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Este libro contiene una serie de trabajos que desdoblan el sentido 
de la pobreza como carencia, es decir, presentan las situaciones 
de pobreza en tanto que formas de vida. Para la tarea se acude al 
uso de categorías sociológicas como la de clase, género, espacio 
regional, etnia, estructura social. Cada texto presenta una versión 
crítica de lo que es la reproducción de la pobreza, por lo que ésta 
es descentrada de su orden estadístico y es colocada como 
referencia a un sistema de relaciones sociales y económicas 
situadas históricamente. Los actores aparecen no sólo como 
reproductores pasivos de las situaciones de carencia, sino 
como sujetos activos que construyen su tiempo vital, sus 
instituciones sociales y económicas, así como su cultura. Esta 
capacidad de praxis implica la existencia de un sistema de 
relaciones de poder-dominación, lo que supone pensar en forma 
convergente la pobreza y las diversas formas de violencia que 
aparecen en la vida cotidiana de los sujetos. Vale destacar 
que cada capítulo es, al mismo tiempo, una propuesta 
metodológica, teórica y normativa que da luz sobre eso que 
denominamos reproducción de la pobreza. Cada caso es una 
apuesta original y está comprometida con la sociedad: son 
una serie de trabajos críticos frente a la perpetuación de la 
pobreza y su sistema de poder-dominación que la hace posible 
como ciclo histórico.
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9InTRodUCTIon
LAtIN AMErICAN CrItICAL tHOuGHt:
tHEOry AND PrACtICE
Si la libertad
existiera,
sería un verbo.
Si el puño
permaneciera,
sería un mástil.
Si la causa
no feneciera,
sería una esperanza...
A. L. B.*
The resurgence of LATin AmericAn criTicAL thought in the 
late 1990s and the early twenty-first century has brought about some 
discoveries that distinguish it from the sociological production of the 
world. it is a scientific framework that has taken on the features of a new 
social scientific paradigm. A growing number of authors have aligned 
themselves with this perspective, with visions that include critical read-
ings geared to contributing to transformative social change, in a Latin 
American context. Thus, we ask ourselves: What are the characteristics 
that distinguish Latin American critical thought and give it its identity? 
What are its germinal features and what are its unresolved matters?
A distinguishing feature of this thought is its belonging to social 
sciences, particularly sociology and its traditions of critical theory, 
whose roots, as gramsci said, do not come from fundamentalist op-
position but rather from the acquisition of scientific certainty on the 
basis of critical analysis.
in scientific discussion […] To understand and to evaluate realistically 
one’s adversary’s position and his reasons (and sometimes one’s adver-
* if freedom existed, it would be a verb. / if the fist persisted, it would be a flagpole. 
/ if the cause did not expire, it would be a hope. / if fists persisted, they would be 
flagpoles. / if causes did not expire, they would be hopes. A. L. B
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sary is the whole of past thought) means precisely to be liberated from 
the prison of ideologies in the bad sense of the word — that of blind 
ideological fanaticism. it means taking up a point of view that is ‘criti-
cal’, which for the purpose of scientific research is the only fertile one1.
here, scientific convergence is not about repeating, reiterating or trans-
lating, but, above all, about re-signifying and reversing the meaning of 
science on the basis of a new objectification agreed by consensus.
This is also a debate on the consensus about social thought, a de-
bate on the intellectual foundation of hegemony. Latin American criti-
cal thought is resurfacing after the long period that followed the im-
passe, or rather the decline, of the ‘Dependency Theory’ of the 1970s 
and the emergence of the intellectual and ideological domination of 
neoliberalism, its political apparatuses and governmental technolo-
gies that prevailed from the 1980s on. This new critical thought has 
called into question the hegemonic forms of understanding the capi-
talist market, the colonization of power and eurocentric assumptions. 
it has gained strength in line with the development of democratic po-
litical forms. When critical Latin American authors refer to the previ-
ous decline in critical scholarship / literature, thought point at the role 
of the genocidal dictatorships in the region. They also find parallels 
between their own work and social movements, especially the peas-
ant, the indigenous and the urban unemployed movements of the late 
twentieth century, as well as the landless workers, the Zapatism and 
the piqueteros, and class fractions that do not have a central place in 
classical theory. Beyond this consensus, authors seem to differ on the 
magnitude of the democratic gains in / for the popular sector and the 
restitution of rights as sources of expansion / in an expansive fashion 
(1990-2010). There are also disagreements about the ‘populist’ charac-
ter of these democratic gains when the fragility of the processes of de-
mocratization and the close links between these electoral democratic 
systems and the transnational capitalist market is considered.
This book, a collection / anthology of critical Latin American 
thought, aims to present a sample of the knowledge produced in the 
south, in line with international productions, and takes the second 
isA forum of sociology Social Justice and Democratization to be held 
at the university of Buenos Aires (2012) as an initial opportunity for 
this. it puts together the views and analyses of outstanding authors 
from Latin America, recognizing that their work represents that of a 
1 gramsci, Antonio 1971 Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart) p. 657. it is recommended the translation and edition 
by hoare, Quintin & nowell-smith, geoffrey (London: electBook, 1999).
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huge number of authors from the region, and also acknowledging the 
existing language barriers. This collection does not cover the broad 
range of topics brought about by the re-emergence of critical thought 
but its outstanding features. With this, we expect to encourage the 
fluid and symmetrical exchange between peers throughout the world. 
We also expect to encourage discussions that cover theoretical con-
tents, empirical references as well as epistemological foci.
This is a necessary and urgent dialogue in the context of the cur-
rent crises in the core nations, taking into account that the concentra-
tion of power and wealth in both the north and the south makes them 
comparable, not so much in their singular aspects as in the nature of 
the systemic questions that includes and connects them. speaking at 
this particular moment in history, in which the very biological exist-
ence on the planet is at risk, a question which concerns us (as the 
type of questions required by the sociological imagination do) arises. 
is sociology an applied science, a social resource for a more just and 
sustainable society? is the knowledge it produces transferable to soci-
ety? Which are the adequate instruments for this transfer? is it not the 
case that we still have many deficiencies and insufficient knowledge to 
address fundamental questions? We can see that social theories have 
the greatest difficulty to become instruments for change, and at the 
same time, we see that critical thought can go through — travel across 
— the networks of collective intellect. The Latin American social phe-
nomenon has as part of its recent experience (2011-2012), university 
student mobilizations in chile, Peru, honduras and mexico. We in-
tend to read them as elements that converge with critical thought, 
not only as a critique of the system of exclusion but also as a form of 
inclusion in critical intellectual activity.
As already noted, the epistemic turn, the paradigm shift is nec-
essary, but what is at stake is not only its denunciation or activist 
content but the alteration in the ways in which scientific knowledge 
in the social sciences is produced, as well as the individual collective 
intellectual praxis. This is why a mutation in the epistemic basis of 
the scientific paradigm is necessary. The transfer of knowledge (the 
trickling down from the intellectual elite) seems to have reached its 
limit. The social actors become authors, we see them taking part 
in national and international meetings, making their influence felt 
against institutional barriers, fighting to participate. This is a new 
intellectual sovereignty and a renewed creative autonomy. Thus, we 
assume that the subordinated / subaltern subjectivity fades away 
when the collective self / subject places itself as a form of inclusion, 
and each subject is able to create as a singular author, both diverse 
from, and in common with others. This participative sociological 
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imagination has yet to be achieved. The task ahead is to lay the 
foundations for a productive force. critical thought, we think, is 
taking steps in this gregarious and plebian direction. We still do not 
know whether it will be able to dissolve the matrix of domination 
that keeps us from dealing with the crisis as a productive intellec-
tual force, comparable or equivalent to the religious formation of /
education in the capitalist system.
here we can quote Aníbal Quijano’s remarks about the lineage of 
José carlos mariátegui in the seminal pages of Siete ensayos de inter-
pretación de la realidad peruana [seven interpretative essays on Peru-
vian reality] (1928) which are still fundamental: 
This original theoretical and epistemic subversion can be recognized 
as a source for the production of the Latin American idea of  histori-
cal-structural heterogeneity, thus breaking with cartesianism’s radi-
cal dualism, which is at the origin of eurocentrism and the positivist 
propensity to reductionism and evolutionism. And without this new 
starting point we would be unable to come to terms with the new 
theoretical and political debate about the nature and history of the 
current world power, especially the lively debate about the theoretical 
proposal of coloniality and decoloniality of power in Latin America 
and beyond2.
The authors in this book, all of them from Latin America, focus on 
different topics. however, there is a shared logic that goes through 
the entire work: the awareness that sociology in Latin America is pro-
duced between two types of tensions: internal tensions inherited from 
coloniality, and external tensions that result from the global reach of 
Latin American critical thought/the developments of Latin American 
critical thought at the global level. A. Quijano’s contribution to the 
critique of development from the point of view of the heterotopy of the 
buen vivir (live well), built on the basis of the experience and knowl-
edge of the Andean World; garcía Linera’s reflection on the original 
multinational state that acknowledges the autonomy of the indigenous 
peoples as a nation within the developmentalist state; and the analysis 
of Jaime Preciado and Pablo uc on the role of cuba in the context 
of inter-American relations, and the alliances between it and some 
countries of the region in undermining the us government’s attempts 
to isolate it and challenging the long-standing Pan-American power 
structure are important examples that call attention to the internal 
changes experienced by Latin American sociology.
2 mariátegui, José carlos 2010 La tarea americana (Buenos Aires: cLAcso) p. 21.
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similarly, internal change has effects and is affected by external 
factors that cannot be neglected. first, there is a tradition that takes 
in the contributions of some european intellectuals to the critique of 
coloniality. This sheds light on the existence of a critical thought in the 
north that aims to challenge colonial domination, and is important to 
recognize the other in the building of the social world. Thus, in the 
context of what seems to be the crisis of late capitalism and the con-
comitant death of the so-called postmodern thought, eduardo grüner 
offers us a stimulating ‘anachronism’ that keeps the intellectual legacy 
of two outstanding thinkers: Jean-Paul sartre and Pier Paolo Pasolini, 
who were able to anticipate current debates in the field of postcolonial 
theory and subaltern studies. on the other hand, it is necessary to 
bring up to date the debate on culture and democracy in the context 
of the changes produced by peripheral globalization. in this regard, 
marilena chaui’s work is crucial, as she reconstructs the meaning of 
the word culture on the basis of different intellectual and political 
contexts, explores the relations between culture and democracy in 
light of the Brazilian experience and outlines the connections between 
democracy and socialism.
on the other hand, in the current scenario, and as a part of the 
theoretical challenge facing the Latin American left, it is worth pay-
ing attention to emir sader’s remarks about the absence of strategic 
thinking in line with the current political challenges for the region, 
and the ardent call to produce theory out of the practices of the re-
gion. regarding this, rafael correa’s speech proposes a balance of 
social sciences in Latin America, mapping the Latin American intel-
lectual heritage, wondering about the meaning of the scientific and 
social work, and arguing against influences of the neoliberal hegem-
onic thought, and in favour of a theory which implies corollaries 
that enable the improvement of our reality. in order to address the 
regional challenges, the intrinsic complexity of the world system has 
also to be taken into account. in this vein, Theotonio dos santos 
argues that such complexity calls for economic and political coor-
dinated action on global issues, rather than the ‘invisible hand’ of 
the market and the illusion of the law of comparative advantages in 
world trade. The search of economic and social justice in the con-
text of globalization needs shared development strategies located 
within a scientific framework built at the global level. finally, José 
Vicente Tavares dos santos presents a typology of the development 
of Latin American sociology and calls for a deeper dialogue with 
chinese sociology in the search of a sociology of transformation. his 
work focuses on the role of sociology in analyzing processes of social 
transformation in Latin America, in the effects of the globalization 
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of social conflict and in the possibility of an intellectual dialogue 
with the Asian giant’s sociology. 
The debates presented in this book attempt to contribute to a 
new way of thinking from the south, that it should also be put in 
the context of broader south-south relations that also integrate other 
countries producing original and important reflections in several con-
tinents of what we call the south and what we call the north.
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Aníbal Quijano*
‘LIVE WELL’
BEtWEEN tHE ‘DEVELOPMENt’
AND tHE DESCOLONIALIty OF POWEr**
WhAT i ProPose here is To oPen a crucial question of our cru-
cial historical period: ‘Live Well’1, to be an effective historical achieve-
ment, cannot be but a complex of social practices oriented to the dem-
1 ‘Live Well’ and ‘good living’ are the most widespread terms in the discussion 
about the new movement of society, especially of the indigenized population in Latin 
 * PhD at the major national university of san marcos (unmsm), Peru. master 
at fLAcso; unesco and the university of chile. Doctor Honoris Causa at 
the university of Buenos Aires (uBA), Argentina; university of guadalajara, 
mexico; university r. Palma, Peru; and central university of Venezuela, Ven-
ezuela. Director at the social investigation centre (ceis), Peru. Professor and 
Professor-researcher in the main universities of Latin America, and in several 
of Asia, europe and the united states. ex Vice-president of the Latin American 
sociological Association (ALAs). member of the international sociological As-
sociation (isA); and the first World social forum. he has published several 
books on coloniality and descoloniality theory; globalization; the social move-
ments and the democratic system, including: Colonialidad del Poder, Globali-
zación y Democracia (Lima: sociedad y Política, 2001); and ‘Poder y Derechos 
humanos’ in Pimentel, carmen (ed.) Poder, Salud Mental y Derechos Humanos 
(Lima: cecosAm, 2001). 
** This is a revised and augmented version of the one that was published in Boletín 
OXFAM Internacional (oxford, uK), may, 2010.  Available in spanish at <http://
www.oxfam.org/es>. Translated by eugenia cervio. reviewed and copy edited 
by Juan Diego incardona.
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ocratic production and reproduction of a democratic society, another 
form of social existence, with its own and specific historical horizon of 
meaning, radically alternative to the global coloniality of Power and 
the coloniality / modernity / eurocentred2. This pattern of power still 
today globally hegemonic, but it is also in its moment of deeper and 
rooted crisis since its constitution more than five hundred years ago. 
under these conditions, ‘Live Well’, today, can only make sense as an 
alternative social existence, as a Descoloniality of Power. 
America, towards a different social existence to the one that the coloniality of Power 
has imposed on us. ‘Live Well’ is, probably, the oldest formulation in the ‘indigenous’ 
resistance against the coloniality of Power. notably, it was coined in the Viceroyalty 
of Peru by nothing less than felipe guamán Poma de Ayala, approximately in 
1615, in his nueva crónica y buen gobierno. carolina ortiz fernández is the first 
one that attracted attention on this historical fact: ‘felipe guamán Poma de Ayala, 
clorinda matto, Trinidad henríquez y la teoría crítica. sus legados a la teoría social 
contemporánea’ in Yuyaykusun (Lima: universidad ricardo Palma), n° 2, December, 
2009. The differences may be not linguistic only, but rather, conceptual. it will be 
necessary to define the alternatives, both in Latin American spanish and in the 
main variants of Quechua and Aymara in south America. in the Quechua of the 
north of Peru and ecuador, it is said Allin Kghaway (good Living) or Allin Kghawana 
(good Way To Live), and in southern Quechua and Bolivia it is usually said Sumac 
Kawsay and is translated into spanish as ‘Live Well’. But ‘sumac’ means pretty, nice, 
beautiful, in the north of Peru and in ecuador. This way, for example, ‘Imma Sumac’ 
(What Beautiful), is the stage name of a famous Peruvian singer. ‘Sumac Kawsay’ 
would be translated as ‘Live nice’. inclusive, some unwary eurocentrists pretend that 
‘Sumac’ is the same as ‘Suma’ and propose to say Suma Kawsay. 
2 The theory of the coloniality of Power, or global coloniality of Power, and of 
eurocentrism or coloniality / modernity / eurocentred as its specific historical horizon 
of meaning, was originally proposed in my texts since the beginning of the last decade 
of the twentieth century. for the purposes of the current debate, it may be useful 
to mention the main ones. ‘colonialidad y modernidad / racionalidad’, originally 
published in Perú Indígena (Lima), Volume 13, n° 29, 1991; ‘Americanity as a concept 
or the Americas in the modern World-system’, in coauthorship with Wallerstein, 
immanuel in International Social Science Journal (Paris, unesco/BLAcKWeL), n° 
134: 549-557, november, 1992; ‘América Latina en la economía mundial’ in Problemas 
del Desarrollo (méxico: unAm), Volume XXiV, n° 95, october-December, 1993. 
‘raza, etnia y nación: cuestiones Abiertas’ in José Carlos Mariátegui y Europa (Lima: 
Amauta, 1993) pp. 167-188. ‘colonialité du Pouvoir et Démocratie en Amérique Latine’ 
in Future Antérieur: Amérique Latine, Démocratie et Exclusion (Paris: L’harmattan, 
1994). ‘colonialidad, Poder, cultura y conocimiento en América Latina’ in Anuario 
Mariateguiano (Lima), Volume iX, n° 9: 113-122, 1998. ‘¡Qué tal raza!’ in Familia y 
Cambio Social (Lima: cecosAm, 1998). ‘colonialidad del Poder, eurocentrismo y 
América Latina’ in Lander, edgardo (comp.) 2000 Colonialidad del Saber, Eurocentrismo 
y Ciencias Sociales (Buenos Aires: cLAcso/unesco) pp. 201 ss. ‘colonialidad del 
Poder y clasificación social’ originally in Arrighi, giovanni & goldfrank, Walter L. 
(eds.) 2000 Journal of World-Systems Research (colorado), Volume Vi, n° 2: 342-388, 
fall-winter. special issue: festschrift for immanuel Wallerstein; and a reviewed version 
in San Marcos (Lima: universidad de san marcos), n° 25: 51-104, July, 2006. A global 
debate on this theory is currently being developed. 
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Aníbal Quijano
‘dEVELoPMEnT’, A EURoCEnTRIC PARAdox: ModERnITy 
WIThoUT dESCoLonIALITy
Development was, especially in the Latin American debate, the key 
term of a political discourse associated with an elusive project of rela-
tive deconcentration and redistribution of the control of the indus-
trial capital in the new geography that was configured in the global 
colonial-modern capitalism, at the end of the World War ii. 
At first, this was a virtually official discourse. however, it soon 
gave rise to complex and contradictory issues that resulted in a rich 
and intense debate, with global reverb, as a clear expression of the 
magnitude and depth of the conflicts of political-social interest im-
plied in all that new geography of power, and in Latin America in  par-
ticular. Thus, it was produced an extensive family of categories (prin-
cipally, development, underdevelopment, modernization, marginality 
and participation, of a side; and imperialism, dependency, margin-
alization and revolution, in the opposite slope) that was unfolding in 
close relation with the conflicting and violent movements of society, 
which led to either non-conducive processes or to relatively impor-
tant, but unfinished, changes in the distribution of power3. 
in a brief way, it might be said that in Latin America the main re-
sult was the removal of the ‘oligarchic state’ and some of its instances 
in the social existence of the population of these countries. But nei-
ther its historical-structural dependence in the global coloniality of 
Power, nor the ways of exploitation and of domination inherent to this 
pattern of power were eradicated or altered sufficiently to give place 
to a democratic production and management of the state, nor the re-
sources of production, distribution and appropriation of the product. 
not even the debate, in spite of its intensity, managed to be freed of 
the hegemony of the eurocentrism. in other words, these changes did 
not lead to ‘development’. otherwise, it could not be possible to un-
derstand why the term always reappears, now for example, as an un-
finished past spectre4. 
3 The names of raúl Prebisch, celso furtado, Aníbal Pinto, fernando henrique 
cardoso; enzo faletto, Andrew gunder frank, rui mauro marini, Theotonio dos 
santos, José nun, among the many who took part in this debate, are probably 
familiar to the majority of the readers. And there is available to this regard, of course, 
an extensive literature. 
4 see: Quijano, Aníbal 2000 ‘el fantasma del Desarrollo en América Latina’ in 
Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales (caracas, universidad central 
de Venezuela), n° 273-91. And, also of the same author: ‘os fantasmas da America 
Latina’ in Novais, Adauto Oito Visoes da America Latina (são Paulo: senAc, 2006) 
pp. 49-87.
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ThE GLobAL CoLonIALITy of PoWER And ThE SPECTRE 
of ThE nATIon-STATE 
The hegemony of eurocentrism in the debate was leading, in Latin 
America, to consider the ‘development’ in relation to the nation-state. 
But in the context of the global coloniality of Power, that perspective 
was historically irrelevant. even more is, precisely, after the World 
War ii that this pattern of power entered on a global scale, in a pro-
longed period of decisive changes which is useful to summarize: 
1. The industrial capital began to link structurally to what then 
was named ‘scientific-technological revolution’. That relation-
ship implied the reduced requirements of living and individual 
labour force and, in consequence, of the wage employment as 
structurally inherent to the capital in its new period. unem-
ployment ceased to be a juncture or cyclical problem. ‘struc-
tural unemployment’ was the term coined later by the conven-
tional economists to mean this process. 
2. These trends of change in the relations between capital and 
labour involved the margin expansion of speculative accumu-
lation as a structural tendency, and not only cyclical, and led 
to the progressive domination of ‘structural financiarization’. 
Thus a new industrial-financial capital was setting up, which 
soon had a relatively rapid global expansion. 
3. A process of technocratization-instrumentalization of the 
subjectivity of the imaginary, of the whole specific histori-
cal horizon of meaning of the colonial / modernity / euro-
centred. strictly, it is a process of increasing abandonment 
of the initial promises of the so-called ‘modern rationality’ 
and, in this regard, of a profound change of the ethical and 
political perspective of the eurocentric original version of 
the ‘coloniality / modernity’. This did not cease to be, yet his 
new character, attractive and persuasive, although becoming 
more and more paradoxical and ambivalent and, ultimately, 
historically impossible. 
4. The development and the expansion of the new industrial-
financial capital, along with the defeat of the nazi-fascists 
groups of the world bourgeoisie, in the dispute over the he-
gemony of capitalism during the World War ii, facilitated the 
disintegration of european colonialism in Asia and Africa and, 
at the same time, the prosperity of the bourgeoisies, of the mid-
dle classes, and also of important sectors of the exploited work-
ers of the euro-American countries. 
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5. The consolidation of the bureaucratic despotism (re-baptized 
‘really existing socialism’) and its rapid expansion in and out-
side europe happened within this same historical course. This 
form of domination was affected, more and more profound 
and irreparably, by this technocratic and instrumental current 
of the colonial / modern ‘rationality’. 
6. in this context, the hegemony of that version of ‘modernity’ 
operated as the most powerful mechanism of domination of 
subjectivity, both on the part of the world bourgeoisie as the 
despotic bureaucracy of the so-called ‘socialist camp’. Thus, 
notwithstanding their rivalries, both modes of domination / 
exploitation / conflict, converged in its repressive antagonism 
to the new movements of the society, in particular in lathe of 
social ethics concerning labour, gender, subjectivity and collec-
tive authority. 
7. it would be more difficult to explain, otherwise, the successful 
alliance of both forms of domination to defeat (be in Paris, new 
York, Berlin, rome, Jakarta, Tlatelolco, or in shanghai and 
Prague) the movements, youth-led in particular, that between 
the end of the 60s and early 70s of the twentieth century were 
fighting, minority but all around the world, not only against the 
work exploitation, against the colonialism and imperialism and 
against the colonial-imperial wars (in that period, Viet nam 
was the emblematic case); but also against social ethics of pro-
ductivism and consumerism, against the pragmatic bourgeois 
and bureaucratic authoritarianism, against the dominations of 
‘race’ and ‘gender’, against the repression of non-conventional 
forms of sexuality, against the technocratic reductionism of 
instrumental rationality and for a new aesthetic / ethical / po-
litical tessitura. fighting, consequently, for a radically different 
historical horizon of meaning that the implied in the colonial-
ity / modernity / eurocentred.  
8. At the same time, a new pattern of conflict emerged. firstly, the 
delegitimizing of any domination system mounted on the axis 
‘race’ / ‘gender’ / ‘ethnicity’. The trend started already since the 
end of World War ii, as a result of the global revulsion with re-
gard to the atrocities of the nazism and of the Japanese military 
authoritarianism. The racism / sexism /ethnicity of those des-
potic regimes not only were, therefore, defeated in the war; but 
also and not less important, turned into an illegitimating refer-
ence of the racialization, the patriarchy, the ethnicism and the 
militaristic authoritarianism in power relations. But it was espe-
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cially during the decade of the 60s of the twentieth century that 
the great debate about ‘race’ and ‘gender’ could receive a new 
and definitive expression, announcing the great current global 
conflict over the control of the respective fields of social practice. 
9. for all that, notwithstanding the defeat of the anti-bureaucrat-
ic and anti-authoritarian movements, and of the sequent impo-
sition of the ‘globalization’ of the new global colonial capital-
ism, the seed of a new historical horizon could survive between 
the new historical and structural heterogeneity of the world 
imaginary, and germinates now as one of the greater signs of 
the Live Well proposal.
ThE nEW hISToRICAL PERIod: ThE RooTEd CRISIS of ThE 
GLobAL CoLonIALITy of PoWER
The development of those new historical tendencies of the industrial-
financial capital, led to this prolonged period of heyday and changes 
to culminate with the explosion of a rooted crisis in the very pattern 
of power as such, the global coloniality of Power, as a whole and in 
its root elements, since the second half of 1973.
With this crisis, the world has entered a new historical period, 
whose specific processes have equivalent depth, magnitude and im-
plications, but with an almost inverse sign to those of the period we 
denominate as ‘industrial-Bourgeois revolution’. The terms ‘neoliber-
alism’, ‘globalization’ and ‘postmodernity’ (that could not be discussed 
thoroughly here)5 presented with reasonable efficiency, nevertheless 
all their ambivalences and complexities, the character and major 
trends of the new period. 
The first point consists, basically, in the definitive imposition of 
the new financial capital in the control of the colonial / modern global 
capitalism. in a precise sense, it is the global imposition of the ‘struc-
tural unemployment’, fully hatched with the ‘structural financiariza-
tion’.  The second, in the imposition of that defined plot on all coun-
tries and the entire human population, initially in Latin America, with 
5 my contribution to the debate of these questions is, principally in: Modernidad, 
Identidad y Utopía en América Latina (Lima: sociedad y política, 1988); ‘colonialidad 
del Poder, globalización y Democracia’, originally in Tendencias básicas de nuestra 
era (caracas: instituto de estudios internacionales Pedro gual, 2001), and a reviewed 
version in San Marcos (Lima: universidad de san marcos), n° 25, July, 2006. ‘entre 
la guerra santa y la cruzada’ originally in América Latina en Movimiento (Quito), 
n° 341, october, 2001. ‘el trabajo al final del siglo XX’, originally in Pensée Sociale 
Critique Pour le XXI Siècle. Mélanges en l´honneur de Samir Amin. Forum du Tiers-
Monde (Paris: L´harmattan, 2003) pp. 131-149. ‘Paradojas de la colonialidad / 
modernidad / eurocentrada’ in Hueso húmero (Lima), n° 53: 30-59, April, 2009. 
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the bloody dictatorship of general Pinochet in chile, and later by the 
politics of the governments of margaret Thatcher and ronald reagan 
in england and in the united states, respectively, with the endorse-
ment and / or the submission of all the other countries. 
That imposition produced social dispersion of exploited workers 
and the disintegration of their main political and social institutions 
(trade unions, especially); the defeat and disintegration of the so-
called ‘socialist camp’, and of virtually all regimes, movements and po-
litical organizations that were linked to it. china, and later Vietnam, 
opted to become members of the new ‘actually existing capitalism’, 
industrial-financial and globalized, under a bureaucratic despotism 
reconfigured as a partner of the largest global financial corporations 
and of the global imperial Bloc6.
in a word, ‘postmodernity’ denominates, not completely inappro-
priately, the definitive imposition of the technocratization-instrumen-
talization of the up till then known as the ‘modern rationality’. That is, 
of the coloniality/ modernity / eurocentred. 
We are, therefore, immersed in a process of complete reconfigura-
tion of the global coloniality of Power, of the hegemonic pattern of 
power of the planet. This is, first of all, the acceleration and deepening 
of a trend of re-concentration of the control of power.
The central tends of this process consists, in a tight inventory, in:
1. The re-privatization of public spaces, of the state in first term.
2. The re-concentration of the control of the work, of the resourc-
es of production and of the production-distribution.
3. The extreme and increasing social polarization of the world’s 
population.
4. The exacerbation of the ‘exploitation of nature’.
5. The hyper-fetichization of the market, rather than of the 
goods.
6. The manipulation and control of the technological resources 
of communication and transport for the global imposition of 
the technocratization-instrumentalization of the coloniality / 
modernity.
7. The commodification of the subjectivity and of the experience 
of life of the individuals, principally of the women. 
6 on the concept of global imperial Bloc, i refer to: ‘colonialidad del Poder, 
globalización y Democracia’ (Quijano, 2001), already quoted.
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8. The universal exacerbation of the individualistic dispersion 
of persons and of the egoistic behaviour posed as individual 
freedom, which in practice is equivalent to the universalization 
of the ‘American dream’ distorted in the nightmare of brutal 
individual pursuit of wealth and power against the others.
9. The ‘fundamentalization’ of the religious ideologies and of its 
corresponding social ethics, which re-legitimate the control of 
the main realms of social existence. 
10. The increasing use of the so-called ‘cultural industries’ (es-
pecially of images, movies, TV, video, etc.) for the industrial 
production of an imaginary of terror and mystification of the 
experience, as a way of legitimizing the ‘fundamentalization’ of 
the ideologies and the repressive violence.
ThE ‘ExPLoITATIon of nATURE’ And ThE CRISIS of ThE GLobAL 
CoLonIALITy of PoWER
Although, in a barely allusive way, it would not be pertinent to stop 
indicating that one of the founding elements of the coloniality / mo-
dernity / eurocentred is the new and radical cartesian dualism that 
separates ‘reason’ and ‘nature’. so, one of the most characteristic ideas 
/ images of eurocentrism, in any of its slopes: the ‘exploitation of na-
ture’ as something that does not require any justification and that is 
fully expressed in the productivist ethics engendered along with the 
‘industrial revolution’. it is not at all difficult to perceive the inherent 
presence of the idea of ‘race’ as part of ‘nature’7, as an explanation and 
justification of the exploitation of the ‘inferior races’. 
it is on the basis of this metaphysical mystification of human re-
lationships with the rest of the universe, that the dominant groups of 
homo sapiens in the global coloniality of Power, especially since the 
‘industrial revolution’, have led the species to impose their exploitative 
hegemony on the other animal species and a predatory conduct on the 
other existing elements in this planet. And, on that basis, the global 
colonial capitalism practises a more and more fierce and predatory 
conduct, that ends up putting at risk not only the survival of the entire 
species on the planet, but the continuity and the reproduction of the 
living conditions of any life on earth. under its imposition, today, we 
are killing each other and destroying our common home-earth. 
7 A more detailed discussion can be found originally in Arrighi, giovanni & 
goldfrank, Walter L. (eds.) 2000 ‘colonialidad del Poder y clasificación social’ in 
Journal of World-Systems Research (colorado), Volume Vi, n° 2: 342-388, fall-winter. 
special issue: festschrift for immanuel  Wallerstein.
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from this perspective, the so-called ‘global warming’ of the cli-
mate on earth, or ‘climatic crisis’, far from being a ‘natural’ phenom-
enon, that occurs in something that we call ‘nature’ and is separated 
from us as members of the animal species homo sapiens, is the re-
sult of the exacerbation of that global disorientation of the species 
on earth, imposed by the predatory tendencies of the new industrial-
financial capitalism within the global coloniality of Power. in other 
words, is one of the core expressions of the root crisis of this specific 
pattern of power.
 
ThE nEW RESISTAnCE: ToWARdS ThE dESCoLonIALITy 
of PoWER
since the end of the twentieth century, an increasing proportion of the 
victims of this pattern of power has begun to resist to these tendencies 
in, virtually, all the world. The dominators, the ‘officials of the capital’, 
either as the owners of the largest financial corporations or as the 
leaders of despotic-bureaucratic regimes, respond with violent repres-
sions, not only within the conventional borders of their own coun-
tries; but going through or crossing over them, developing a tendency 
to global re-colonization, using the most sophisticated technological 
resources that allow to kill more people, faster, with less cost.  
given these conditions, in the crisis of the global coloniality of 
Power and, especially, of the coloniality / modernity / eurocentred, 
the exacerbation of conflict and violence has been established as a 
global structural trend. 
such exacerbation of the conflict, of the fundamentalisms, of the 
violence, related to the growing and extreme social polarization of 
the world’s population, is leading to the resistance itself to configure 
a new pattern of conflict. The resistance tends to develop as a mode 
of production of a new sense of the social existence, of the life itself, 
precisely because the vast population involved perceives, with increas-
ing intensity, that what is at risk now is not only their poverty, as their 
everlasting experience; but nothing less than their own survival. such 
discovery entrails, necessarily, that it is not possible to defend the hu-
man life on earth without defending, at the same time, in the same 
movement, the conditions of life itself on earth. 
Thus, the defence of human life, and of the conditions of life 
on the planet, is being constituted in the new sense of the resistance 
struggles of the vast majority of the world’s population. And without 
subverting and disintegrating the global coloniality of Power and its 
colonial global capitalism, nowadays at its most predatory period, 
these struggles could not move towards the production of an alterna-
tive historical sense to the coloniality / modernity / eurocentred.
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dESCoLonIALITy of PoWER AS ConTInUoUS dEMoCRATIC 
PRodUCTIon of SoCIAL ExISTEnCE
in this new historical horizon of meaning, the defence of the condi-
tions of their own life and of the others in this planet is already raised 
in the struggles and in the alternative social practices of the species; in 
consequence, against any form of domination / exploitation of social 
existence.  That is to say Descoloniality of Power as a starting point, 
and the democratic auto-production and reproduction of the social 
existence as a continuous axis of orientation of the social practices. 
it is in this historical context in which it is necessary to locate any 
discussion and development on the proposal of Live Well. Therefore, it 
is, first and foremost, to accept it as an open question, not only in the 
debate, but in the everyday social practice of populations that decide 
to concoct and dwell historically in this possible new social existence. 
To develop and consolidate, the Descoloniality of Power would 
imply social practices configured by:  
a. The social equality of heterogeneous and diverse individuals, 
against the unequal racial / sexual / social classification and 
identification of the world’s population.
b. consequently, neither the differences nor the identities would 
be more the source or the argument of the social inequality of 
individuals.
c. Associations, groupings, memberships or belongings and / or 
identities would be the product of free and autonomous deci-
sions of free and autonomous individuals.
d. The reciprocity between groups and / or individuals socially 
equal, in the organization of the work and the distribution of 
products.
e. The egalitarian redistribution of tangible and intangible re-
sources and products of the world, among the world popula-
tion.
f. The tendency of communal association of the world popu-
lation, in local, regional or global scale, as a direct mode of 
production and administration of collective authority and, in 
this precise sense, as the most effective mechanism of distribu-
tion and redistribution of rights, obligations, responsibilities, 
resources and products, between groups and individuals, in 
every field of social existence: sex, work, subjectivity, collective 
authority and co-responsibility in relations with other living 
beings and other entities on the planet or the entire universe.
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ThE ‘nATIVES’ of ThE ‘GLobAL SoUTh’ And ThE PRoPoSAL of 
LIVE WELL: PEndInG QUESTIonS
it is not a historical accident that the discussion about the colonial-
ity of Power and the coloniality / modernity / eurocentred has been 
produced, initially, in Latin America. As well as it is not so that the 
proposal of Live Well comes from, firstly, the new movement of the 
Latin American ‘natives’. 
Latin America is the world founded in the ‘Accidental indies’ (an 
ironic reference to the disclosed idea of ‘West indies’)8; and for this 
reason, as the original space and the inaugural time of a new histori-
cal world and of a new pattern of power, that of the global coloniality 
of Power. And likewise, as the original and inaugural space / time of 
the first ‘indigenization’ of the survivors of the colonizer genocide, as 
the first population of the world subjected to the ‘racialization’ of their 
new identity and place dominated in the new pattern of power. 
Latin America and the ‘native’ population occupy, therefore, a ba-
sal, foundational place in the constitution and history of the coloni-
ality of Power. hence, their current place and role in the epistemic / 
theoretic / historic / aesthetic / ethic / politic subversion of this pattern 
of power in crisis, involved in the proposals of global Descoloniality 
of Power and Live Well as an alternative social existence. 
however, though America, and particularly Latin America, was the 
first new historical identity of the coloniality of Power and their colonized 
populations the first ‘natives’ or ‘indians’ of the world; since the eighteenth 
century, the remaining territory of the planet, with all their populations, 
was conquered by Western europe. And such populations, the vast major-
ity of the world’s population, were colonized, racialized and, consequently, 
‘indigenized’. Their current emergency is not, therefore, one more ’social 
movement’. it is a whole movement of society whose development could 
lead to the global Descoloniality of Power, that is, to another social exist-
ence, liberated from domination / exploitation / violence. 
The crisis of the global coloniality of Power and debate and the 
struggle for their Descoloniality have demonstrated, to full light, that 
the social relation of domination / exploitation, founded around the 
idea of ‘race’, is a product of the history of power and not of the car-
tesian ‘nature’. But it also make clear the extreme historical hetero-
geneity of this population ‘indigenized’, first in their prior history to 
european colonization; second, in which has been produced by the 
experiences under the coloniality of Power for almost five hundred 
years and, finally, for the one that is being produced now in the new 
movement of the society towards the Descoloniality of Power. 
8 finley, robert 2003 Las Indias Accidentales (Barcelona: Barataria).  
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it would have no sense to expect that this historically heterogene-
ous population, which comprises the overwhelmingly vast majority of 
the world’s population, has produced or nestled a historical homoge-
neous and universal imaginary as an alternative to the global coloni-
ality of Power. That could not be conceivable, even taking into account 
exclusively Latin America, or America as a whole. 
in fact, all these populations, without exception, are derived from his-
torical experiences of power. To our knowledge, the power seems to have 
been, throughout known history, not only a phenomenon present in all 
social existences of long duration, but, more importantly, the main motiva-
tion of the historical collective behaviour of the species. such experiences 
of power, no doubt, differ from one another and with regard to the colo-
niality of Power, despite the possible common experiences of colonization.
 however, the ‘indigenized’ populations under the colonial domina-
tion, first in ‘America’ under iberia, and later worldwide under ‘West-
ern europe’, not only have shared in common, universally, the perverse 
forms of domination / exploitation imposed with the global coloniality 
of Power. But also, paradoxical but effectively, in the resistance against it 
they have gone so far as to share common historical aspirations against 
the domination, exploitation and discrimination: the social equality of 
heterogeneous individuals, freedom of thought and expression, of all in-
dividuals, the egalitarian redistribution of resources, as well as the equal 
egalitarian control of all of them, on all main spheres of social existence. 
for these reasons, the historical ‘indigenousness’ of  the populations 
victims of the global coloniality of Power, not only encourages the her-
itage of the past, but the whole learning of the historical resistance of 
that long term. We are, therefore, walking in the emergence of a new 
historical identity, historical-structurally heterogeneous as all the others, 
but whose development could produce a new social existence liberated 
from domination / exploitation / violence; which is the very heart of the 
demand of the World social forum: Another World is Possible.
in other words, the new historical horizon of meaning emerges 
with all their historical-structural heterogeneity. in that perspective, 
the proposal of Live Well is, necessarily, an open historical question9 
that requires to be inquired, discussed and practiced continuously.
9 About that, for example the recent interviews with Aymara leaders in Bolivia, made 
and broadcast by the cAoi internet e-mail. The journal América Latina en Movimiento, 
of the Latin American information agency (ALAi), has dedicated the n° 452, february, 
2010, entirely to this debate, under the general title of ‘recuperar el sentido de la vida’. 
regarding the social practices themselves, there is, already, a very important movement 
of specific research. see: gómez, esperanza et al. 2010 Vivir Bien Frente al Desarrollo. 
Procesos de planeación participativa en Medellín (medellín: universidad de medellín).
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IndIGEnoUS AUTonoMIES  
And ThE MULTInATIonAL STATE** 
I. ThE ExCLUSIonARy REPUbLIC
When Bolivia became a republic, it inherited the colonial social struc-
ture. Land distribution, social stratification, the tax regime and even 
part of the civil service and the staff tasked with administrating it did not 
undergo substantial changes, leaving intact the class structures, powers, 
institutions and hierarchical staff created during the different stages of 
the colonial regime. in the process, perhaps the most enduring legacy 
was also conserved — the system of beliefs, prejudices and dominant 
values that had determined collective behaviour before the independ-
ence process: the racialisation of social differences by means of the state 
invention of the ‘indian’, not only as a taxpayer category, but above all, 
 * Vice-president of Bolivia since 2006. mathematician and self-taught social and po-
litical scientist. he has published several books on political theory, the economic 
regime, social movements and the democratic system, including, Plebeian Power: 
Collective action and indigenous, working-class and popular identities in Bolivia 
(Bogotá: cLAcso/siglo del hombre, 2009). in 2004, he received the ‘Agustín cue-
va’ award in social sciences granted by several universities in ecuador.
** Text extracted from: garcía Linera, Álvaro ‘Autonomía indígena y estado multi-
nacional. estado plurinacional y multicivilizatorio: una propuesta democrática 
y pluralista para la extinción de la exclusión de las naciones indias’ in AA.VV. 
2004 La descentralización que se viene (La Paz: iLDis/Plural). Translated by sha-
na Yael shubs and ruth felder. reviewed and copy edited by eugenia cervio.
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as the ‘negative other’ that organised the symbolic structures with which 
people, including the indians themselves, made sense of the world.
The category of indian was initially introduced by representatives 
of the spanish monarchy as a tax and fiscal category. This classifica-
tion, in addition to partially diluting other forms of native identifica-
tion, established a division of labour and a ranking of types of knowl-
edge and means of accessing trades, producing a complex structure 
of social class formation. But at the same time, and in order for this 
taxation to work, the colony constructed indianness as a discourse 
and a prejudice that naturalised the structures of social domination, 
identifying it with those who are not qualified, who must be ruled, ed-
ucated, indoctrinated, led, governed and appeased. The stigmatisation 
of indianness (which in turn has different levels of symbolic meas-
urement) naturalised practices of economic exclusion and legitimated 
the political and cultural monopolies on defining the rules of social 
competence, thereby contributing not only to a racialised expression 
of particular socioeconomic conditions of exclusion and domination, 
but also to objectively constructing these socioeconomic conditions.
The indianisation of colonised society was produced by means of a 
series of components, which, at certain times and in particular contexts, 
demarcated the indian that had to pay taxes and be excluded from the 
higher levels of the colonial power. And — as clearly evidenced by the 
tax records that show repeated visits to collect taxes as well as indig-
enous people’s escape strategies — place of residence, maternal language, 
occupation, surname, income, type of property, form of dress and even 
physical features were tied together in a flexible way in different periods 
in order to objectify the indian, or to create distance from the indian, as 
a subject of economic levy and political exclusion. in this sense, indian is 
neither a race nor a culture, but colonial rule systematically sought to ra-
cialise the indian because it had to somehow delimit the tax-paying and 
subordinate population. An ethnification of this exploitation was there-
fore established de facto. There are, then, three interconnected processes. 
The first, conquest, distinguishes between rulers and the ruled as a result 
of the confrontation between forces of political and state apparatuses. 
The second, the colony, marks out the spaces of the division of labour and 
the cultural, administrative and economic powers, based on a geograph-
ic, cultural, somatic and racial identification of the colonised. And lastly, 
there is the legitimation and naturalisation of the system of domination, 
based on this culturalist, spatial and racial hierarchy of the social order.
The Bolivian republic was founded leaving intact these colonial 
structures, which conferred prestige, property and power as a function 
of skin colour, surname, language and lineage. The liberator simón 
Bolívar clearly distinguished between ‘Bolivianness’, assigned to all 
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those who had been born under the territorial jurisdiction of the new 
republic, and ‘citizens’, who had to know how to read and write the 
dominant language (spanish) and be free of bonds of servitude, en-
suring that right from the start, indians lacked citizenship1. in a step 
backward even with respect to the colony, which had recognised the 
local validity of indigenous systems of authority, Bolívar, attempting to 
establish a liberal constitution, had previously declared the authority of 
the indigenous chiefs to be defunct, replacing them with local officials 
appointed by the state2.
The different state forms up to 1952 did not significantly modify this 
political apartheid. The caudillo state3 (1825-1880) and the regime of so-
called ‘censitary’ democracy (1880-1952)4 in both its liberal and its con-
servative periods had modified the state’s political constitution many times 
(1826, 1831, 1834, 1839, 1843, 1851, 1861, 1868, 1871,1878, 1880, 1938, 
1945, 1947); however, politico-cultural exclusion was maintained both in 
state law and in the people’s daily practices. indeed, throughout this pe-
riod, ethnic exclusion became the articulating axis of state cohesion.
in this entire period, the state did not even pretend to incorporate 
the indians into state decision-making processes, although, incidental-
ly, a large part of governmental expenses were financed with indigenous 
taxes, even in the early twentieth century5. here, citizenship, like power, 
legitimate property and culture, are rights not to be deliberated over but 
to be exercised as categorical imperatives, because they are a type of 
right of conquest. citizenship is not so much a production of rights as it 
is a family inheritance; it was a type of patrimonial citizenship.
The rights to govern would be manifested for more than a hun-
dred years as a display of lineage; one does not become a citizen, one 
is born either citizen or indian. it is a stigma of ancestry and pedigree. 
1 grüner, Wolf 2000 ‘un mito enterrado: la fundación de la república de Bolivia 
y la liberación de los indígenas’ in Historias: Revista de la Coordinadora de Historia 
(La Paz), n° 4.
2 Bolívar, simón 1991 (1825) ‘Decreto del 4 de julio de 1825, cuzco’, cited in 
sandoval rodríguez, isaac Nación y estado en Bolivia (La Paz: mundy color).
3 irurozqui, marta 1994 La armonía de las desigualdades. Elites y conflictos de poder 
en Bolivia, 1880-1920 (Lima: consejo superior de investigaciones científicas/centro 
de estudios regionales Andinos/Bartolomé de las casas).
4 mayorga, rené A. 1999 ‘La democracia o el desafío de la modernidad política’ in 
campero Prudencio, fernando (ed.) Bolivia en el siglo XX (La Paz: harvard club Bolivia).
5 Viaña, Jorge 2002 ‘La llamada ‘acumulación originaria’ del capital en Bolivia’ (La 
Paz: Postgrado en ciencias del Desarrollo/universidad mayor de san Andrés/muela 
del Diablo); rodríguez, gustavo 1979 La acumulación originaria de capital en Bolivia 
1825-1885 (cochabamba: universidad mayor de san simón/instituto de estudios 
sociales y económicos).
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Patrimonial citizenship in the oligarchic state, more than a culture 
of public responsibility, is a pledge of loyalty to the perpetuity of the 
caste. it is, above all, the showing off of family crests, of the purity of 
the bloodline. of course, this does not impede the intrusion of social 
climbers who have been able to whiten their lineage in this inbred 
political space. This is the case of successful merchants, purchasers of 
communal lands and the offspring of oligarchic encholamiento6 who, 
nonetheless, possess a suspicious citizenship, which must be negoti-
ated by developing clientelist networks, showing off their money and 
abiding by the lifestyle of the traditional elites.
We can appreciate the extent to which the state’s limited ambi-
tion for expanding its constituency was part of its structural logic by 
comparing the number of residents registered in the country with the 
number of voters participating in different elections. from 1880 to 
1951, the number of voters — ‘citizens’ — varied between two and 
three percent of the total population inhabiting Bolivia7.
The processes of democratisation and cultural homogenisation 
that began in the wake of the 1952 revolution partly transformed the 
oligarchic state’s regime of ethnic and cultural exclusion. The univer-
sal vote extended the right of political citizenship to millions of indige-
nous people previously deprived of any input into state decision-mak-
ing. similarly, as public and free education started to extend into rural 
areas, the indigenous people, who had constituted the overwhelming 
majority of ‘illiterates’ excluded from the body of state knowledge, 
were able to gain more access to this knowledge, and some possibili-
ties for social mobility emerged as academic cultural capital was ac-
cumulated. All these measures, along with the creation of a domestic 
market, the individualisation of agrarian property and the nationali-
sation of the main centres producing economic surplus, were clearly 
inscribed within a program of nation-building8 led by the state.
however, the legitimate cultural knowledge acquired by indigenous 
groups was limited to the mandatory learning of a foreign language, 
spanish, and of cultural norms produced and monopolised by mestizo-
urban communities, setting into motion the mechanisms of ethnic exclu-
sion once again, although now in a reformed and euphemistic fashion. 
Thus, from 1952 to 1976, the 60 to 65% of the Bolivian population that 
spoke an indigenous language as their mother tongue could only exercise 
their citizenship rights in a foreign language, as official education, the 
6 The union of white, oligarchic men and mestizo women (Translators’ note).
7 Percentages calculated based on data provided by irurozqui (1994) and contreras, 
manuel ‘reformas y desafíos de la educación’ in campero Prudencio (1999).
8 original in english (Translators’ note).
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university system, the relationship with the public administration and so 
on could only be conducted in spanish, and not in Quechua or Aymara.
With the 1952 revolution, spanish became the only official lan-
guage of the state, in effect devaluing the indigenous languages, which 
had no official recognition that could enable their acknowledgement 
as a legitimate language for engaging in public affairs, pursuing social 
mobility or gaining access to bureaucratic-administrative positions. 
similarly, granting the universal vote to the indians imposed a single 
organisational framework for political rights — the liberal one — in a 
society with other traditional systems of political organisation and of 
selection of authorities, which were then swept aside, no longer con-
sidered to be efficient mechanisms for the exercise of political rights.
This linguistic and organisational homogenisation to which the 
indigenous peoples, who were bearers of other cultural knowledge and 
other systems of forming authority, were subjected quickly gave way to 
the construction of a space of linguistic and organisational competence 
and accumulation regulated by the state, in which the indigenous people, 
now ‘fellow peasants’, were once again positioned at the bottom of the 
struggle to conquer legitimate political and academic knowledge. obvi-
ously, if the only language taken into account by the state for the pur-
pose of communicating about state matters is the mother tongue of the 
mestizo elites, those with a different mother tongue who have to learn a 
second language, like the indians, have to make a greater effort to access 
the privileged sites that those with spanish as a first language occupy au-
tomatically. here, the linguistic combination and the weaknesses in the 
syntactic construction of spanish, inevitably revealed by those with an 
indigenous language as their mother tongue, is an easy way to identify, 
discipline and belittle indigenous efforts to master spanish.
in this linguistic market, the top, with access to decision-making 
positions in the state, is occupied by long-standing spanish speak-
ers, while the stigmatised group on the opposite end of the hierar-
chy is made up of those who only speak indigenous languages. in the 
middle, in a complex system of hierarchical rankings, are those who 
speak both spanish and an indigenous language, but can not write; 
immediately following them are those that do know how to write in 
spanish, but can not pronounce it well; then there are those that can 
speak only spanish, but do so as the first generation and are there-
fore still brought down by their family environment that includes an 
indigenous language;  then there are those who have achieved an aca-
demic title as a result of their second-generation spanish skills; after 
them are those who can write and speak with greater skill in spanish; 
then come those that can also speak and write some other foreign lan-
guage, even better if it is english, and so on.
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in the same way, in terms of cultural practices, it is clear that those 
like the urban mestizos — who have defined their particular knowledge 
and skills as socially valued, legitimate cultural practices on the basis 
of their privileged relationship with the state — have greater chances 
for accumulating other types of cultural capital. The indigenous, on 
the other hand, with other practices and customs, have fewer options 
for social mobility and cultural accumulation, because they have not 
gained access to the production of these skills within their immediate 
environments, and in order to develop them, they have to exert a great-
er effort to understand them, assimilate them and use them efficiently.
With respect to organisational systems in politics, it is similarly 
clear that those with better chances at entering public office and ben-
efitting from such positions will be those groups of people well-suited 
to the exercise of liberal rights, who have been educated by those rights 
and for those rights: once again, educated mestizos in liberal profes-
sions. meanwhile, those educated in the logic of corporatist, commu-
nalist and traditional behaviours, like the indians, have greater chances 
of entering subaltern positions. As a result, in the development of the 
legal political field, the acquisition of political capital is principally con-
centrated in those people who, being educated in liberal principles and 
practices, are well-prepared to carry themselves efficiently in accord-
ance with such liberal dictates and in their service. meanwhile, in order 
for those with a different political culture to have any opportunities in 
the structure of the field of political competencies, they must necessar-
ily acquire strange skills, usually both belatedly and ambiguously, such 
that their efforts can only ‘spontaneously’ materialise in subordinated 
and marginal positions of scant legitimate political capital.
This hierarchical construction of languages in the linguistic field, 
and of politico-organisational cultures in the political field, creates a 
new social apparatus for the exclusion of indigenous people. it is no 
longer implemented by the force of law or of arms, but rather ‘softly’, 
by means of the procedures and components that in an apparently ‘nat-
ural’ way result in the higher ranking posts in the state apparatus, in 
the administration of culture and in the economy being occupied by 
groups that have been spanish-speaking for a long time, by the heirs of 
the old colonial networks of power, marked by processes of individua-
tion. meanwhile, the indigenous, with their communitarian practices, 
always hold positions of less privilege and power, seemingly as a result 
of a ‘natural selection of aptitudes’. it is a modernised re-ethnification 
of the social division of labour, of occupations, of powers and of politi-
cal hierarchies. The ‘modernist’ aspect here lies in the use of the facade 
of equality to reproduce inequalities. There is talk of the equality of the 
individual vote, but only in order to mask an unequal acknowledgement 
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of politico-organisational cultures and practices, as the representative 
liberal ones are seen as the only legitimate ones, in opposition to indig-
enous political practices and systems, which are marked by the impor-
tance of the community. There is talk of equality in education, but only 
in order to conceal an inequality in the recognition of the languages that 
are publicly valid for social mobility. if we also consider that there is a 
high probability of associating different social groups in their linguistic, 
cultural and organisational abilities with specific physical features, then 
a racialisation of these abilities is not unusual. As a result, an ethnic field 
is established once again in which a desirable good — legitimate ethnic-
ity based on social and physical whiteness — emerges as the structuring 
axis of accumulations, wagers and competences that confer recognition, 
greatness and social position.
All this is what the indianism emerging in the seventies has spoken 
out against as the existence of a ‘second-class citizenship’9. first-class 
citizenship is for people that bear the symbolic badges of social white-
ness (surname, social networks, personal demeanour), which position 
them as suitable for taking on government positions, institutional or 
business leadership and social recognition. second-class citizenship is 
for those who, as a result of their rural origins, their language or their 
skin colour, are ‘discouraged’ such that they occupy subaltern positions, 
roles of obedience and severed opportunities for social mobility.
A. EThnICITy AS CAPITAL
in very general terms, an ethnicity is a community that constructs a set 
of shared cultural attributes, as well as a belief in a history rooted in a 
shared ancestry, in addition to a collective unconscious10. These cultural 
attributes can be of a subjective nature, such as affective, emotive and 
symbolic criteria with respect to collective affinities; or they can be ob-
jective, like language, religion, territory and social organisation. how-
ever, the importance of all these attributes lies in their connoted compo-
sition; that is, in the form of articulating and understanding them.
There are ethnicities for which the criteria of differentiation are of 
a racial and biological nature (in guyana, between Africans and indi-
ans); linguistic and religious (Tamils and singhalese in sri Lanka); or 
exclusively based on language (Walloons and flemish in Belgium). in 
any case, what matters in this repertoire of ethnicity11 is that it manages 
9 hurtado, Javier 1985 El katarismo (La Paz: instituto de historia social Boliviana).
10 hechter, michael 1987 Principles of group solidarity (Berkeley: university of 
california Press); epstein, Arnold 1978 Ethos and identity (London: Tavistock). 
11 Balibar, Étienne & Wallerstein, immanuel 1991 Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous 
identities (London/new York: Verso).
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to form a collective memory that goes back to an ancestral line, allow-
ing the group to imagine a unique trajectory that differentiates it from 
others; it allows an appreciation of the language as a live archive of a 
world view shared by the bearers of this communicational code; it cre-
ates frameworks for performing the existence of the group that make its 
public life visible; and it supports a reclamation of the territories con-
sidered to be ‘ancestral’, where the group’s symbolic and identity-based 
points of reference are presumably anchored.
The evolution of ethnicities may take several trajectories.  They can 
produce nations with a state, like the english; they can form a part of a 
multinational state that recognises nationalities as components of a con-
federation (the former Yugoslavia); they can exist as minorities or major-
ities without an institutional presence in the colonial states; or they can 
carry on amid a disavowal of their existence, like the Kurdish in Turkey.
ethnicities can follow several paths of development. There are 
identities produced by the state, and in fact, there is no modern state 
that has not invented an ethnic identity in one way or another12. in 
other cases, they might date far back in time, be the product of a re-
cent ethnogenesis, or be the product of colonial politics13.
in this last case, we can agree with oommen that ethnicities are pro-
cesses by which certain communities are defined as foreign in their own 
territories and are stripped of control over the political and economic life 
in this same territory14, hence the colony and the republic can be under-
stood as uninterrupted processes of ethnicising indigenous peoples.
The ethnicisation of the indigenous, by dissociating the cultural 
community from its territorial sovereignty, creates the structural basis 
for the processes of exclusion, discrimination and social exploitation 
that characterise regimes of occupation. in this sense, ethnic labels can 
also be understood as cultural and political artefacts of the complex 
systems of social class structuring15 that, by means of the symbolic 
power of specific class fractions, allows class differences to be natu-
12 Balibar & Wallerstein (1991).
13 stavenhagen, rodolfo 1996 Ethnic conflicts and the nation-state (new York: st. 
martin’s Press); clavero, Bartolomé 1994 Derecho indígena y cultura constitucional 
en América (mexico: siglo XXi).
14 oommen, T. K. 1997 Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity (cambridge: Polity 
Press and Blackwell).
15 Balibar, Étienne ‘racism and nationalism’ in Balibar & Wallerstein (1991). for a 
discussion between ‘primordialists’ and ‘instrumentalists’ about the bases of ethnicity, 
see geertz, clifford 1993 The interpretation of cultures (new York: fontana); cohen, 
Abner 1974 Two-dimensional man: An essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism 
in complex society (London: routledge); Barth, fredrik (ed.) 1969 Ethnic groups and 
boundaries the social organization of culture difference (Boston: Little Brown).
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ralised in some cases, and in others, enshrines cultural differences as 
patterns of fundamental social differentiation16. in this latter case, the 
discourse of ethnicity takes the form of political discourse, in which 
objective class differences are reduced to cultural differences in an at-
tempt to group together — based on an objective class position (for 
example, a certain dominated fraction of intellectuals, or segments of 
urban merchants), as well as on specific projects — those social sectors 
with different class conditions that share with more or less intensity 
the same cultural and symbolic matrix. it is an authentic euphemisa-
tion of the class condition. it is dangerous in that by cloaking the class 
condition, it only serves to strengthen, in the market of cultural goods, 
the cultural value of certain practices that grant greater negotiating 
power to that fraction (which bases its advancement on the possession 
of a certain type of cultural capital) in defining legitimate cultural and 
political capital. meanwhile, it leaves intact the distribution of other 
objective class conditions, which once again confine the subaltern 
classes to their traditional class subalternity.
still, we must investigate the conditions that allow physical indica-
tors, like skin colour, hair colour, and surname, to take on such great 
importance when it comes to classifying and naturalising the differences 
between social classes. it is not enough to claim that it is merely a mat-
ter of cultural constructions through which class differences are seen as 
natural differences. The fact that physical classifications play a role as 
noticeable, desirable or negative assets suggests that they are not just 
an ‘expression’, a reflection, or the effects of mere discursive ‘deception’. 
under certain circumstances, such as Bolivia’s colonial and postcolonial 
periods, ethnic differentiations in general, and racial classifications in 
particular, can be seen as a type of specific capital17, a specific social 
good: ethnic capital, which along with other economic, cultural, social 
and symbolic capitals, helps to shape the values of class differentiation.
ethnic capital thus refers to two complementary dimensions: on 
one hand, to distinctive cultural practices with universal scope, which 
euphemise and erase the imprints of the objective conditions of their 
production and control (legitimate language, legitimate tastes and aca-
demic knowledge, etc.); and on the other hand, to objective social differ-
ences that have taken on the rank of physicalised differences, and which 
have then erased the history of the objective struggles to impose these 
16 A similar way of understanding the development of social classes in an Andean 
region can be found in gose, Peter 1994 Deathly waters and hungry mountains: Agrarian 
ritual and class formation in an Andean town (Toronto: university of Toronto Press).
17 Bourdieu, Pierre 1984 Distinction: A social critique of the judgment of taste 
(cambridge: harvard university Press).
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differences. skin colour and the distinguished surname with which the 
colonisers initially symbolically made explicit their objective position 
as victorious conquerors with rights to riches, land and indians con-
vert this physicalised symbolic difference into bodily wealth, the dis-
play of which symbolically secures their objective position of strength 
and control. it is a cultural product that confers value to racial features 
and ancestry, but whose virtue lies in converting the differences actually 
conquered in the political, military, organisation and technical victory 
over the colonised into differences of blood that naturalise the objective 
balance of forces. in more horizontal terms, this form of constructing 
ethnic assets, but without the consequences of domination, can also be 
the symbolic structure through which the solid and somewhat closed 
family and community ties (which articulate the circulation of the la-
bour force and land ownership) express their social value, their privi-
leged place in the world, to other nearby communal groups.
This kind of ethnic capital, which today is more valuable than the 
differences that stem from the distribution of legitimate academic as-
sets, is a type of symbolic capital that affects the effectiveness of all other 
types of capital (economic, social, political, linguistic, etc.), and that has 
also created its own field of distribution, competition and positioning to 
control it. The competition for ‘whiteness’18 in Bolivian society has thus 
been a form of making real or fictitious class structuring physical, but 
with all the force of symbolic power to produce practical classing or de-
classing effects in the ordering of the realm of objective class conditions. 
This becomes clear when, for example, people from a lower social class 
want or think they can have an intimate relationship with a partner from 
a distant social class, because they have the ethnic capital (physical fea-
tures, surname) of a social class located further up on the social ladder; 
or the silent pursuit by any family of any social class to find a mate that 
could culturally or physically ‘whiten’ their descendants.
The objective importance of processes of social class structuring 
and their possibilities of being converted into other capital (such as 
economic capital) can be seen in the very structure of economic op-
portunities in the Bolivian labour market. According to a survey con-
ducted by Jiménez Zamora, indigenous people hold 67% of the most 
vulnerable and precarious jobs, 28% of semi-skilled jobs, and just 4% 
of skilled jobs19. These data can be taken as evidence that there is open 
18 frankenberg, ruth 1989 ‘The social construction of whiteness’ in Annual Review 
of Anthropology (Palo Alto), n° 18.
19 Jiménez Zamora, elizabeth 2000 ‘el costo de ser indígena en Bolivia: 
discriminación salarial versus segregación laboral’ in Revista de la Sociedad Boliviana 
de Economía Política (La Paz), Volume 1.
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discrimination against indigenous skilled and semi-skilled workers; 
or they can be understood to indicate that there are fewer indigenous 
people that can offer skilled labour than there are spanish-speaking 
mestizos who can do so; or they can be interpreted to mean that skilled 
and semi-skilled indigenous workers no longer identify with an indig-
enous identity; or, lastly, they can suggest that a combination of two or 
three of these options produces this kind of ethnic segmentation in the 
labour market. in any of these cases, openly or not, indigenous ethnic-
ity emerges as an object of systematic exclusion and social devaluation.
We can arrive at the same conclusion based on a review of the 
structure of labour income. non-indigenous emigrants earn three 
times more than indigenous emigrants, while the indigenous, in gen-
eral, earn only 30% of the wage of non-indigenous workers performing 
the same jobs, and non-indigenous women earn just 60% of men’s wag-
es20. To put it bluntly, an indian is ‘worth’ one third of a spanish-speak-
ing mestizo man and one half of a spanish-speaking mestizo woman.
so, the republic and the acquisition of individual political rights, 
from 1952 to the present, have at least formally dissolved the colonial 
system of labour division, both economic and political. But what has not 
disappeared — since more than an administrative measure it is a cogni-
tive structure of embodied reality — is the racialised or ethnicised repre-
sentation of the world, the naturalisation of social differences and apti-
tudes according to specific cultural, historical, geographic and physical 
properties. racially expressed discrimination, at least in Bolivia, is no 
longer just a state or tax invention; it is, above all, common sense. And 
to the extent that it is an imagined structuring of the world, with which 
both the dominant and the dominated see themselves and others in the 
world, it plays an effective role in the practical structuring of that world.
With the erasure of the memory of the social deed that produced 
this ethnification of social differences and class structuring, the ra-
cial or ethnic ranking of the world takes on a structuring force be-
cause it helps to symbolically delimit social differences, increasing the 
strength of social differentiation. hence the presence of ethnic capital 
— that is, of a regime of competences around ethnic assets (contin-
gently attributed to mother tongue, place of origin, skin colour, sur-
name) — which strengthens or devalues each person according to his 
or her proximity to legitimate or stigmatised ethnicity in an attempt 
to obtain other social goods of an economic, relational or educational 
nature. in this way, today, as is clear from the different paths pursued 
by subjects in their matrimonial strategies, and cultural acquisitions, 
wage hierarchies, the proportional distribution of prestige conferred 
20 Jiménez Zamora (2000).
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by cultural background and the treatment of the body itself, ‘cultural 
whiteness’ and indianness are not just stigmatising expressions, but 
opposite poles that structure the field of legitimate symbolic assets 
that contribute to the structuring of the social classes.
b. MonoCULTURAL STATE, MULTInATIonAL SoCIETy
it has been said that a nation is a unit of language, culture, territory and 
economy. This is partly true, but as a result of the consolidation of the 
nation, and not as its point of origin or its defining substance.
There are nations that have more than one official language, such as 
Belgium and Paraguay, and in other cases, the fledgling nation initially 
included numerous regional and local languages, without this impeding 
the development of a national spirit that would fight for independence, 
as in the united states and germany. There are currently more than 400 
languages in the world, but the number of nations does not exceed 190, 
reinforcing the notion that not all languages result in a nation, nor does 
every nation need just one language in order to develop.
similarly, cultural unity, which can be the outcome of long cen-
turies of social cohesion, is not a prerequisite for the formation of 
a nation. indeed, all modern nations initially were, and continue to 
be, groupings of diverse cultural practices, but with the articulatory 
capacity of a national identity that enabled and still enables them to 
compete in the global context. france, for example, was a cultural 
and linguistic mosaic in the eighteenth century, where entire regions 
shared more cultural affinities with parts of southern germany or 
northern italy, but this was not an obstacle for the construction of the 
french nationality as a republican entity possessing state sovereignty. 
Likewise, economic unity is not a prerequisite for the formation of 
a nation. israel, much before it had relatively unified economic institu-
tions, already existed as a national desire in all those that considered 
themselves fellow nationals and that were scattered throughout differ-
ent regions of the world. in this case, the unified economy and even 
the territory were the result, not the precondition, of the strength of 
national identification. At heart, territory, culture and language are a 
product of the history of the nation, their historic substantiation and 
material corroboration, not the beginning of their formation. in fact, 
there are many peoples who possess territory and cultural, linguistic 
and economic unity, yet remain mere ethnic fragments, or in other cas-
es, they prefer to dissolve into larger national entities, in which they be-
lieve they will find more satisfactory public rights than those they could 
obtain autonomously. The history of some european, African and Latin 
American peoples has been precisely this path, while that of others has 
been one of violent extinction.
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What matters about territory, language, culture and even the econ-
omy is not their sum, because not even with the sum of these four com-
ponents are nations achieved. What matters is how these elements are 
dealt with toward the future; that is, their historical connotation or ex-
tent of qualification, which can be used by the social conglomerate that 
identifies in advance with a shared destiny, with a community of belong-
ing and transcendence.
Language or territory can be understood as specific (folkloric) 
components of a greater social structure, as devalued belongings from 
which it is best to disassociate oneself, or as expressions of an uncom-
promisingly separate and differentiated identity from those that sur-
round and dominate it. only in this case do language, territory or cul-
ture become components of a national identity; therefore, what matters 
is that they are read, interpreted, signified, desired, or in other words, 
their form of politicisation.
nations are, then, political artefacts, political constructions 
that create a sense of belonging to a type of historical entity that can 
confer a sense of transcendent collectivity, a sense of historical cer-
tainty in the face of the vicissitudes of the future, a sense of a basic 
familiar bond between people who will surely never see each other, 
but who supposedly share a form of intimacy, of historical proxim-
ity, of possibilities of cohabitation that other people who constitute 
‘otherness’, alterity, do not possess. herein lie the importance and 
the prominent role that discursive constructions and leaderships 
play in the development of national identities, due to their capacity 
to articulate demands, predispositions, expectations and solidari-
ties in symbolic frameworks of aggregation and autonomous po-
litical action in the field of dominant cultural, territorial and policy 
competences21. nations are social, territorial and cultural frontiers 
that exist first in the heads of fellow nationals, and which have the 
strength to become objectified in material and institutional struc-
tures. in this sense, nations are political communities whose mem-
bers, those that see themselves as part of the nation, identify in ad-
vance with an institutionality that they recognise as their own and 
within which they constitute their social struggles, their abilities 
and mentalities22. it is precisely the formulation of these symbolic 
frontiers in the collective imaginary, based on the visualisation and 
politicisation of the actual frontiers of the existing colonial segrega-
21 miller, David 1995 On nationality (new York/oxford: clarendon Press/oxford 
university Press); eagleton, Terry 1999 ‘nationalism and the case of ireland’ in New 
Left Review (London), Volume 1, n° 234.
22 Balibar, Étienne ‘The nation form: history and ideology’ in Balibar & Wallerstein (1991).
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tion, that would seem to be one of the rising claims of the Aymara 
indigenous social movement of recent years23.
national formations are initially performative discourses24 with 
the strength to generate the processes that construct communities 
of political consent with which people define an ‘us’ distinct from an 
‘others’. They do so by means of the reinterpretation, enunciation or 
invention of one or more social components (for example language, re-
ligion, ethnicity, the history of domination), which from that moment 
on become the components of differentiation and community adher-
ence that guarantee their members a collective security in their shared 
future. it is a type of communicative interaction that produces, or un-
earths, or invents, an expanded fraternity, a broadened kinship able 
to create, first, a gravitational attraction toward certain demographic 
sectors that will feel drawn in, and second, a complementary effect of 
repulsion toward those who then feel excluded. Because of all this, it is 
said that nations are ‘imagined communities’25. in this sense, nations 
do not need a pre-existing ethnic community to become consolidated, 
although this may favour it, producing a monoethnic nation.
in general, nations are the outcome of a political aggregation of 
many ethnicities, and the nation is precisely the production of a new 
(real or fictitious) ethnicity that allows the relevance and the necessity 
of the current existence of the nation to be projected into the past. But, 
at the same time, as processes of remaking the collective subjectivity 
23 ‘struggles over ethnic or regional identity — in other words, over the properties 
(stigmata or emblems) linked with the origin through the place of origin and its 
associated durable marks, such as accent — are a particular case of the different 
struggles over classifications, struggles over the monopoly of the power to make people 
see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition 
of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups. What is 
at stake here is the power of imposing a vision of the social world through principles 
of division which, when they are imposed on a whole group, establish meaning and a 
consensus about meaning, and in particular about the identity and unity of the group, 
which creates the reality of the unity and the identity of the group’ in Bourdieu, Pierre 
1991 Language and symbolic power (cambridge: harvard university Press) p. 221.
24 ethnic or regionalist discourse ‘is a performative discourse which aims to impose as 
legitimate a new definition of the frontiers and to get people to know and recognize the region 
that is thus delimited in opposition to the dominant definition, which is misrecognized as 
such […] The act of categorization, when it manages to achieve recognition or when it is 
exercised by a recognized authority, exercises by itself a certain power: ‘ethnic’ or ‘regional’ 
categories, like categories of kinship, institute a reality by using the power of revelation and 
construction exercised by objectification in discourse’ Bourdieu (1991: 223).
25 gellner, ernest 1983 Nations and nationalism (ithaca: cornell university Press); 
Anderson, Benedict 1983 Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism (London: Verso); guibernau, montserrat 1996 Nationalisms: The nation-
state and nationalism in the twentieth century (cambridge/cambridge: Polity Press).
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that creates a sense of ‘us’, nations are also a form of producing the 
‘common’, the common good that unites the group and differentiates 
it from ‘other’ groups, and in this sense they are political communities, 
as their articulatory strength is precisely the management, distribution 
and conservation of this common good.
hence, it is not strange that the state is sometimes confused with 
the nation, as both deal with the management of the common good. The 
former, however, is institutionalised from above, and works to produce 
the illusion of a political community from the top down (marx), while the 
nation, in contrast, exists from the moment in which a political commu-
nity is imagined from below and works from the bottom up to create an 
institutionality that embodies this political desire. in modern societies, 
when only the ‘illusory community’ (state) works, we encounter forms 
of authoritarianism and curtailed processes of nationalisation, such as 
those of Bolivia. When the ‘illusory community’ results from the insti-
tutionalised specification of the ‘imagined community’ (the nation), we 
find the formation of political legitimacy and successful nationalisation.
This identification between nation and institutional concretisation 
of the political community in the form of the state has led to the affir-
mation that we can only speak of nations in the strict sense when the 
political intersubjectification of fellow nationals achieves governmen-
tal autonomy through the state, and that until this happens we must 
speak of nationalities. The virtue of this assertion lies in that it does 
not assume an essentialist or static vision of national construction; it 
sees it as a field of forces, as a process, as a political course that reaches 
maturity when it is institutionalised as a state.
in Bolivia, it is exceedingly evident that, despite the profound pro-
cesses of cultural mixing, a national community has not yet been made 
a reality. There are at least thirty regional languages and/or dialects26, 
there are two languages that are the mother tongue of 37% of the popu-
lation (Aymara and Quechua), and close to 62% identify with the in-
digenous peoples27. And, to the extent that every language is a whole 
understanding of the world, this linguistic diversity is also cultural 
and symbolic diversity. if we add to this that there are cultural and 
national identities older than the republic, and that even today they 
demand political sovereignty over seized territories (the case of the Ay-
mara identity), it is very clear that Bolivia is, at heart, a coexistence of 
various overlapping  or moderately articulated regional nationalities 
26 Albó, Xavier ‘etnias y pueblos originarios’ in campero Prudencio (1991).
27 instituto nacional de estadística (ine) 2002 Censo nacional de población y 
vivienda 2001 (La Paz: ine).
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and cultures28. however, and despite this, the state is monolingual and 
monocultural in terms of the spanish-speaking Bolivian cultural iden-
28 All identities are always the fruit of deliberate work in the discursive, symbolic 
and organisational field, which produces a state of self-reflexivity in subjects in order 
to demarcate imagined borders (real or believed) that differentiate them from other 
subjects. This distinctive will is always the fruit of an activity specifically intended to 
achieve an objective, and therefore it is always fabricated, produced. in this sense, 
all identities are cultural inventions that, either externally to the group (as with the 
colony’s ‘indians’, for example), or as a result of the presence of internal political 
elites (the contemporary Aymara identity), make visible and resignify some shared 
element (language, history, ancestors, culture, religion, etc.), with which boundaries 
are set down to distinguish them from other people, and substantive loyalties (a kind 
of extended kinship) are instilled amongst the ‘identified’.
now, of course this production of identities can not be made out of nothing; there are 
greater chances of success when there are similar conditions of objective existence 
between people, but it is also possible that, even when these similar objective conditions 
exist, a cultural identity or differentiated politics will never be produced. All identities 
are historically contingent and relational, thus any speculation about ‘originary’ and 
‘fabricated’ identities is reprehensible. The only rigorous approach in any case, is to inquire 
into the conditions of production of this or that identity and its capacity for mobilisation, 
and not about its artificiality, as all identities are, ultimately, social inventions.
A common error about the concept of identity, that of Jorge Lazarte for example, is 
to confound ethnic identity, based on cultural practices, with socioeconomic regime 
or technical acquisition, as it regards identifying oneself as Aymara or indigenous 
as antagonistic to demanding internet or tractors. While the former has to do with 
the cultural system of signification with which subjects know and act in the world, 
the latter refers to the economic organisation and access to resources upon which 
this signification of the world acts.  A german person and an english person can 
have a car, a cell phone and an industry in common, but that does not make them 
participants in the same cultural identity, nor is their attachment to the language 
or the cultural tradition of their respective cultural communities a return to the 
technology of the middle Ages. similarly, that the Aymara people demand modern 
roads, telephone systems and technology does not mean that they have renounced 
their language, their tradition, or that they joyfully demand their rapid conversion to 
the spanish language and their immediate cultural mixing.
unlike what Lazarte believes, indigenous cultural identity is not associated with a re-
turn to the takit’aclla plough, as if identity were associated with a specific technologi-
cal level of society and a single activity (agricultural work). The Aymaras, for example, 
have shown that it is possible to culturally be Aymaras when cultivating in precolonial 
suka kollos times, as well as in times of the colonial mita, the republican hacienda and 
the modern factory. The confusion between ethnic identity and socioeconomic regime 
leads to a petrified interpretation, and therefore a useless one for the purpose of ac-
counting for the complicated processes of modern ethnic identity construction. Like 
in other parts of the world, indigenous identity claims are not incompatible with, for 
example, industrial or technical modernity. indeed, this is when the very vitality and 
regenerative capacity of cultural identities are put to the test. That the Aymaras de-
mand tractors, but with discourses in their own language and as part of an indigenous 
project of political autonomy, far from debilitating the process of identity construc-
tion, inserts it into modernity itself, or in other words, fights for a modernity articu-
lated with tradition and based on the repertoires of indigenous cultural signification.
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tity. This implies that only with the spanish language can people ob-
tain rights and possibilities of social mobility within the country’s dif-
ferent power structures — economic, political, judicial and military 
ones, as well as cultural ones. Despite the fact that most people hold 
rural-urban indigenous cultural origins, physical and cultural ‘white-
ness’ is an asset pursued by every social stratus, as it symbolises social 
mobility and becomes a symbolic advantage that contributes to the 
ability to better position oneself in the processes of social class struc-
turing and destructuring.
What is paradoxical about all this is that this compulsive con-
struction of ethnic identities delegated or attributed (the indigenous) 
by the state itself, which enables the constitution of whiteness as ac-
cruable capital and indianness as devalued stigma, is accompanied by 
a repudiation of ethnicity as the subject of political rights, in a repeat 
of the classical schizophrenic attitude of the state that institutionally 
promotes the inexistence of majority ethnic identities, while at the 
same time it regulates ethnic exclusion as a means of the racialised 
monopolisation of social powers.
in Bolivia, there are almost fifty historico-cultural communities 
with different characteristics and hierarchical positions. The major-
ity of these cultural communities are located in the eastern region of 
the country, and demographically they range from a few dozen fami-
lies to almost a hundred thousand people. The two largest indigenous 
historico-cultural communities are located in the western part of the 
country: the Quechua and Aymara speakers.
The former, resulting from indigenous migrations and the poli-
cies of spanish colonisation, which imposed the Quechua language 
in the old Aymara ayllus, constitute, in a strict sense, only a linguis-
tic community, and not so much an ethnic identity with unifying 
levels of politicisation. in general, this linguistic community, de-
spite including almost three and a half million people, features a 
high degree of permeability that brings its members, in some cases, 
to quickly merge with other cultural structures, especially urban-
mestizo ones, to group together around peasant or union class iden-
tities, and in other cases, to become concentrated in ethnic micro-
is it not at all possible to be culturally or nationality-wise Aymara and at the same time 
be an engineer, a worker, a manufacturer or a farmer?
The peasant and archaistic reductionism with which some conservative ideologues 
attempt to interpret indigenous cultural identity formation not only suffers from a 
lack of knowledge about history and social theory, but it is also strongly marked by 
an ethnocentric mental framework, which tends to associate the indigenous with the 
backward, the rural and the opposite of the ‘development’ and ‘modernity’ that would 
naturally be part of the mestizo and spanish-speaking world.
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identities around ayllus or federations of ayllus (the ayllus located in 
Potosí and in sucre).
in contrast, the other large linguistic community, Aymara, which 
includes a little more than two and a half million people, features all 
the elements of a highly unified and politicised ethnic identity. un-
like the rest of the indigenous identities, the Aymara identity has for 
decades produced cultural elites able to create discursive structures 
strong enough to reinvent an autonomous history that anchors the 
pursuit for an autonomous future in the past, a system of mass union 
mobilisation around these political beliefs, and recently, a leadership 
able to confer a visible body politic to ethnicity. in historical terms, 
the Aymara identity is not only the oldest in the Bolivian territory, but 
above all, it is the one that has most systematically created an archi-
tecture of beliefs, of political discourses based on self-government, of 
projects, and of a mobilising force with respect to these demands29. 
unlike the rest of the indigenous cultural identities, it is the one with 
an extensive intellectual elite, which has constructed an ethnic dis-
course that, through the union network, has been appropriated by 
broad sectors of the population, constituting itself as the only current 
indigenous nationality-like identity.
Lastly, there is the dominant Bolivian cultural identity, resulting 
from 179 years of republican life and which, though it initially arose as 
a state-created political artifice, now has a set of historic-cultural and 
popular milestones that make it consistently and predominantly urban.
All this should not make us forget that, like any ethnic identity, in 
Bolivia these are flexible identities, and in extreme cases, they are con-
tingent upon the attributes of the context, which advance or withdraw 
their borders according to the historical cycles of economic expansion 
and openness of governmental spaces of power.
These diverse linguistic communities and ethnic identities have 
different symbolic configurations, world views, organisational forms, 
cultural knowledge and practices and territorial attachments. none-
theless, the majority of these cognitive and practical references have 
never been integrated into the establishment of the legitimate state 
symbolic and organisational world, because the structures of social 
power are under the reigning monopoly of the Bolivian ethnic iden-
tity. This is why we can say that the republican state is a monoethnic 
or monocultural state, and in this sense, an exclusive and racist one.
This state monoculturalism is visible daily, when, for example, stu-
dents with Aymara or Quechua as their home or childhood language 
29 hurtado (1985); garcía Linera, Álvaro 2003 ‘La formación de la identidad nacional 
en el movimiento indígena-campesino aymara’ in Fe y pueblo (La Paz), Year 1, n° 2.
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have to incorporate, among the structural conditions for academic 
success, in addition to the availability of time and cultural resources 
that flow from their socioeconomic condition, the mastery of new lin-
guistic skills monopolised by spanish-speaking students, as spanish is 
the legitimate language for acquiring educational goods. in this case, 
the home language is the point of departure for a visible indianness, 
and therefore for a stigma that undervalues the body of available skills 
for different social competences. something similar occurs in many 
public domains (military service, administrative positions, the judici-
ary, banking access, etc.), and not for a minority, but rather for more 
than half the population. in certain contexts, surname, dress and skin 
colour can fulfil this same devaluing role in the social trajectory.
it is well known that the state needs to create collective adherences 
and systems of common objectives and values that allow it to imaginar-
ily unite the different social groups present throughout the range of its 
territorial influence. The school, the system of birth records, of supply-
ing identity cards, of voting, the public rituals, the suite of civic symbols, 
etc. create this base of cultural affiliation that over the long term pro-
duces a state-invented ethnicity. The problem with this begins when this 
state monoethnicisation is made by arbitrarily selecting a set of skills, 
competences and values monopolised by specific groups, to the detri-
ment of others. This problem becomes complex when these identity-
based components are predominantly controlled by limited or minority 
sectors of the population, and, even worse, when the acquisition of these 
components of ethnic legitimation is an unsuccessful or mutilated en-
terprise as a result of the state-endorsed symbolic devaluation to which 
the people who enter into these processes of de-ethnification and re-
ethnification are subject, which is precisely what happens in Bolivia.
Being a country of approximately eight million inhabitants, in 
linguistic terms a little more than four million speak Aymara or Que-
chua as their mother tongue, or they are bilingual with spanish. how-
ever, no government office, no institute of higher education, nor any 
high-ranking economic, political or cultural posts have the Aymara 
or Quechua languages as an official means of communication. state 
monolingualism, while it arbitrarily establishes a single language as 
the language of the state, in practice devalues the other languages as 
means with which to access public office or as a mechanism of ur-
ban social mobility. it also, surreptitiously, coerces the bilingual and 
monolingual Aymara-Quechua speakers to abandon their languages, 
as they are not considered legitimate cultural goods.
The fact that there are increasingly more people that speak spanish 
or combine spanish with another native language is not a ‘choice’ based 
on the recognition of the virtues of the state’s monoethnic mestizo condi-
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tion; it is a consequence of the relations of ethnic domination that, with 
the strength of state power, have prioritised specific cultural goods to the 
detriment of others. in light of this, the opposition of several indigenous 
peasant communities to bilingual primary school education (spanish/
Aymara, for example) is easy to understand; it is a rational act based 
on calculated expectations. What good would it be to learn to read and 
write in Aymara if it is not going to be of any use for obtaining urban em-
ployment, nor for interacting with government agencies or entering into 
a recognised profession? Thus, nobody should be surprised by the de-
crease in the number of people that speak only a native language, along 
with the growth of bilingualism or of the group of people that only speak 
spanish, as this is the direct outcome of the state’s cultural and symbolic 
coercion. it is easy to envision that the rates of bilingualism, and even of 
native monolingualism, would grow markedly if the structures of state 
power were officially and extensively bilingual or trilingual, as is the case 
in other modern multicultural and multinational states.
C. MULTICIVILISATIonAL SoCIETy And SChIzoPhREnIC STATE
state monoethnicity or mononationality in a multiethnic or multina-
tional state is, therefore, the first barrier to an efficient and democratic 
relationship between society and state. nonetheless, this is not the only 
problem with structural complexity in what we call Bolivia. The other 
axis of substantial social disarticulation is what rené Zavaleta called 
‘the motley’, a concept that can be summed up as the overlapping co-
existence of several modes of production, of several historical periods 
and political systems30. in more operationalisable terms, we could say 
that Bolivia is a country in which several civilisations coexist in a dis-
articulated fashion, but where the state structure claims the organisa-
tional logic of only one of them — modern market capitalist logic.
following elias31, on a general level, the civilisational system can 
be understood as the social web and behavioural patterns with which 
people are used to living. This involves the forms of differentiating so-
cial roles, the forms of constituting the institutions that monopolise 
physical and tax violence, the ways of symbolising the long-term fore-
cast of sequences in the relationships between people (technology), and 
30 Zavaleta, rené 1986 Lo nacional popular en Bolivia (mexico: siglo XXi); Tapia, 
Luis 2002 La producción del conocimiento local. Historia y política en la obra de René 
Zavaleta (La Paz: Postgrado en ciencias del Desarrollo/universidad mayor de san 
Andrés/muela del Diablo).
31 elias, norbert 1978 The civilizing process (new York: urizen); see also: Braudel, 
fernand 1979 Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIII siècles 
(Paris: A. colin).
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the dictates and prohibitions that shape the bond between people32. 
There is, then, a coherent set of structures that generate the material, 
political and symbolic order that differentiates productive functions, 
technical processes, systems of authority, political organisation, and 
symbolic frameworks with which large communities give coherence 
to the world. A civilisational system is much more than a mode of pro-
duction, as it forms the cognitive matrix and the processes of author-
ity that regulate collective life. similarly, a civilisation can go through 
several modes of production, such as the archaic community and the 
rural community, which, as two different modes of production, shared 
similar life-organising matrices. Likewise, a civilisation can include 
several discontinuous territories and several peoples or nations, like 
the global capitalist civilisation, which includes more than a hundred 
nation states, or communal civilisation, which includes both Aymara 
and Quechua speakers living in agricultural communities.
in Bolivia, there are four large civilisational systems33. These four 
civilisations are:
32 guillermo Bonfil employed a pioneering use of the concept of civilisation to study 
indigenous peoples, although in a form directly associated with the social characteristics 
of the peasant (centred around self-sufficient production, family solidarity, reciprocity, 
communal land ownership, nature as a live, dialoguing body, etc.).
33 in a recent text (‘el país está dividido: ¿habrá que dividirlo mejor?’ in T’inkazos (La 
Paz), n° 17, 2004), rafael Archondo tries to make a number of observations about our 
proposal regarding the multinationalisation of the state. unfortunately, his attention 
to the aesthetics of irony has been to the detriment of argumentative reason and 
knowledge. he indicates that the state can not be the (connoted) ‘synthesis’ of society, 
but only ‘of the political’ (?), as if the authority that guarantees the citizenship rights 
of the members of a territory, the taxes that sustain the bureaucratic administration 
or the property system that prioritises access to collectively generated assets only 
affected the small elites ‘thirsty for power’, while the rest, the majority, lived in a type 
of non-state so coveted by primitive anarchism.
The naivety of the concept of a society outside the state would be no more than 
innocent speculation if it were not because it ‘forgets’ or hides the fact that the state 
‘lives’ off of the resources of all of society, it hierarchically allocates these assets 
according to the strength of all social fractions, and it establishes access to these 
powers by means of coercion and the legitimacy it obtains from all of society’s 
members. The state is therefore a total social relation, not just the aspiration of the 
‘capable’ or of those ‘thirsty’ for power; the state runs through all of us in some way, 
hence its public nature. if the state only affected ‘ideologically active elites’, then 
Archondo should wonder about the reason for the phantasmal income tax he pays 
every month, about the unreality of property deeds and about the fiction of the vote.
in part, this whole illusion is related to the dream of state bureaucrats, who think that 
they owe nothing to society and that the public is solely for the virtuous. Archondo 
confuses the administration of the state with the state itself. The former is indeed 
a thing of elites, who administer state power, while the latter is a relational and 
mechanical thing that, in one way or another, runs through all of society.  The solidity 
of a modern state lies in that it is able to produce a political relationship with all
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 - modern, market-industrial civilisation, which includes people 
who, possessing an eminently market and accumulative ration-
ality, have gone through processes of individuation and uproot-
of society by means of an active legitimacy, such that the interests of different politically 
active social blocs are hierarchically articulated in state functions, and the elites of 
these blocs can competitively gain access to the different mechanisms of power. This 
is precisely what does not happen in this country. here, not even the state is a social 
relational thing (evidenced by the percentage of people that do not pay taxes or have 
access to political or social citizenship), nor are the collective rights of a demographic 
majority (the indigenous as a historico-political identity) included in full citizenship 
rights. Archondo’s pre-reflexive simplicity becomes clear political militancy as soon as 
he criticises the proposal of a multiculturalisation or multinationalisation of the state’s 
decision-making structures. it is understandable that he may not be familiar with the 
institutional adaptations that other multicultural democratic states have implemented 
(Belgium, switzerland, india, canada, etc.). in this case, we can simply recommend 
that he review the relevant literature before venturing to weigh in on things that he 
does not understand. But what does merit comment is the principle that a proportional 
presence of cultural identities in the state would be a form of ‘apartheid’. if Archondo 
had had the grace to review the meaning of the words he uses with such notable 
levity, he would have discovered that apartheid means society’s exclusion from power 
structures based precisely upon its membership in a cultural community, and that 
this is legally regulated. This is what happens in Bolivia, not in a legal fashion, but 
rather in practice, just as we are demonstrating here, and it does so with the practical 
consequences of segregated access to public resources and social mobility.
This hypocritical apartheid, to which Archondo is attached, is exactly what should be 
dismantled and not legitimised with little phrases about a de-ethnicised ‘democracy’ 
that enshrine the monoethnicity of the state structure. in multicultural societies, 
the demos of democracy must be culturally plural, because otherwise, it leaves the 
mechanisms of political exclusion intact, with the imposition of a single parameter 
of demos that will never be either impartial or universal. in this respect, Archondo’s 
attachment to the illusion that identity is a matter of individual choice is symptomatic, 
as are liberalism’s claims about culturally homogenous societies. What we should 
not lose sight of is that identity is a product of collective struggles around access 
to resources based on the politicisation of certain components (language, religion, 
history, tradition, etc.), and that the state also produces identities, both dominant 
and dominated. it is a context of powers from which individuals can not remove 
themselves in order to choose freely, and, even less so, when these powers regulate 
access to a society’s economic and political goods, as in Bolivia.
The immaculate individuality to which Archondo is attached is a fiction that legitimates, 
with universalist clothing, the dominant state identity (as the state monopolises 
legitimate education, legitimate language, legitimate culture, legitimate history) and 
reproduces de facto the dominated identities. ultimately, the dismantling of this 
actually existing domination is the uncrossable boundary of all this pseudoliberalism, 
which verges on frivolity. Archondo should ask himself about what ‘freedom’ the 
indians have to successfully ‘whiten themselves’ or ‘gringify themselves’ when seeking 
matrimonial exchanges, employment or public recognition.
With respect to our critic’s anxiety about how to identify the cultural communities, this 
is a political act of self-identification whose jurisdiction is the territoriality of the state. 
in multicultural democracies, all citizens can exercise their citizenship rights based on 
their cultural membership, wherever they might be located, or choose representatives 
of their cultural community from any place, as the state is multicultural in its central 
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structure. With the difference that in places where a cultural identity is territorially the 
majority, the decision-making structures of sub-national (regional) power are culturally 
predominant, but recognise the rights of other cultural minorities within them.
With respect to considering identities and different civilisations as watertight spaces, 
as Archondo suggests, we can refer in our responses in this text to more solid and 
coherent critical arguments. in any case, not because Bush uses the words ‘democracy’ 
and ‘freedom’ to legitimise his wars are democracy and freedom warlike concepts. 
The same thing happens with the concept of ‘civilisation’ employed by samuel 
huntington. if Archondo had read the author before using him with comparative 
and disparaging purposes, he would have realised that for huntington, civilisation 
is synonymous with culture, and that culture is reduced to language and in some 
cases to religion. And it is with this concept that he puts together his conservative 
interpretation of the ‘clash of civilisations’.
in our case, and revisiting the sociological use by norbert elias and other Latin 
American researchers that Archondo would do well to review, with the concept of 
civilisation we seek to articulate the concept of mode of production, in its hard 
technical and organisational core, and the system of political authority and the form 
of structurally signifying the world.  Like any concept, it is not reality, but rather 
a way of mentally ordering information about reality; thus it is epistemologically 
abusive to want to ‘map out’ and geographically demarcate ‘civilisations’ with a 
pencil and ruler. This concept is a category that allows us to understand how it can 
be that in people’s behaviours, the logics and organisational practices they use to 
materially and symbolically produce and reproduce their lives are overlapping, or 
sometimes hierarchically fused. Disqualifying a category as a result of the use given 
to it by a different author who defines it differently is an ideological juggling act that 
easily wins applause, although intellectually, it is a sham.
ing from traditional communities. They experience the sepa-
ration of the political with respect to the economic, and they 
create the basis of the conditions of their existence as dominant 
or subordinate actors in waged labour such as mining and in-
dustrial manufacturing, banking, large-scale trade, public ser-
vices, transportation, etc., with their respective circuits of ac-
cumulation and the direct market exchange of products, goods 
and labour. in demographic terms, no more than 20 or 30% of 
the people in the country are directly and technically involved in 
this social setting. 
 - The second civilisational regime is that with the economy and 
culture organised around simple market activity of a domes-
tic, artisan or peasant nature. Those belonging to this regime 
have an occupational or corporatist rationality and a system 
of political institutions based on the normatised coalition of 
small business owners. A good part of the so-called informal-
ity, which accounts for 68% of urban workers, artisans and 
smallholder peasants, corresponds to this social segment.
 - Third, there is communal civilisation, with its technological 
procedures based on the strength of the masses, the manage-
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ment of family and communal land and the fusion between 
economic and political activity, with its own authorities and 
political institutions that favour normative action over elective 
action34, and in which individuality is a product of the commu-
nity and its history.
 - Lastly, there is the Amazonian civilisation, based on the itiner-
ant nature of its productive activity, on technology based on 
knowledge and individual hard work, and on the absence of 
the state.
Altogether, two thirds of the inhabitants of the country35 find them-
selves in one of the last three civilisational or societal groups36. it is 
clear that this is a conceptual model that does not exclude complex 
ties, crosses and hybridisations, produced by colonisation, between 
these four civilisational blocs, at the same time that it highlights the 
differences in the current patterns of social organisation in Bolivian 
social space37.
34 habermas, Jürgen 1984 The theory of communicative action (Boston: Beacon Press).
35 Agriculture is comprised of 550,000 domestic units, which include 90% of the agrarian 
population, while in urban labour, 700,000 semi-businesses and family units predominate, 
accounting for 65% of urban employment. in this respect, see: grebe, horst 2002 ‘el 
crecimiento y la exclusión’ in AA.VV. La fuerza de las ideas (La Paz: World Bank/instituto 
Prisma/iLDis/maestrías para el Desarrollo); Arze, carlos 1999 ‘empleo y relaciones 
laborales’ in AA.VV. Bolivia hacia el siglo XXI (La Paz: umsA/coordinadora nacional de 
redes/centro de estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario/PnuD/ ciDes).
36 guillermo Bonfil proposed using the category of civilisation to understand the 
organising structure of indigenous peoples. for him, civilisation was ‘a sufficiently 
high and complex level of cultural development (in the broadest and most inclusive 
sense of the term ‘cultural’) to act as a common base and essential orientation for the 
historical projects of all the peoples that share that civilisation’. see: Bonfil Batalla, 
guillermo 1987 México profundo, una civilización negada (mexico: ciesAs/seP). 
A similar concept to the one we use here is that proposed by Luis Tapia with the 
category ‘societal’. see: Tapia, Luis 2002 La condición multisocietal. Multiculturalidad, 
pluralismo, modernidad (La Paz: ciDes/umsA/muela del Diablo). 
37 The proposal to differentiate Bolivia’s structural heterogeneity into three or four 
blocs was developed by Luis Tapia (2002); and Álvaro garcía Linera in ‘estado y 
sociedad: en busca de una modernidad no esquizofrénica’ in AA.VV (2002).
Later, roberto Laserna, in the article ‘Bolivia: la crisis de octubre y el fracaso del 
chenko’ (La Paz: muller y Asociados, 2004), proposed the ‘concept’ of ‘different 
economies’ to refer to this Bolivian social complexity. Leaving aside this sudden change 
in theoretical approach by one who just a few months earlier had enthusiastically 
evaluated the economy as being immersed in the unstoppable process of globalisation 
(see Laserna, roberto ‘Bolivia en la globalización. estado y sociedad. Temas del 
presente’ in AA.VV. (2002); and my critique of this type of ideological schizophrenia), 
the only innovation in Laserna’s text is the fact that he attributes the failure of the
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now in general, the norms, functions, institutions and repre-
sentations with which state life has been constituted in Bolivia have 
considered the universe of representation, general interpretation and 
synthesis to be only those liberal practices and political dispositions 
(party regime, secret and individual vote, division of powers, separa-
tion of politics from the economy, etc.) that result from their inser-
tion in modern market life, with its customs of elective affiliation and 
of individuals partially uprooted from ties of lineage and traditional 
relationships with their fellow residents  — individuals who are well-
suited  to forms of partisan aggregation and the formation of public 
authority through the modern political market38.
in contrast, the majority of the population — immersed in non-
industrial economic, cognitive and cultural structures, also including 
other linguistic and cultural identities — have different political cus-
toms and technologies, resulting from their own material and techni-
cal life. The superposition of collective identity above individuality, of 
deliberative practices above elective practices, of normative coercion 
as a mode of rewarding behaviour above free adherence and compli-
ance, of depersonalising power, of its consensual revocability and the 
rotation of functions, etc. — these are forms of behaviour that tell 
of political cultures different from liberal and representative partisan 
ones, deeply rooted in their own objective living conditions, in their 
own technical systems of social reproduction. cooperativism, consen-
sual assemblyism, leadership rotation and traditional normative cus-
toms tell of types of political action, political organisation and politi-
cal technologies rooted in the very economic and technical structure 
of non-modern civilisational systems. They are, therefore, still active 
as long as these economic, cultural and symbolic systems that organ-
ise social life are maintained.
in homogenous and politically nationalised cultural societies, 
there is an ethico-political principle of unifying criteria, which estab-
lishes the state as the legitimate substantiation of this historical in-
application of liberal reforms to the existence of these ‘distinct economies’. if it is all 
about failures, perhaps it would be more honest to think about the social failure and 
the ignorance of the free market ideologues who rushed into applying modernising 
formulas to a country that they did not know or understand. nonetheless, unlike 
the concept ‘different economies’ proposed by Laserna, that of multisocietal or 
multicivilisational not only incorporates the ‘modes of production’ or differentiated 
economies, but it also refers to the existence of multiple systems of authority and 
multiple symbolic structures for defining the world that coexist in a hierarchical 
fashion in Bolivia.
38 Bobbio, norbert 1987 The future of democracy: A defense of the rules of the game 
(minneapolis: university of minnesota Press).
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tegration, holding the ultimate power over resources and decisions 
about how to manage these resources. This can occur because the 
state, despite its hierarchies, presents itself as the imagined synthesis 
of society, for which ultimate sovereignty is not a matter of dispute but 
rather one of deliberate fulfilment. 
in complex societies like the Bolivian one, the state is present-
ed as a monoethnic and monocivilisational relational and political 
structure, which just as it denies or destroys other cultural terms for 
interpreting and representing territorial resources, its legitimacy is 
permanently in doubt and under threat by other cultural and ethnic 
identities and other practices for understanding responsibility for the 
common good, excluded from governmental administration.
This gives way to the emergence of a strategic uncertainty about 
the state’s legitimacy, occasionally remedied with top-down pacts of 
mutual tolerance, vulnerable to being broken by any camp, as soon as 
any group becomes careless or weakened. This has been precisely the 
situation of the Bolivian state throughout its 179 years of republican 
life, converting it into not only an apparent state39, but also a precarious 
one, under permanent suspicion due to its inability to structurally ar-
ticulate the social forces that coexist in its area of geographic influence.
in the absence of a nationalising principle of belonging or of ex-
tended symbolic kinship between people under state influence, sover-
eignty becomes a constant stage for high and low-intensity wars, in 
which different subjects — the state through its laws, business own-
ers with their economic interests, and communities by means of their 
practices and customs — temporally elucidate kaleidoscopic and frac-
tured forms of territorial sovereignty. The affirmation that in Bolivia 
each region resembles its own small country merely affirms this situa-
tion of state uncertainty, which impedes any pretence of restoring any 
commonly accepted territorial governmental normativity, respected 
and endorsed by all members of society. in Bolivia, the state is not 
a source of hegemony, in the sense that it has not managed to gen-
erate long-lasting shared beliefs or behaviours that establish a basic 
principle of accepted sovereignty.  in this absence of a shared illusion 
of political community, the state and its norms are always seen as a 
simple instrumental tool, and almost never as an expressive synthesis 
of society as a whole.
This catastrophic discord between these civilisational structures 
has been a constant in all the political orders of the republic, including 
the most democratic one, which emerged from the 1952 revolution. 
Today, when there are attempts to establish the rule of law, this cata-
39 Zavaleta (1987).
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strophic discord manifests itself once again, with even greater viru-
lence due to the non-state articulation of these other non-liberal po-
litical rationalities and technologies belonging to the indigenous and 
peasant social movements.
The limitation of the current liberal democratic-representative 
institutionality is not a result of the persistence of an authoritarian 
culture40, as if politics depended only on cultural customs that can be 
corrected with pedagogical actions or political evangelisation. it is a 
structural feature, rooted in the materiality of the disarticulated or 
barely articulated coexistence of civilisational regimes that have not 
changed as a result of simple appeals to the conscience. indeed, this 
belief, which attempts to reduce the only legitimate means of doing 
politics to liberal representative and individualised forms, is not only 
a form of political intolerance, but also of exacerbated authoritarian-
ism with respect to the cultural plurality of ways of doing and under-
standing politics, including democracy.
strictly speaking, in order to work successfully, the liberal re-
gime of representative democracy (which the elites desperately pur-
sue) requires a series of indispensible prerequisites or primary con-
ditions of possibility. first, there is what Zavaleta once called the 
prejudice of equality as being a mass phenomenon41. of course, if 
we are talking about the political market of parties as the site of 
gathering for individuals with the ability to exchange political goods 
untouched by ‘extrapolitical’ coercion, in order to guarantee free 
personal electability and the principle of equality between every op-
tion in the constitution of the ‘general will’, then it is people with the 
same legal rights to trade and the same political prerogative with 
respect to public authority who must confront each other in the mar-
ket. This is the sustenance of the economic market, and, with greater 
reason, of the political market. This is certainly a legal and political 
illusion; however, it is a well-founded illusion, to the extent that in 
the electoral act, the people ‘believe’ that they have the same power 
as everyone else, independently of their economic or cultural posi-
tion, just as they believe that they have the same rights and options 
in the market as do their competitors, customers and suppliers. But 
this then requires:
40 mansilla, h. c. f. 1994 Autonomía e imitación en el desarrollo (La Paz: centro 
Boliviano de estudios multidisciplinarios); Lazarte, Jorge 2001 ‘entre dos mundos: 
la cultura democrática en Bolivia’ in Toranzo, carlos et al. Democracia y cultura 
política en Bolivia (La Paz: BiD/cne/PnuD).
41 Zavaleta, rené 1983 Las masas en noviembre (La Paz: Juventud).
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a. That society has adopted the market logic in the majority of its 
productive, consumptive, cultural, intellective and ethical activ-
ities, which occurs by means of the generalisation and technical 
command of the capitalist production regime and the extinc-
tion of non-capitalist productive structures, such as agro-peas-
ant, communal and artisan ones. This is called real subsump-
tion42. With regards to the requirements for the proper working 
of representative democracy, the absence of real subsumption 
or the existence of non-capitalist productive structures and of 
non-market exchange systems is an obstacle for the constitu-
tion of equal subjects able to accept the market as the rational 
underpinning of their social behaviours, including the political. 
in the case of Bolivia, it is abundantly clear that we find our-
selves under the dominion of capitalist rationality, but that it is 
not generalised. What is more, close to two thirds of economic 
circuits move with non-industrial parameters. As a result, in 
terms of mental frameworks, not only is the presence of a sense 
of social equality scarce with respect to the small size of the ful-
ly capitalist  economy, but also, there are spaces of fragmented, 
territorialised equality based on place of residence, kinship, 
ties to other residents, etc. one of the structural conditions of 
representative democracy is, therefore, non-existent in the Bo-
livian social formation. 
b. The other component of the constitution of political equal-
ity is the breakdown of the modes of differentiating access to 
political rights based on culture, ethnicity, religion or gender, 
which would prevent numerical scrutiny from being a form of 
determining the general will. This means that the constitution 
of relevant political capital should conform to institutionalised 
cultural goods issued in a public and undifferentiated fashion, 
such as with the certification of academic qualifications. given 
that colonialisms, among other things, institute inherited eth-
nicity and culture as hierarchising social goods and as forms of 
political capital that guarantee or exclude political rights, the 
logic of representative democracy requires political decoloni-
sation and a certain degree of cultural homogenisation. This 
has been called the nationalisation of society, and it is an es-
sential feature for the development of citizenship and liberal 
representative competence.
42 marx, Karl 1976 (1867) ‘results of the immediate process of production’ in 
Appendix to Capital (London: Penguin) Volume 1.
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There can not be liberal representation while colonial regimes ex-
ist that impose a minority culture, ethnicity or religion as entrance 
stamps to political participation. in the case of Bolivia, this is precisely 
the reality. Above the majority populations with their culture, linguis-
tic uses and specific ethnicity, there is a minority social group, with a 
language, culture and ethnicity that are different, but are instituted as 
legitimate and dominant. it thus turns out that the racist and colonial 
practices of the political elites, supposedly dedicated to processes of 
political modernisation, are at the same time some of the most impor-
tant obstacles to their own liberalising political preferences.
second, for this liberal form of political exchange to work, there 
must be a minimum of what max Weber called ‘shared goals and val-
ues’, which can promote a shared and relatively articulated sense of 
the public, validating as accepted norms the competition between po-
litical proposals, the rules of election and the political equivalencies 
of electoral proposals.
The possibility of the political market being taken to be the site 
of constituting public powers depends upon a body of shared beliefs 
about the best way to constitute society’s intervention in the manage-
ment of what unites them (the world of social ends), but, in addition, 
it relies on members of society sharing the certainty that they have, 
over the long term, something in common: the world of shared values.
it is a spiritual, cultural, but also procedural thing, which can es-
tablish a narrative of a social body that is, in turn, a way of creat-
ing its cohesion and its desire for permanence. for these structures of 
perception and social action to exist has, in modern times, required a 
certain state-induced cultural homogeneity (hence nations are partly 
state artifices), but above all, it has needed the cultural and organisa-
tional effects of real subsumption, which is no less than the destruction 
or weakening of other forms of social affiliation — the extinction or 
subalternation of other networks for the spiritual constitution of the 
social body, like the family, the town, the agrarian community, etcetera.
The persistence of other mechanisms of social identification, of 
other mechanisms for obtaining local collective values, has the virtue 
of making the aggregation of political wills in a party impossible, as 
the party is based on elective affiliations, voluntary ones, by individu-
als untied to other forms of collective belonging. The persistence of 
traditional structures of producing and thinking, in contrast, generates 
both forms of normative affiliation, in that individuals are the way they 
are because of the preexistence of and their membership in the group, 
as well as forms of local political participation and systems of political 
authority, rooted in the characteristics of these civilisational structures. 
in this case, the (kinship, communal, work) community, which is the 
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condition for individuality and political practice, is understood as the 
responsibility and obligation of the individual for the symbolic, eco-
nomic, ritual and cultural reproduction of the community’s trajectory.
in the liberal model, in contrast, individuality is the point of 
departure for constructing the community, and for this to occur, 
the concrete collective structures that introduce a different sense 
of belonging and participation must have previously disappeared. 
This, in turn, requires that capitalist relations of production be 
widespread, which in Bolivia occurs in a limited and non-majority, 
though dominant, fashion.
II. A MULTInATIonAL And MULTICIVILISATIonAL STATE
how can we modify this incongruence between the country’s state life 
and its socioeconomic composition? The option that we propose here 
is to stop simulating political modernity and cultural homogeneity in 
a predominantly premodern, multicivilisational and pluricultural so-
ciety. This means breaking with the schizophrenia of a few elites who 
for centuries have dreamed of being modern and white, who copy 
modern institutions and laws in order to apply them in a society in 
which the indigenous are the majority where and market and organi-
sational modernity is nonexistent for more than half the population 
and will continue to be so in subsequent decades.
The actual existence of multiple ethnic identities in the country 
and the historic substantiation of state precariousness, which per-
manently threaten social systems weakly integrated into a regime of 
long-term normative legitimacy, demands that we treat seriously and 
openly the debate about ethnicities, cultural communities and state-
less nations43 as decisive political and territorial subjects for creating 
and establishing any long-lasting state order in the country. 
With the recognition of ethnic, cultural and linguistic identities in 
most of the territory, which includes the majority of the population, there 
are various options that can be pursued. The first is to deny or to simu-
late a recognition of this diversity while developing policies of extinction, 
either by the coercive exclusion of these identities, or by their symbolic 
devaluation, leading to strategies of ethnic self-denial. in a strict sense, 
this is the state policy that has been applied over the last hundred years, 
with several ‘soft’ variations over the last decade, but whose result is a 
constant reconstitution of the excluded identities and the rise of seces-
sionist indianist projects with respect to the Bolivian state.
Another option is to strengthen projects of indigenous national 
autonomy, which could produce the formation of new states of major-
43 guibernau (1996).
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ity indigenous composition. This could be the case, for example, with 
Aymara-speakers, which is the cultural community that has under-
taken the greatest amount of work towards ethnic politicisation in re-
cent decades, producing a nationally based body politic in addition to 
possessing a demographic density potentially sufficient to make these 
proposals of political self-determination viable. These kinds of politi-
cal programs have started to be revitalised in recent years, especially 
in the Aymara zone, and they indicate a radically different model from 
the rest of the continent’s indigenous movements. This path should not 
surprise us, as ultimately, a nationality is a deterritorialised ethnicity, 
or, we could say, a nation is an ethnicity successfully identified with 
a territory44, establishing a political system of state sovereignty based 
on this ethnicity. The difference between an ethnicity and a nation lies 
only in that the latter has undertaken a process of structuring an in-
stitutionalised political community by means of a state regime. When 
an ethnicity becomes autonomous from a system of domination, it 
develops into a nation, and the set of indigenous struggles and de-
mands deployed in recent decades by the Aymara people makes them 
a potential candidate for the constitution of a nation-state identity.
A third option, devoid of cultural trauma, would be to design a 
new state structure capable of integrating into the entire institutional 
framework, into the distribution of powers and into normative sys-
tems, these two large aspects of the Bolivian social character: ethnic-
cultural diversity and the civilisational plurality of the symbolic and 
technico-procedural systems that are part of the organisation of the 
collective world. in terms of a regime of citizenship rights and demo-
cratic practices, this would mean the constitution of a multinational 
and multicivilisational state.
A. ThE MULTInATIonAL oR MULTICULTURAL dIMEnSIon  
of ThE PoLITICAL CoMMUnITy
it is clear that one of the cores of state construction, capable of rec-
onciling the state with society and putting an end to cultural exclu-
sion, is a profound state reform that would enable, in global norma-
tive terms, a recognition of social multiculturalism and, as a result, 
of the need to construct a multinational politico-institutional state 
framework. To this end, political theory and different international 
experiences offer a series of experiences and reflections that merit a 
brief synthesis, in order to articulate them with the logic of the place, 
in this case with the set of social possibilities and resources present 
in Bolivian reality.
44 oommen (1997).
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in the early twentieth century, the debate about the political and 
territorial rights of cultural identities, peoples, ethnicities and state-
less nation-building45 was approached with respect to the need, or not, 
for the self-determination of statehood for the peoples or nations that 
desired it. The greatest contributions in this area came from socialist 
thought46, although there were also similar contributions from liberal 
thought. immanuel Wallerstein has shown that the policy of united 
states presidents Thomas Woodrow Wilson and Theodore roosevelt 
to support the self-determination of nations in the Balkans and in 
russia was applying the liberal principle of individual suffrage to the 
sphere of state sovereignty in the global political sphere47.
During the 70s and 80s, the debate in political theory was between 
liberals and communitarians. During this stage, the liberals were op-
posed to rights for oppressed nations and/or minorities, because this 
diverted attention away from individual autonomy, considered to be 
central when it came to deciding about well-being48, while the com-
munitarians saw ‘minority’ rights as a way to protect a form of life in 
common that is over and above individual choices49.
There has been a proliferation in recent years of discussions 
about the rights of stateless nations and ethnicities, both in the con-
text of pluralist institutional construction and in that of philosophical 
reflection about the scope and fairness of these rights50.
charles Taylor, questioning the existence of neutral ethnocul-
tural states that could offer the same conditions for development to 
different cultural perceptions, considers that the recognition of rights 
for different cultural communities allows a need for social visibility 
to be satisfied, which, far from opposing the individual freedoms rec-
ognised for all, creates a solid and equitable base for exercising these 
45 Keating, michael 2001 ‘nations without states. minority nationalism in a global 
era’ in ferran requejo (ed.) Democracy and national pluralism (London: routledge).
46 Bauer, otto 2000 The question of nationalities and social democracy (minneapolis/
London: university of minnesota Press); Lenin, Vladimir illich 1972 ‘The right of 
nations to self determination’ in Lenin, Vladimir illich Collected works (moscow: 
Progress Publishers) Volume XX; Luxemburg, rosa 1976 The national question: 
Selected writings (new York: monthly review Press).
47 Wallerstein, immanuel 1995 After liberalism (new York: new Press).
48 narveson, Jan 1991 ‘collective rights’ in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
(London, ontario), Volume 4, n° 2.
49 Johnston, Darlene 1989 ‘native rights as collective rights’ in Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence (London, ontario), Volume 2, n° 1.
50 Pfaff, William 1993 The wrath of nations: Civilization and the furies of nationalism 
(new York: simon and schuster).
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freedoms51. Will Kymlicka, assuming that these cultural entities do 
not demand rights that protect them from modernity, but rather as-
suming quite the opposite, that they demand access to liberal institu-
tions, considers that the collective rights they demand promote the 
extension of liberal values within these communities, and hence from 
the point of view of liberal philosophy, there is no reason to oppose 
these collective rights52. moreover, he considers that those cultural 
communities that face disadvantages with respect to the preservation 
of their culture place the individuals that compose it at a disadvan-
tage, breaking the democratic cohabitation principle of equality. in 
order to preserve this principle of equality, he suggests that it is nec-
essary to recognise special collective rights, which would allow their 
life skills and possibilities to be balanced with the rest of the people 
in the society53.
There are those who think that recognising ‘minority’ cultural 
and ethnic identities is a reactionary proposal54, while there are liber-
als who consider that recognising these collective rights fosters social 
disintegration, which could give way to a spiral of mutual competi-
tion and confrontation between different ‘ethnicities’55. however, as 
Kymlicka has recently shown, there is evidence that, on the contrary, 
recognising the self-government of national minorities contributes to 
the stability and cohesion of state56.
in Latin America, the debate about indigenous peoples’ rights 
has been extensive, and permanently linked to the action of the states 
or indigenous social movements and politicians. Leaving aside the 
integrationist, statist, indigenist interpretation of the 40s and 50s57, 
51 Taylor, charles 1992 Multiculturalism and ‘the politics of recognition’: an essay 
(Princeton: Princeton university Press); also, by the same author: ‘shared and 
divergent values’ in Watts, Donald and Brown, Douglas (eds.) Options for a new 
Canada (Toronto: university of Toronto Press, 1991).
52 Kymlicka, Will 2001 Politics in the vernacular: Nationalism, multiculturalism 
and citizenship. (new York: oxford university Press); also, by the same author: 
Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights (oxford/new York: 
clarendon Press, 1995).
53 Kymlicka, Will 1995 Liberalism, community and culture (oxford: clarendon); and 
also: Kymlicka (1995).
54 Dahrendorf, ralf 1995 ‘Preserving prosperity’ in New Statesman and Society 
(London), Volume 8, n° 383.
55 Ward, cynthia 1991 ‘The limits of liberal republicanism’ in Columbia Law Review 
(new York), Volume 91, n° 3.
56 Kymlicka, Will 1998 The new debate over minority rights (Toronto: university of 
Toronto).
57 Aguirre Beltrán, gonzalo 1991 Formas de gobierno indígena (mexico: fce).
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the different interpretations proposed since the 70s, in the wake of a 
resurgence of indigenous social and political movements, have gone 
from the vindication of ‘anti-occidental’ indian governments, crossing 
many republican state borders58, to the recognition of local commu-
nity rights and the formation of regional autonomies with higher or 
lower degrees of self-determination59.
in the wake of the indigenous uprising in chiapas, the political 
and theoretical discussion with respect to systems of autonomy has 
acquired considerable maturity. Due to the complexity of ethnic diver-
sity in mexico, but also because of its already reduced proportion of 
indigenous people with respect to the whole of the mexican popula-
tion, these interpretations have placed greater emphasis on the rights 
of ethnic minorities60 than on the rights of stateless national majori-
ties. We will return to part of this debate and its contributions later.
in general terms, the political recognition of different cultural or 
national identities within the state can exhibit different degrees with 
respect to institutional ‘density’ and ‘hierarchy’. in the case of insti-
tutional ‘hierarchy’, political rights can simply remain in the local, 
community sphere, or they can include meso or regional factors or, 
ultimately, extend to the macro or largest structure in the state admin-
istration, such as the executive, the parliament or the highest court. 
how far recognising the rights of nationalities goes will depend on the 
strength of their internal political cohesion, the openness of the state 
and the democratic expectations of the rest of the social communities 
that exist within it. 
With respect to the density of rights, these can range from the 
recognition of property rights for land and natural resources to ter-
ritorial rights and negotiated political sovereignties over certain re-
sources. similarly, they can range from the contingent recognition 
of the presence of members of excluded cultures at some level of 
the state apparatus, to the construction of a ‘societary culture’ un-
derstood as a territorially concentrated culture, based on a shared 
language that is used in political and social institutions, in public 
life as well as private life — government, schools, law, economy, 
58 reinaga, fausto 1969 La revolución india (La Paz: Partido indio de Bolivia); 
Alcina, José (ed.) 1990 Indianismo e indigenismo en América (madrid: Alianza).
59 Díaz Polanco, héctor 1985 La cuestión étnico-nacional (mexico: Línea); also, by 
the same author: Autonomía regional, la autodeterminación de los pueblos (mexico: 
siglo XXi, 1991); Bate, Luis 1984 Cultura, clases y cuestión étnico-nacional (mexico: 
Juan Pablos); Díaz Polanco héctor & sánchez, consuelo 2003 México diverso. El 
debate por la autonomía (mexico: siglo XXi). 
60 Díaz Polanco & sánchez (2003); Revista Chiapas (méxico: erA-iiec), n° 11, 2001.
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public employment and the media61. in general terms, citizenship 
is the inclusion of a person as a competent member of a political 
community with a set of practical, legal, economic and political 
practices defined as rights62. This assumes the existence of a set 
of common ends and values that can constitute a lasting political 
community that is in general the fruit of economic homogenisation 
processes with respect to solid industrial and market economies, 
in addition to extensive processes of cultural integration. in multi-
ethnic or multinational societies, the political community can only 
be constructed with mechanisms that, without eliminating people’s 
cultural particularity, can ensure that they have the same opportu-
nities and rights to constitute a part of the political institutionality. 
in order to allow this, some authors have proposed a differentiated 
citizenship63, which allows the exercise of full political rights for 
those that belong to a specific ethnic-cultural or national commu-
nity within the state itself. in this way, excluded ethnic-national 
identities would have institutional means that would guarantee 
their representation as cultural identities in political institutions, 
including the capacity to issue a collective veto to any decision that 
could affect the ethnic community.
The political community, as a site of citizenship, would therefore 
be a process of collective construction, in which different excluded 
ethnic identities would be seen as communities and have their com-
munity rights and power recognised. This differentiated citizenship 
could take on several forms, such as the autonomous state or the mul-
tinational state.
61 Kymlicka (1998).
62 on citizenship, see marshall, Thomas and Bottomore, Tom 1992 Citizenship and 
social class (London/concord: Pluto Press); habermas, Jürgen 1996 ‘citizenship 
and national identity’ in habermas, Jürgen Between facts and norms: contributions 
to a discourse theory of law and democracy (cambridge: miT Press); Tilly charles 
(ed.) 1996 ‘citizenship, identity and social history’ in International Review of Social 
History Supplements (cambridge/new York/melbourne: cuP), n° 3; held, David 
1995 ‘Between state and civil society: citizenship’ in Andrews, geoff 1995 Citizenship 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart); ‘ciudadanía: el debate contemporáneo’ 1997 in 
La política: revista de estudios sobre el Estado y la Sociedad (Barcelona), n° 3: 5-39, 
october; Revista Metapolítica (mexico), n° 15, 2000. 
63 Young, iris marion 1990 Justice and the politics of difference (Princeton: university 
of Princeton Press); Taylor, charles 1994 Multiculturalism: Examining the politics 
of recognition (Princeton: Princeton university Press); Kymlicka (1996); Baumann, 
gerd 1999 The multicultural riddle: Rethinking national, ethnic, and religious identities 
(new York: routledge); Villoro, Luis 1998 Estado plural, pluralidad de culturas 
(méxico: Paidós). for a mild critique of these interpretations, see: sartori, giovanni 
2001 La sociedad multiétnica (madrid: Taurus).
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some local authors have considered that a multicultural or mul-
tinational state would go against the ‘idea’ of the democratic founda-
tion of the state, based on universal citizenship or ‘demos’. in this 
case, one can not help but be concerned about the ignorance of these 
‘critics’ with respect to the abundant academic debate in political 
science about this issue. intellectual currents that have never been 
suspected of any type of antidemocratic position, such as the com-
munitarian liberals or the multiculturalist liberals, have been devel-
oping the topic of ‘multinational democracy’ for over a decade as part 
of efforts to extend the democratic basis for modern states in mul-
ticultural societies. indeed, reality demonstrates that not only have 
recently decolonised societies advanced in the formation of a demo-
cratic state with multinational institutions (india, malaysia, nigeria, 
south Africa), but so have highly industrialised societies with long-
lasting democratic traditions (Belgium, switzerland and canada). 
With close to eight thousand ethnocultural groups in the world, and 
only close to two hundred states, it is clear that more than 90% of 
modern states must deal with some type of majority or minority mul-
ticulturalism in their territories.
it is incoherent, therefore, to separate ethnos and demos, because 
strictly speaking, any demos is also an ethnos. When it comes down to it, 
the exercise of ‘universal citizenship’ implies a language for public edu-
cation, for accessing higher state functions and public services, and it 
implies history, heroes, festivities and commemorations adapted to the 
historical narrative of a particular culture, which inevitably promotes 
a particular cultural identity above and beyond other identities. This is 
precisely what occurs in Bolivia, where even though close to 45% of the 
people speak an indigenous language as their mother tongue and 62% 
self-identify as indigenous, there is a hierarchical linguistic market that 
favours spanish, there is an ethnically stratified labour market, public 
office is monocultural and spanish-speaking mestizo ethnicity plays the 
role of a capital that helps to produce social class structuring. in mul-
ticultural societies, no state is neutral, and no demos results from the 
procedural rules of liberal democracy. it has always been the result of 
cultural impositions, dominations and ethnic exclusions.
The debate about multinational democracy seeks to understand 
demos not as a ‘political nation’, but rather as a ‘political community’, 
and one that can therefore be produced as the multicultural or mul-
tinational articulation of a culturally plural society. When demos is 
confused with ‘political nation’, we have a type of ethnocentrism that 
attributes universal values to what are simply the particular values, 
knowledge and practices of a dominant culture that is the result of 
colonisation and war.
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hiding this fact inside the assumptions of an ethnocentric uni-
versalism64, refusing to seek better democratic alternatives, is the pre-
cise expression of a type of mental colonisation that reinforces the 
continuity of ethnified and racialised colonial state institutions such 
as those of the Bolivian state. And this, far from encouraging the in-
ternal ‘unification’ of a society that has never been united, despite all 
the monocultural state’s liberalising and modernising tricks, reinforc-
es the structures of cultural and ethnic domination, thus provoking 
greater possibilities of ethno-national rebellions over the long term. in 
this sense, the multinationalisation or multiculturalisation of the state 
does not ethnify the state, as the state is always ethnified, as much as 
it might cloak itself in its respect for ‘universal rights’. What state mul-
tinationality does is demonopolise the ethnicity of the state, allowing 
other dominated and excluded ethnicities to share the structures of 
social recognition and political power.
in the Bolivian case, the existence of two large linguistic com-
munities (Aymara and Quechua), one of them with a high degree of 
nationality-based politicisation (Aymara), in addition to the exist-
ence of several dozen smaller linguistic and cultural communities, 
tells of the existence of a multiplicity of cultural communities with 
goals and values that are different from the dominant and major-
ity national identity — the Bolivian identity. however, the coun-
try’s multicultural complexity is not included in the administrative 
structures of the state, which remain monocultural, monolinguistic 
and monoethnic, radically limiting the exercise of citizenship and 
of democratic rights.
64 We must remember that the social sciences clarified a long time ago that many 
of the so-called modern ‘universal values’ are historical arbitrarities, the result of 
specific balances of material and discursive forces that transformed  local and partial 
values and interests into general values — first ‘local’ ones and then ‘universal’ ones. 
As richard rorty reminds us, the fact that out of an attachment to one’s capacity for 
reasoning and argument one can have a moral commitment to these values does not 
elude an understanding of their contingency and temporality. see: rorty, richard 
1991 Objectivity, relativism, and truth. (cambridge: cambridge university Press).
The mystification of ‘universalisms’ as the norm, beyond society and its capacity 
for argumentative reflection, is not only intellectually untenable; it is also an 
ideological sham behind which old and new authoritarianisms lurk (yesterday’s ‘real 
socialism’, today’s ‘free market economy’). even so, multicultural democracies and 
ethnocultural assertions do not necessarily contradict the exercise of the currently 
predominant ‘universal’ values of equality, tolerance and individual liberty. As the 
liberal Kymlicka has already pointed out, the collective rights to self-government 
of dominated or colonised peoples and nationalities are the best way to defend the 
‘societary culture of each people’, as these provide the ‘context of individual choice’ 
for the options and evaluations of equality and freedom, which are precisely the 
foundation of modern citizenship.
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one way to begin to solve this conflict between the cultural plu-
rality of society and the ethnic monopolisation of the state, which re-
produces discrimination and colonial rule, lies precisely in undertak-
ing processes of asymmetric and differentiated recognition of national 
and ethnic identities, at the macro and regional scales. of course, in 
the case of Bolivia, not every cultural community distinct from the 
Bolivian one is national; there are smaller and less politicised cultural 
identities, especially in the eastern region of the country, whose politi-
cal state recognition requires different organisational procedures than 
those of the national cultural communities, like the Aymara commu-
nity, which requires a substantial modification to the general organi-
sational structure of the state.
it is necessary, therefore, to guarantee cohabitation with a pactist 
conception of power by articulating plurality in a shared political uni-
ty within a differentiated society; that is, some communities are na-
tional and others are not. The first step toward this is to grant regional 
autonomies by linguistic and cultural community with different levels 
of political self-government, depending on the political density and 
territorial scope of the cultural identities making demands. following 
Donald rothchild and caroline hartzell, we understand autonomy to 
be an institutional arrangement that,
[…] delimits a regionally-based, self-administering entity or entities 
within a state as having explicit policy-making responsibilities in one 
or more political, economic and cultural spheres […] The aim of terri-
torial autonomy is to cede responsibilities over specified subjects, and 
in some cases, a certain degree of self-determination, to a group that 
constitutes the majority in a specific region65.
only with different forms of self-government can different cultures 
find a space for recognition, validation and development, as self-gov-
ernment allows the structuring of a system of political institutions 
capable of positively awarding and disciplining the cultural practices 
of the community (language, dress, customs, etc.) and creating a field 
of administrative, economic and cultural competencies based on lin-
guistic homogeneity.
in peasant indigenous regions in the altiplano, the valleys and 
the tropics, these structures of certain forms of local self-govern-
ment have existed de facto, at the level of communities, agricultural 
65 rotchchild, Donald & hartzell, caroline ‘security in deeply divided societies: 
The role of territorial autonomy’ in safran, William & maíz suárez, ramón (eds.) 
2000 Identity and territorial autonomy in plural societies (London/Portland: frank 
cass) pp. 259-260.
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unions and groups of communities66, since much before Bolivia was 
a republic. But there is no high-level structure of self-government 
connecting various communities or the hundreds or thousands of 
communities and urban neighbourhoods that are members of a 
large linguistic and cultural community, such that when the mem-
bers of these cultural communities join the different governmen-
tal systems of economic, educational, bureaucratic, police or mili-
tary administration, they must do so by abandoning their cultural 
knowledge (linguistic, oral, etc.) and forcibly using the ambiguously 
learned language, knowledge and customs of the dominant cultural 
identity that regulates state administration. This is the case of any 
communard or resident in an Aymara — or Quechua — speaking 
neighbourhood, who to register title to a property has to use exclu-
sively spanish to submit the request, complete the paperwork and to 
obtain the property rights. All those with an indigenous language as 
their mother tongue have to experience the same linguistic and cul-
tural schizophrenia; the parent dealing with the director or a teacher 
at the school, the urban merchant at the town hall, the union leader 
dealing with road services, the business person at customs, the stu-
dent dealing with a university professor, the resident having to pay 
for electricity and water services.
Popular Participation, it must be recognised, not so much inten-
tionally as because of the communities themselves, has enabled sever-
al town councils to partially modify linguistic practices in the bureau-
cratic administration. Because of the political organising by peasant 
unions, some mayors and administrative staff speak indigenous lan-
guages in their relationships with voters in the regions, and in some 
cases they are subject to forms of social control practiced by the in-
digenous communities67. however, in all these cases, we can only talk 
about low intensity forms of municipal self-government, to the extent 
that these authorities only have municipal competencies, while the 
decisive ones, demarcated and decided upon by the central govern-
ment, are monopolised by dominant monoethnic communities. This 
would help to explain why, despite the accomplishments achieved 
with the municipalisation of Bolivian territory, the occupation of 
some town councils by indigenous communities and the very forma-
66 carter, William & mamani, mauricio 1982 Irpa Chico: individuo y comunidad 
en la cultura aimara (La Paz: Juventud); rivera, silvia 1993 Ayllus y proyectos de 
desarrollo en el Norte de Potosí (La Paz: Aruwiyiri).
67 Blanes, José 2000 Mallkus y alcaldes (La Paz: Programa de investigación 
estratégica en Bolivia/ceBem); Albó, Xavier 1999 Ojotas en el poder local (La Paz: 
centro de investigación y Promoción del campesinado/hisBoL).
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tion of indigenous municipalities68, they have not been able to create 
a field of cultural and political competencies around an indigenous 
linguistic homogeneity. of course, if it is just a matter of executing the 
normative directives decided upon by spanish-speaking mestizo com-
munities, and the rest of the governmental functions at the local, re-
gional and higher levels are based on the use of the spanish language, 
then the indigenous language does not cease to be a merely local and 
private language, without possibilities for making social mobility and 
full citizenship viable. The introduction of indigenous languages into 
some governmental offices and services would not solve the problem, 
as it would continue to be an officially marginal language that would 
continue to lack the rank of an officially practiced language; that is, a 
language for the full exercise of citizenship, social mobility and com-
petition for high-ranking legitimate public posts.
The recognition of forms of self-government in territories demar-
cated by language communities would be a type of jura singularia that 
would immediately permit the creation of a field of competences and 
the accumulation of political, cultural, economic, educational and bu-
reaucratic capital, based on a linguistic homogeneity that, from the 
state, would revalue and legitimate the different indigenous languag-
es. in the process, a ‘societary culture’ would be created; that is, a ter-
ritorially concentrated culture, based on a shared language, used in a 
broad range of social institutions of both public and private life (edu-
cation, government, economy, media, taxation, etc.). The importance 
of constructing these societary cultures lies in that, without promot-
ing secession69, it would offer recognition for other cultural communi-
ties of the same right that the currently dominant cultural community 
practiced in its process of nation-building, because in a strict sense, 
every nation state is a societary culture70. 
68 Pacheco, Diego 2002 ‘Tierra, territorio y productividad’ in AA.VV. Visiones y 
contextos para un nuevo desarrollo rural (La Paz: Agencia suiza para el Desarrollo 
y la cooperación/Asociación de instituciones de Promoción  y educación/grupo de 
Desarrollo rural).
69 on the right to secession, see norman, Wayne 2001 ‘secession and (constitutional) 
democracy’ in requejo coll, ferrán (ed.) 2001 Democracy and national pluralism 
(London/new York: routledge). 
70 examples of these forms of autonomy for cultural communities in special 
territories exist in finland in the Åland region, in catalonia and the Basque country 
in spain, in the Azores and madeira islands in Portugal, and soon in england with 
the territories of northern island and scotland. on this, see: Aja, eliseo 1999 El 
Estado autonómico (madrid: Alianza). A study about the limits to applying this 
model of state organisation is presented in mozaffar, shaheen & scarritt, James ‘Why 
territorial autonomy is not a viable option for managing ethnic conflict in African 
plural societies’ in safran & maíz suárez (2000).
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now, the characteristics of the self-government of cultural and/
or linguistic communities can vary according to territorial scope, cul-
tural identity, demographic identity and the degrees of ethnic and 
nationality-based pollination that run through the different com-
munities. in the case of small ethnic identities, a minimum level of 
regional self-government that can guarantee the development of the 
culture, multicultural citizenship and the democratic exercise of dif-
ferent political rights likely to put an end to current exclusion would 
have to recognise:
a. The right of the indigenous peoples, and not only of the com-
munities, to self-determination, and therefore, to political au-
tonomy as part of the Bolivian state71. This entails the pos-
sibility that various indigenous communities, ayllus or larger 
ethnic identities, such as the Laymes and Qakachacas, could 
join together to produce an autonomous region with regional 
monoethnic or pluriethnic indigenous self-government.
b. The election of executive authorities and the formation of 
structures of regional deliberation by the cultural communi-
ties that result from the federation of indigenous peoples and 
ethnicities. The provincial federations and the federations of 
ayllus, with their cabildo systems or their alternative systems 
for the individual election of representatives, could fulfil this 
role of minimal regional government.
c. The preservation of the principle of balanced ethnic propor-
tionality and representation in the formation of autonomous 
regional governments, in order to prevent one ethnic group or 
linguistic community from imposing itself on another.
d. The integration of non-indigenous inhabitants of cities or 
neighbourhoods included within the autonomous territory 
as subjects of the same individual and collective rights in the 
shaping of regional systems of authority.
e. Autonomous territorial jurisdiction, with administrative re-
sponsibilities negotiated with and differentiated from the 
state in the educational and legal spheres, in agrarian prop-
erty ownership and in the management and protection of 
natural resources (water, forests, flora, fauna, and mineral 
71 for an extensive debate about the ambiguity of the international Labour 
organisation (iLo) and the united nations Working group declaration with respect 
to the recognition of the right of ‘peoples’ to self-determination, see clavero (1994).
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resources). This implies a redefinition of territoriality, in or-
der to articulate state sovereignty with the property rights 
and indigenous sovereignty that existed prior to the repub-
lican state.
f. Access to state funds under the principles of equity and solidar-
ity, so that the most impoverished regions due to previous ex-
tractions and exclusions can participate in the state-regulated 
common good.
g. The participation of autonomous regions based on cultural 
and/or linguistic communities in general and higher-level de-
cision-making. The redistribution of uninominal seats to allow 
the creation of districts related to autonomous regions and eth-
nocultural communities could allow precisely this articulation 
between the micro and macro levels of the state’s multicultural 
organisation72.
This form of regional autonomy could be implemented among rela-
tively small cultural and linguistic communities such as those in the 
oriente, with different linguistic or ethnic communities that together 
could build a more solid autonomous region; but also between more 
or less compact ethnic identities, such as those in northern Potosí 
and sucre; or between several different ethnic identities that have the 
same language, such as the Quechua-speaking cultural communities, 
which despite a shared linguistic base, display an often insurmount-
able diversity of identities.
But, simultaneously, there is at least one linguistic and cultural 
community of national size and quality — Aymara — whose process 
of internal politicisation and nationality-based cohesion demands a 
more complex structure of autonomous self-government. 
72 on the origin of some of these points, see the extensive debate about indigenous 
autonomies that arose in mexico as a result of the Zapatista uprising. in particular, 
see: ‘Postura del eZLn para la plenaria resolutiva de las partes. Tema i: Derechos y 
cultura indígena’ (san Andrés, mexico: manuscript),  January, 1996; ‘resultados de 
la consulta a las bases zapatistas sobre la mesa i de derechos y cultura indígena’ in 
Convergencia Socialista, Year 1, n° 1, July-August, 1997 (communiqué, february, 
1996); ‘Pronunciamiento conjunto que el gobierno federal y el eZLn enviarán a las 
instancias de debate y decisión nacional, correspondiente al punto 1.5 de las reglas 
de procedimiento’ (san Andrés, mexico: manuscript),  february 16, 1996; ‘La 
autonomía  como nueva relación entre los pueblos indios y la sociedad nacional’ 
in Ojarasca (mexico) n° 38-39, 1994; ‘comparación entre la iniciativa de ley 
elaborada por la cocopa y presentada  por el ejecutivo y las reformas aprobadas 
por el congreso de la unión’ in Chiapas (mexico), n° 11, 2001; Díaz Polanco & 
sánchez (2003).
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Because of the history of Aymara national construction73; the for-
mation of an enduring political autonomist narrative; the consolida-
tion of a nationalist elite with a large capacity for discursive reach; the 
persistence and expansion of its cultural repertoires; and its demo-
graphic importance, highly politicised through structures of collective 
action such as the sole union confederation of Campesino Workers 
of Bolivia (csuTcB) and the indianist parties [indian Party, Tupac 
Katari indian movement (miTKA), and Tupac Katari revolutionary 
movement (mTrK)], along with their subsequent offshoots, and, the 
most successful, the Pachacuti indigenous movement (miP), the de-
mand for the political recognition of this national community would 
require at least the following characteristics of regional autonomous 
self-government:
a. The right of the Aymara nationality, not just the right of the 
communities, to self-determination, and therefore, to political 
autonomy as part of the Bolivian state.
b. constitutional recognition of regional autonomy for linguis-
tic communities, in order to guarantee state recognition of 
the equality of cultures beyond the current conjuncture. Any 
reform to the constitution would necessarily require major-
ity participation and approval by the autonomous region. At 
the same time, the autonomous region would have its own 
constitutional normative regime, considered to be the basic 
law of the autonomous region, although with a rank just be-
low that of the constitution of the political community of the 
Bolivian state.
c. An Aymara executive and national legislative chamber, from 
where the executive of the autonomous regime would be 
elected. This assembly, which would carry out its roles in the 
continuous territorial jurisdiction of the (urban-rural) Aymara-
speaking region, would be directly elected by the members of 
the cultural community itself, and would be responsible only 
to this community.
d. An autonomous government with total political responsibil-
ity for the primary and higher educational system, public ad-
ministration, land registration, the media, taxes, public works, 
tourism, commerce, industry, transportation, housing, internal 
73 Albó, Xavier (ed.) 1988 Raíces de América: el mundo aimara (madrid: Alianza/
unesco); garcía Linera (2003). 
LAtIN AMErICAN CrItICAL tHOuGHt: tHEOry AND PrACtICE
70
trade, the environment, civil law, the police74, and natural re-
sources such as water, forests, flora, fauna, mining resources, 
etc. issues like labour legislation, intellectual and industrial 
property, ownership of hydrocarbon resources and market leg-
islation could be shared responsibilities between the autono-
mous community and the state75. As in the previous case, this 
implies redefining the meaning of territoriality, in order to ar-
ticulate state sovereignty with the property rights and indig-
enous sovereignty that existed prior to the republican state.
e. stable and predictable funding for the functioning of the au-
tonomous regime. This could be achieved by committing the 
income from certain taxes to the domain of the autonomous 
region, as well as by applying the principle of equity and state 
solidarity by means of the conditional and unconditional trans-
fer of resources from the state for the regular functioning of the 
autonomous administration76.
f. The integration of non-indigenous minorities from cities and 
neighbourhoods included within the autonomous Aymara terri-
tory as subject to the same individual and collective rights in the 
shaping of regional authority systems. recognition of the rights 
of cultural minorities for non-Aymara-speaking cultural com-
munities, with the possibility of accessing educational systems 
that preserve their cultural identity. The metropolitan area of La 
Paz, which is an enclave in the middle of an Aymara-speaking 
cultural territory, could be dealt with in one of two ways.
on one hand, the recognition of a special statute establishing it as an 
autonomous territorial region, like the city of Brussels in Belgium77, 
74 in germany’s case, 80% of police staff depends on the Länders or autonomous 
regions, while only 20% are under the purview of the federal state. in catalonia and 
the Basque country in spain, the autonomous police tend to become the only police 
with responsibility for the security of citizens in the autonomous region, with the 
exception of control over supracommunity services such as borders, airports and so 
on, where there are state police with special powers. in this respect, see: Aja (1999).
75 Aja (1999).
76 on the different ways to finance the system of autonomies, see: seijas, esther 2003 
Configuración asimétrica del sistema de comunidades autónomas (León: universidad 
de León) 2 Volumes.
77 caminal, miquel 2002 El federalismo pluralista. Del federalismo nacional al 
federalismo plurinacional (Barcelona: Paidós); see also: Peeters, Patrick 1994 
‘federalism: A comparative Perspective — Belgium transforms from unitary to a 
federal state’ in De Villiers, Bertus (ed.) Evaluating federal systems (Kenwyn, cape 
Town: Juta & co.).
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with bilingual status in the construction of self-government such 
that the legislative chamber proportionally represents the number of 
members of society who belong to the Aymara linguistic community 
and to the spanish-speaking linguistic community. This proportion 
should also be maintained in the regional executive, with the excep-
tion of the regional president. This would permit a local distribution 
of the administration of regional responsibilities in the city based on 
cultural and linguistic affinity. Another option would be for the city 
of La Paz and members of neighbouring areas, if they wish to be in-
cluded because of their cultural affinity, to remain as a discontinuous 
part of the spanish-speaking cultural community, with the status of 
a municipal regime similar to the current one, as with the rest of the 
cities and agricultural areas that do not see themselves as having in-
digenous cultural identities.
This set of minimal rules would permit an immediate revaluation 
of indigenous cultures, a democratic extension of social participation 
in the structures of state power, and most substantially, the political 
equality of cultures, with a positive, fair ethnification of specific state 
structures. in this way, the Aymara language and culture would have 
a system of public institutions that would ensure their development 
and positively sanction their public and private use, and a regional-
national framework would be formed that would provide economic-
administrative legitimation for their knowledge and use.
in a strict sense, this would be the establishment of a large-scale 
social space that would ensure a regime of aptitude, competence and 
accumulation of different types of capital78 (economic, political, cul-
tural, social, state, union, etc.), based on linguistic and cultural homo-
geneity. in other terms, the development of an Aymara societary cul-
ture would be based on conditions of normative political development 
equal to those of the spanish-speaking mestizo societary culture79.
78 Bourdieu (1984).
79 recently, félix Patzi criticised our proposal of indigenous autonomies in the 
book Sistema comunal (La Paz: ceA, 2004). he thinks that the regime of autonomies 
does not affect the core of the regime of capital, and thus that the demand for a 
regime of autonomies is not revolutionary. Patzi’s first error lies in that he confuses 
the issue of cultural identities with the issue of civilisational diversity. While 
the former refers to the existence of several linguistic or cultural identities in the 
same territory, indiscriminately including different productive logics (capitalist, 
communitarian, family-based, etc.) and different social classes (communards, 
business owners, workers, peasants, etc.), the latter refers to the overlapping of 
different societal, productive, organisational, political and symbolic logics (market-
industrial civilisation, communal civilisation, etc.). The dismantling of the relations 
of ethnocultural domination, as demonstrated by the political history of other 
countries, is not necessarily an anti-capitalist event, and much less so a socialist one.
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Depending on the extent of ethnic integration and politicisation 
of the Quechua-speaking cultural identities, it is theoretically possi-
ble to think about the formation of a second large-scale autonomous 
government, based on the most prevalent linguistic community in the 
country —Quechua.
But for these forms of indigenous self-government at the local, re-
gional or national level to not create centrifugal processes that enable 
separatist tendencies in the Bolivian state, and furthermore, to com-
plete the ethnic demonopolisation of the macro or general structure 
of the Bolivian state in order to consolidate high-level recognition of 
the indigenous cultural communities and linguistic regions, these pro-
cesses of autonomous construction must simultaneously include a re-
indeed, in general this occurs within modern social processes of democratisation 
and decolonisation that form a part of capitalist development, which does not mean 
that in the Bolivian case, their extinction would not be a gigantic decolonising 
revolution in political and economic relations. in contrast, dismantling the relations 
of civilisational domination would affect the expansion of the capitalist regime 
itself, and though this can intersect with the issue of cultural domination, it has its 
own internal dynamic. studying to what extent it is possible to move forward in the 
transformation of relations of civilisational domination is an issue that can not be 
carried out as a matter of will, but rather must emerge from studying the structure of 
real and potential forces of contemporary social struggle.
Patzi’s second error is that although the indigenous are the ‘majority’, this is a 
circumstantial majority to the extent that it depends on the strength of indigenous 
identity construction, which is a political and historical matter and not a natural, 
physical one. moreover, in a strict sense, the indigenous majority is a general sum 
of different indigenous cultural and national minorities — Aymaras, Quechuas, 
guaranis, mojeños, etc. even in the case of the Quechuas, more than having a 
shared identity as the Aymaras do, they have a set of quite fragmented territorial and 
local identities, which makes it impossible to speak of a real, socially mobilisable 
Quechua majority. in a strict sense, Aymaras, Quechuas, guaranis and so on, as well 
as the mestizos in terms of mobilised sociocultural identities, are all ‘minorities’ with 
respect to the others, which justifies even further the need for modes of territorial 
self-government where these are the majority, and their subsequent articulation at 
the macro level in a regime of higher multinational institutions.
in third place, the possibility of affecting capitalist society and the possibility of 
building a communitarian society are not matters of bookish logic, but rather of 
historical logic. capitalism is not transcended by mere theoretical deduction from a 
conceptual framework, as Patzi does, but rather by following the actual ‘movement 
going on before our own eyes’ The fact that social communitarianism could overcome 
capitalism is a fact that has to be analysed in historical events and in the actual 
struggles of communities, and Patzi has not been able to corroborate any of this. 
The error of Patzi’s position lies in confusing the proposal of a long-term, theoretical 
and wilfully emancipatory model with a politically conjunctural proposal dependent 
upon the balance of existing and potential forces, as suggested in our proposal of 
indigenous autonomies. Additionally, it is clear that the peasant rationality of family, 
not communal, work, applied to industrial production, which is essentially Patzi’s 
‘emancipatory’ proposal, entails little or nothing of a real communitarisation of the 
conditions of social reproduction.
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distribution of responsibilities between the state and the autonomous 
government, and a real and proportional presence of the indigenous 
cultural communities in the composition of the institutions and pow-
ers that regulate the highest political community of the Bolivian state.
in the case of the Aymara national community, this could be 
fulfilled by:
a. reforming the Bolivian state in order to democratically estab-
lish its unity, and preserve politico-cultural diversity by con-
stitutionally integrating regional politico-indigenous commu-
nities in a new higher political community, in which power is 
shared and divided between a general government with nation-
al responsibilities and constituent governments with regional 
or sub-national responsibilities. This therefore implies two 
spheres of vertically articulated government: state government 
and autonomous governments. in the event that departmental 
autonomies are established in spanish-speaking areas, in line 
with the territorial reconfiguration of the state produced by the 
indigenous autonomies, these regimes of departmental govern-
ments could also be included in this new vertical ordering of 
Bolivian state powers.
b. The representation and participation of the autonomous com-
munity in the organisations of the general state government, 
in the upper and lower chambers as well as in the ministries.
c. in the case of the lower chamber, made up of representatives of 
the entire nation and with responsibility for state administra-
tion, a numeric presence of Aymara representatives according 
to the percentage of Aymaras with respect to the total number 
of Bolivia’s inhabitants — approximately 25-30% — implying 
control of a total of 25-30% of the seats in the general parlia-
ment. With respect to the other indigenous autonomous com-
munities such as those in the oriente, the principle of over-
representation could be established in order to favour the 
presence of small cultural communities80.
d. in the case of the upper chamber that represents the depart-
ments, an equal proportional presence of the autonomous gov-
ernments following the principles of equality and institution-
al symmetry. in both the lower and the upper chambers, the 
80 Lijphart, Arend et al. 1998 Las democracias contemporáneas: Un estudio comparativo 
(Barcelona: Ariel) spanish translation by elena de grau; 3rd edition.
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principle of ‘double mandate’81 could be established, such that 
some parliamentarians elected for the autonomous parliament 
would also be directly present in the state parliament.
e. in the case of the state executive, proportional presence of the 
main linguistic communities (spanish, Aymara, Quechua) in the 
composition of the cabinet, in order to bring the country’s lin-
guistic diversity and the balance of rights of the most important 
linguistic communities to the very forefront of the executive. 
This, of course, does not rule out party competition, but it forces 
the party system itself to become multicultural, or to establish 
multicultural party alliances in order to be able to govern.
ultimately, this is about culturally constituting a consociational gov-
ernment (consociation with consensus)82, or a responsive plurination-
al federative government83 able to articulate a balanced representa-
tion of all the linguistic cultures and communities in the institutional 
structure, both in the state core and in local and regional government 
spaces. This would thus extend the official radius of the space of rec-
ognition, valuation and social legitimacy of the most important indig-
enous languages, and, consequently, it would enhance their capacity 
to be used as legitimate languages in the context of the state; that is, 
as linguistic capital suitable for obtaining posts in public administra-
tion, in the administration of the central government, in the economic 
leadership of the country, and so on.
The possibility of structuring systems of general government 
based on the proportional distribution of positions according to lin-
guistic community would break with the monoculturalism of the cur-
rent Bolivian state and extend the validity of the principal indigenous 
languages to the level of the highest state structure, thus making pos-
sible the political equality of cultures and languages as parallel and 
balanced mechanisms for social advancement and citizenship.
finally, this administrative political equality of the spanish lan-
guage and the Aymara and Quechua languages would initiate the 
structural process of dissolving the colonial legacy, which made eth-
nicity a capital such that social class structuring, access to goods, la-
bour supply and the possibilities of gaining access to positions of gen-
81 Pas, Wouter ‘La estructura asimétrica del federalismo belga’ in fossas, enric 
& requejo coll, ferrán (eds.) 1999 Asimetría federal y Estado plurinacional 
(madrid: Trotta).
82 Lijphart (1998).
83 caminal (2002).
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eral power would cease having (mestizo spanish-speaking) language 
or culture as a bonus that increases the efficacy and volume of the 
other types of capital.
b. ThE MULTICIVILISATIonAL dIMEnSIon of ThE  
PoLITICAL CoMMUnITy
But the problem that needs solving in the country is not only that 
of the multiculturalism or multinationality of its members. it is also 
that of the diversity of political systems and technologies with which 
people take on the exercise and broadening of their public rights. citi-
zenship is a state of society’s political self-awareness and self-organ-
isation that is recognised as legitimate by the laws of the state. The 
problem arises when the state prescribes a set of norms, of exclusive 
ways in which citizens can express and practice this production of 
the political dictates of public effectiveness, and revokes, denies or re-
presses other ways, other institutional forms, other practices, political 
cultures and systems of authority.
There is not one single way to exercise political rights or to in-
tervene in the management of the common good. Liberal democracy, 
by means of the individual vote, electoral competition, the formation 
of political elective communities and the political market84, is a form 
of democratically constituting citizenship, corresponding to societies 
that have undergone modern processes of individuation and that have 
eroded normative loyalties and systems of traditional aggregation 
(kinship, shared geographical origins, etc.). in general, this occurs in 
countries that have, in a majority and dominant fashion, participated 
in industrial economic processes that replace the peasant, artisan and 
communitarian economies that materially sustained the existence of 
normative forms of constituting the social group. in Bolivia, the econ-
omy displays such heterogeneity that scarcely 20% can be considered 
to be a modern market-industrial economy, while the rest is made 
up of traditional technico-procedural, semi-market-oriented systems, 
anchored in a strong presence of occupational and community sys-
tems in the organisation of productive processes. hence, the forms of 
corporatist, occupational and community affiliation are systems that 
constitute collective subjects, mainly practiced in cities and agrarian 
areas as modes of social affiliation, of conflict resolution, of mediation 
and of political self-representation.
now, it is true that these techniques of deliberative democracy, 
ethnic democracy and traditional corporatist citizenship, governed 
84 Bobbio (1987); Dahl, robert 1989 Democracy and its critics (new haven: Yale 
university Press).
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by moral and political parameters distinct from the liberal ones and 
made effective through associative and assembly-style, non-party in-
stitutions, have a predominantly local and regional existence. how-
ever, different moments in history have shown that these systems can 
be articulated into networks, into macro systems of democracy that 
include thousands of communities and numerous occupational asso-
ciations, engaging in large-scale democratic practices (provincial un-
ion federations, federations or confederations of ayllus, roadblocks, 
electoral participation, etc.). With a little bit of effort and support, 
such as that given by the state to the parties so that they will not disap-
pear, these non-liberal democratic practices could easily have a regu-
lar existence at the macro-state level.
Believing that liberal-style representative democracy is the only 
way to exercise political responsibility is to mistakenly suppose that Bo-
livia is an economically modern country in its technico-organisational 
structure, and that individuation is a majority phenomenon, as these 
are prerequisites for implementing models of representative democracy.
in Bolivia, the normative collective identities of the neighbour-
hood, ayllu, community and occupational association largely precede 
any manifestation of individuality, and they are used daily to exercise 
social control, to make claims, to elect representatives, to present de-
mands for equal rights, to form a civic moral code of citizen responsi-
bility. however, these democratic institutions85, which have their own 
practices for deliberation, for accountability, for choosing authorities, 
for presenting demands, for shaping public opinion, for dissenting and 
consenting, for the political equality of its members — that is, for ex-
ercising democratic rights in a substantive sense — are not currently 
taken into consideration by the state, which on the contrary, makes sys-
tematic, authoritarian efforts to discipline all of these other expressions 
of social democratisation so that they will fit the demo-liberal moulds.
These different political techniques, these systems of peasant-in-
digenous86 and urban-plebeian87 authority, form part of the complex, 
multicivilisational fabric of Bolivian reality. They are also visible in 
85 for a discussion on the democratic act that goes beyond the liberal procedural 
and minimalist perspective, see: rancière, Jacques 1999 Disagreement: Politics 
and philosophy (minneapolis: university of minnesota Press); Tapia, Luis 2002 La 
velocidad del pluralismo (La Paz: muela del Diablo).
86 rivera (1993); spedding, Alison & Llanos, David 1999 No hay ley para la cosecha. 
Un estudio comparativo del sistema productivo y de las relaciones sociales en Chari y 
Chulumani (La Paz: PieB/sinergia).
87 garcía Linera, Álvaro 2001 ‘sindicato, multitud y comunidad. movimientos sociales 
y formas de autonomía política en Bolivia’ in garcía Linera, Álvaro; Quispe, felipe; 
gutiérrez, raquel; Prada, raúl & Tapia, Luis Tiempos de rebelión (La Paz: comuna).
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other social practices, such as those revealed in the understanding 
and exercise of ayllu justice88, in Andean (textile and trenzado)89 writ-
ing, in the predominance of textual repertoires (orality, visualisation, 
tactile, etc.)90, in the management of collective resources91, in the man-
agement of family rights tied to political responsibilities92, and so on.
The possibility of real political equality in society therefore de-
pends on a suppression of the mono-organisational structure of the 
current Bolivian state, which has simply recognised and instituted 
those institutions that come from the dominant and minority (mer-
cantile-industrial) civilisation as the only legitimate institutions for 
the political exercise of (citizenship and liberal democracy) rights. 
substantial political equality between cultures and identities requires 
equality in the forms of producing policy at all levels of governmen-
tal administration (general, regional and local); that is, the equality 
of political practices, of political institutions and of different systems 
of political authority belonging to the different cultural communities 
and civilisational regimes that coexist in Bolivian territory.
This composition of political institutions and forms coming from 
different civilisational or societal matrices, which coexist in condi-
tions of equality, has been termed mestizo politics by Luis Tapia93, and 
is capable of creating solid and extensive processes of democratisation 
and citizenship formation.
To the extent that these different forms of technical and organi-
sational political production belong to different civilisational regimes, 
their historical rhythms and time are heterogeneous, hence it is neces-
sary to think about a specific synchrony for short periods, such that 
‘their presence, strength, opinion and decision can be included in 
the deliberation and overall action’94. one example of these specific 
synchronies of civilisational political regimes is that, at the regional 
scale, in the towns of chapare and northern Potosí, when choosing 
88 fernández, marcelo 2000 La ley del ayllu (La Paz: PieB); and El sistema jurídico 
indígena (santa cruz: centro de estudios Jurídicos e investigación social, 2003). 
see also the ten volumes on community Justice prepared by the Bolivian ministry of 
Justice and human rights in 1999.
89 Textile and braided are ancient Andean writing systems (copy editor´s note).
90 Arnold, Denise & Yapita, Juan de Dios 2000 El rincón de las cabezas. Luchas 
textuales, educación y tierras en los Andes (La Paz: umsA).
91 gerbrandy, gerben & hoogendam, Paul 1998 Aguas y acequias. Los derechos al 
agua y la gestión campesina de riego en los Andes bolivianos (La Paz: Plural).
92 spedding & Llanos (1999).
93 Tapia (2002).
94 Tapia (2002).
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municipal authorities through parties and the individual vote (liberal 
regime), the decision to choose people for the council is made with 
agrarian union and ayllu forms of deliberation and lobbying (corpo-
ratist or communal regime).
in this case, traditional institutional systems are articulated 
with ‘modern’ ones. in some cases, this de facto composition of po-
litical institutions also occurs during elections for representatives to 
parliament, though this is an occasional occurrence that is upheld 
in exceptional circumstances of community and ayllu politicisation 
and self-organisation. A democratic composition of different politi-
cal institutions and forms would imply the regulation, expansion 
and institutionalisation of these local and ephemeral experiences of 
civilisational articulation. This could be regulated by means of the 
following points:
a. constitutional recognition of political systems and systems of 
constituting authority practiced by peasant communities, ayl-
lus, neighbourhoods and unions (federations, confederations, 
associations), as legitimate systems for election and decision-
making in specific spheres of the government system at the 
general, regional and local levels.
b. Legitimate spheres for electing representatives where these 
other systems of deliberation would be applied would be: 
1) representatives to parliament at the top level of the state 
(or the general political community) in regions where these 
forms of political organisation are predominant or have 
a partial presence; 2) the parliaments of the autonomous 
regions of indigenous self-government. The proportional 
combination of elected representatives through parties or 
through corporatist structures would be negotiated, depend-
ing on the magnitude, history and presence of each one of 
these organisational forms, in each autonomous region and 
departmental constituency.
c. obligatory recognition, in the form of sanction or veto, of their 
deliberation on central issues of state management (state own-
ership of resources, overall public investment, constitutional 
reform, etc.).
d. institutional recognition, carrying the force of state law, 
for the forms of communal administration of justice, of 
controlling collective resources and of medical knowledge 
practiced regularly by indigenous cultural communities. 
extending those institutions that enable social legitimacy, 
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regular learning and the acquisition of resources for these 
practices to the regional and state level of bureaucratic and 
political administration.
e. constitutional recognition of authority rotation systems, of 
systems of accountability that report to collective organisa-
tions (not only to individuals, as in the liberal regime) on the 
political authorities that make up the different levels of the 
state hierarchy (municipalities, autonomous regions, depart-
mental governments, general state).
A multicivilisational state would mean precisely the recognition of 
multiple mechanisms, multiple techniques and forms of understand-
ing, practising and regulating society’s democratic impulses, in ac-
cordance with the multiple forms of exercising citizenship as a result 
of the plurality of society’s civilisational matrices.
As a result of the characteristics of its historical formation, Bo-
livia’s complex social reality has produced various practices of demo-
cratic political behaviour. Thus, an effectively democratic state would 
require large-scale recognition, in the sphere of fundamental public 
policy decision-making, of the institutionalised legitimacy of the dif-
ferent ways of practicing and understanding democracy. such legiti-
macy would enhance awareness of the democratisation of political 
power. This is precisely the multi-institutional nature of the state 
structure that, along with redefining legitimate ethnicities and the 
norms of territorial administration in accordance with ethnic prac-
tices and sovereignties, could produce a type of multinational and 
multicivilisational state.
if Bolivia is an overlapping of several cultures and several civi-
lisations, then the state, as a synthesis, should be an institutionality 
capable of articulating and forming a political design developed with 
a proportional presence of linguistic cultures and identities, as well as 
with modern and traditional, deliberative, representative and assem-
bly-type institutions in broad-scale, ‘national’ decision-making.
AdMInISTRATIVE CoMPLExITy
given that overcoming the exclusion of indigenous cultural communi-
ties and their systems of authority will inevitably require state reform, 
which would multiculturalise all public institutions and combine 
multiple organisational logics for political action in the different lev-
els of government, it is clear that the training of administrative staff, 
in order to adapt to these complex tasks, would have to incorporate 
equally complex forms of training, of ethnic composition and of or-
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ganisational abilities. in this respect, we can at least note the need for 
the following changes in the training of administrative staff, which 
would prepare them for the implementation of a multicultural and 
multicivilisational state:
a. Processes of recruiting public officials in similar proportions 
to the number of public posts that every linguistic community 
has with respect to all state administrative positions, at the 
micro and regional levels as well as at the macro level.
b. selection and ranking of staff according to merit-based com-
petition within each of the administrative segments chosen 
because of their relevance to a linguistic community.
c. Design of merit-based promotional tiers based not only on 
formal knowledge and bureaucratic rationalisation95, but 
also on knowledge of the organisational logic of indigenous 
cultures and the textual repertoires of non-market-industri-
al civilisations. To the extent that bureaucratic rationality 
is a product of the social internalisation of modern mar-
ket and factory logic96 in the regulation of legitimate state 
administrative knowledge, the acceptance of a plurality of 
forms of recognising administrative merits would introduce 
the plurality of systems of authority and of knowledge of 
public administration into the workings of the state. This 
would mean the alternation or coexistence of several types 
of merit-based capital in the administrative profession and 
in governmental administration.
d. Training, in preparation for administrative careers in govern-
ment, in the country’s three majority languages.
This democratisation of bureaucratic-administrative training recog-
nises indigenous languages as a legitimate means for gaining access 
to public roles and advancing within this sphere, and recognises a 
plurality of administrative practices and knowledge as valid routes 
for gaining merit.
given that the extinction of ethnic discrimination will be a gradu-
al process of structural state reform, there are several ways to initiate 
95 Weber, max 1978 Economy and society (Berkeley: university of california Press).
96 osborne David & gaebler, Ted 1992 Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial 
spirit is transforming the public sector (reading: Addison-Wesle); elster, Jon 1988 
Constitutionalism and democracy (cambridge/Paris: cambridge university Press/
maison des sciences de l’homme).
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this process. one possibility would be a reform ‘from below’, estab-
lishing indigenous forms of self-government in special territories at 
intermediate levels, which would then serve as experience for other 
regions. This would entail local initiative as well as state tolerance and 
support from the highest levels of leadership.
Another form of reform is ‘top down’, such that the decision to 
modify principal parts of the organisational architecture of the sys-
tem of self-government would be made at the highest levels of the 
state, for this to then flow down to (autonomous) intermediate and 
micro (local indigenous self-government) levels. This would require 
immediate constitutional reforms that would, for example, make 
the composition of congress multicultural in the short term, as well 
as the working of some governmental agencies.
if, as we have seen above, the key to eroding processes of eth-
nic exclusion in multicultural societies lies in the equality of lan-
guages and cultural practices in the spheres of public adminis-
tration, then in order to officially legitimate all cultures by using 
them within these spheres and by creating conditions for the social 
mobility of the members of these cultures, it is necessary for the 
state, from the highest and broadest levels of self-government pos-
sible, to validate the majority cultures, identified in this case as 
linguistic communities. for example, the normatised and regular-
ised leadership of ministries by indigenous people and a gradual 
indigenous majority, and/or proportional distribution in the par-
liament according to linguistic affiliation. These measures would 
issue a state signal that indigenous languages are recognised as 
linguistic capital for holding public office, for real citizenship and 
for social mobility.
Together, all these transformations would mean that in the 
sphere of legislative, judicial and executive powers, in addition to 
proportionally distributing general and territorial unitarian ad-
ministration according to ethnic and linguistic origins, the forms 
of management, representation and social intervention would have 
to incorporate multiple composite political mechanisms, such as 
representative democracy, through parties; deliberative democracy, 
through assemblies; communal democracy, through the normative 
action of communities and ayllus, and so on. This is, then, about 
combining at a macro, general scale, modern institutions with tra-
ditional ones, multicultural representation with general representa-
tion, in accordance with the multicultural and multicivilisational 
reality of Bolivian society. in other words, it is about seeking a po-
litical modernity based on what we really are, and not simulating 
what we can never be.
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All this certainly points to a radical extension of democracy 
to the extent that it creates real, equal possibilities of citizenship, 
both in the context of the collective rights of cultural identities 
and in the exercise of organisational practices for gaining access 
to public recognition. in turn, the radical nature of this process 
stems from the fact that it entails the dismantling of colonial and 
civilisational structures of domination that have persisted to the 
present day, not only since the birth of the republic, but going all 
the way back to the very beginning of indigenous colonisation in 
the sixteenth century — structures which have been dressed up 
over the centuries in different forms of imposed economic and po-
litical pseudo-modernisation.  
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CUbA And ThE nEW
InTER-AMERICAn SySTEM***
InTRodUCTIon
statements against the trade embargo imposed against cuba by the 
united states since 1962 are no longer coming only from academics 
and intellectuals, nor are they a mere expression of institutional con-
demnation by multilateral bodies. The issue has taken a new turn in 
the hemispheric agenda and in the agendas of countries in the region, 
both in Latin America and the united states. The geopolitical rhetoric 
of the cold War era that warned of the ‘cuban threat’ to hemispheric 
and American stability and that rationalized international isolation of 
the country has faded and is now considered to be the most anachro-
nistic aspect of us foreign policy.
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The lack of objective reasons for the policy led American national 
security agencies to strike the ‘cuban threat’ from their list of strategic 
priorities 10 years ago, a view supported by former President Jimmy 
carter. The embargo is now justified more as a matter of domestic pol-
itics than as part of Latin American policy and has become a divisive 
issue among us interest groups. it has also come under serious ques-
tioning by regional players who are demanding autonomy for their 
own international affairs and policies. Although officially formulated 
as a series of economic measures designed to promote ‘democratiza-
tion and greater respect for human rights’ (state Department, 1992), 
it has also led to the island nation’s exclusion from inter-American re-
lations and regional institutions with strong ties to the united states. 
under this scenario, the embargo can be viewed as a policy geared 
towards influencing the hemispheric balance of power.
As the embargo approaches its fiftieth anniversary, Latin Ameri-
can countries are virtually unanimous in their call for its cancellation 
and for cuba’s full political and diplomatic reintegration into regional 
affairs. foremost among these countries are those with leftist govern-
ments, who have moved from issuing statements at multilateral forums 
to carrying out an intensification of trade relations with cuba, to the 
displeasure of Washington. in the political sphere, the absence of any 
normalization of cuban-American relations has led these countries 
to abandon negotiation forums such as the organization of American 
states (oAs) and the summit of the Americas, which they consider to be 
dominated by a us vision of pan-American relations. At the same time, 
there is a growing group of countries that acquiesce to the us position, 
and linking the lifting of the embargo to the implementation of political 
reforms in cuba. The most prominent among these are countries with 
non-leftist governments such as chile and Panama, as well as countries 
such as honduras and haiti where the us exerts direct influence. 
The new cuban role in inter-American relations requires that 
a number of variables and players involved in this reincorporation 
be taken into consideration, as well as the terms under which it will 
take place. first of all, it is necessary to examine the most significant 
changes, both real and symbolic, that have taken place in the cuban 
political system since raul castro became president. such changes in-
clude new foreign policy initiatives that have led the caribbean coun-
try to reconfigure its ambitions with respect to new Latin American 
realities as well as new global powers and alliances. 
it is thus important to understand and assess the isolationist policy 
pursued by the us against cuba as well as the unsustainable exclusion 
of cuba from the inter-American system. We should also try to deter-
mine whether the political capital that sustained the anti-cuban agenda 
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as an unquestionable feature of us foreign policy for both republican 
and Democratic administrations is running out, or whether the same 
policy towards cuba will continue with only minor adjustments.
making such a diagnosis will enable us to analyze the reintegration 
of cuba into the inter-American system at the end of the twenty-first cen-
tury’s first decade from two perspectives. The first consists of an exami-
nation of the new inter-American institutional system, whose validity is 
challenged by the emergence of cuba as a regional player. The second 
entails a detailed analysis of the restructuring of the neo-conservative 
geopolitical framework backed by the us as the basis for the structural 
resistance that cuba will face, contrasted with a new Latin American 
emphasis on autonomous regional integration which includes cuba.
This chapter is divided into three sections. in the first offers an 
analysis of internal changes on the island taking place at the end of the 
first decade of the twenty-first century and their impact on inter-Amer-
ican relations, not only at the intergovernmental level but also in rela-
tions between groups and social movements that resist and demand 
autonomy from the hegemony of us power. it also contextualizes the 
new geopolitical status of cuba, the prestige and international solidar-
ity that it enjoys; its strengths in the fields of biomedical and genetic 
research and its quest for autonomy with respect to the european un-
ion and the strengthening its ties with russia and especially china. The 
second section sets out the contradiction inherent in the domestic and 
foreign policy of the united states regarding cuba: the continuance of 
the embargo and the many ways in which the state Department im-
poses isolation on multilateral, international, continental and regional 
levels. it also underlines some signs of easing of pressure under the re-
publican administration of george W. Bush, frustration resulting from 
the failure of Barack obama to fulfil some of the ideals articulated 
during his campaign and the transformations experienced by the pow-
erful cuban-American lobby and its power to affect us foreign policy 
through domestic politics. The third section discusses cuba’s role in 
the transformation of inter-American relations and highlights its lead-
ership in criticizing longstanding Pan-American power structures. 
I. ChAnGES In ThE CUbAn PoLITICAL SySTEM In ThE ConTExT 
of A nEW REGIonAL And GLobAL SCEnARIo
After the fall of the soviet union in 1991, cuba turned its gaze to the new 
Latin American reality of change and resistance, and not with an eye to-
wards promoting armed movements, but with the aim of strengthening 
the anti-establishment movements and governments that emerged from 
elections with broad popular support. similarly, on the worldwide level, 
improvements during the ‘special Period’ (1991-1997) during which the 
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cuban economy was reorganized to cope with the hardships that ensued 
following the termination of soviet union support resulted in a strength-
ening of trade relations with the european union, eastern europe, rus-
sia and particularly with china. The weakening of old export sectors 
such as sugar made feasible the strategy of including cuba in the new 
dynamic of international relations that favoured tourism, extraction of 
raw materials and energy resources of Latin American countries. 
ThE InTERnAL-doMESTIC SPhERE
The ascent of raul castro to the cuban presidency in february 2008 
brought a number of liberalization measures, reforms and changes 
that could be interpreted as a response to internal and external expec-
tations for a ‘transition administration’ yet which in reality did not 
break with the historical ideals of the cuban revolution. in addition, 
several of these measures can be taken as an attempt to adapt to the 
regional, hemispheric and global realities of Latin America in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century.
in the area of domestic policy, the following measures taken 
during the first weeks of the current administration (BBC, 2008) are 
noteworthy:
 - Allowing cubans living on the island access to tourist hotels.
 - making cell phone service available to all cubans.
 - Liberalization of the sale of computers and appliances within 
the country.
 - streamlining procedures for civil servants to buy houses be-
longing to government agencies.
 - Transferring land to private farmers and cooperatives to stimu-
late the production of food, coffee and tobacco. This measure 
will boost agricultural output, reduce the prices of products 
and increase the purchasing power of wages.
 - cancellation of farmer debts and increasing prices the state 
pays for milk and meat.
 - increasing pension payments and salaries for employees of the 
judiciary, from may 2008.
 - commuting all death sentences, with the exception of three 
prisoners incarcerated for terrorism.
other more comprehensive measures, including those related to the 
property system, dual currency, low wages and allowing foreign eco-
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nomic investment, will certainly take more time to implement, but 
they have been greeted with enthusiasm by the international commu-
nity and some cuban-American dissidents (hernández, 2009).
in the economic sphere, one sign of a turn by the new administra-
tion was the appointment of several senior military officers directly 
associated with raul castro to economic affairs posts for the purpose 
of optimizing efficiencies, which has been achieved to the greatest ex-
tent in companies run by the armed forces. These measures can be 
compared with the tight state control of the economy undertaken by 
china before adopting an open-market approach (sader, 2009).
After two years of such measures, it is possible to make a critical 
analysis of the extent to which they have affected the re-positioning of 
cuba within the inter-American and international system and influ-
enced changes in cuban diplomacy on the regional and global levels. 
STRATEGIC foREIGn PoLICy MoVES 
The beginning of raul castro presidency was marked by two deci-
sions which greatly impacted the cuban international agenda: the dis-
missals of carlos Lage, who served as a kind of prime minister, and 
felipe Pérez roque, the young chancellor who was noted for his close 
association with the political ideas of fidel castro. These changes, in 
spite of the controversial circumstances that precipitated them, were 
interpreted as signs of openness to dialogue with the us, and above 
all as harbingers of a new era in cuban diplomacy that would coincide 
with changes in the extra-regional and extra-continental spheres. Ac-
cording to journalist Lissette Bustamante (2009) ‘[m]ost analysts and 
observers of the cuban issue in the us believe that the changes imple-
mented by raúl castro strengthen the economy and set the stage for a 
new chapter in relations between both countries’. 
important steps have been taken towards reactivating relations 
with the european union and the international community. south-
south relations have been strengthened, particularly with two major 
regional players: Venezuela and Brazil. harmonious relations have 
been re-established with the government of mexico after the diplo-
matic break that occurred under the administration of former presi-
dent Vicente fox Quezada (the first such rupture in 45 years). in 
addition, an interesting approach has been taken regarding closer re-
lations with china and russia, which includes strengthened strategic 
relations with Venezuela and the prospect for triangulated negotia-
tions in energy and military matters.
cuba, the largest island in the Antilles, was the first nation in the 
Western hemisphere to establish diplomatic ties with the china of 
mao Zedong (1961), a country which is now its second largest trading 
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partner for sugar and nickel after Venezuela. on the occasion of the 
visit of chinese President hu Jintao in 2009, cuba obtained a deferral 
of several debt payments to china and a $70 million loan for the repair 
and renovation of the cuban hospital network. 
havana has also renewed relations with moscow. in 2006, the two 
countries signed 30 cooperation agreements, which according to the 
russian ministry of finance included more than $350 million in loans 
and aid for the island. russia was among the first countries to provide 
disaster assistance to cuba for three hurricanes that struck in 2008 
(grogg, 2009). 
in the geopolitical sphere, russia expanded its military coopera-
tion with cuba as a result of us support for the uprising in south 
ossetia in August 2008 and conducted joint military manoeuvres 
with the Venezuelan army later that year. All of this contributes to the 
strengthening of cuba’s strategic defence and national security. 
ThE InTERnATIonAL SPhERE
The economic, commercial, trade and financial embargo is the most 
serious difficulty faced by the cuban government and people at the 
international level. The united nations general Assembly has over-
whelmingly voted to condemn the embargo 19 times since 1992. most 
recently, on october 26, 2010, 182 countries voted in favour of ending 
the embargo, while 2 voted against and 3 abstained. cuban foreign 
minister Bruno rodriguez said on that occasion: ‘The direct economic 
damage that the embargo has inflicted on the cuban people amounts 
to 751 billion dollars at current exchange rates’.
Aynel Álvarez guerra and Anet Pino rivero (2010) offer the back-
ground to this situation: ‘The embargo against cuba was imposed by 
the us government on february 3, 1962 through Presidential Proc-
lamation 3447. This decision, based on the legal authority afforded 
presidents under section 620(a) of the foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
established a total embargo on all trade between the us and cuba, 
even though the us had already been applying economic measures 
against the young cuban revolution since 1959’. They then conclude: 
The legal structure of the embargo is a flagrant violation of human 
rights of the people of cuba, citizens of third countries and American 
citizens themselves. its provisions also violate us law, and it has also 
received condemnation for violating fundamental provisions and ten-
ets of international law related to the political, economic, commercial 
and financial relations between states.
internationally, in other controversial un debates, cuba agreed to hu-
man rights discussions with spain (resulting in the release of several 
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political prisoners) and promised to sign united nations protocols 
on civil rights in 2008. earlier that same year it resumed cooperative 
initiatives with the european commission through a joint declara-
tion signed by commissioner for Development and humanitarian Aid 
Louis michel and then cuban minister of foreign Affairs felipe Pérez 
roque at a ceremony in havana.
The declaration establishes a general framework to guide both 
parties through the gradual development of their future cooperation. 
in addition, both parties agreed to continue to explore potential areas 
of cooperation in which cuba excels such as the environment, sci-
ence and technology, trade, cultural exchanges and natural disaster 
preparedness. european commission funding, which totalled €20-25 
million, could be invested in these areas (Europa Press/IP, 2008). 
internationalization strategies left over from the cold War pe-
riod have been adapted to prevailing circumstances and included in 
the integration process, mainly through the Bolivarian Alliance for 
the Peoples of our America (ALBA). in December 2004, cuba and 
Venezuela signed their first ALBA statement and agreement, consoli-
dating a strategic alliance with the symbolic backdrop of ideological 
and political opposition to the longstanding strategy of us-imposed 
isolationism, amidst the present reality of already strong ties between 
caracas and havana. 
Joining ALBA has given cuba a higher profile among governments 
in the region, and it has also become a key factor in updating its image 
in Latin America. The move has drawn key support from networks 
of social movements throughout Latin America and the caribbean, 
mostly in the southern cone. support from organizations through-
out Latin America has been expressed at the post-2004 editions of the 
World social forum and at Peoples’ summit sessions held in parallel 
to official presidential meetings, such as the summit of the Americas, 
where the rejection of cuba’s isolation has been a constant demand. 
it should be noted that cuba provides doctors and health tech-
nology to Venezuela as part of mission Barrio Adentro, as well as 
strategic advice regarding the design of Venezuelan anti-poverty pro-
grams. in return, cuba receives 60,000 barrels of oil per day (Trinku-
nas, 2006). in 2006, following the victory of evo morales in Bolivia, 
the Andean country became a full member of ALBA, followed by 
nicaragua after Daniel ortega’s victory in 2007. in 2008, Dominica 
joined ALBA as a full member, followed by honduras in october of 
that year, although the participation of honduras was thwarted by 
the June 2009 coup. saint Vincent and the grenadines joined in April 
2009, followed by ecuador in June, giving ALBA its current member-
ship of eight countries.
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We should also mention the importance of the media project Tel-
evisora del sur, better known as Telesur, which was founded in 2005 
by the governments of Argentina, uruguay, Venezuela and cuba to off-
set the quasi-total monopoly of Anglo-American media corporate em-
pires and the national economic elites and their impact on the politi-
cal (de)-stabilization of Latin American countries that have adopted 
policies unfavourable to their interests (Villamil, 2009).
The establishment of contacts between progressive leftist govern-
ments and civil society organizations has resulted in a subtle but im-
portant step towards ownership of the initiative in terms of both the 
pragmatic aspects of international political relations and alternative 
civilian actors in Latin America. While pragmatism is associated with 
political realism, that which is doable or feasible, without considera-
tion for the means to achieve the goals, the policy of social agencies is 
seen as an ethical stance which subordinates the type of means used 
to the validity of the purposes.
in this context, there has been growing momentum behind propos-
als for Peoples’ Trade Agreements (TcPs). These proposals were initially 
driven by Bolivia, Venezuela and cuba in 2006 and then gradually taken 
on by a number of social movements as part of an advocacy for fair trade 
and in opposition to the neoliberal and orthodox versions of other free 
Trade Agreements (fTAs) (gudynas, 2006). This has been a fundamen-
tal factor in linking cuban political development to that of the rest of 
Latin America. it has expanded historical support from certain sectors 
of Latin American civil society associated with the traditional left joined 
by new generations and expressions of resistance and a global leftist 
movement contributing new ideas to the anti-neoliberal struggle. These 
initiatives champion regional integration initiatives as alternatives to 
neo-Pan American initiatives, and with the express inclusion of cuba.
ALBA’s strategic focus covering the caribbean ring, which encom-
passes havana, caracas, managua and extends all the way through 
the Amazonian-Andean region to La Paz, has enabled the creation of 
a platform for the negotiation of strategic alliances in areas such as 
energy, economics, trade and to a great extent ideology. 
These factors take on geopolitical significance when we consider 
the interest that the united states has in making central America 
and the caribbean part of its primary security perimeter as defined 
by usnorThcom, the push to adopt the central America-Domini-
can republic-united states free Trade Agreement (cAfTA-Dr) and 
its ongoing support for the idea of giving mexico a pivotal role as a 
regional hub and geopolitical linchpin between the us and central 
America through the mesoamerican initiative, which replaced the 
Puebla-Panama Plan.
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in spite of such geopolitical determinants, the multi-faceted po-
litical and diplomatic agenda of cuba is opening doors to the possi-
bility of it becoming key player in regional debate. The intensity with 
which the cuban government is going forward with its Latin Ameri-
can foreign policy, through its presence in forums that are not directly 
controlled by the united states (rio group, Latin American and eu-
ropean ibero-American forums and the são Paulo forum), is putting 
an end to past isolationism and helping to consolidate and amplify 
its stance against us imperialism. As a result, cuba has attained the 
cooperation of some Latin American countries for the coordination 
of political and trade negotiations with Washington, in a way that 
strengthens Latin American regional autonomy. 
ending the us embargo is at the top of the list of demands pre-
sented before other regional organizations such as the south American 
union of nations (unAsur) and the caribbean community (caricom) 
and even continental bodies such as the organization of American 
states (oAs), with historical implications to be dealt with below.
ThE InTERnATIonAL SoLIdARITy And MoRAL PRESTIGE ASSoCIATEd 
WITh ThE CUbAn REVoLUTIon
The abovementioned political and diplomatic efforts, combined with 
the quality of cuban international solidarity projects made possible 
by its scientific and technological development, have contributed to 
the ethical and moral prestige of the cuban revolution in Latin Amer-
ica and throughout the world. cuban ‘literacy brigades’ have helped to 
eradicate illiteracy in Venezuela and nicaragua and mitigate it in sev-
eral other countries in the region. ‘operation miracle,’ which provides 
specialized eye surgery, has returned sight to hundreds of thousands 
of senior citizens throughout the region, and without such care be-
ing based on ideological considerations of any kind. And in the case 
of cuba, the humanitarian aid provided to countries that have fallen 
victim to natural disasters is not a question of giving what one has left 
over, but sharing what one has. This attitude is reflected in the values 
of solidarity that lead cuba to cooperate in natural disaster relief even 
though providing this international assistance involves making sacri-
fices on the domestic front. 
A case in point is the prestige gained by cuba’s integrated security 
system against risks, a social safety program that has helped Latin 
American countries overcome catastrophic damage from hurricanes 
that have killed in endemic fashion in the caribbean region. cuba’s 
prestige is reaffirmed not only by its response to disasters in Latin 
America, but also by the evident hypocrisy of international disaster 
relief and the way preparedness is managed elsewhere.
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some specific cases illustrate this view. in early July 2005, hur-
ricane Dennis, a category 4 hurricane, as was Katrina, struck cuba 
(De Belder, 2005). cuban authorities evacuated 1.5 million people in a 
timely and orderly manner. in the case of hurricane ivan, a category 
4 hurricane and the fifth most powerful storm ever to have struck the 
caribbean, two million people were evacuated, 100,000 within the first 
three hours, and casualties were kept to a minimum. While deaths 
resulting from natural disasters in other countries, including the us, 
have numbered in the thousands, in cuba there have not been more 
than a few dozen. This record has given the cuban disaster prepared-
ness system recognition as a model for all countries in the region, 
according to the office of humanitarian Affairs of the united nations 
Development Programme (unDP). 
The role of cuban cooperation in natural disaster relief in hai-
ti confirms the humanitarian intensions of their international soli-
darity (carpineta, 2010): ‘They came when the hurricanes struck in 
‘98 as a health care contingency. After the earthquake struck, they 
were examples to other physicians. over 12 years, 744 cuban doc-
tors have treated more than 34,500 patients. of the 2,728 operations 
performed, 1,297 were highly complex surgeries, 380 were upper 
limb amputations and 644 of the lower limbs. A total of 744 doctors, 
nurses and laboratory technicians, worked on 18 surgical teams in 
three hospitals in Port-au-Prince and in care centres throughout the 
10 departments of haiti’. 
in the first weeks after the disaster, professionals from spain, 
chile, Venezuela, colombia and germany joined the effort in hospitals 
operated by cubans. so did about 400 haitians recently graduated or 
about to finish their medical studies in havana. ‘The us, however, re-
fuses to reach out to the cubans. not counting the un peacekeeping 
mission, the us and cuba are the two countries with the most people 
deployed in the devastated country’ (carpineta, 2010). The earthquake 
in haiti questions the depth of international humanitarian coopera-
tion and the funding of official development assistance. This situation, 
illuminated by cuban foreign policy initiatives, begs a rethinking and 
reorientation of international financial assistance for natural disasters.
II. ThE WAnInG of ThE AMERICAn PoLICy of CUbAn ISoLATIon
ThE noRMALIzATIon of CUbAn-LATIn AMERICAn RELATIonS
The normalization of diplomatic relations between costa rica and el 
salvador with cuba in march 2009, which had been suspended since 
1961, resulted in cuba having diplomatic relations with more coun-
tries in the Americas that it had ever had since gaining full independ-
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ence in 1902. At the same time, this milestone also made the us is 
the only country in the hemisphere that has no formal relations with 
cuba. in other words, the most powerful country in the Americas is 
utterly alone in its policy towards cuba.
in 2009, costa rica and el salvador re-established diplomatic ties 
with cuba, after having been the only two countries in Latin America 
not to have such relations. This breakthrough allowed all of the re-
gion’s political cooperation agreements to be implemented, including 
the Latin American economic system (seLA), in which cuba has par-
ticipated since it began, and the rio group, which it joined in 2009 
at the request of mexico, which served as Pro Tempore secretariat at 
that time. still pending is membership in the organization of Ameri-
can states (oAs), which in June, 2009 reversed the 1962 decision bar-
ring cuba from oAs membership (collins, 2009). The cuban govern-
ment declined the invitation on the grounds that the spurious origins 
of the oAs had not been overcome.
Another fundamental demonstration of cuba’s full incorporation 
into regional dynamics is the fact that 40% of cuba’s current trade 
is with other Latin American countries, an unprecedented statistic 
(suárez salazar, 2009). These factors reinforce its imminent integra-
tion into the contemporary Latin American scenario, and even its 
symbolic leadership, as argued in the preceding section.
ThE EffECTS And LIMITATIonS of ThE CUbAn-AMERICAn Lobby
With the exception of local-level concerns in southern florida, cuba no 
longer has priority status within us foreign or domestic policy. At pre-
sent, the old embargo coexists with recent liberalization initiatives pro-
moted by powerful American business interests. The republican Party 
itself has organized new pro-dialogue lobbies in Louisiana, iowa, Texas, 
north carolina, nebraska, minnesota, and other agricultural states. 
however, ‘[s]ince george W. Bush assumed the presidency of the 
united states in 2001, the budget to create a social opposition move-
ment in cuba allied to the interests of miami and the White house 
ballooned from $3.5 million in 2000 to $45 million in 2008’ (Pertierra, 
2010). in 2003, Bush created the President’s commission for Assis-
tance to a free cuba, whose aim was to ‘identify ways to quickly bring 
the cuban regime to an end and organize a transition’. The policies of 
President Barack obama follow the patterns laid down by this body: 
‘To implement measures to train, develop and strengthen the opposi-
tion and civil society in cuba’ (Pertierra, 2010). 
in spite of such high-level support, as of this writing millions 
of dollars in funding have not yet been released to this commission. 
senator John Kerry (D-massachusetts) questioned the use of that 
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funding, citing concerns of misuse by cuban residents of florida and 
echoing an audit in 2006 by the government Accountability office 
(gAo) which documented such corruption. in 2009, Kerry, as chair-
man of the senate foreign relations committee, asked for a review 
of the project, which now has $20 million budgeted for 2010. con-
sequently, the state Department temporarily froze the sizeable fund 
until, following a new enquiry concluded in march 2010, ‘plans were 
announced to release $20 million in anti-cuban funding, arguing that 
the program had been restructured in such a way that the funds would 
arrive clandestinely to certain cubans on the island and not to certain 
others in miami’ (Pertierra, 2010).
meanwhile, the international community has become increasing-
ly persistent in its calls for the reintegration of cuba into the interna-
tional system. from a critical perspective, many see reintegration as 
a solution to the problems of democratization and respect for human 
rights, issues on which the united nations human rights commis-
sion has been adamant.
cuba is not a threat to any country, yet it remains on the list of 
terrorist states, even though no us allies consider it to be such — even 
the uK refuses to blacklist cuba. several cuban and American politi-
cal analysts have found a direct relationship between progress towards 
détente in cuban-American relations and the level of belligerence of 
the cuban-American lobby (Landau, 2010): ‘in 2010, Washington con-
tinues to adopt a provocative attitude towards havana — currently for 
not saving a political prisoner, orlando Zapata Tamayo, who died from 
a hunger strike. Zapata, arrested on charges of assault, decided to be-
come a dissident while in jail. There are videos showing him being 
hospitalized by cuban authorities. Another video showed him receiv-
ing top-level medical care without anyone asking for his insurance pol-
icy. Another dissident, guillermo fariñas, then began his own hunger 
strike at home demanding that cuba to release all political prisoners. 
When he collapsed, cuban authorities rushed him to hospital’.
According to Landau (2010), tense situations such as these can be 
linked to a hardening of us policy toward cuba, steered by the cuban 
lobby: ‘ronald reagan privatized the American policy toward cuba, 
leaving it in the hands of a minority group in miami who had no de-
sire to see things improve. every step forward, such as the migration 
talks in february, was met with a step backwards, thanks to the power 
of the anti-cuban contingency. A hunger striker dies, and another aris-
es to steal the headlines. maybe things will change when oil begins to 
flow from cuban offshore platforms’ (Landau, 2010).
We should clarify at this point that the cuban-American lobby is in 
fact a diverse group of actors that can be classified into three categories: 
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1. Those who are most reluctant to open the door to negotiations 
between cuba and the us government, and who influence the 
us congress and senate by applying political pressure through 
their elected representatives. Prominent political figures associ-
ated with this contingency have included the likes of brother con-
gressmen Lincoln and mario Diaz-Balard of the state of florida. 
2. A second group takes a position which is apparently more open 
to negotiation but which in reality promotes ‘horizontal rela-
tions’ between the civilian populations of both countries to the 
exclusion of the cuban government. This group, which has ties 
with the cuban American national foundation, has influenced 
the policies of the Department of state and the White house 
under Barack obama. This group also supports corporate in-
terests that attempt to dissuade governments of agricultural 
exporting states from exporting to cuba. 
3. Although not formally identified as a group, a broad network 
of social agencies, unions, human rights advocates, representa-
tives and personalities from the American cultural and intel-
lectual communities are calling for end to the embargo and for 
the establishment of us-cuba diplomatic relations. 
of course, operating independently of such groups in the united 
states are a number of diverse forces in Latin America and the carib-
bean which have broadened the autonomy of the region over the past 
decade and led to enhanced political, economic and institutional con-
vergence in which cuba is a participant, and who through a number 
of forums continue to challenge the justification for cuba’s isolation in 
the political, economic, financial, trade, immigration and information 
technology spheres. 
III. TWEnTy-fIRST CEnTURy: RESTRUCTURInG of ThE 
InTER-AMERICAn SySTEM
ThE PAn-AMERICAn SySTEM And US doMInAnCE 
from the first half of the nineteenth century, and in the midst of in-
dependence movements in places that would become the new nation-
states of Latin America, the united states gradually consolidated its 
position under the ideas of the monroe Doctrine (1823), the geopoliti-
cal fulcrum of the ‘pan-American’ project inspired by ‘pan-American 
ideas’ that would shape the western hemisphere (clearly laid out in the 
manifest Destiny doctrine). This point of view, which reflects haush-
ofer’s geopolitical model of pan-regions, defines Latin America as an 
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‘appendix subordinated’ to that power (cairo, 2008), whose primary 
function was to provide the natural resources needed by American in-
dustrialization and serve as an immediate consumer market for Amer-
ican products. in other words, Latin America would be ‘the greater 
market’ of the emerging hegemonic power, to use the geo-economic 
term of Alfred Weber.
suárez salazar (2008) classifies inter-American affairs into a num-
ber of periods: 1) from the haitian revolution to the American civil 
War; 2)the spanish-American War (in which the us, as new world 
power, snatched independence from cuban liberators) and the Treaty 
of Paris of 1898 to the great Depression; 3) the ‘good neighbour’ pe-
riod following the end of World War ii until the cuban revolution 
in 1959; 4) the beginnings of the cold War and the ongoing efforts 
to promote a cuban counter-revolution during the current new post-
cold War period. Thus, the construction of the ‘inter-American hemi-
spheric order’ in the twentieth century was the institutionalization of 
a neo Pan-American system supported by the implementation of a 
‘natural area’ of control by the united states, anxious to counter any 
political, identity-related or inter-regional projects in Latin America or 
the caribbean perceived as being against its interests.
This system of Pan-American ideas and regimes supported by the 
historical triangulation of the organization of American states (oAs) 
in the political sphere, the inter-American Development Bank (iDB) 
in the business and financial sector, and the inter-American Treaty 
of reciprocal Assistance (TiAr), with the help of the inter-American 
Defense Board in the military field, expelled cuba from the Pan-Amer-
ican institutional system. This isolationism became a cornerstone for 
the maintenance of unfettered us dominance in the region and a way 
to avoid any type of regional contamination from the ‘cuban threat.’ 
sustained under a double argument of reward (carrot diplomacy) and 
punishment (gunboat diplomacy), the us has implemented a parallel 
foreign policy which makes use of instruments of power (hard power) 
and deterrence (soft power) (nye, 2003). such policies became the ba-
sis of many forms of direct and indirect involvement in Latin America 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Barack obama’s campaign promise to combine soft power and 
smart power has not materialized in the area of inter-American rela-
tions. Although the internationalist Joseph nye, who was the first to 
define hard power (the power of coercion by military means) and soft 
power (obtaining consensus, acceptance and support) proposed add-
ing the trait of intelligence and concluded that the obama campaign’s 
new synthesis could be called smart-soft power. unfortunately, cuba 
is proof that this proposal falls into the category of empty rhetoric 
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used in presidential campaigns that is never put into practice by the 
winners once in office.
events and movements in Latin America and the caribbean over 
the last decade, and in particular cuba’s reintegration into the inter-
American system, represent a break in both symbolic and practical 
terms with the scheme of unrestricted domination described above.
ThE RoLE of CUbA In ThE InTER-AMERICAn SySTEM
signs of questioning and a potential weakening of the Pan-American 
scheme can be surmised from the following:
 - The failure of the original format of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA). The rejection of the fTAA in its original 
format at the 4th summit of the Americas in mar del Plata, 
Argentina in 2005 prevented the us from creating a deregu-
lated and homogeneous institutional framework in which the 
state does not intervene to influence market forces. A uniform 
framework of continental integration based on free trade 
would have favoured its expansionary business practices and 
given it access to a main supply market for natural resources. 
ALBA and mecosur member countries led an opposition drive 
that has kept the monroe doctrine at bay in the twenty-first 
century (oliva, 2008). 
 - Without Cuba, the OAS is an anachronistic institution. As pre-
viously stated, at its 39th general Assembly in June 2009 the 
oAs rescinded resolution Vi, which had been adopted on 
January 31, 1962 and condemned cuba to regional isolation. 
The move to rescind the resolution taken in san Pedro sula, 
honduras does not stipulate specific conditions but does is-
sue a request for dialogue with the cuban government and 
a willingness for it to address fundamental principles of se-
curity, democracy, self-determination, non-intervention, hu-
man rights and development, ideals which the institution has 
traditionally championed. 
it is important to point out that the cuban government ex-
pressed disinterest in returning to the body, while recognizing 
that ‘the general Assembly debating cuba’s return to the in-
stitution is a heroic deed of Latin American rebellion‘ (castro, 
2009). meanwhile, the decision to drop the exclusion of cuba 
from the oAs prompted seven us congressmen, mostly repub-
licans, to introduce a bill to suspend their country’s financial 
contribution to the oAs if cuba was readmitted as a member.
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 - Cuba influences both South-Latin Americanism and Latin Amer-
icanism. With respect to south America, cuba offers key ele-
ments for the consolidation of the ALBA project, namely new 
mechanisms for cooperation in the area of oil through Petro-
caribe, in alliance with Venezuela, and it also maintains close 
cooperation with the union of south American nations (un-
Asur), an organization which supports a post-neoliberal and 
autonomous regionalism.
special mention should be made of the newly established com-
munity of Latin American and caribbean states (ceLAc), an 
organization that will undoubtedly influence the restructuring 
of the inter-American system. This community was created 
during the 2nd Latin American and caribbean unity summit, 
held in mexico in february 2010. for the first time since gain-
ing independence, the countries of the region agreed to create 
their own body, without the presence of any former ‘colonial’ 
powers, as was the case for events such as the summit of the 
Americas, led by the united states, the ibero-American sum-
mit, presided over by spain, and the caribbean-european un-
ion summit, led by the european union.
This quest for Latin American autonomy has its roots in two organiza-
tions: the rio group, which provided a space for intergovernmental 
policy dialogue and consensus and recently welcomed cuba, at the 
request of mexico, making it the most inclusive organization in the 
region, and the summit of Latin America and the caribbean on in-
tegration and Development, held since December 2008, which brings 
together all national leaders of Latin America and the caribbean with-
out the presence of the united states or canada.
A first challenge for this community is to define itself with respect 
to the united states. here two governmental discourses intersect: creat-
ing a counterweight to areas in which the us is dominant, and comple-
menting or strengthening negotiation capacity in the presence of asym-
metrical relations with the us. The cuban situation is one of the most 
representative cases of this balancing act. on the one hand, it supports 
and strengthens the Latin American forums and meetings that serve as 
a counterweight to us hegemony, while on the other hand it strength-
ens its international negotiating skills through unconditional participa-
tion in ALBA and the promotion of Peoples’ Trade Agreements, as the 
alternative format to free trade model. As demonstrated by the 39th 
general Assembly and at the 5th summit of the Americas, although 
dominated in part by the resounding speech of Barack obama, who 
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promised a new relationship with Latin America based on cooperation, 
the wildcard in the area of making demands for Latin American au-
tonomy turned out to be cuba (malamud and garcía-calvo, 2009).
from a strategic perspective ceLAc faces three major issues in 
inter-American relations: modifying the us doctrine of militarized se-
curity, promoting a policy that overcomes the limitations of the inter-
American commission on human rights, now under us influence, and 
transforming the ibero-American Democratic charter from a mere cer-
tificate of good conduct issued by the united states to a charter that ac-
knowledges a democracy which is plural, representative, participatory 
and community-based, as now reflected in the Bolivian constitution, 
and that also recognizes the particular nature of democracy in cuba.
it is also important to consider that in terms of the development 
agenda, it is risky for countries like mexico, colombia, Peru and the 
cAfTA-Dr signatories to equate economic autonomy with more free 
trade agreements, as this situation would limit the recognition of ALBA 
or People’s Trade Agreements, in which cuba is a participant. Preferable 
are schemes that emulate community formats of a reciprocal, gradual na-
ture and which emphasize selective trade liberalization and strengthening 
pathways towards the development of alternatives to neoliberalism.
ConCLUSIonS
Although there are clear signs that cuba is finding itself in a new phase 
of the inter-American system and within the framework of a regional 
integration initiative which is attempting to achieve unprecedented au-
tonomy from the us and other globally-imposed processes, we should 
also consider the geopolitical scenario where Latin American geopoliti-
cal trends meet structural resistance from ‘hard power’ forces.
We must also make a realistic assessment of the new us adminis-
tration almost a year and a half after Barack obama became president 
of the united states. The emergence of a renewed us foreign policy 
agenda based on ‘good neighbour’ principles (suárez salazar, 2010) 
as articulated by the new Partnership for the Americas initiative has 
met with significant structural limitations imposed by the American 
political system (interest groups, lobbyists, the military-industrial 
complex). Among the few initiatives that seem to enjoy support is the 
liberalization of remittances and some easing of travel restrictions for 
cubans who have family ties on the island. however, proposals for 
trade liberalization in areas such as medicine, construction materials 
and spare parts have not gained any traction. The state Department 
insists that relations between the civil societies of both countries may 
be intensified, while discounting the possibility of any negotiation in-
volving the cuban government.
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This less than positive scenario has been worsened by occasional 
political miscalculations by the obama administration, which has fur-
ther called into question us leadership potential in Latin America, 
particularly regarding more cordial relations with cuba. As noted by 
nye (2009), a key aspect that should be driving us diplomacy during 
a historic period when its leadership is widely questioned is the use 
of smart power. Yet despite the obama’s novel proposal to re-estab-
lish new leadership for the Americas based on a new good neighbour 
framework, the exercise of hard power has been more than explicit 
since his arrival to the presidency. some examples:
a. strengthening of the us military presence in the region through 
existing military bases (casus belli), seven new bases in colombia 
and the redeployment of the fourth fleet in the south Atlantic.
b. The mérida initiative, which complements the Plan colombia 
(now called the mesoamerican initiative) and provides the pretext 
for the war on drugs, has militarized the state and politics in co-
lombia, mexico, Panama, central American countries and Peru. 
c. The coup in honduras (June 28, 2009), which demonstrated 
the inconsistency of obama’s policy towards the Americas. 
even though he condemned it a few hours after it occurred, 
the state Department was leaning towards backing the coup. 
d. The earthquake in haiti (January 12, 2010), which was used 
to reinforce the Pentagon’s military presence in the caribbean, 
with more than ten thousand marines deployed to control the 
international humanitarian aid and all logistical and military 
aspects on the island.
e. American think tanks and lobbies are showing contradictory 
trends, as conciliatory policy reforms aimed at easing us-cu-
ban relations are torpedoed by the right-wing cuban-American 
lobby (hard power).
f. The resurgence of right-wing governments and elite groups in 
several Latin American countries, as well as the cuban-Amer-
ican lobby, who may promote belligerency towards cuba and 
Latin America (Bolivia, Venezuela, Paraguay, colombia, Peru, 
Panama, honduras) in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century through their relationship with the us.
Although the prospects for a policy favouring changes in hemispheric 
relations during the obama administration are clearly limited, the 
progress made towards the reincorporation and leadership by cuba 
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in the inter-American system is indisputable. it is a reinsertion that 
does not paint cuba as a regional military power connected to pro-
cesses of national liberation in Africa and Third World countries, but 
a ‘cultural’ regional power in areas of international cooperation and 
solidarity. furthermore, diversification of cuba’s trade relations with 
the world market and to some Latin American countries with which 
it has close relations, such as Venezuela and the mercosur countries, 
has strengthened its negotiating hand with respect to other countries 
and international institutions. This relatively successful reintegration, 
which has also occurred in the areas of medical, educational and bio-
genetic research, has allowed cuba to take a moral and intellectual 
leadership role in Latin American projects. 
The three pillars that have supported the inter-American sys-
tem have come into disuse: the organization of American states is 
experiencing a crisis of legitimacy and lags behind transformational 
events that call into question us hegemony in several Latin American 
countries; the rio Treaty (known more formally as the inter-American 
Treaty of reciprocal Assistance, or TiAr) does a bad job of hiding the 
militarization of the continent under the guise of a counter-terrorism 
and anti-narcotics strategy promoted by the united states; and the 
free Trade Area of the Americas (fTAA) has failed in its continen-
tal aspirations and now has an adversarial relationship with the new 
democratic leftist governments in Latin America. 
however, the return of cuba to the rio group, combined with 
the growing force of social movements demanding autonomy and na-
tional sovereignty, builds on the expectations generated by the com-
munity of Latin American and caribbean states (ceALc) as the first 
regional organization that was created without the intervention of 
any external power. 
such trends will strengthen cuban autonomy and sovereignty if 
a newly integrated Latin America accepts the notion that to defend 
cuba is to defend all of Latin America.
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ThE GAzE of / on ThE oThER
SArtrE, PASOLINI AND tHE EurOPEAN CuLturAL
FASCINAtION FOr tHE tHIrD WOrLD**
in The AfTermATh of WorLD WAr ii, and most particularly in 
the sixties, left-oriented european intellectuals felt a growing fascina-
tion for Third World culture, art and politics. This was due partly to 
the fact that it was an era of vibrant anti-colonial insurgence (Vietnam 
war, cuban revolution, Algerian and general African liberation move-
ments, the Palestinian conflict, chinese ‘cultural revolution’ and so 
on) and partly to the sense of an exhaustion of Left-wing politics in 
europe (stalinist bureaucratization of the communist parties, inte-
gration of the traditional working class into late capitalism). Argu-
ably the two most important and representative of these ‘new Left’ 
intellectual trend-makers were the french philosopher, playwright 
and novelist Jean-Paul sartre and the italian filmmaker, poet and nar-
rator Pier Paolo Pasolini. This paper will try to show that, although 
these two great thinkers / artists were quite different in theoretical 
perspective and aesthetic sensibility, from their distinct points of view 
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they strived and managed to ‘let otherness speaks for itself’, instead 
of merely constructing an ethnocentric and ‘orientalised’ imagery of 
such other. each in their own way, therefore, they anticipated by at 
least two or three decades (and with stronger radicalism, we might 
add) the current fashionable debates in the fields of postcolonial theo-
ry or subaltern studies. And they did this not only ‘in Theory’ (to para-
phrase Aijaz Ahmad) but also in the very logic of their artistic praxis, 
in which the presence of a variously represented ‘excluded other’ al-
legorizes a tragic conflict within western reason itself, much in the 
vein of Adorno’s ‘negative dialectic’. nowadays, in the context of what 
seems a nearly apocalyptic crisis of late capitalism and ‘globalization’, 
and the concomitant demise of so-called Postmodern thought, a re-
turn to such precedents could prove to be a stimulating ‘anachronism’, 
a modest but decided way ‘to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up 
at a moment of danger’, to quote Walter Benjamin’s famous dictum. 
of course, we won’t have time to examine more than a couple of 
examples from the vast work of these two ‘infinite’ authors. But we 
trust they will be enough to make our point.
SARTRE: oR, ThE AMbIGUITIES of ThE ‘oThER’
Probably the most famous (and for that very same reason, the most 
misunderstood) line in all of sartre’s literature is the statement ut-
tered by his character garcin at the end of his play No Exit (Huis 
Clos): ‘hell is the other’ (‘L’enfer c’est l’Autre’)1. misunderstood, i say, 
because only too frequently sartre’s critics have taken this as a dec-
laration of solipsistic desperation and misanthropy. And yet, already 
in his earlier and major philosophical treatise, Being and Nothingness 
(L’Etre et le Néant), and most particularly in a section titled precisely 
‘The for - other’ (‘Le Pour-Autrui’), sartre had clearly stated his no-
tion of an irresoluble conflict between man’s need for the other — 
more specifically, for the other’s gaze —, and his / her feeling of being 
trapped  in the field of the other’s gaze2. The other strives to dominate 
my ‘conscience’ as i try to dominate his / hers, creating a perpetual 
and unavoidable tension between the mutual rejection and at the same 
time the mutual interpenetration of both consciences. now, this pic-
ture is quite obviously modelled on the famous section iV of hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Mind, the so-called ‘master / slave’ dialectic; and, 
whether intentional or not, the very inspiration stemming from such 
a representation of what we can dub as ‘class struggle’ (never mind 
the ontological or metaphysical meaning this might have in hegel, 
1 sartre, Jean Paul 1948 Huis Clos  (Paris, gallimard) p. 41
2 sartre, Jean Paul 1943 L’Étre et le Néant (Paris : gallimard) p. 275 passim
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as in sartre himself) is highly suggestive. What is at stake here is of 
course man´s freedom and its limits. in fact, the next and last section 
of sartre´s opus magnum deals precisely with the category of freedom 
(‘Liberté’)3. There we learn that the other is both someone through and 
against whom i can, and must, conquer my freedom. Also, that i don´t 
have the choice of not choosing freedom. As another famous sartrean 
paradox states, ‘We are condemned to be free’.
But about a decade later we witness a more clear-cut surfacing 
of some of these more or less tacitly political implications. from the 
mid-50s, and especially in the early 60s, sartre´s engagement with a 
heterodox, even ‘heretical’ version of marxism and most particularly 
with Third World anti-colonialist or anti-imperialist causes becomes 
utterly strong. he visits revolutionary cuba and is fascinated by the 
figures of fidel castro and che guevara (although consistently, he will 
later not hesitate to head a worldwide intellectuals’ protest against 
heberto Padilla’s arrest). he presides over the Bertrand russell Tri-
bunal against war crimes in Vietnam. he supports popular resistance 
against military dictatorships in Latin America and national libera-
tion movements in Africa. in 1964 he rejects the nobel Prize as a sym-
bolical recusation of the cultural and literary ‘system’. And of course, 
throughout all this period he feverishly writes and speeches in favour 
of the fLn, Algeria´s national Liberation front. These last interven-
tions include his extraordinary ‘Preface’ to frantz fanon’s Les Dam-
nées de la Terre (The Wretched of the Earth)4, to which we will come 
back in a moment. 
This period is one in which sartre’s role as an engagée political es-
sayist at least equals that of philosopher / playwright / literary theorist. 
And yet, this all-too linear periodization should be challenged. At least 
as far back as 1947 (that is, somewhere between Being and Nothing-
ness and No Exit ) sartre has already quite clearly expressed his ‘Pas-
calian wager’ on Third World not only in political, but also in artistic 
and poetic terms (although certainly for sartre these different levels 
of discourse are strictly inseparable). in that year he writes his famous 
essay ‘Black orpheus’, a long introduction to Leopold sedar senghor’s 
Anthology of ‘negro’ poetry5, where he profusely uses Aimé césaire’s 
concept of négritude. Aimé césaire was an extraordinary Black poet 
born in martinique, the former french colony in the caribbean, and 
3 sartre (1943: 508 passim).
4 sartre, Jean Paul 1961 ‘Preface’ in fanon, frantz Les Damnées de la Terre (Paris: 
maspero) p. 7 / 31
5 sartre, Jean Paul 1947 ‘introduction’ in senghor, Léopold sedar Anthologie de la 
Nouvelle Poesie Négre et Malgache (Paris, Puf).
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educated in france; in the late 1930s, in Paris, he launches the polemi-
cal concept of négritude , ‘blackness’, as a way to affirm the right to 
an autonomous African / Antillean art, literature and cultural identity 
against neo-colonialist and white supremacist european culture 6. cé-
saire’s basic contention is that there is a specific and irreducible, even 
un-translatable ‘African’ way of writing poetry, which has not as much 
to do with thematic ‘content’ as with an idiosyncratic grammar, syn-
tax, lexicology and ‘rhythm’, all of them absolute singularities which 
resist its ‘colonization’ by an allegedly ‘universal’ european culture. 
césaire was bitterly, sometimes violently criticized for this the-
sis. Although ‘political correctness’ had not yet become the tyranny 
we suffer today, even many ‘progressive’ intellectuals accused him of 
creating a sort of reverse exclusivism, if not an outright new form of 
reversed ‘racism’, and of proposing the utopia of an impossible return 
to ‘mother Africa’ for black Antilleans. But sartre takes a totally dif-
ferent stand. he understands that the concept of negritude is no doubt 
an ideologically ‘defensive’ argument, very much in today’s sense of 
a strategic essentialism (to quote gayatri spivak’s notion)7 but it also 
is a new form of poetic thought, a new ‘concrete particularity’ (this 
time quoting the hegelian jargon) which has the political advantage 
of questioning de facto european pretensions to literary superiority, 
without schematizing the claim into direct political pamphlet. he also 
correctly understands, because he reads césaire attentively and ‘to the 
letter’, that there is no such utopian ‘return to Africa’, but that what 
césaire is talking about is the Atlantic triangle  (europe à Africa à 
America) of the colonial slave trade. And sartre realizes something 
else, perhaps deeper and more complex: since the debate had been 
launched in France  by a group of intellectuals coming from the for-
mer caribbean and African colonies, négritude  was a way the ‘other’ 
had found to speak ‘for themselves’ from the inside  of ‘enemy territo-
ry’ and nevertheless remaining utterly ‘themselves’. As sartre writes in 
his introduction, ‘We (meaning the white europeans) must acknowl-
edge that these poets are not speaking to us, but they are speaking 
among themselves over our heads’. so, for sartre this was a statement 
of strict sovereignty, and at the same time a reminder that anyhow 
europeans had to listen, because it was within their territory and their 
culture that this ‘insurgence’ was happening. sartre was probably very 
much ready to grasp this complexity, because in many ways it was 
6 see, for instante: césaire, Aimée 1939 ‘cahier d’un retour au pays natal’ in 
Volontées n° 20: 23-51.
7 see: spivak, gayatri chakravorty 1999 A Critique of Postcolonial Reason 
(massachussetts: harvard university Press).
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a political-artistic translation of the philosophical subtleties of Being 
and Nothingness, with all the ambiguities and irresolvable conflicts of 
the relation to ‘otherness’. 
Therefore, when in 1960 he was asked to write a Preface to 
fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, he knew exactly where to stand. 
fanon was yet again an Antillean intellectual, also from martinique 
and also educated in france, where he had graduated as a psychia-
trist; he was sent to practice in an Algerian hospital in the 50s. The 
Algerian masses were by then starting a more consistently organized 
independence movement, and fanon almost immediately became an 
fLn partisan. An extraordinarily gifted writer, he set himself to ex-
plore the colonized peoples’ ‘subjectivity’ in a series of essays full of 
deep philosophical, cultural and psychological insights, explaining 
how his sudden awareness of negritude (which he owed to his fellow-
countryman césaire, and which he had analyzed in his first major 
book Black Skin, White Mask8) had made him understand the material 
and symbolic violence of the asymmetric relation to the other. 
so, again sartre discovered in fanon the complexities he had 
been coping with since Being and Nothingness, and that he was just 
then, in 1960, re-examining in his Critique of Dialectical Reason, a 
book where the tragedies of history had an incomparable larger pres-
ence than in the former. only this time, for sartre, there is no meta-
physical ambiguity: the ‘others’ are still ‘hell’, but they have a precise 
determination; they are the oppressors of all kinds: colonial, class, 
race and gender oppressors. so now the other is neatly split: we have 
the ‘good’ other (the oppressed) and the ‘bad’ one (the oppressor). 
Which does not mean that these relations have gotten over-simplified, 
that ambiguities and contradictions have disappeared, specially inside 
the oppressed field, where the oppressor has for a long time succeeded 
in its ‘colonizing’ of the minds and the ‘subjectivity’, and not just the 
territory, so the struggle must go on, perhaps eternally. But what all 
this does mean is that for sartre the relation to the other (the conflict 
between ‘consciences’, the limits and obstacles to freedom, the master 
/ slave dialectic, and so on) has became intensely politicized. While 
still maintaining its ontological structure, the tragedy of otherness is 
permanently ‘crystallized’ in the concrete historical situation. And this 
8 see: fanon, frantz 1952 Peau Notre, Masques Blancs (Paris: Du seuil). for the 
uses and abuses of fanon’s concept of ‘blackness’ see: read, Alan (ed.) 1996 The Fact 
of Blackness. Frantz Fanon and Visual Representation (London/seattle: institute of 
contemporary Arts/Bay Press); gordon, Lewis r. 1995 Fanon and the Crisis of European 
Man , (London: routledge); and Alessandrini, Anthony c. (ed.) 1999 Frantz Fanon: 
Critical Perspectives , (London: routledge). for a (rather violent) discussion of the 
concept of négritude, see Adotevi, stanislas 1972 Négritude et négrologues (Paris, 10/18).
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adds complexity instead of reducing it, because now we have a new 
tensional dimension, that between ‘ontology’ and ‘history’. The poetic 
word, the artistic work, the literary or dramatic fiction, the philosoph-
ical essay are (and should be consciously faced as) symptoms of such 
tension: the theory of ‘engaged’ literature and art is not — as so often 
has been misread — a reductionist attempt to ‘simplify’ a political-
philosophical ‘message’, but a rigorous, energetic call to embrace the 
‘symptom’, both in ‘form’ and ‘content’.
But this is not all. There´s still a huge question we have to ap-
proach. Where do all these ideas originally come from, whether sartre 
is aware of it or not? Let us remind ourselves: he ‘discovers’ negritude as 
a metaphor of a rebellious ‘good’ otherness thanks to Aimé césaire, and 
the concept acquires a full political meaning with frantz fanon. Both 
césaire and fanon are Black, and both come from the former french 
colonies in the caribbean. Well, that´s where it comes from, and not by 
chance. Because the conditions of possibility , if not the signifier itself, 
of the emergence of such concept have appeared much before césaire 
and fanon, in 1804, with the triumph of the monumental haitian revo-
lution for independence (the island of saint-Domingue, named ‘hayti’ 
after its independence from france, was the richest slave colony in the 
whole continent). ‘monumental’ it was indeed, in several senses: to be-
gin with, it was the first  independence revolution in all the Americas 
south of the rio grande; second, it was by far the most radical  of them 
all, for it was the only one where the most oppressed classes and eth-
nic groups, the plantation slaves of African origin, seized power and 
founded a new nation (besides being the only triumphant slave revolu-
tion in the whole history of mankind, by the way); third, it was not just 
a social and political revolution, but also a ‘philosophical’ and cultural 
one, so to speak. The famous Article 14 of the first haitian constitu-
tion of 1805 makes a very strange statement: it decrees that from then 
on, every haitian citizen, regardless of the colour of his / her skin, will 
be known as… ‘Black’ (Négre). And what does this mean? in 1789 the 
french revolution had declared the Universal rights of man and citi-
zen. But the slaves of the colonies were very soon to discover that this 
‘universality’ had a very particular limit, and that limit had a very partic-
ular colour of skin: black. so in 1791 they had to launch a huge revolu-
tion which paid the price of 200.000 massacred black slaves, and which 
only five long and bloody years after the french Declaration succeeded 
in obtaining the emancipation from slavery in 1794, although the strug-
gle for independence had to go on for still ten years more9.
9 for all this problematic, see our recent book: grüner, eduardo 2010 La oscuridad 
y las luces (Buenos Aires: edhasa).
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This, we repeat, was a great philosophical achievement as well. 
in the first place, as susan Buck-morss has consistently proved, he-
gel’s master / slave dialectic, published in 1806, is straightforwardly 
inspired by the haitian revolution, which hegel knew in detail10. sec-
ond, and possibly even more relevant for us: Article 14 calls into ques-
tion the pretensions of ‘fake universalism’ (as Adorno would say) of 
no less than the most ‘progressive’ european event of the time, the 
french revolution, and therefore of Western culture as a whole. it 
is as if they said: ‘so we were the particular Other excluded from the 
universal? Well, now we are the ‘universal’ and you are the excluded 
particular’. What this is revealing is, as we have insisted above, the 
dimension of tragically irresoluble conflict between the universal and 
the Particular, its ‘negative dialectic’ (as again Adorno named it) and 
the sheer brutal material and symbolic violence of any ideology which 
tries to force, from ‘the outside’ as it were (that is, from a ‘fake univer-
sal’ pretension of being the Totality) such resolution.
unless we think of things like art, literature, poetry. All through 
the ninetieth and twentieth centuries there are strongly implicit — 
and sometimes quite explicit — traces of the debate on negritude cata-
pulted by the haitian revolution, in european and Latin American / 
caribbean narrative, poetic and essayistic literature, and also in visual 
art and film. it would be too long to review all its expressions in this 
paper. Let us merely mention that the debate is still very much alive in 
our day. many of the most significant Antillean intellectuals (like the 
poet / philosopher edouard glissant and the 1993 nobel Prize winner, 
writer Derek Walcott) have in the last decades re-launched the polem-
ic through the concept of créolité (‘creole-ness’), as a more nuanced 
and subtle way to think the amphibologies of the relation to otherness 
(a ‘philosophy of relation’ is precisely the notion coined by glissant11). 
As we have seen, on the european side it is the merit of Jean Paul 
sartre to have realized the simultaneously political and artistic power 
of those notions.
PASoLInI: oR, ThE ‘fREE IndIRECT’ oThER
Pier Paolo Pasolini is best known for being one of the most creative 
and original of the italian avant-garde filmmakers of the 60s. The pub-
lic is perhaps less aware of the fact that he was one of the greatest 
italian poets and novelists of the twentieth century, and that he made 
decisive contribution to Literary and film Theory, semiotics and Art 
10 Buck-morss, susan 2000 Hegel and Haiti (London: Verso).
11 see: glissant, edouard 2009 Philosophie de la Relation (Paris : nrf/gallimard). 
Also, his former work Le Discours Antillais (Paris: gallimard, 1997).
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history. Like sartre (albeit in a very different way) he is a hardly clas-
sifiable intellectual. A heretic marxist, a heretic catholic, a heretic 
homosexual, an angry impugner of what he called ‘neo-capitalism’, 
he was too irritating for any one of those ‘churches’, to the point that 
even today there are serious suspicions that his violent death in 1975, 
at the age of 53, supposedly a consequence of an obscure sexual epi-
sode, might have been a political crime. Whatever the case, what mat-
ters for us now is that he too, again like sartre, and maybe even more 
sanguineously, took sides consistently with ‘the other’: the marginal-
ized ‘sub-proletariat’ of the urban borgate (the italian cities slums), the 
poor rural peasants, the ethnic and sexual minorities, and of course 
the Third World and the colonized or neo-colonized peoples. he de-
fended this standing not only in the realm of straight politics, but 
also, and more deeply, in that of every expression of art and culture 
at large. his contention was that neo-capitalism, the so-called ital-
ian ‘economic miracle’ of the 60s, the ‘new technocracy’ of industrial 
acceleration and the quick-paced erection of a consumption society 
were committing a sheer cultural genocide. The richness and diversity 
of traditional cultures, local dialects, artistic forms and even la lingua 
del Dante  (Dante’s language) were being shred apart and turned into 
expendable ruins by the capitalist homogenization and the materialis-
tic ‘commodity fetishism’ which strived to unify and degrade culture, 
not to mention human beings, sacrificing them in the altar of capital 
accumulation and fast earning. 
Art and literature, including cinema, in Pasolini´s view, could only 
resist this cultural genocide through struggling to ‘let the other speaks’. 
Political denunciation and militant opposition (which he also prac-
ticed) was not enough. The structural logic and the semiotic texture 
itself, the ‘grammar’ of poetry, narrative, film, needed to open the space 
for the other to ‘speaks’. Pasolini tried to do this in every way. many 
times in his poetry he used the peasant dialect of friule (where he had 
grown), subtly combining it with the most exquisite and intellectual 
inflections, to show a possibility of cultural dialogism (to use Bakhtin’s 
famous notion) between ‘high’ and ‘low’ cultures. in many of his novels 
(Ragazzi di Vita and Una Vita Violenta come immediately to mind) the 
jargon of the borgate youth is reproduced with extreme credibility. in 
most of his films (from Accatone to Edipo Re, from Il Vangelo secondo 
Mateo to the so-called Trilogia della Vita) he used non-professional ac-
tors or actresses, marginal men and women from the very same loca-
tions where he shot the films. The presence of the ‘Third World’, in the 
broadest sense of the word, is always felt in various ways; in Edipo, for 
example, the main sequences are filmed in the millenary villages of the 
moroccan desert, and its real inhabitants play all secondary parts; the 
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clothes look African, the hats Vietnamese; the musical background is 
an ancient Japanese ritual litany, and so on. in sum, archaic greece, 
which has always passed for the very same origin of Western culture, is 
a sort of condensation of non-Western ‘marginalities’. But once again, 
the ‘lowest’, most oppressed end of culture is articulated to the ‘high-
est’, most canonized of its historical expression. Pasolini does not hesi-
tate to transpose the literary likes of Aeschylus, sophocles, euripides, 
the new Testament, chaucer, Boccaccio, the marquis de sade, not to 
mention his own narrative (as in Teorema). only he does it in such a 
manner that the sublime ‘spiritualization’ of academically consecrated 
symbols does not hide ‘the slums’ of the world. Being a convinced if 
heterodox catholic, he believes in the possibility of redemption; but 
as in fanon (or as in Walter Benjamin) this rescue of the spirit can 
only come from the ‘wretched of the earth’, from the ‘victims’ of neo-
capitalism and colonialism. Linear history as the dominant ideology 
conceives it, the history of ‘technocratic progress’ for instance, is only 
the ephemeral history of the victors ; but there is another, a subterrane-
an  and therefore much more profound history, that of the vanquished: 
a ‘pre-history’ which art must make evident in its clash with present 
‘history’, creating a ‘barbarous polyphony’, a squeaking discordance 
within the tedious ‘comfort’ of Western culture, to show that all its ap-
parently indisputable elegance is rooted in the ‘mud and blood’ of the 
oppressed, and to make those roots visible.
Yes, but, how to do this? Pasolini does not fool himself. We (again 
meaning the white Westerners) are not ‘the other’. To pretend that we 
can speak for the other in our own language would be just another 
insidious way of colonialism, disguised as paternalist understanding. 
once more, we are in the midst of an irresoluble tension. The only way 
out (or, more accurately, the only way into  this tension in the inside 
of which we should create our art) is that which ernesto de martino 
— the important italian ethnologist who Pasolini has read very deeply 
— would call a ‘critical ethnocentrism’:  we must be constantly and 
perfectly aware of the fact that we belong  to the dominant culture 
and that we cannot deny or renounce this fact, and at the same time 
we must make an effort to let ourselves be ‘penetrated’ by the other 
culture, by the culture of the other, even if it necessarily clashes with 
ours12 , because it is precisely from the standpoint of this clash that 
will rise a rigorous self-critical possibility.
now, how does this ‘translate’ into actual aesthetic praxis? in his 
poetic and narrative writing, Pasolini aims to put into practice what 
12 see De martino, ernesto 1958 Il Mondo Magico (Torino: einaudi) and also, Morte 
e Pianto Rituale (Torino: Bollati Borlingheri, 1965).
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in his theoretical work he explains about ‘free indirect speech’, a half-
grammatical, half-stylistic device which does not give  his / her ‘voice’ 
to the other (as ‘Direct speech’ would do), but allows his (Pasolini’s) 
own  speech to be ‘invaded’ by the accents and modalities of the other, 
generating a split  between the two ‘voices’ in the inside of the same 
speech level, in such a way that the ‘same’ and the ‘other’ are not 
mutually external and incommunicable realities, but a moebius band-
like, frequently conflictive but intertwining ‘heterotopic’ space (to re-
trieve foucault’s expression)13. in film, this is even more difficult, but 
nonetheless possible, to achieve. it’s what Pasolini dubs the ‘indirect 
subjective shot’, in which the eye of the camera, usually situated be-
hind and a little to the side of the character’s back, is able to simulta-
neously ‘see’ what the character and the camera itself are watching, 
so we spectators can grasp both superimposed gazes, interacting with 
each other within the same sequence-shot14, thus not allowing a full 
‘ideological’ identification between the ‘narrator’ and the character.
in Pasolini’s view these are of course not merely technical devices. 
They represent an ethical and political besides an aesthetic position-
ing, by mean of which the ‘narrator’ does not pretend to ‘lose’ his voice 
in favour of the other’s voice, but acknowledges the tense co-existence 
of the different voices. Thus, cultural conflict is made to objectively 
live before our eyes or in our reading, without having to be explicitly 
(and reductively) proclaimed. We have already mentioned how Paso-
lini’s use of friulan dialect in his (especially early) poetry, or of the 
borgate idiom in his novels, is an attempt at permitting this invasion 
of his own voice by the other’s ‘accent’.  Pasolini’s films are also filled 
with these attempts. in some of them, the resource of ‘indirect sub-
jective shot’ is even exceeded towards an allegorical reality of conflict 
which portrays what the author calls a ‘cinema of poetry’, that is, the 
interaction of ‘historic’ and ‘pre-historic’ voices and images where the 
‘narrator’ strives to make the reader / spectator aware that he / she, like 
the narrator, is not the other but nevertheless can share the other’s 
‘heterotopic’ space. 
of all the examples we could cite, we have chosen one that we 
might even connect with césaire´s negritude and sartre´s reading of 
it. The film in question is Appunti per un’Orestiade Africana (or Notes 
for an African Orestes, 1970). This is not a finished film. or, more pre-
cisely, it’s a ‘finished-as-unfinished’ film; it is made of visual ‘notes’ 
13 Pasolini, Pier Paolo 1964 ‘intervento sul discorso libero indirecto’ in Empirismo 
Eretico / Saggi sulla Letteratura e sull’Arte (milano: mondadori); english translation 
in Pasolini, P. P. 1988 Heretical Empiricism (Bloomington: indiana university Press).
14 ‘observations on the sequence shot’ in Pasolini (1988).
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(fragmentary shots and sequence-shots) which Pasolini intended to 
use as basic inputs for a future film in which he was to transpose 
Aeschilus’ orestiad to a film about African national liberation move-
ments. Afterwards, he decided not to make the second film, and leave 
it in its state of ‘notes’. it is therefore a very strange film, part fiction-
al, part ‘documentary’, part mythical allegory. on the other hand, as 
a whole, it transparently illustrates Pasolini’s aesthetic and political 
view: a condensation of greek ‘pre-history’ (as evoked by Aeschilus’ 
tragic trilogy) and African ‘modernity’ (the anti-colonial struggle of 
the 60s). And by the way, were it not for the fact that this is Pasolini 
‘speaking’, it might come as a surprise that europe is on the side of 
‘pre-history’, while Africa is on that of ‘modernity’. But let’s keep on 
going. in one scene, Pasolini himself is interviewing some African po-
litical science students (so he is situated before, and not behind, the 
camera, moving from ‘narrator’ to ‘character’) and he celebrates, pre-
cisely, the ‘modernity’ of the emancipation movement, until one of the 
students refutes his one-sided view, confronting him with the need to 
understand the conflictive combination of such ‘modernity’ with the 
tribal mythical tradition of African peoples. Pasolini honestly realizes 
that, against his best intentions, he has not been able to avoid the trap 
of ‘speaking for the other’. he then changes his strategy. We switch to 
a long and functionally unexplained scene where he films Argentinean 
jazz musician gato Barbieri playing his ‘squeaking’ tenor sax to back 
an African-American female singer who half sings, half recites an Af-
rican ritual litany. Because he now has gone back to his ‘narrator’ role, 
he leaves room for the Latin American and African-American ‘voices’ 
to build a visual and musical metaphoric evocation of the Atlantic ‘tri-
angle’, where the gaze of europe (that is, Pasolini himself) is certainly 
present, but not as an interference, let alone a ‘view from above’.
(In)ConCLUSIon: To ThInk AGAIn
To my knowledge, sartre and Pasolini, being coetaneous, never read 
each other. There is no connection whatsoever between them, beyond 
having to bear, as their second name, the signifier of the apostle Paul 
(if i’m allowed this small half-joke). And still, as i have tried to show, a 
deep connection does exist. They both wanted to ‘let otherness speaks 
for itself’, but they both had the ethical and political seriousness of 
not pretending to concede the other his voice. They were willing to 
stand on an ideological and cultural tightrope, looking in the face of a 
tragic, unsolvable conflict. They both discovered that certain forms of 
art could be practiced as a conscious symptom  of the conflict, without 
surrendering to the temptation of an aesthetization  of the conflict, 
which would have meant, at best, its trivialization, and at worst, a new 
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‘leftist’ form of colonial self-empowerment. Also to my knowledge, 
none of them read Theodor Adorno or Walter Benjamin. But both of 
them, pivoting upon notions such as negritude or free indirect speech, 
put into practice the negative dialectic or the dialectic at a standstill 
which those other great contemporary thinkers theorized, and where 
the work of art denounces, with its own specific artistic means, the 
state of ‘non-reconciliation’ of a violent, unjust and oppressive world-
system, and of the ‘instrumental reason’ which culturally corresponds 
to it. in my personal opinion (which of course is as debatable as any 
opinion) this ‘style’ of thinking and making art and culture is consider-
ably more radical and questioning than the ‘rhyzomatic dispersions’ 
of so-called postmodernism, with its risk of a displacing of the dimen-
sion of violent domination and cultural conflict behind an exhilarated 
celebration of multicultural ‘differences’. in our context of global capi-
talist crisis, it would be far from useless to return to thinkers like sar-
tre and Pasolini, who had the courage of confronting the sometimes 
unbearable tensions of cultural clash. for the thinkers and artists, for 
the men and women from the Third World and specifically from Latin 
America, who have had to learn in their own skins what this is all 
about, such ‘return’ could mean a stimulating challenge to think again 
(and again, and again) about their own place in the conflict, and also 
to think about, quoting sartre, ‘not so much what history has done to 
us, but what we can do with that which has been done to us’. 
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CULTURE And dEMoCRACy**
I
from the Latin verb colere, in its origin, culture means crop or care. 
At the beginning, it referred to the crop or taking care of the land as in 
agriculture, in the same way as puericulture refers to infants as well as 
the gods and the sacred refer to cult. As crop, culture was conceived 
as an action directed to the sheer fulfilment of the potentialities of 
someone or something; it referred to sprout, fruit, blossom and cover 
with benefits. 
Through western history this meaning was lost until the eight-
eenth century with the philosophy of illustration when the word cul-
ture emerges as a synonym to a different concept: civilization. civili-
zation derives from the idea of civil life, therefore, of political life and 
political regime. During the period of enlightenment, culture refers to 
the pattern or criterion that measures the level of civilization in a soci-
ety. in this way, culture turns into a number of practices (arts, sciences, 
techniques, philosophy and crafts) for the assessment and hierarchysa-
tion of political regimes, according to an evolutionary criterion. 
 * Professor at the Philosophy Department, university of são Paulo, Brazil. spe-
cialist in Political Philosophy and history of Philosophy.
** Text extracted from: Crítica y Emancipación (Buenos Aires: cLAcso), Year 1, 
n° 1, 2008. Translated by claudia Pereira.
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The idea of time is introduced in the concept of culture, however, 
it refers to a very precise kind of time, it is continuous, linear and 
evolutionary then little by little turning into a synonym of progress. in 
a civilization, progress is assessed through its culture and culture is 
valuated through the progress it brings to such civilization. 
Deeply political and ideological, the illuminist concept of culture 
reappears in the nineteenth century, when it becomes part of human 
sciences and anthropology. At the beginning of the constitution of an-
thropology, the anthropologists kept the illuminist concept of evolu-
tion or progress. since anthropologists took the notion of progress as 
a measure to culture, they established a pattern to measure evolution 
or level of progress in a culture and this pattern was evidently the one 
of capitalist europe1.
societies started to be evaluated according to the presence or 
absence of some elements that belong to western capitalism and the 
absence of such elements was considered a sign of lack of culture or 
a poorly developed culture. Which are those elements? state, mar-
ket and writing.  every society developing exchange, communication, 
power and writing forms different from the european ones were de-
fined as ‘primitive’. in other words, a concept of value was introduced 
to differentiate cultural forms. 
The notion of primitive can only be elaborated if determined by 
the concept of not primitive, therefore, by the figure of that producing 
an ‘evolution’. This fact implies not just passing judgment, even more; 
it implies that those criteria defined the essence of culture in a way 
that societies yet without market, without writing and without state 
would necessarily get to such stage in time. The capitalist european 
culture appears not only as telos2, as necessary end to the development 
of any culture or civilization. Thus, adopting an ethnocentric position 
but specially legitimizing and justifying firstly colonization and later 
imperialism when presenting itself as the necessary model of histori-
cal development. 
in the nineteenth century, mainly with the german philosophy, the 
idea of culture suffers a decisive mutation because it is elaborated as 
the difference between nature and history. culture is the breakup of the 
immediate adhesion to nature, which belongs to the animal world, and 
opening to a world that is merely human. The natural order or phys-
ics is governed by laws related to a necessary causality for the balance 
1 Lecture given in salvador, Bahia on november, 11th. chaui discusses issues 
included in her book: Democracy and Culture. Competent discourse and other words 
(são Paulo: cortes, 2007).
2 Target, objective (Translator’s note).
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of the whole. The vital order or biology is governed by rules related to 
the adaptation of the organism to the environment. The human order 
is the symbolic one, that is, the human capacity to relate to the ab-
sent and the possible through language and labour. The human dimen-
sion of culture is a transcendence movement that places existence as 
the power to transcend a certain situation through an action directed 
to what is absent.  for this reason, it is only through this dimension 
that speaking about history per se is possible. A human body immedi-
ately stops adhering to the environment, as an animal does, through 
language and work. it transcends the immediate data from signs and 
objects and recreates them into a new dimension. Language and la-
bour reveal that a human action cannot be reduced to a vital action, 
an ingenious device to reach a fixed target, however, there is an imma-
nent sense relating means and ends that determines the development 
of such action as the transformation of data into ends and from these 
means into new ends therefore defining man as the historical agent per 
se and opening the order of time and discovery of what is possible. 
finally, this enlarged concept of culture is incorporated by eu-
ropean anthropologists in the second half of the twentieth century. 
They will try to undo the ethnocentric and imperialistic ideology of 
culture whether because they had marxist instruction or a deep sense 
of guilt, hence inaugurating a social anthropology and a political an-
thropology in which each culture conceives a symbolic human order 
historically and materially determined with its own individuality or 
own structure.  since then, the word culture is more comprehensive 
than before. now, it is understood as the creation and production of 
language, religion, sexuality, work tools and forms of work, clothing, 
housing, cooking, leisure expressions, music, dance and social relation 
systems particularly the systems of kinship and family structure, pow-
er relations, war and peace, the notion of life and death. culture starts 
to be understood as a field where human subjects elaborate symbols 
and signs, establish practices and values, define for themselves the 
possible and the impossible, the time line sense (past, present, future), 
the differences in space (the sense of proximity and distance, big and 
small, visible and invisible), values such as true or false, beautiful and 
ugly, fair and unfair, establish the idea of law and therefore of what 
is permitted and forbidden, determine the sense of life and death and 
the relations between sacred and profane. 
however, in modern societies this enlargement of the notion of 
culture collides with a problem: the fact of their being societies and 
not communities. 
The main characteristic of community is the internal non-division 
and the idea of common wealth; its members are always in a one to 
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one relationship (without institutional mediation). communities have 
a sense of a unity of destinies or a destiny in common and assert the 
incarnation of the communal spirit in some of its members and under 
certain circumstances. But the modern world does not acknowledge 
communities: the capitalist production model originates a society, 
whose first feature is the existence of individuals separated from oth-
ers by their interests and desires. society means isolation, fragmenta-
tion or atomization of its members thus forcing the modern thought 
to investigate how isolated individuals can relate to one another or be-
come partners. in other words, a community is perceived as natural by 
its members (its origin is the biological family) or otherwise ordered 
by a divinity (like in the Bible), but a society also imposes the require-
ment of an explanation to its social origin. such requirement leads to 
the invention of the idea of a social contract or social covenant signed 
by the individuals constituting a society.  The second feature, what re-
ally makes it a society, is the internal division. if the community is per-
ceived as ruled by the principle of non-division, a society cannot avoid 
internal division being its principle. such division is not accidental; it 
is not produced by some people’s evil and might be corrected, but is an 
original division. machiavelli understood this for the first time, when 
in The prince he states that ‘every city is divided between the bourgeoi-
sie’s desire to oppress and command and the people’s desire not to 
be oppressed and commanded’, and was later restated by marx when 
opening the Communist Manifesto saying that ‘until now, history has 
been the history of struggle between classes’. The main feature of a so-
ciety is the existence of social division, that is, the division of classes.
how is it then that within a class divided society so broad and 
generous a concept of culture as the expression of an indivisible com-
munity can be maintained, as proposed by the philosophy and anthro-
pology? in fact, it is possible, since society of classes states a cultural 
division. This receives different names: we can speak about dominated 
or dominating culture, oppressed or oppressing culture, elite culture 
and popular culture. Whatever the term used, a clear cut within cul-
ture between what was agreed to be called formal culture or lettered 
culture and popular culture is evidenced, it spontaneously runs in the 
veins of a society. 
on the other hand, the concept of popular culture is not an easy 
one. Let’s just remember the three main approaches. The first one 
during the romantic period in the nineteenth century states that 
popular culture is the culture of a good, truthful, fair people or the 
one that embodies the spirit of the nation and the people. The sec-
ond approach, from the french illustration considers popular culture 
as a tradition residue, a mixture of superstition and ignorance to be 
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corrected by educating people; and the third one from the populisms 
of the twentieth century blending the romantic and the illuminist vi-
sion by maintaining the idea that culture made by the people is per 
se good and truthful. from the illuminist vision it also keeps the idea 
that culture tends to be traditional and behind in time since made by 
the people, thus in need for updating in terms of a pedagogical ac-
tion carried out by the state or a political avant-garde. each concep-
tion of popular culture purports quite determined political options: 
the romantic view searches for universalizing the popular culture by 
means of nationalism, that is, transforming it into a national culture; 
the illustrated or illuminist conception proposes the disappearance of 
the popular culture through formal education by the state; and the 
populist one pretends to bring the ‘right consciousness’ to the people 
so that popular culture may turn into revolutionary (in the perspec-
tive of left-wing vanguards) or support the state (in the perspective of 
right-wing populisms).
Let’s change the focus of our analyses. Thanks to analyses and 
reviews in ideology, we know that the place a dominant culture occu-
pies is quite clear: it is the place where the exercise of economic ex-
ploitation, political domination and social exclusion is legitimized. 
however, this place makes popular culture clearer too, as something 
produced by popular classes, particularly the working class, accord-
ing to what is done in terms of domination; that is, as repetition or 
response depending on historical conditions and the forms of popu-
lar organizations. 
for this reason, how cultural division tends to be hidden must be 
taken into consideration and for this, reinforced with the rise of mass 
culture or cultural industry. how does cultural industry function?
in the first place, it separates cultural commodities according to 
their supposed market value: there are ‘expensive’ and ‘rare’ pieces 
destined for the privileged that can pay for them, creating an elite; 
while on the other hand there are ‘cheap’ or ‘ordinary’ pieces ad-
dressed to the mass. in this way, instead of guaranteeing the same 
right to everyone to the totality of the cultural production, the cultural 
industry over-determines the social division thus increasing the divi-
sion between the ‘cultivated’ elite and the ‘not cultivated mass’.
in the second place and contrary to the first aspect, it creates the 
illusion that everyone has access to the same cultural commodities, 
each one freely choosing what he wishes, as a consumer does at the 
supermarket. however, we just need to pay attention to the timetables 
of radio or TV programs or what is sold at the newsagent to real-
ize that culture promoting companies have already chosen what each 
class or social group can and must listen to, read or watch.
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for example, in terms of newspapers and magazines, the paper 
quality, graphics, typos and images, kind of headline and topic pub-
lished define the kind of consumer and determine the content of what 
it will have access to or the kind of information that it may receive. if 
we compared five or six newspapers in the same morning we would 
notice that the very same world where — we all live in — turns into 
five or six different and even opposing worlds since one same event 
receives quite a different treatment according to the kind of target 
reader the news agency is interested in (economic and political) .
in the third place, it invents a figure called the ‘average viewer’, 
‘average listener’ and ‘average reader’ who is attributed ‘average’ men-
tal capacities, ‘average’ knowledge and certain ‘average’ tastes and 
therefore, ‘average’ cultural products are offered.
What does all this mean? The cultural industry sells culture. in 
order to do so, it has to seduce and please the consumer. in order to 
seduce and please the industry cannot shock, provoke or make the 
consumer think by bringing him any new information that might up-
set him. Accordingly he must receive what he already knows, has done 
or seen with a new appearance. The ‘average’ is the common sense 
crystallized; what the cultural industry gives back with a new face. 
in the fourth place, it defines culture as entertainment and leisure. 
hannah Arendt stated the transmutation of culture under mass 
communicative imperatives, that is, the transformation of cultural work, 
mental work, art pieces, religious and civic acts and entertainment fes-
tivals. evidently, she says, human beings do need entertainment and lei-
sure.  Be it as marx showed, so that work force increases productivity 
because of rest, or as marxist scholars show, so that social control and 
domination are perpetuated through alienation or even as Arendt states: 
because entertainment and leisure are vital to the human metabolism. 
no one shall be contrary to entertainment, even when critical to 
entertainment modes that amuses social and political domination. 
Whatever the concept of entertainment, it is true that its main charac-
teristic is not just repose but also a pastime. it is spending time as free 
time without any obligation, our time (even when this ‘our’ is illusive). 
entertainment or leisure time is related to the biological time and to 
the vital cycle of recovering physical and mental forces. entertain-
ment is a dimension of culture taken in its broad and anthropological 
sense, since it is the way a society invents its moments of distraction, 
amusement, leisure and repose. however, and just because of this, 
entertainment differs from culture when it is understood as a creative 
work and expression of thought and art. 
if for a moment we set aside the broad concept of culture as a 
symbolic order and we take it under the prism of creation and expres-
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sion of thought, mental work and art pieces we will say that culture 
has three main features that separate it from entertainment: the first 
one is work, that is to say, the movement towards creation of sense 
when a piece of art or thought capture the experience of the world 
given to interpret it, criticize it, transcend it and transform it, it is 
the experience of what is new. in second place, it is the action to give 
what is hidden behind lived experiences or everyday experiences to 
be thought about,  to be seen, to be reflected on or imagined and felt, 
thus turning them into a piece of work that transforms them since 
they become known (in works of thought) dense, new and profound 
(in art pieces). Third, in a society of classes, exploitation, domination 
and social exclusion culture is a citizen’s right, the right to have access 
to cultural works and commodities, the right to do culture and partici-
pate on decisions about cultural policies. Then, the culture industry 
denies such features of culture. As part of the culture of masses, works 
of thought and art tend to: turn from expressive to reproductive and 
repetitive; from creational works to consumption events, from experi-
mentation of what is new to the consecration of what is consecrated 
by fashion and consumption; from lasting events to be part of the 
fashion market, something ephemeral and transient without past or 
future, from forms of knowledge that unveil reality and establish re-
lationships with what is true they become a disguise, a falsifying illu-
sion, propaganda or publicity. even more than this. The so called cul-
ture of masses appropriates cultural works to consume them, devour 
them, destroy them and make them null in simulations. Just because 
the spectacle becomes a simulation or the simulation is exhibited as 
entertainment; the mass media turn everything into entertainment 
(wars, genocides, strikes, parties, religious ceremonies, tragedies, pol-
icies, natural catastrophes, works of art, and mental labour). This is 
the cultural market. 
in order to assess the contemporary meaning of cultural the in-
dustry and mass media producing so it is worth to briefly remember 
what was conveyed to be called the post-modern condition, that is, the 
social and cultural existence under a neoliberal economy. 
The social and economic dimension of the new kind of capital 
is inseparable from a dramatic transformation in terms of time and 
space, as stated by David harvey ‘the space-time comprehension’.  The 
fragmentation and globalization of the economic production produce 
two contrary and simultaneous phenomena: on the one hand, space-
time fragmentation and spreading out; on the other, under the effects 
of electronic and information technologies, a different understanding 
of space — everything happens here, without distances, frontiers or 
differences — and the comprehension of time — everything happens 
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now, without past or future. in other words, the fragmentation and 
scattering of time and space condition their reunion under a no-differ-
entiated space (a flat space with fugacious images) and an ephemeral 
time without depth. Paul Virilio (1993) speaks about acrony3 and ato-
py4 or the disappearance of sensitive units of time and space lived un-
der the effects of the electronic and computer science revolution. Time 
depth and its differentiating power disappear in front of the power of 
the instantaneous. Accordingly, field depth that defines the space of 
perception disappears under the power of a location without a place 
and overflying technologies. We live under the sign of the telepres-
ence and teleobservation that precludes the differentiation between 
the impression and the sense, the virtual and the real, since everything 
is immediately given to us within the form of temporal and spatial 
transparency of the appearances introduced as evidence. 
Volatile and ephemeral, today our experience is unaware of any 
sense of continuity and is exhausted in a present meaning of a fugacious 
instant. When we lose the temporal differentiation we not only pursue 
what Virilio calls ‘immediate memory’ or the absence of past depth, but 
also lose the depth of the future as a possibility inscribed in human ac-
tions in relation to the power to determine the indeterminate and to 
overcome given situations by understanding and transforming their 
sense. That is to say, we lose the sense of culture as historical action. 
II
massification is the opposite of democratization of culture. or better, 
it is the denial of the democratization of culture. 
What could culture be when treated from the point of view of de-
mocracy? What would the culture of democracy and a democratic cul-
ture be? Which are the problems of a democratic treatment of culture, 
therefore, of a culture of democracy and the realization of culture as 
a democratic vision, thus a democratic culture? These questions mark 
some of the problems to be faced. in the first place, the problem refers 
to the relation between culture and the state; secondly, the relation 
between culture and the market; and thirdly, the relation between cul-
ture and the creators. 
3 in greek, kronos means time like in chronology, chronometer etc. Anachronism 
means without time, absence of time. 
4 in greek, topos means place, the space that is differentiated by places and 
qualities like distant, close, tall, short, small, big etc. like in: topology, topography. 
Atopy means without place, absence of a differentiated space. utopia derives from 
topos that according to some people means no place and according to others: a 
perfect inexistent place.
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if we examined the way in which the state traditionally functions 
in Brazil, we may say that in the treatment of culture its tendency was 
antidemocratic. not because the state was occupied by this or that 
ruling group, but because of the way the state addressed the question 
of culture. Traditionally, it always tried to capture every social crea-
tion of culture under the pretence of broadening the public cultural 
field, turning a social creation into the official culture to make it oper-
ate as a doctrine and to be spread to the whole society. in this way, 
the state is presented as culture producer bestowing it with national 
generality by taking from antagonist classes the place where culture 
is effectively realized. still, there is another form of state action that 
comes from 1990s where the sate proposes a ‘modern treatment of 
culture’ and considers it archaic to present itself as the official pro-
ducer of culture.  government understands modernity as the cultural 
industry criteria and logic whose patterns are repeated by the state 
by means of culture governmental institutions. Thus, the state starts 
to operate within culture with market patterns. if in the first case it 
appeared as a producer and distributor of the official culture, in the 
second, it appears as a counter where demands are attended by adopt-
ing consumption and mass media patterns, particularly the pattern of 
consecrating the consecrated.   
however, we know that a different relation of state organisms 
and culture is possible. in order to understand why the state cannot 
be a culture producer we need to return to the broad philosophical 
and anthropological concept — culture as the social activity that es-
tablishes a field of signs and symbols, values, behaviours and practices 
— though increasing that there are cultural differentiated fields within 
society resulting from social class divisions and plurality of groups 
and social movements. in this multiple vision of culture, yet within 
the field of the philosophical-anthropological definition, the impos-
sibility in fact and rights of the sate to produce culture becomes evi-
dent. Then, the state starts to be seen as one of the elements of cul-
ture, that is, one of the ways in which a society creates for itself power 
symbols, signs and images under certain historical conditions and the 
imperatives of social division of classes. The state is a product of cul-
ture and not the producer of culture. it is a product that establishes 
social division and multiplicity. 
in relation to the state perspective of adopting the logic of the 
cultural industry and cultural market we may reject it by, now, con-
sidering culture in a less broad sense, that is, like a specific area of 
creation: creation of imagination, sensitivity and intelligence that is 
expressed in art pieces and mental work when looking for critically 
surpassing what is established. This specific cultural field cannot be 
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defined by the market prism, not just because it operates as consump-
tion, fashion and the consecration of the consecrated; but also be-
cause it reduces this form of culture to the condition of entertainment 
and leisure, the reverse of the critical and creative sense of cultural 
works. it does not mean that culture does not have a ludic and laze 
side that is essential and a constituent part of it, but one thing is per-
ceiving the ludic and laze inside culture and another, orchestrating it 
so as to reduce it to just that: something superfluous, like a dessert, 
a luxury in a country where basic rights are not attended. Do not to 
forget that under the market logic, the merchandise ‘culture’ becomes 
something absolutely measurable. The measure is given by the num-
ber of spectators or sales, that is to say, the cultural value derives 
from the ability to please. This measurement has even another sense: 
it indicates that culture is taken at its final step, at the moment the 
works are exhibited as a spectacle, leaving aside the essential, that is: 
the creative process. 
What is a new relation with culture where the creative process is 
considered? it is the understanding of such as labour. it is treating cul-
ture as the work of intelligence, sensitivity, imagination, reflection, ex-
perience and debate as well as work within time; thinking about it as a 
social institution, therefore, determined by the material and historical 
conditions of its realization. it is known that work is an action that 
produces something inexistent up to that moment, the result of trans-
forming the existent into something new. Free labour surpasses and 
modifies what already exists. As work, culture brings changes to our 
immediate experiences, opens time with the new, and produces what 
has not been done, thought or said yet.  Accepting culture as work 
ultimately means the understanding that the cultural result (the work/
piece) is offered to the other social subjects, it is exhibited to them as 
something to be received by them so as to become part of their intel-
ligence, sensitivity and imagination and to be re-worked by the recipi-
ents because they interpret the work or because the piece generates 
the creation of other pieces. The exhibition of cultural works is es-
sential to them; they exist to be given to others’ sensitivity, perception, 
intelligence, reflection and imagination. This is so because of cultural 
market   explores this dimension in art pieces, in other words, the fact 
that they are a spectacle subordinate them to show business.
 if the state is neither the producer of culture nor the instrument 
for its consumption, what is the relation that state may have with 
culture? it may conceive culture as a citizen’s right and accordingly, 
ensure the right to access cultural works produced, particularly the 
right to enjoy them, the right to create pieces, that is, to produce them, 
and the right to take part in the cultural policies. 
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What does the right to produce cultural works mean? if we con-
sider culture as the group of fine arts then we may suppose that this 
right would for example mean that the right to be a painter is avail-
able to everybody. After all, each of us, one day or the other feels like 
painting a picture with watercolours, gouache, drawing and so, cul-
tural policies might be created to spread ateliers, classes and painting 
groups all around the cities. such policy will not guarantee the right 
to produce paintings but will probably create a hobby, a leisure time 
activity and in the best of the cases a ludotherapy.  What is a painting? 
The expression of the enigma of vision and what is visible: enigma of 
a body that sees and is seen, that makes a corporal reflection because 
it sees itself seeing; the enigma of the visible things that are simultane-
ously out in the world and inside our eyes; the enigma of depth that is 
not a third dimension beside height and width, but what we do not see 
and accordingly, allows us to see; the enigma of colour, since colour 
is just a difference among colours; the enigma of a line because when 
marking the limits of a thing it does not close in itself but is located in 
relation to all the others. The painter questions such enigmas and his 
work is to present the visible we do not see when we look at the world 
to be seen. so, if not everyone is a painter but mostly everyone loves 
paintings, wouldn’t it be better if people could have the right to see the 
artists’ works, enjoy them, being drawn to them? Wouldn’t the state 
be in charge of guaranteeing the citizens the right to have access to 
paintings — the painters guaranteed the right to create them, and to 
those who are not painters the right to enjoy them? 
Those who are not painters or sculptors or dancers are neverthe-
less culture producers in the anthropological sense of the word: they 
are, for example, subjects, agents, authors of their own memory. Why 
not offer them conditions so that they can create ways to record and 
preserve the memory they are subjects to? Why not offer them techni-
cal and theoretical conditions so once they know the variety of memo-
ry support tools (documents, writings, photographs, films, objects etc) 
and they may preserve their own creation as social memory?  This is 
not about the exclusion of people from the production of culture but 
the enlargement of the concept of culture further than the fine arts, 
thus guaranteeing people that they have the right to produce the best 
possible work, when they are subjects of their own work. 
finally, the right to take part in the decisions related to cultural 
policies is a citizens’ right, the right to participate in the definition 
of cultural guidelines and public budgets in order to ensure citizens 
both, access to culture and its production. 
Then, we refer to a cultural policy defined by the idea of cultural 
citizenship where culture is not just reduced to the superfluous, to en-
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tertainment, market patterns, official doctrinarism (that is, ideology) 
but that is accomplished as the right to every citizen; right as from 
social class division or class struggle can be manifested and worked 
through the exercise of the right to culture. Within this frame, citizens 
as social political subjects, differentiate from each other, enter into 
conflicts, communicate and exchange experiences, reject forms of cul-
ture, create others and move the cultural process. 
III
Asserting culture as a right is rejecting the neoliberal policy that 
abandons the guarantee of rights turning them into services sold and 
bought in the market and therefore, into class privileges. 
This conception of democratization of culture supposes a new 
conception of democracy. in fact, we are used to accepting a liberal 
definition of democracy as the regime of law and order to guarantee 
individual freedom. considering that the liberal thought and prac-
tice identify freedom and competition, such definition of democracy 
means in the first place, that freedom is reduced to economic compe-
tition, the so called ‘free initiative’ and political competition among 
parties disputing elections. secondly, there is a reduction of Law to-
wards the judiciary in order to limit political power defending society 
against the tyranny, since law guarantees the government chosen by 
will of the majority. Thirdly, there is identification between the order 
and the potency of the executive and judiciary power to contain so-
cial conflicts and restrain their becoming explicit and their develop-
ment by means of repression. Lastly, despite the fact that democracy 
appears to be justified as ‘value’ or as a ‘commodity’ it is in fact ap-
proached through the efficiency criterion and measured in the legisla-
tive area through the representatives’ actions; understanding they are 
professional politicians. in the executive, it is measured through the 
activities developed by the elite of competent technicians that are re-
sponsible for the state administration.
in this way, democracy is reduced to an efficient political regime 
based on the idea of citizenship organized in political parties and that 
is expressed at the election processes where representatives are cho-
sen, at the rotation of governments and technical solutions to eco-
nomic and social problems.
however, in the democratic practice and ideas, there is a bigger 
and superior depth and truth to what liberalism perceives and enables 
to perceive. We may, in general and brief traces, characterize a democ-
racy as surpassing the simple idea of a political regime identified with 
a form of government by taking it as a society’s general form and so, 
considering it a: 
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 - socio-political form defined by the principle of isonomy (citi-
zens’ equality in law) and isegory (everyone’s right to public ex-
posure of opinions, their discussion, acceptance or rejection) 
taking into consideration the statement the everyone is equal 
in rights because they are free, that is to say that there is no-
one under the power of other because everyone obeys the same 
laws of which they are all authors (direct authors, in a par-
ticipative democracy, indirectly in a representative democracy) 
Where the major problem of democracy in a society of classes 
lies in the observance of its principles — equality and freedom 
— under the effects of the real inequality.
 - A political form where, contrarily to others, the conflict is con-
sidered legitimate and necessary, looking for institutional me-
diations so it can express itself. A democracy is not a regime of 
consensus, but of work on and about conflicts: What is the ori-
gin of other democratic difficulties in societies of classes: like 
operating with conflicts when they have the form of a contra-
diction and not of mere opposition? A socio-political form that 
tries to face — the difficulties above mentioned by reconciling 
the principle of equity and freedom and the real existence of 
inequalities, just like the legitimacy principle of the conflict 
and the existence of material contradictions and for that pur-
pose introducing the idea of (economic, social, political and 
cultural) rights. Thanks to the rights, those who are not equal 
conquer equity by entering the political space to vindicate their 
participation in already existing rights and above all, in order 
to create new rights. These are just new not only because they 
did not previously exist, but because they are different from 
those already existing once they emerge as citizens; new po-
litical subjects that established them and made them known to 
the whole society.
 - Because of the creation of rights, a democracy emerges as the 
unique political regime that is really open to temporal changes, 
once the new emerges as part of its existence and as a conse-
quence, temporality becomes a constituent of its being. 
 - The only socio-political form where the popular character of 
power and struggles tends to become evident in societies of 
classes, as rights only enlarge its scope or just arise as new 
by the action of popular classes against the judicial-political 
crystallization in favour of the dominant class. in other words, 
a feature of a modern democracy, permitting its passage from 
liberal democracy to social democracy, results from the fact 
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that only the popular classes and the excluded (the minorities) 
feel the exigency of vindicating rights and creating new ones.
 - A political form where the distinction between power and gov-
ernment is ensured not only by the presence of laws and the 
division of several authority areas but also by the existence of 
elections since (contrarily to what the political sciences state) 
they do not merely mean ‘rotation in office’ but also show that 
power is always empty, that the holder is a society and the 
government is just occupying the place because a temporary 
mandate was received. in other words, the political subjects 
are not simple voters, but electors. choosing means not just 
the exercise of power but manifesting the origin of such power, 
recovering the principle stated by the romans when they in-
vented politics: it is ‘giving someone what is possessed, since 
nobody can give what   he does not have’, that is, electing is 
asserting the sovereignty to choose the temporary occupants of 
the government. 
Then, we say that a society — not a simple government regime — is 
democratic when apart from elections, political parties, division into 
three powers in the republic, respect to the will of the majority and the 
minorities, it establishes something more profound that is also condi-
tion of the political regime, that is when it establishes rights and such 
institution is a social creation in a way that the social democratic activ-
ity is carried out like a social counter-power that determines, directs, 
controls and modifies the state actions and the power of governors.  
A democratic society establishes rights by opening the social field 
to the creation of real rights, to the enlargement of existing rights and 
the creation of new rights. That is why we can assert that democracy is 
a really historical society thus, opened to time and what is possible, to 
transformations, changes and to what is new. in fact, by the creation 
of new rights and the existence of social counter-powers, a democratic 
society is not fixed to a form for ever determined, in other words, it 
never ceases working in its divisions and internal differences, neither 
stops focusing on the objective possibility (freedom) nor being altered 
by its own praxis. 
for this very same reason, democracy is the form of social life 
that creates for itself a problem that cannot cease to solve because 
each solution found reopens, rediscovers that problem, whatever the 
question of participation is. 
As popular power (demos = people; krathos = power) democracy 
demands law to be done by those that will enforce it and to express 
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their rights. in societies of class, we know the people in its quality of 
governor is not the total of classes or the population, but the dominant 
class presenting itself through voting as representing the whole soci-
ety to pass laws, enforce them and guarantee rights. Thus, paradoxi-
cally, the political representation tends to legitimize forms of political 
exclusion without being perceived by the population as illegitimate, 
on the contrary, this is perceived as unsatisfactory. consequently, so-
cial movements and actions are developed on the sidelines of repre-
sentation under forms of pressure and vindication. 
This way tends to receive the name of popular participation with-
out its effectively being one, since popular participation will only be 
political and democratic if it could produce its own laws, rules and 
regulations to govern the socio-political life. so being, in each step, 
democracy demands the enlargement of representation and participa-
tion as well as the discovery of other procedures to guarantee partici-
pation as an effective political act that increases with the creation of 
every new right. if democracy is that, we can assess how far from it 
we are, since we live in a society that is oligarchic, hierarchic, violent 
and authoritarian. 
IV
What is the Brazilian society as an authoritarian society? 
it is a society got to know citizenship through the unusual figure 
of the master (of slaves) —  citizens that conceive citizenship as a class 
privilege, making it a concession from the dominant class to the other 
social classes; something that may be taken from them when decided 
by those dominating.
it is a society where social and personal differences and asym-
metries are immediately transformed into inequalities in terms of hi-
erarchy, command and obedience. The individuals are immediately 
distributed between superior and inferior, although someone who is 
superior in a relation may result inferior in others depending on the 
hierarchy codes ruling the social and personal relations. All the rela-
tions take the form of dependence, tutelage, concession or favour. This 
means that people are not seen as autonomous and equal subjects on 
the one hand, or as citizens thus holders of rights on the other. This 
is exactly what makes violence the rule in social and cultural life. even 
greater violence because it is invisible under paternalism and patron-
age considered as natural and sometimes glorified as positive qualities 
of the ‘national character’. 
it is a society where Law has always been a weapon to preserve 
privileges and also the best instrument for repression and oppression, 
without ever defining concrete rights and duties understandable to 
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everybody. in the case of popular classes, rights are always present-
ed as a concession granted by the state depending on the governor’s 
personal wish or will. This situation is clearly recognized by workers 
when stating that ‘justice only exists for the rich ones’. such situation 
results in a diffuse social consciousness that is represented in the well-
known saying ‘for the friends everything and for the enemies the law’. 
for those who are big, the law is a privilege; for the popular stratums 
it is repression. The law does not appear as the public pole of power 
and the regulation of conflicts; it never defines citizens’ rights and ob-
ligations because in our country the task of the law is to preserve the 
privileges and the exercise of repression. for this reason, the laws ap-
pear as innocuous and useless or incomprehensible. They are created 
to be broken and not to be transformed — violent situation that is 
mythically transformed into a positive feature when the transgression 
is praised as the ‘Brazilian way’ [o jeitinho brasileiro]. The Judiciary is 
clearly perceived as distant, secret, representing the privileges of the 
oligarchies and never the rights of the society in general. 
in this society the authentic political representation does not ex-
ist, neither the idea nor the practice. The political parties tend to be 
private clubs belonging to the local or regional oligarchy; they always 
take the form of patronage which results in relationships of tutelage 
and favouritism. it is a society where the public sphere never becomes 
public since it is always and immediately defined by the demands of 
the private space, thus, the governor’s wishes and will become the fea-
tures of the government and the ‘public’ institutions. The indistinct-
ness of public and private (politics is born on the distinction between 
both, as mentioned above) is not an accidental failure that might be 
corrected, since it is a structure of the social and political field deter-
mined by the indistinctiveness of public and private. society and poli-
tics are realized in the same indistinctness: it is not just politicians 
and congressmen who practice corruption on public funds but there 
is no social perception of a public sphere of opinion, of collective so-
ciability, of the street as a common place in the same way there is no 
perception of rights of privacy and intimacy. 
for this reason it is a society that blocks the public sphere of 
opinion as the expression of the interests and rights of differentiated 
and/or antagonistic groups and social classes. This blockage is not 
like an absence or emptiness but a group of determined actions that 
are translated into a determined way of dealing with the opinion field: 
the mass media that monopolize information and consensus is con-
fused with unanimity therefore disagreement appears as ignorance 
or behind in time. Disputes on the possession of cultivable land are 
solved with weapons and clandestine murders. economic inequali-
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ties acquire the dimension of genocide. Black people are considered 
childish, ignorant, a dangerous and inferior race; this is so, that until 
recently an engraving at the entrance of the escola de Polícia de são 
Paulo (Police school in são Paulo)  read ‘A black person standing is 
suspicious, when running is guilty’. indigenous people, in the final 
phase of extermination, are considered irresponsible (that is, incapa-
ble of citizenship), lazy (that is to say, misfit to the capitalist job mar-
ket), dangerous, so they should be exterminated or then ‘civilized’ (that 
is, delivered to the rage of the market selling and buying manpower 
but without any labour guarantee since they are ‘irresponsible’). And, 
at the same time and since romanticism, the indigenous image is pre-
sented as heroic and epic by the lettered culture, as founders of the 
‘Brazilian race’. rural and urban workers are considered ignorant, be-
hind in time and dangerous and the Police are authorized to stop any 
worker on the street and ask for his work identification and arrest him 
to ‘verify antecedents’. if he is not carrying a professional identifica-
tion with him, and if he is black, apart from the identification, the Po-
lice are authorized to examine his hands to check whether they show 
any ‘sign of work’ and arrest him in case such ‘signs’ are not found). 
There are cases where women report being raped or beaten and they 
are again beaten or raped by the ‘public force’ at police stations. Just 
not to mention torture of homosexuals, prostitutes and infant crimi-
nals in prisons. in other words, popular classes carry the stigma of 
suspicion, guilt and permanent incrimination. This situation is even 
more terrifying when remembering that the instruments created dur-
ing the dictatorship (1964-1975) for repression and torture of political 
prisoners were transferred to the treatment of the working population 
on daily basis and that the prevailing ideology according to which 
misery is the cause of violence. The so-called ‘underprivileged’ classes 
are considered potentially violent and criminal. This prejudice pro-
foundly affects the inhabitants of the favelas (slums), they are stig-
matized not only by dominant and middle classes but also by their 
equals:  the city looks at the favela as a pathological reality, an illness, 
a plague, a cyst, a public calamity.
This is a society where the population in big cities is divided in 
the ‘centre’ and the ‘ suburbs’, this last term is used not only in a space-
geographical sense but a social one [periphery] since it names distant 
neighbourhoods where no basic services are available (electricity, gas, 
sewers, pavement, transport, schools, medical attention centres). As a 
matter of fact, this situation is also found in the ‘centre’ of the city in 
pockets of poverty, slums and favelas. Population in these places has 
a 14-15 working hour day, including commuting, and in the case of 
women also includes house chores and taking care of the children. 
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This is a society where the land structure and the settlement of 
agro-industries created not only the phenomenon of immigration but 
also new figures in the landscape of the fields: the landless [sem-terra], 
migrant farm workers [bóias-frias] and cleaning women without work 
contract and without minimum work guaranties. Those workers’ la-
bour day start around three a.m. when they get to the roads to wait 
for the trucks that will take them to work and ends around 6 p.m. 
when they are deposited again by the road that will be followed by a 
long walking way home. more often than not, the trucks are in very 
bad conditions and fatal accidents are constant, dozens of workers die 
and their families do not receive any indemnity. on the contrary, to 
substitute a dead worker, another member of the family — children 
or women — becomes a migrant worker. They are called bóias-frias 
because their only meal — between 3 a.m. and 7 p.m. — some rice, 
egg and banana- is eaten when already cold because it is prepared at 
very early hours of the day. Workers do not always carry with them a 
bóia- fria [cold pot], and those who carry them try to hide from others 
at lunch time, feeling embarrassed and humiliated. 
At last, it is a society that cannot tolerate an explicit manifestation 
of contradictions, just because social divisions and inequalities are 
pushed to the limit and cannot be accepted back, not even by the rou-
tinization of the ‘conflicts of interest’ (in the way of liberal democra-
cies). on the contrary, in this society the dominant class exorcizes the 
horror to contradictions producing the ideology of the non-division 
and national unity at whatever the price. for this, it refuses to per-
ceive and work on the social, economic and political conflicts and con-
tradictions as so, since conflicts and contradictions deny the mythical 
image of a good indivisible, pacific and organized society. contradic-
tions and conflicts are not ignored and do receive a precise meaning: 
they are ignored as a sign of danger, crisis, turmoil and they receive 
just one response: political and military repression on the popular 
layers, a constant condescending disdain for the opposers in general. 
it is a society that encloses the fascination for signs of prestige and 
power, as can be observed in the use of titles of honour without any 
relation to a possible appropriateness of their attributions; ‘doctor’ is 
the most commonly used term when in a social relation  the other is 
seen or felt as superior (‘doctor’ is the imaginary substitute for the old 
nobility titles), or when the importance given to the maintenance of 
the household maids is observed; the bigger number of servants the 
greater prestige and status etc. 
Wages inequality between men and women, black and white, in-
fant work exploitation and elder people are considered normal. The 
existence of landless, homeless and unemployed people is attributed 
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to ignorance, laziness and the incompetence of the ‘miserable’. The 
existence of marginalized children [crianças de rua] is seen as the 
‘natural tendency of poor people to criminality’. Work hazards and ac-
cidents are attributed to the ignorance and incompetence of the work-
ers. Working women (if they are not teachers or social workers) are 
considered potential prostitutes and prostitutes are vicious, perverted 
and criminals, however essential to preserve the sanctity of the family.
in other words, the Brazilian society is polarized between pop-
ular layers that lack of everything and the absolute privilege of the 
dominant or managing classes, thus blocking the institution and con-
solidation of democracy. in fact, since it is founded in the notion of 
rights, the democracy is apt to differentiate ‘privilege from lack’. By 
definition, a privilege is something particular that when generalized 
or universalized stops being a privilege. A lack is also a particular or 
specific deficit that results in a particular or specific demand; it cannot 
be obtained without becoming general and universal. contrary to a 
privilege or a lack, a right is not particular or specific but it is general 
and universal, whether because it is the same and valid to every indi-
vidual, social class or group or because even when it is differentiated 
it is also recognized by everyone (like minority rights). in this way, the 
economic and social polarization between lack and privilege stands as 
an obstacle to the institution of rights that defines a democracy.
Apart from what was mentioned above, two major neoliberal of-
ferings are added: on the side of economy, there is an accumulation 
of capital that does not need to incorporate more people to the labour 
and consumption market operating as structural unemployment; on 
the side of politics: the privatization of the public that is, the state 
not only abandons social policies but there is also a re-intensifica-
tion  of the historical structure of the Brazilian society centred in the 
private space reinforcing the impossibility of the public sphere to be 
constituted. Before the distinction between public and private is es-
tablished, a new form of capital establishes de non-difference between 
public and private.
Politically and socially, the neoliberal economy is the project of 
shrinking the public space and the enlargement of the private sector 
— with an essentially anti-democratic characteristic — perfectly suit-
ing the Brazilian society. 
in the Brazilian case, neoliberalism means: taking the polariza-
tion lack-privilege to the extreme, socio-political exclusion of popular 
layers, disorganization of society as a mass of unemployed people, 
increasing the private space barely occupied by big economic and fi-
nancial corporations but also by organized crime that in front of the 
sate shrinkage can spread to the whole society as a substitute for the 
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state (protection, security, privatization of war, privatization of the 
use of force). it means solidifying and finding new justifications for 
the oligarchic form of politics, social authoritarianism and the block-
age to democracy.
facing this picture, we may say that social policies establishing 
economic and social rights against privileges and cultural policies de-
termining the right to culture and against social exclusion constitute 
a real democratic revolution in Brazil.
 
V
it is possible to say that democracy enables the culture of citizenship 
because of its own rooting. its realization is only possible through 
cultivating the citizens. 
if we can think about a cultural citizenship we can be sure that 
it is only possible through the culture of the citizens, only possible in 
democracy. 
These facts open up a complicated topic: a concrete democracy 
and therefore the topic of socialism. 
What is socialism? 
in terms of economy, the socialism is defined by the social proper-
ty of social means of production. This means on the one hand, that the 
private individual property is preserved and guaranteed as the rights 
to commodities which are not only necessary to the reproduction of 
life but above all, essential to its development and betterment. on the 
other, work stops being waged, thus producing more value, exploited 
and alienated force, to become the social self-management practice 
of economy, a commitment of the individuals to the society as part of 
the whole. Work is free, that is, the subjective human expression into 
objects or exteriorized in products. As long as the property of produc-
tion means is social, production is self administered and the labor 
is free. What centrally defines capitalism ceases to exist, that is, the 
private appropriation of social wealth by the exploitation of work as 
merchandise that produces goods that are sold and bought by means 
of the universal merchandise: money.
socially, it is defined by the ideas of justice  ‘ each second with its 
necessities and capacities’, as marx said — abundance — there is no 
private appropriation of social wealth — equality — there is no class 
holding wealth and privileges — freedom — there is no class hold-
ing social and political power — rational autonomy — knowledge is 
not at the service of private interests of a dominant class — ethical 
autonomy — the individuals are conscientious agents that establish 
behaviour rules and values — cultural autonomy — art and though 
works and pieces are not determined by the logic of the market or the 
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interest of a ruling class. These ideas and values that define socialism 
also establish rights.
Politically, socialism is defined by the abolition of the state ap-
paratus as an instrument of domination and coercion, it is substitut-
ed by participation and self-administration practices through socio-
political associations, committees and movements; that is, power is 
not concentrated in a state apparatus, neither realized by the logic of 
force or the identification with the figure of the leaders but truly, with 
the public space of debate, discussion and collective decision making.
if we understood democracy as an institution of a democratic so-
ciety and socialism as an institution of a democratic policy we would 
understand that only in a socialist policy, rights that essentially define 
a democratic society, may come true and only in a democratic soci-
ety a socialist policy practice becomes concrete. Thus, a new cultural 
policy needs to start as a new cultural policy whose main column is the 
idea and exercise of participation
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4. oRPhAnS of STRATEGy?**
ALThough A conTinenT of reVoLuTions and counter-rev-
olutions, Latin America lacks the strategic thinking it needs to ori-
ent its rich variety of political experiences, which is adequate to the 
challenges it faces. in spite of considerable analytical skills, important 
processes of change and a number of emblematic revolutionary lead-
ers, the continent has not yet produced the theory of its own practice. 
The three historic strategies of the left have had dynamic forc-
es in their leadership — socialist and communist parties, national-
ist movements and guerrilla groups — and have steered experiences 
of profound political significance such as the cuban revolution, the 
government of salvador Allende, the sandinista victory, the post-neo-
liberal governments in Venezuela, Bolivia and ecuador, the building 
of local power, as in chiapas, and the experiments with participatory 
budgets, of which the most important were developed in the city of 
Porto Alegre. nonetheless, there is no overall, strategic vision that 
 * Philosopher at university of são Paulo, Brazil. PhD in sociology at sorbonne 
university, france. Director of the Public Policies Lab at national university 
of rio de Janeiro, Brazil. current executive secretary of the Latin American 
council of social sciences (cLAcso).
** Text extracted from: sader, emir 2011 The New Mole: Paths of the Latin Ameri-
can Left (London/new York: Verso).Traslated by iain Bruce.
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could combine assessments of these different approaches and a num-
ber of other reflections into a set of new proposals. 
The fact that these three strategies were developed by distinct 
political forces means there has been no shared process of common 
activity, reflection and synthesis. While they still had a real pres-
ence, the communist parties encouraged theoretical reflection on 
their own experiences. During its short lifespan, the oLAs (Latin 
American solidarity organization) did the same for the processes of 
armed struggle. The nationalist movements, for their part, never had 
enough contact with each other to produce anything similar. Today’s 
processes have allowed little room for theory, or for critically exam-
ining the new realities. 
The strategies adopted in Latin American suffered badly, above 
all in the early days, from the left’s international links, especially with 
the communist parties, but also with the social democrats. The ‘class 
against class’ line introduced in the second half of the 1920s was a 
direct import from the soviet union, where it reflected the isolation 
from Western european governments, and was not based on concrete 
conditions in Latin America. As a result, it made it difficult to un-
derstand the particular political forms taken by the response to the 
crisis of 1929 — of which the government of getúlio Vargas in Brazil 
was just one expression, alongside the fleeting socialist government in 
chile, that lasted just twelve days, and similar phenomena in cuba.
The revolts led by farabundo martí in el salvador and Augusto 
sandino in nicaragua were born of the specific circumstances of re-
sistance to north American occupation and were direct expressions 
of anti-imperialist nationalism. The processes of industrialization in 
Argentina, Brazil and mexico came in response to the 1929 crisis. 
There was not, at least to begin with, any developed strategy behind 
them. The economic commission for Latin America and caribbean 
(cePAL)1 was merely describing an existing state of affairs when, at 
the beginning of the postwar period, it began to develop its theory of 
import-substitution industrialization, which in any case was a pure-
ly economic strategy. nor did the 1952 Bolivian revolution elaborate 
a strategy of its own; rather it put into practice a number of existing 
demands, like universal suffrage, land reform and the nationaliza-
tion of the mines.
1 cePAL was set up in 1948 as the body of the united nations responsible for 
encouraging economic and social development in the region, with its headquarters 
in santiago, chile. under its first executive secretary, the Argentinean economist 
raúl Prebisch, from 1950 to 1963, it became an influential promoter of structuralist 
economic analyses and developmentalist policies (Translator’s note).
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Thus neither nationalism nor traditional reformism based their 
action on strategies; they simply responded to economic, political 
and social demands. When the communist international adopted its 
position on anti-fascist fronts in 1935, application of the new policy 
clashed with the concrete circumstances in Latin American countries. 
if the ‘class against class’ line corresponded to conditions inside the 
ussr, the new orientation was a response to the growth of fascism in 
europe. neither took account of the situation in Latin America, which 
was just thrown in alongside the colonial periphery in general, with 
no particular identity of its own.
This failure had various consequences. for example, the Brazil-
ian movement led by Luis carlos Prestes, in 1935, found itself caught 
between these two contradictory, imported political lines2. on the one 
hand, they organized an uprising based on the ‘lieutenants’, in keeping 
with the more confrontational ‘class against class’ orientation; on the 
other, they advocated not a workers’ and peasants’ government, but a 
national liberation front, in accordance with the new, broader orien-
tation of the communist international. in other words, the forms of 
struggle corresponded to the earlier, radical line, while the objective 
reflected the more moderate one of a democratic front. The result was 
that the movement isolated itself from the nationalist, popular ‘revo-
lution of 30’, led by getúlio Vargas.
The Popular front in chile imported the ‘anti-fascist’ slogan, even 
though fascism had barely reached the continent.  This was a mechan-
ical transfer of the analysis of european fascism to Latin America, 
with all the mistakes that flowed from that. in europe, fascism had 
taken a stance that was nationalist and anti-liberal, but in no sense 
anti-imperialist. european nationalism was characterized by chauvin-
ism, by the supposed superiority of one national state over others and 
by opposition to liberalism, including liberal democracy. This liberal 
ideology had been taken up by the rising bourgeoisie as a means of 
releasing the free circulation of capital from its feudal fetters.
in American Latina too, nationalism was both politically and 
economically anti-liberal; but it also took an anti-imperialist stance, 
because of its position on the periphery — in our case in relation to 
the united states — which put it on the side of the left. however, the 
mechanical copying of european schemas of fascism and anti-fascism 
led some communist parties (for example in Brazil and Argentina), on 
2 Luis carlos Prestes was a junior officer in the Brazilian military who led a revolt 
and ‘long march’ in the 1920s, spent time in the soviet union, became a leader of 
the Brazilian communist Party and led a failed uprising by the national Liberation 
Alliance (ALn) in 1935 (Translator’s note).
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occasions, to characterize Juan Perón and getúlio Vargas as repro-
ductions of fascism in Latin America, and therefore identified them 
as mortal enemies to be fought. The Argentinean communist Party, 
for example, in the 1945 elections, in opposition to Perón, allied itself 
not only with the liberal candidate, of the radical Party, but with the 
church and the us embassy, on the grounds that any alliance was 
justified against the main enemy, which was fascism.
The main confusion has to do not just with nationalism, but also 
with liberalism, which in europe was the ideology of the bourgeoisie 
in its ascendancy, but which in Latin America was taken up, along 
with free trade, by the oligarchies that controlled primary commodity 
exports. not only nationalism, but liberalism too has exactly the op-
posite significance here.
it was this that produced a separation between the social and the 
democratic, and the incorporation of social question into the nation-
alist agenda, at the expense of democratic ones. Liberalism always 
sought to lay claim to the theme of democracy, and to accuse nation-
alist governments of being authoritarian, totalitarian and dictatorial. 
These, in turn, accused the liberals of governing for the rich and of 
lacking social awareness, while claiming themselves to defend the im-
poverished mass of the population.
only the concrete analyses of concrete situations, like those devel-
oped by, among others, the Peruvian José carlos mariátegui, the cu-
ban Julio Antonio mella, the chilean Luis emilio recabarren and the 
Brazilian caio Prado Jr.3 — all of them independent analyses which 
were largely ignored by the communist parties of which all these were 
members — would have made it possible to take on board specific 
historical conditions of each country and the region as a whole. But it 
was the perspectives of the communist international that held sway, 
and made it more difficult for the communist parties to sink roots in 
the countries.
When nationalism was taken up by the left, it was a subordinate 
force in alliances with popular leaders representing multi-class blocs. 
This long period was never theorized by the left, and the alliances 
and theories put forward by the popular fronts did not understand 
this new phenomenon, where anti-imperialism took the place of anti-
fascism, with very different characteristics.
There was a dispute over how to interpret the Bolivian revolu-
tion of 1952, because it contained both nationalist elements, like the 
3 The first three were early leaders and theoreticians of the communist movement 
in Peru, cuba and chile respectively. caio Prado Jr. was a Brazilian communist 
intellectual active in the 1930s and ‘40s (Translator´s note).
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nationalization of the tin mines, and popular ones, like land reform. 
But the active role of worker´s militias, taking the place of the army, 
the existence of a worker–peasant alliance and the inclusion of anti-
capitalist demands, enabled other interpretations of what was emerg-
ing from this multi-class movement, ranging from a classic national-
ism of an anti-oligarchic bent, to different versions of anti-capitalism.
The cuban revolution could count on two kinds of theoretical 
support: the programmatic one of fidel in History Will Absolve Me, 
and that of che in Guerrilla Warfare, on the strategy for building a 
political-military force and struggling for power. The text that fidel 
wrote as his defence in the trial of those who attacked the moncada 
Barracks, in 1952, is an extraordinary exercise in developing a po-
litical programme on the basis of the concrete conditions of cuban 
society at the time. che’s analysis describes in concrete detail how 
the guerrilla war combined political and military struggle, from the 
initial guerrilla nucleus to large detachments of the rebel army; how 
it resisted the offensive of the regular army, and how it launched the 
final offensive that led to victory.
however, either because they hadn´t thought about it, or because 
they wanted to maintain an element of surprise — which could be 
important for victory — there was never any public attempt to ex-
plain the character of the movement, defining whether it was merely 
nationalist, or embryonically anti-capitalist. it was in the light of un-
folding events that the cuban revolution developed its strategy for a 
rapid transition from the democratic and national phase to the anti-
imperialist and anti-capitalist phase, as the dynamic between revo-
lution and counter-revolution dictated. This development was much 
less discussed than the forms of struggle, especially guerrilla warfare, 
which occasioned the major debate in Latin America after cuban vic-
tory. Armed struggle or peaceful road? guerrilla war or people’s war? 
urban guerrillas or rural guerrillas? The link between national or anti-
imperialist questions and anti-capitalist or socialist ones was far less 
discussed and theorized.
The various guerrilla struggles and the Popular unity government 
in chile prolonged this central debate. nationalist military govern-
ments, especially that of Velasco Alvarado in Peru, but also, fleetingly, 
those in ecuador and honduras, raised the question of nationalism 
again, but their military character did not encourage the left at the time 
to analyse their dynamics or to consider them as strategic alternatives.
The nicaraguan revolution incorporated earlier strategies for 
taking power and elaborated a rather vague governmental platform 
which took account of a series of new factors. The most important of 
these were the arrival of large numbers of christians and women into 
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the revolutionary ranks, and a more flexible foreign policy. obstacles 
were dealt with in an empirical way —most notably, the military siege 
mounted by the united states. Yet the platform produced little or no 
theory to explain what was being done.
As with Popular unity, the sandinista experience generated a vast 
bibliography. But this hardly led to a clear strategic balance sheet, 
capable of leaving lessons for the left as a whole. The debate about 
chile became a part of the international discussions on the left, and 
thus lost its chilean or Latin American specificity. The debates about 
nicaragua, on the other hand, raised important issues, for examples 
of ethics. But they did not produce a strategic assessment of the eleven 
years of sandinista government.
Just when the left was at its weakest around the world, the Bra-
zilian left appeared as an exception; it seemed to be moving against 
the general current, especially in comparison with the radically re-
gressive turn-about in the international balance of forces. here Lula 
projected himself as a political alternative from the very first time he 
stood for president, in 1989. By reaching the second round he helped 
the left, for the first time, to look like a viable governmental alterna-
tive in Brazil — in the same year as the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the end of the socialist camp, with strong signs that the soviet union 
was about to fall apart and the united states about to win the cold 
War, delivering the world to the uncontested, imperial hegemony of 
the united states.
At the same time, carlos menem and carlos Andrés Pérez won in 
Argentina and Venezuela, thereby extending the neoliberal experience 
to nationalist and social-democratic forces and indicating the spread 
of these policies to the whole of the continent.  To this would be added 
the election of fernando collor de mello, who in the end defeated 
Lula, and of the concertación, an alliance between christian Democ-
racy and the socialist Party, in chile in 1990. in february of the same 
year came the electoral defeat of the sandinistas in nicaragua. cuba 
had entered into its ‘special period’, during which it would confront, 
with considerable difficulty, the consequences of the end of the social-
ist camp, into which it had been structurally integrated.
meanwhile a number of developments in Brazil pointed towards 
a new kind of left — post-soviet according to some, post-social-dem-
ocratic according to others. in addition to Lula and the PT, the 1980s 
had seen the foundation of the cuT, the first legally-recognized trade 
union congress in the country’s history; the emergence of the msT, 
the country’s strongest and most innovative social movement; and the 
beginnings of participatory budgets in local government, generally in 
municipalities governed by the PT. for all these reasons, the southern 
145
Emir Sader
Brazilian city of Porto Alegre would later be chosen to host the World 
social forums.
All of this meant that great hopes were placed on the Brazilian 
left, and especially on the PT and Lula’s leadership — hopes that a new 
phase was opening for a renovated left. Yet as the previous chapter’s 
analysis suggests, these expectations were hardly justified by the real 
situation of the party and its leader, or the political and ideological 
characteristics these had developed over the years.
some parts of the left, and some international currents, paint-
ed Lula as class-struggle, worker’s leader, linked to the traditions of 
worker´s councils, as well as the leader of a new, gramscian kind of 
left party, at once socialist and democratic. Lula was nothing of the 
sort. nor was he a leader in the image of what the PT had become. 
Lula’s origins were as a grassroots, trade union leader in the period 
when trade unions were banned by the dictatorship, a leader who 
negotiated directly with the bosses, a great mass leader, but without 
ideology. he felt no connection with the left tradition, neither with 
its ideological currents nor with its historical experiences. he joined 
what we might call the social left, without necessarily having any po-
litical or ideological links to it. he sought to improve the conditions 
of either the working masses, the people or the country, according to 
the evolution of his own vocabulary over the course of his career. he 
is a negotiator at heart, averse to confrontation, and therefore with no 
radical bent for revolution.
one aspect of the hegemonic crisis in Latin America is the lack 
of any accompanying theorization. in general the post-neoliberal pro-
cesses have advanced by trial and error, along the lines of least resist-
ance in the neoliberal chain. The work of the Bolivian group, comuna, 
is a notable exception. They have produced the richest collection of 
texts that the Latin American left has to draw on. it’s a unique exam-
ple, because they have been able to combine individual and academic 
works of great theoretical creativity by writers like Álvaro garcía Lin-
era, Luis Tapia and raúl Prada, among others, with direct political 
interventions — so much so that garcía Linera became vice-president 
of the republic, and raúl Prada was a leading member of the con-
stituent assembly.
These processes have already gone beyond the initial phase, when 
— as we pointed out — they made progress relatively easily, until the 
right reorganized and regained its capacity for initiative. since then it 
has become essential, for any further advance, that we develop theories 
that will allow us to understand the real historical situation that the 
region confronts, with its strengths and weaknesses, the real, concrete 
and global balance of forces, the challenges and possible solutions.
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ever since the neoliberal hegemony took hold, resistance to this 
model and the struggles of the social movements, including the World 
social forum, have shifted the focus of their thinking to the arena 
of denunciation and resistance, and neglected to reflect on political 
and strategic questions. in the other words the emphasis has been on 
working in the area of so-called civil society, to the detriment of poli-
tics, the state and, with these, issues of strategy and the construction 
of alternative hegemonic projects and new political and social blocs. 
This theoretical stance has severely diminished the analytical capacity 
of the anti-neoliberal forces, which have virtually limited themselves 
to celebrating the voices of resistance and grassroots mobilizations, 
while ignoring the positions of parties and governments.
The new social movements had no updated, Latin America, stra-
tegic thinking to draw on — not even balance sheets of previous posi-
tive and negative experiences. What made the situation even more se-
rious were the deep changes in the historic period, notably the shift 
from a bipolar to a unipolar word, under us imperial hegemony, and 
from a regulated model to a neoliberal one. These were changes on a 
world scale, with consequences for Latin America. one of these was 
the step backward in the way the countries of the region were inserted 
into the word economy, as a result of the neoliberal lifting of trade 
barriers and the debilitation of national states.
Theories like those of John holloway and Toni negri seemed to 
accommodate to the way things were; instead of putting forward stra-
tegic solutions, they made a virtue of their absence. Although they used 
different theoretical frameworks, both ended up supporting the con-
genital lack of strategy on the part of those who rejected the state and 
politics, and took refuge in a mythical ‘civil society’ and a reductionist 
‘autonomy of the social movements’. such a renunciation of strategic 
thinking and propositions left the anti-neoliberal camp unprepared to 
meet the challenges presented by the hegemonic crisis, which became 
more acute as the dispute over hegemony came to the fore.
Post-neoliberalism brings new theoretical challenges. The new 
circumstances that social and political struggles face in the region 
mean a new kind of practice needs to be explained, and that re-
quires strategic reflection and proposals which point towards new 
forms of power.
several things make it difficult for the Latin American left today 
to theorize its practice. one of them is the way theoretical work is 
mainly concentrated in universities, where the change in period had 
a particular impact: through the ideological offensive of neoliberal-
ism; because people get trapped in the universities’ internal division of 
labour, especially through specialization; and due to the tendency to 
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take refuge in merely critical positions, often quite doctrinaire ones, 
without pointing to any alternatives.
meanwhile the real struggles to overcome neoliberalism have 
raised issues that are far removed from academic reflection. issues 
like the indigenous peoples and pluri-national states, the nationaliza-
tion of natural resources, regional integration, or the new nationalism 
and post-neoliberalism have little to do with the topics usually includ-
ed in university courses or those favoured by research institutions. 
The latter have promoted a fragmented approach, giving no credit to 
global historical interpretations and accentuating the separation of 
concrete reality into separate spheres — economic, social, political 
and cultural.
There are also the effects of the ideological crisis which have 
affected theoretical work during this transition from the previous 
historical period to the current one. The rejection of so-called over-
arching narratives and widespread adoption of the idea of a crisis of 
paradigms indicated that general analytical models were being aban-
doned in favour of postmodernism; the result was structures without 
history, history without a subject, theories without truth. it was truly 
the suicide of theory and of any attempt to produce a rational explana-
tion of the world and of social relations.
Questions that are essential for any strategy for power, such as the 
nature of power itself, the state, strategies, alliances, the development 
of alternative blocs of forces, imperialism, foreign alliances, analyses 
of the balance of forces, the building of support, the development of 
a hegemonic bloc, and others, were either set aside or disappeared 
altogether. This was especially the case in so far as the social move-
ments came to play the leading role in anti-neoliberal struggles. The 
passage from defensive struggles to a dispute over hegemony has to 
mean — as it does in the texts of the comuna group or in the speeches 
of hugo chávez and rafael correa — a return to these questions, up-
dating them for the period of neoliberal hegemony and the struggle 
against the tyranny of markets. relying on mere denunciation, with 
no commitment to formulate and develop concrete political alterna-
tives, tends to distance much of the intelligentsia from the concrete 
historical processes faced by the popular movements in the region. 
These, in turn, are condemned to endless processes of trial and error, 
because they no dot have the support of a body of theory committed 
to the processes of change that really exist.
The opposite temptation is a strong one. since fidel castro is not 
Lenin, che is not Trotsky, hugo chávez is not mao Zedong. evo mo-
rales is not ho chi minh and rafael correa is not gramsci, it might 
seem easier to reject to processes that really exist, because they do not 
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correspond to the dreams of revolution cast in the image of another 
era, than do try to understand contemporary history as it is, with all 
its enigmas. in other words, either we recognize the signs left by the 
new Latin American mole, or we resign ourselves to the anthologies 
to which classic texts have been reduced by the nervous and sectarian 
hands of those who are afraid of history.
Taking refuge in classic texts is the most comfortable path, but 
also the surest route to failure. Defeats are usually attributed not to 
political causes but to moral ones. ‘Betrayal’ is the most common. The 
inability to give political explanations leads to sub-political, moral 
accounts. Trotsky’s diagnosis of the soviet union is the opposite of 
this. it is a political, ideological, and social explanation of the course 
adopted by the Bolshevik leaders. for this reason it moves from the 
thesis of the revolution ‘betrayed’ to a substantive explanation of the 
state under bureaucratic hegemony.
The defence of principles supposedly contained in those classic 
texts seems to explain everything, except the most important thing: 
why is that doctrinaire, extremist views of the ultra-left never tri-
umph, never manage to convince the majority of the population, never 
build organizations capable of leading revolutionary processes? They 
identify with the great balance sheets of defeats, but never lead to 
the growth of revolutionary political forces. not by chance, their ho-
rizon is generally limited to polemics within the ultra-left itself and 
criticisms of other sections of the left, without leading big, national 
debates, without directly confronting the right or taking part in the 
dispute over hegemony. Those who only appear in public to criticize 
others on the left, often taking advantage of spaces in the right-wing 
media, have lost sight of who the main enemies are, and of the central 
confrontations with the right.
The challenge is to face the contradictions of history as it really 
exists, in the concrete conditions of Latin America today, and to tease 
out the elements with which to build a post-neoliberal order. The co-
muna group were able to do this because they reread Bolivian his-
tory, particularly since the 1952 revolution; deciphered significance, 
identified the country’s subsequent historical periods, understood the 
cycles that led to the decline of neoliberalism, managed to avoid the 
mistakes of the traditional left in relation to the historic subjects, and 
did the indispensable theoretical work needed to marry evo morales’s 
leadership with the re-emergence of the indigenous movement as the 
essential protagonist of the current period of Bolivian history. in this 
way were able to re-establish the link between theoretical and political 
practice and help the new popular movement to carry their economic 
and social demands into the ethnic and political arenas.
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such theoretical work is indispensable and can only be done on 
the basis of the concrete reality of each country, combined with reflec-
tion on the historical experiences and theories acquired by the popu-
lar movement over the years. reality has no mercy on theoretical er-
rors. Latin America in the twenty-first century needs and deserves a 
theory that is up to the challenges of the time.
REfoRM And/oR REVoLUTIon
in recent decades, the Latin American left has oscillated between for 
reform and others projecting a rupture through armed struggle. The 
former were accused of being ‘reformist’, the latter of ‘ultra-leftism’ 
and ‘adventurism’. To freeze to process of reforms without challeng-
ing the dominant system, without raising the question of power, is to 
drown in the reproduction of existing social and political relations. on 
the other hand, to concentrate on strategic demands without linking 
these to the underlying feelings and interests of the vast majority of 
the population leads to sectarianism, to positions that sound radical 
but are incapable on winning the hearts and minds of the people. Both 
versions have scored victories — social improvements for the poor, 
electoral triumphs in cuba and nicaragua — but by the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, in their original forms, both had had their day.
The movements that have been victorious since then are those 
that managed to escape the logic of these two opposed positions and 
combine both of them: they brought together a platform of reforms 
with modes of struggle that permitted the conquest of power. Trotsky’s 
proposal in The Transitional Programme pointed in this direction, that 
is, to reform that the dominant system in incapable of carrying out 
without suffering fatal consequences. These are, by definition, histori-
cal demand, subject to modification in time and space, which is why 
they are called ‘transitional’; they serve to deepen the contradictions in 
the system and awaken society’s awareness of them.
in practice, these demands have taken various forms: ‘peace, 
bread and land’ in russia; expulsion of the Japanese invaders and 
agrarian revolution in china; the overthrow of the Batista dictatorship 
in cuba; the expulsion of us invaders and reunification of the country 
in Vietnam; the overthrow of the somoza dictatorship in nicaragua. 
All had, nonetheless, a transitional character, pointing to the passage 
from capitalism to post-capitalism.
in Latin America, traditional reformism, which includes both the 
nationalist variety (particularly of getúlio Vargas and Perón, in ad-
dition to the mexican Pri) and the traditional left variety, which had 
two examples in chile — the Popular front in the 1930s and Popular 
unity in the 1970s — remained at level of reforms to the system, with-
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out linking these to the question of power. Apparently, Popular unity 
raised the question of power when it proposed a transition, albeit 
gradual, from capitalism to socialism. however, as we shall see later, it 
did not analyze what would be the real conditions for defeating the ex-
isting power and building an alternative one. it believed these would 
emerge through the application of a programme of essentially eco-
nomic reforms, as a natural consequence, and ended up falling into an 
economism that left in incapable of taking on other decisive centres 
of power, like the Armed forces, imperialism and the private press.
The cuban and sandinista revolutions did manage to combine 
the struggle against dictatorship with the struggle against imperial-
ism and, in the cuban case, against capitalism too. other examples 
on anti-dictatorial or merely democratic struggle concluded without 
projecting and strategy of rupture: witness the re-establishment of lib-
eral-democratic system in the southern cone of the continent. At the 
opposite extreme, some other struggles concentrated exclusively on 
the armed struggle, with its promise of a military rupture, and failed 
to connect with the sentiments or immediate needs of the vast major-
ity of the population; they ended in isolation and defeat.
in the first case, the reforms got bogged down in the dominant 
system; in the second, they never managed to break out of the narrow 
circle of the organizations themselves, whether political or political-
military in character.
ever since the classic debate between rosa Luxemburg and ed-
uard Bernstein, the left has been trapped in this dichotomy between 
reform and revolution. Bernstein laid everything on the movement, 
to the detriment of its final objectives, as if the accumulation of par-
tial gains would pose and resolve the question of power and anti-cap-
italism transformation. rosa Luxemburg drew attention to the fact 
that such reforms could open the way to a restructuring of capitalism, 
broadening its support — something Lenin called the ‘labour aristoc-
racy’, in reference to the predominance of privileged layers within the 
working class.
The fact is that reformism acquired a dynamic of its own, and 
became hegemonic in the history of the left. mainly this took the form 
of the social democratic parties coming to accept capitalism, or of the 
stageist strategies of the communist parties, which never managed to 
pass beyond the first of these stages and remained locked in reform-
ism, with no rupture.
in Latin America, this was the principal face of the left, especially 
from the 1930s to the 1970s, in the midst of the industrial growth 
based on import substation. in countries such as mexico, Brazil and 
Argentina, such reformism was sponsored by nationalist forces led 
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by the Pri, Vargas or Perón; in others, like chile and uruguay, it was 
articulated by alliance of socialists and communists.
This logic — almost spontaneous within the left in a context of 
development and modernization — coincided with the expansion of 
the domestic, mass consumer market, the democratization of the pub-
lic health and education systems and the growth of both urban and 
rural trade unions, which identified with aspects of this programme 
of democratic, anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist reforms. As long as 
they served the needs of the industrial expansion, they could be car-
ried out. When the import substitution process went into decline, the 
alliance between the trade unions, sectors of the middle class and in-
dustrial bourgeoisie broke down, rendering the reform strategy unvia-
ble. The chilean experiment with Popular unity was a solitary attempt 
to take this process further; now lacking any alliance with bourgeois 
sectors, it found itself smothered within the state apparatus and even-
tually defeated by a military coup supported by all of the bourgeoisie.
nonetheless, the reformist logic survives, adapting to new politi-
cal circumstances and driven by the spontaneous reactions of the pop-
ular movement to neoliberalism’s attacks on its rights. it is important 
to take into account that the reappearance of reforms projects occurs 
in a context where class relations have changed, with a much wider 
and deeper internationalization of the region’s bourgeoisies and the 
erosion of formal labour rights, leading to a weakening of the workers’ 
movement and the trade unions.
The current period presents a new challenge to the left´s ability to 
overcome dichotomies that rather hinder than help the formulation 
of strategies linking theory and practice, concrete reality and strategic 
proposals. The processes which have triumphed in the past are rich in 
lessons of this ability, and have made those responsible — Lenin, Trot-
sky, mao Zendong, ho chi minh and fidel castro — the left´s great-
est strategists. in none of these cases did a reformist project simply 
transcend into a revolutionary one. nor were any for them based on 
a pured proposal to break with capitalism in favour of socialism. All 
of them were born of concrete imperatives — to overthrow Tsarism, 
expel the invaders, revolt against dictatorship — but the leaderships of 
these struggles imposed a dynamic that went to the root of the prob-
lem and pointed to a rupture with the imperial system of domination 
and, with it, the underlying capitalist system.
gramsci’s description of the russian revolution as a revolution 
‘against Capital’ has various meanings. one of them — which in the 
end had a tragic outcome — points to the fact that it occurred on the 
periphery of capitalism and faced task of breaking out of its encircle-
ment to enable the anti-capitalist struggle in the most advance coun-
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tries to itself really negate and overcome capitalism. This objective 
was not achieved, neither in the crisis following the first World War, 
when the attempted revolutions in germany were defeated and it was 
the far right that filled the void, nor later, when the ussr was left iso-
lated and the revolutionary process moved in the opposite direction, 
towards the most backward countries of Asia. 
Another of is meanings is that all revolutions are inevitably het-
erodox. no revolutionary formula has been repeated over time; all are 
unique and represent a peculiar combination of multiple factors. such 
combinations mean that revolutions are always exceptions, never the 
rule, in historical development. The list of factors that make possible 
the outbreak of revolution include, according to Lenin, subjective and 
objective factors, which come together at a specific moment and for a 
limited time. The art of revolution situation is to harvest this combi-
nation of factors at just the right moment.
Lenin speaks of the revolutionary situation and the revolutionary 
crisis. The first occurs when there is such polarization in a country 
that those below are no longer prepared to live in the old way, and 
those above are no longer able to dominate in the old way. The revolu-
tionary crisis occurs when a political leadership manages to steer this 
polarization towards a revolutionary outcome.
As gramsci correctly pointed out, Lenin was referring to the strat-
egy in backward societies, where the decisive axes of power come to-
gether in the state apparatus; seizing the latter should make it possible 
to dismantle this power and build a new one. in gramscian terms, 
hegemony in these societies rests manly on coercion rather than con-
sensus. This analysis suggests that a much more complex political 
strategy would be required in societies where power rests on the fab-
rication on consensus and where the decisive axes of power are coor-
dinated by the state, but exist manly outside of it. Developing strategy 
for power in these societies means developing alternative, hegemonic 
projects (counter-hegemonic ones), which end up contesting the state 
apparatus, but whose key battles will unfold in the complex fabric of 
economic, social and ideological relations in society as whole.
The problem is that this proposition of gramsci’s seem to contra-
dict one of the basic principles of marxism, which states that, in class 
societies, ‘the dominant ideas are those of the dominant class’. This is 
a structural condition, because ideology is not just the development 
of ideas on the cultural level: it is a born deep within the process of 
capital accumulation, from the relations between capital and labour 
and the forms of appropriation of surplus value, from alienation as 
a fundamentally economic phenomenon that impregnates all social 
and cultural relations. The alienation we feel before the world we 
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have ourselves created, but in which we do not recognize ourselves, 
comes from the relations of production, the process of wealth crea-
tion, which separates the products from the producers and prevents 
the latter from recognizing the wealth created by their labour.
This rupture between subject and object, between history and na-
ture, between producer and product, between human beings and the 
world reproduces the mechanisms of alienation day after day, in every 
corner of society. it poses the question, both theoretical and political, of 
how, in these conditions, it is possible to develop a counter-hegemonic 
project, of how the hegemony of the dominant ideology can be broken. 
in other words, it presents a challenge: how can the alternative class bloc 
develop its own hegemony before accedes to national, state, power?
indeed, an alternative ideological force is essential for develop-
ing alternative political subjects. in Bolivia, for example, this was 
achieved through a reunification of political forces which assumed 
anew their indigenous identity. The victory in Bolivia — in this case an 
electoral one — was the result of a long and profound process of mo-
bilization and struggle, over the previous half decade. once it acceded 
to government, the development of an alternative project took a quali-
tative leap, for now it could mobilize more widely and employ more 
sophisticated instruments. But before it achieved this dominance, 
Bolivia’s indigenous movement had to assume leadership, organizing 
and putting itself at the head of a bloc of alternative forces with a ba-
sic platform — nationalization of natural resources, agrarian reform, 
constituent Assembly — and to demonstrate that this combination 
was possible. That meant understanding the real balance of forces, the 
dynamic of the confrontations, and the real strengths and weaknesses 
of each of the opposing blocs.
To comprehend better how counter-hegemonic projects can be 
developed, we need to look more closely at the two logics that have to 
be understood and overcome, so that we can then move on to the con-
crete analysis of concrete reality, with all its contradictions, structural 
determinations and potential for change.
ThE ULTRA-LEfT LoGIC
‘ultra-left’ is a political category that has characterized much of the 
history of the international left. We are not going to rake over this 
history now; it is enough to mention Lenin’s analysis in ‘Left Wing’ 
Communism: An infantile disorder and Trotsky’s in Revolution and 
Counter-Revolution in Germany, to take just two of the most rigorous 
and systematic critiques of this phenomenon.
The russian revolution, like all victorious revolutions, did not 
come about through calls for the overthrow of capitalism and the build-
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ing of socialism. on the contrary, it captured the essential needs of the 
russian people — for ‘peace, bread and land’ — and channelled these 
into a dynamic that ran up against not only Tsarism but also the alli-
ances between russia and the Western capitalist powers, and against 
capitalism itself. This is the art of revolutionary leadership: the ability 
to link immediate demands, or a minimum programme, with strategic 
objectives, or a maximum programme, thus opening the way to a revo-
lutionary solution to the question of power. in other words, it means re-
connecting, in a dynamic, non-segmented, non-corporative, and much 
less counterposed way, the terms ‘reform’ and ‘revolution’.
some on the ultra-left in russia wanted to install socialism im-
mediately and expropriate all sectors linked in one way or another 
to capitalism. They were opposed to the Brest-Litovsk agreement, by 
means of which the new soviet government sought a kind of peaceful 
coexistence with germany in order to begin rebuilding after the dam-
age done by the war. They were also opposed to the new economic 
Policy (neP), introduced by Lenin to encourage the reactivation of 
small and medium rural landholdings and to restore production and 
supply to the domestic market, especially in the towns. The aim of 
the neP had been to combat the threat of widespread hunger result-
ing from the encirclement of the countryside, where the counter-rev-
olution of the Whites was prolonged by intervention from more than 
fifteen foreign armies and by the failure of the revolution in germany, 
which, if successful, could have broken the siege and isolation of the 
Bolshevik government.
immediately after the triumph of the revolution, a system of ‘war 
communism’ was decreed, which simply shared out what there was in 
the most egalitarian way possible, as it were socializing the existing 
poverty. When the war ended, there was strong internal pressure to 
re-establish economic growth and ensure the supply of basic neces-
sities, especially to the cities. it was to this end, and in a defensive 
situation, that the government decreed the neP. for the ultra-left, it 
was a betrayal of revolutionary ideals, a capitulation by Lenin, Trotsky 
and their fellow revolutionaries. The correctness of the policy became 
clear a few years later, when the change in policy carried out by stalin 
failed to resolve the question of the countryside, the peasants intensi-
fied their supply boycott and the new leadership of the revolution had 
to resort to the worst possible solution: the expropriation of the land by 
force and the dead of millions of peasants from starvation. unresolved, 
the agrarian question was removed from the agenda through the front 
door, only to come back through the window in explosive fashion, 
marking one of the weak points of the russian revolution. right up 
to the last days of the ussr, this was an issue that was never resolved. 
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The ultra-left has difficulty understanding defeats, retreats and 
negative shifts in the balance of forces. it tends to reduce its diagnoses 
to accusations of betrayal by the leaders, generally discovering innu-
merable cases of leaderships that have become corrupt or bureaucra-
tized, and which have reneged on their ideals or platforms. But critical 
balance sheets that to not lead to alternatives also fail build support 
for their positions; they end up being a part of the defeat, because they 
do not translate into solutions.
The crises unleashed by the first World War confirmed Lenin’s 
prediction, when he said that it was never more difficult to make a rev-
olution than at the beginning of a war, when chauvinism holds sway 
and demands national unity against other countries, but it was never 
more likely than in the course of a war. When the inter-imperialist 
character of the war became clear, people could see that they were 
being used as cannon fodder in a conflict that didn’t concern them. in 
germany and italy, however, the possibility of revolution that arose 
from the suffering and defeat of war never came to fruition — the at-
tempts failed, leaving the way clear for the mass counter-revolutions 
of fascism and nazism to impose their solutions to the crisis.
in germany, a failure to grasp the strength and danger of na-
zism meant that the social democratic and communist parties did 
not put unity against this enemy above their own differences. They 
thereby facilitated the rise of hitler, who repressed them all. The 
communists called the social democrats ‘social fascists’ — socialists 
in word, fascists in deed — and argued that they would open the 
door to nazism. The socialist accused the communists of being an 
extension of soviet totalitarianism, something quite similar to na-
zism. Trotsky drew up a scathing balance sheet of the ultra-leftist 
attitudes of both parties. They were incapable of understanding its 
strength and facilitated its rise.
more recently, we saw typical examples of ultra-leftist positions 
in china, during the cultural revolution, and in cambodia, soon after 
the defeat of the united states in Vietnam. china disagreed with the 
soviet attitude to the building of socialism and relations with us im-
perialism; it claimed that the ussr was restoring capitalism, citing as 
an example of adaptation to capitalist lifestyles the importing of a car 
factory from fiat in italy — located in a city now renamed Togliatti, 
in homage to the former leader of the italian communist Party. Ac-
cording to this analysis, as a major capitalist power in an imperialist 
epoch, the soviets must also be a new imperialist power, like the us. 
While the united states represented decadent imperialism, the ussr 
was characterized as a rising power; it was therefore more dangerous 
and should be targeted as the main enemy.
LAtIN AMErICAN CrItICAL tHOuGHt: tHEOry AND PrACtICE
156
on this basis, the chinese did all they could to combat the ussr 
and all those forces and governments that seemed to depend on its 
supports. They went so far as to back racist or dictatorial governments 
in south Africa and chile, because these opposed so-called soviet ex-
pansionism. They classified the cuban government as ‘the armed wing 
of soviet imperialism’, because it helped the Angolans to resist the 
south African invasion.
The logic of the chinese position — often repeated by others on 
the ultra-left — was that if they didn´t displace the ussr from its po-
sition, china would never have room to expand its own leadership in 
the world. hence the violence of the repeated attacks on the soviet 
and — as also happened with other forces in similar position — the al-
liance with decadent imperialism (the united states) to try to liquidate 
the main enemy (the soviet union). This alliance, sealed with richard 
nixon´s visit to china, gave rise to the so-called ping-pong diplomacy.
To cap it all, despite the immense defeat it would have meant for 
the first socialist revolution in history to restore capitalism and become 
an imperialist power, china continued to preach that the revolution was 
advancing and that imperialism was a ‘paper tiger’, calling on peoples 
everywhere to rebel and change the world, as if nothing had happened.
cambodia saw one of the most tragic examples of sectarianism by 
a left-wing government. This put into practice an even more radical 
version of the chinese cultural revolution´s diagnosis that capital-
ism, it culture and its cities, corrupt human beings, in contrast with 
the pure life of the countryside. millions of people were sent off to 
become proletarianized on the land, and many were eventually ex-
ecuted. Driven by a dogmatic and sectarian vision of capitalism ideol-
ogy and modern culture, the cambodian regime carried out a brutal 
form of ideological ‘cleansing’ until it was overthrown with the aid of 
the Vietnamese, who had already suffered invasion by china, on the 
grounds that they had become agents of the soviet union.
The most radical currents of the left — among them Trotskyists 
and maoists — are characterized by the criticisms of the majority, re-
formist currents. They have always tended to adopt this critical view, 
without ever being able to develop mass support — most typically in 
the case of the Trotskyists. in the intellectual field, more understand-
ably, such critical tendencies have played an important part, pointing 
out the mistakes and ‘deviations’ of the political forces. however, pre-
cisely because of this intellectual character (they are not themselves a 
political forces), they are unable to formulate alternatives that would 
overcome the problems they identify, even when their diagnoses turn 
out to be correct. often, these critical views arise from a contrast with 
what are regarded as the principles of revolutionary theory; at other 
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times, from what are seen as the internal inconsistencies of the pro-
jects in question. such currents make a key contribution to political 
practice, but they often succumb of the temptation of ultra-leftism 
because they put theory before the concrete conditions of struggle, 
which prevents them from grasping the dilemmas imposed by con-
crete practice.
What is the contemporary logic of ultra-leftism, which is so wide-
ly disseminated in these times when liberalism has such an ability to 
co-opt, and there is such a contradiction between the historic decline 
of capitalism and the retreat of socialism as a current possibility?
in quite a thorough text, James Petras — one of the most repre-
sentatives of these ultra-left positions — sets out to analyse the history 
of the left in order to explain the present and future of revolutionary 
politics4; his text was in response to an article that Perry Anderson 
wrote in 2000 to inaugurate a new phase of New Left Review, the jour-
nal he had begun to edit forty years earlier. in that article, Anderson 
had compared the situation at the beginning of the new century with 
that which existed when he took over the publication5.
in line with the logic underlying his approach, Petras includes a 
number of extremely aggressive references in his article, seeking to 
brand Perry Anderson as one of those intellectuals who had adopted ‘a 
certain apolitical centrism’, born of defeatism, the self-flagellation of 
the left and its capitulation before the strength of neoliberalism. This 
language matches the content of Petras’s argument and that of others 
who take a similar stance: the dismissal of those criticized is justified 
because they have abandoned the left, capitulated, and because they 
defends views that are only apparently of the left. Therefore they need 
to be not just answered but thoroughly thrashed and ‘unmasked’, to 
make sure they no longer exert a negative influence within the left.
But what was Anderson´s balance sheet in 2000? in making his 
comparison between that period and the 1960s, Anderson organized 
the differences into three categories: historical, intellectual and cultural.
in the 1960s, ‘a third of the planet had broken with capitalism’. 
While nikita Khrushchev proposed reforms in the ussr, china main-
tained its prestige, the cuban revolution was unfolding in the Ameri-
cas, the Vietnamese were successfully resisting us occupation and 
capitalism felt under threat. intellectually, there began ‘a discovery 
process of suppressed leftist and marxist traditions’, and ‘alternative 
4 Petras, James 2001 ‘notes toward an understanding of revolutionary politics 
today’ in Links: International Journal of Socialist Renewal, n° 19, may-August. 
Available at: <http://links.org.au/node/105>.
5 Anderson, Perry 2000 ‘renewals’ in New Left Review, n° 1, January-february.
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strands of revolutionary marxism’ gained currency6. culturally, com-
pared with the conformist atmosphere of the 1950s, rock music and 
new wave cinema provided a flavour of rebellion.
four decades later, the climate could not have been more differ-
ent. ‘The soviet bloc has disappeared. socialism has ceased to be a 
widespread ideal. marxism is no longer dominant in the culture left’. 
The 1990s brought ‘the virtually uncontested consolidation, and uni-
versal diffusion of neoliberalism’7.
five interconnected processes had radically changed the land-
scape:
1. us capitalism reasserted its predominance in all fields (eco-
nomic, political, military and cultural);
2. european social democracy made a turn towards neoliberal-
ism;
3. Japanese capitalism entered a deep and prolonged recession, 
while china moved towards membership in the WTo, and in-
dia, for the first time in the history, came to depend on the imf;
4. The new russian economy did not provoke popular protest, in 
spite of the catastrophic regression imposed on the country;
5. The deep socio-economic changes imposed by neoliberalism 
were accompanied by two shifts, one political and the other 
military:
•	 ideologically, the neoliberal consensus extended to parties 
identifying with the ‘third way’, like Tony Blair’s Labour Party 
in Britain and Bill clinton´s Democrats in the united states; 
whit this, it seemed the ‘single orthodoxy’ and the Washing-
ton consensus had become immovable, because a change of 
government in either of neoliberalism’s main bastions would 
no longer change the model, but simply reproduce it;
•	 militarily, the war in the Balkans ushered in the age of ‘hu-
manitarian wars’, a type of military intervention conducted 
in the name of ‘human rights’.
Among intellectuals, who had previously been mostly socialist, there 
were two main reactions. The first was conversion to the new order — 
capitalism passed from being a necessary evil to become ‘a necessary 
and on balance salutary social order’8, with the superiority of private 
6 Anderson (2000: 7).
7 Anderson (2000: 9-10).
8 Anderson (2000: 13).
159
Emir Sader
enterprise given pride of place. The second was consolation — the 
need to sustain a message of hope led here to overestimating the im-
portance of the various forms of opposition, as if it were these that set 
the tone of the period.
As a result, the idea ‘of the spread of democracy as a substitute for 
socialism, either as hope or claim’, became widely accepted. it didn’t 
seem to matter that the actual practice of democracy had been emptied 
of all content, limiting its historical horizons to what currently existed 
— the liberal democracy and capitalist economy as promoted by fran-
cis fukuyama. faced with this situation, Anderson concluded that:
The only starting-point for a realistic Left today is a lucid registra-
tion of historical defeat […] no collective agency able to match the 
power of capital is yet on the horizon […] for the first time since the 
reformation, there are no longer any significant oppositions — that is, 
systematic rival outlooks — within the thought-world of the West […] 
neo-liberalism as a set of principles rules undivided across the globe: 
the most successful ideology in world history9.
The whole system of references in which the generation of the 1960s 
had been educated, had now been swept from the map.
Anderson´s analysis completes his 1994 account of neoliberalism, 
which remains the best overview of the new hegemonic project10. Al-
ready at that time, he drew attention to the breadth and depth of this 
model, which introduced radical changes in the Keynesian model and 
extended market relations to areas never before reached by capital-
ism, like the ex-socialist countries, including the ussr, eastern eu-
rope and china. The model launched by the far right proceeded to in-
corporate first nationalists and then social democrats. it was possible 
to say: ‘We are all neoliberals now’11.
it is against this analysis that James Petras reacts so strongly, in 
a denunciation that tries to interpret the history of the left without, 
as he sees it, succumbing to the liberal illusion and defeatism. Ac-
cording to him, ‘During periods of counter-revolutionary ascendancy, 
following temporary or historic defeats, many of the former radical 
intellectuals revert to their class origins, discovering the virtues of 
right-wing ideologies’, which, he says, they present as invincible and 
9 Anderson (2000: 16-17).
10 Anderson, Perry & camiller, Patrick 1994 ‘introduction’ to Mapping the West 
European Left (London/new York: Verso). 
11 This remark is an inversion of milton friedman´s claim in a 1965 letter to Time 
magazine, later attributed to richard nixon, that ‘We are all Keynesians now’.
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irreversible. They make the mistake of concentrating on a ‘particular 
one-dimensional configuration of contemporary power as the reality’, 
in an approach without historical roots12.
Petras sets out to debunk a certain view that sees the 1950s as 
dominated by conformism, the two following decades by the spread of 
revolution, and the period from 1980 to 2000 as one of defeat and dis-
solution. he recounts a series of struggles in the 1950s, none of them 
fundamental, to try to show that there were mobilizations — but this 
does not alter the general picture of capitalist stability, albeit uneven.
As ever, the left finds it difficult to recognize political defeats and 
setbacks. The 1950s unquestionably saw us hegemony reach its height. 
eric hobsbawm has characterized the long cycle of growth stretching 
from the end of the second World War to the mid 1970s as ‘the golden 
age of capitalism’13, when the three locomotives of metropolitan capi-
talism, the united states, germany and Japan, found their economic 
growth synchronized. The fact that the second two countries achieved 
this status is itself noteworthy, after being destroyed in the second 
World War and then rebuilt, along with the italian economy, with the 
help of the us-financed marshall Plan. This coincided with growth in 
peripheral capitalist countries like Brazil, Argentina and mexico, as 
well as in non-capitalist areas, which ended up contributing to growth 
rate under the hegemony of the world capitalist market.
hobsbawm believes that, in the 1950s, the united states estab-
lished its economic and technological superiority over the ussr in 
irreversible fashion, but that the full effects of this were only felt a 
decade or two later. Drawing on second World War rearmament, the 
us economy was already recovering from the 1929 crisis by the end 
of the 1930s and experienced growth in the 1940s, while europe and 
Japan were destroyed.
Whatever the important struggles that can be identified in the 
1950s, what is needed is to take the measure of the hegemony in the 
period, and not limit one’s view the strength of anti-hegemonic forces. 
for Petras, ‘it is a monstrous distortion to refer to the 1950s as a pe-
riod of ‘conformisy’’14 — yet he fails to grasp that this was a period of 
considerable ideological consensus around ‘the American way of life’.
he refers to political developments that might contradict Anderson´s 
argument: the presence of powerful communist parties in greece, italy, 
france and Yugoslavia; the revolts in hungary, Poland and east ger-
12 Petras (2001).
13 hobsbawm, eric 1994 Age of extremes (London: michael Joseph) esp. chapter 9.
14 Petras (2001). section 1. 
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many; the re-emergence of the left in Britain and the united states; 
the Vietnamese victory against the french in 1954; and, what he 
sees as steps toward the following decade, the support for the war 
in Algeria and peasant struggles that led to the revolutions in cuba 
and indochina.
These are clearly insufficient counterweights to the immense sta-
bilization and consolidation of capitalist hegemony that characterized 
the decade. The procedure is typically ultra-left: it takes a few exam-
ples, without measuring their relative importance in the overall bal-
ance of forces. A political analysis of any given situation cannot limit 
itself to examples of the supposed strength of the left. A political anal-
ysis which is not merely descriptive, which as a serious journalistic or 
academic function, and aims to elucidate the big class confrontations, 
must concentrate on the balance of forces while understanding that 
any balance of forces is temporary, referring as it does to the relation-
ship between the strength of one side and that of the other.
in this sense, it is impossible to overlook the strengthening of the 
Western bloc and the reaffirmation of us leadership, alongside the 
reconstruction on more modern foundations of germany, Japan and 
italy, all of them led by conservative forces.
This inability to characterize a decade in accordance with its 
dominant aspects is patently obvious in the way Petras rushes to deny 
Anderson´s contrast between the relative conformism of the 1950s 
and the radicalization of the decade that followed. for Petras, ‘if the 
1950s were not a period of worldwide conformity, neither were the 
1960s, in all of their manifestations, an age of uniform revolutionary 
upheaval’15. historical development is based, fundamentally, on un-
even processes. no period can be described as homogeneously moving 
in one direction or the other. it is therefore inappropriate to apply the 
word ‘uniformly’ to any historical period.
Petras recognizes the rise of mass struggles in north America, 
europe and parts of the Third World, but holds that there were impor-
tant setbacks in important countries and various contradictions and 
conflicts within the mass movements. he argues that the result should 
be a positive re-evaluation and a creative development of marxist 
thought to take in new areas and new problems.
he places particular importance on the struggles in indochina, 
cuba and other countries where peasant struggles gave rise to new 
strategic ideas. however, he says that much intellectual work contrib-
uted little politically, because it failed to grasp the role of imperial-
ism in the contemporary world. he dismisses the counter-cultural of 
15 Petras (2001). 
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the 1960s as motors of individualism, which were finally co-opted by 
‘market populism’ — they were so permeated by drugs, according to 
him, that ‘opium became the opium of the left’.
for Petras, ‘There are links between some variants of intellectual 
and cultural life in the 1960s and 1970s and the right turn in the 1990s: 
the substantive differences in political activity in the two periods, par-
ticularly in the Anglo-saxon world, are bridged by the pseudo-radical 
individualist cultural practices and values in both periods’16.
The key to the problem is presented as a deep division between 
anti-imperialist thinkers and Western marxists. The latter had sup-
posedly denied the importance of the struggles in indochina, Latin 
America and south Africa, giving a derogatory connotation to the ex-
pression Third World, while focusing their attention on the central 
capitalist countries. The theoreticians of anti-imperialism, for their 
part, had focused their attention on the relations between centre and 
periphery, samir Amin, Andre gunder frank and immanuel Waller-
stein, and sometimes from a perspective of class struggle.
on the other hand, military coups in Brazil and indonesia, sup-
ported by the united states, had interrupted two processes in the big-
gest and most promising countries of the Third World. Petras also in-
cludes, in this category of ‘counter-revolution in the revolution’, the 
turn in china, which opened the way to way would become capitalist 
restoration at the end of the 1970s. As the same time, Khrushchev’s an-
ti-stalinist movement had been defeated by the ‘repressive apparatus’.
Petras´s inability to grasp the global correlation of forces is re-
vealed most clearly in the passage to a decade of obvious reversals for 
the popular camp and of obvious gains for imperialism — the 1990s. 
he takes it up in a section of the essay entitled, ‘restoration, imperial-
ism and revolution in the 1990s’, in which the inclusion of the third 
element aims to reinforce its presence even in a decade like this.
his main claim in relation to this new period is that ‘certainly 
only an ahistorical and hasty judgment can claim that the decade was 
a period of unprecedented historical defeats, surpassing anything in 
prior history’. he compares this period with another, from the begin-
ning of the 1930s to the beginning of the 1940s, in which he says there 
was huge setback and devastation of the left in europe on an unprec-
edented scale, either through physical repression, isolation or co-op-
tion. nothing similar, he argues, ad occurred in the 1990s:
us ‘hegemony’, a rather vacuous concept that inflates the role of ‘polit-
ical persuasion’, is totally inappropriate when one considers the scope 
16 Petras (2001).
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and depth of violence in the recent past and its continuous use on a 
selective but demonstrable basis in the present17.
in this way, Petras calculate shifts in the balance of forces as a func-
tion of the level of repression, and not in terms of imperialism´s he-
gemonic capacity, which is a synthesis of both forces and persuasion. 
if the two periods mentioned are, in many ways, not comparable, it is 
nonetheless clear that Petras underestimated the scale of the imperial-
ist victory in the new period, which began in the 1990s.
The years from 1930s to 1940s saw the ussr grow stronger, and 
liberalism grow weaker as a result of the great Depression; the sec-
ond successive war in europe, as an inter-imperialist war, attacked the 
foundations of european capitalism and created the conditions for the 
left to grow, just as the struggle by the communist parties against fas-
cism and nazism consolidated the international prestige of the ussr.
Thus, the defensive position the left had to adopt in this period 
— expressed especially by the Vii congress of the communist interna-
tional, which approved Dimitrov’s resolution on the anti-fascist  unit-
ed front — although it had a strategic character, did not come about 
in a context of political and ideological dismantling of the left like that 
which occurred in the 1990s.
When Petras lists the movements of resistance to neoliberalism, 
he misses out the main thing: the fundamental, strategic changes 
that happened at the beginning of the 1990s, with all the conse-
quences these had. i am referring to the shift from a bipolar world 
to a unipolar one, under us hegemony, and the shift from Keynesi-
anism to the neoliberal model. The combination of both and their 
consequences — of which the most important is the hegemony of 
the north ‘American way of life’, as a value and as a lifestyle — give 
a globally regressive character to the new period. Whatever counter-
tendencies there may be, these do not outweigh the negative shift in 
the balance of forces.
The disappearance of the bipolar world does not just mean a shift 
to a world under the hegemony of a single, imperialist super-power. 
it also means an ever larger gap between the strength of the united 
states and that of others powers. At the same time as the world´s num-
ber two power, the ussr, disappeared, the economies of Japan and 
germany were stagnating. And because the strength of a country is 
defined not in comparison with its past achievements, but in relation 
to the strength of other countries, the united states entered the new 
period stronger than ever before.
17 Petras (2001), section 3.
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The consequences for the left were devastating. There was an ide-
ological retreat, with a questioning of everything that had to do with 
socialism (state, party, labour, planning, socialization, etc.), and a po-
litical one too, with social democracy sliding to the right, the break-up 
of alliances with the communist parties, the weakening of both these 
and the trade unions, and a proliferation of right-wing governments. 
Any global evaluation of 1990s must conclude that there was a radical 
change in the correlation of forces between the blocs. The disappear-
ance of the ussr and the socialist camp saw these replaced, not with 
something further to the left, but with the restoration of capitalism 
in its neoliberal form. socialism, which had been a part of history 
through most of the twentieth century, practically disappeared, to be 
replaced by anti-neoliberal struggle. capitalism extended its hegemo-
ny as never before in history.
A comparison of the 1990s with the present decade in Latin Amer-
ica also confirms the regressive nature of the former. it was only at the 
end of that decade that the first anti-neoliberal government emerged 
in the region, that of Venezuela. Although there were varied forms 
of resistance to neoliberalism, these developed in a defensive frame-
work. But it was only the strength accumulated in this defensive phase 
that made possible the current hegemonic struggle, marking a new, 
more favourable situation for the popular camp.
The ultra-left view does not take account of these setbacks, rather 
clinging to one of its constant themes, the permanent possibility of 
revolution. The only option this leaves is to accuse the political lead-
ers of ‘betrayal’, making them responsible for the fact the revolution 
hasn´t happened. originally, this line of analysis goes back to Trotsky. 
he held that the objective conditions for revolution already exist, and 
it was precisely such betrayal by leaders that created the obstruction; 
the problem was that these leaderships had become bureaucratized, 
defended their own interests, made compromises with the ruling class 
and abandoned the side of the revolution and the left.
This kind of analysis is also based on what Lenin said about the 
‘aristocracy of labour’: a section of the working class that identified 
with colonial and/or imperial domination and forms the social basis 
for certain kinds of political representation.
nonetheless, we need to take account alterations in the balance of 
forces that indicated changes in the objective conditions, especially in 
the current period. here there is a contradictory combination between 
setbacks in the subjective conditions for anti-capitalist struggle and 
the evident limits of capitalism. The victory of the imperialist camp 
and the defeat of the socialist camp, along with the structural and 
ideological changes introduced by neoliberal policies, have change 
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the objective and subjective conditions for political struggle. This is 
how the possibilities for struggle should be understood, in their actual 
historical context, and not applying the same rigid and dogmatic ap-
proach to all situations.
more recently, before evo morales had even assumed office, Pe-
tras was already accused him of betrayal, and calling Álvaro garcía 
Linera a ‘neoliberal intellectual’, which shows a failure to understand 
the concrete conditions of the Bolivian process. Leaders of others 
countries, and even the leadership of the msT in Brazil, were not 
spared similar accusations.
What does the charge of ‘betrayal’ imply? could it be a question 
of ideological co-option? This would give it a concrete class meaning, 
and a perfectly plausible on, given the way institutional politics works, 
the reach of neoliberalism’s ideological values in today´s world and 
the pressure from powerful, private media.
The worst consequence of this type of criticism is that it tends to 
foster the idea that the ‘traitor’ is the main enemy, a representative of 
the ‘new right’ who needs to be ‘unmasked’, defeated and destroyed. 
otherwise, the new force represented by these criticisms cannot be-
come an alternative leadership for the left.
The results of such a political approach have been isolation and 
a blurring of the boundaries between the left and right. This has pro-
duced a sense of impotence, reflecting the absence of movements 
with these positions that have been able to build major forces and 
lead revolutions. Victorious movements like the 26 July movement in 
cuba, the sandinista front in nicaragua, Bolivarianism in Venezuela 
or the movement to socialism (mAs) in Bolivia, even when they call 
for radical forms of struggle as in cuba and nicaragua, mainly adopt 
a broad political approach, in their platforms and slogans as well as in 
their alliances. What characterizes them as revolutionary movements 
is the fact that they manage to tackle the question of power in a direct, 
concrete and appropriate way, and to build a strategic force that cor-
responds to the history of popular struggles in their country and to the 
kind of power structures that exist there.
The particular experience in chile, where the Popular unity 
government of salvador Allende sought a peaceful transition to 
socialism, presented the revolutionary left with a tricky dilemma. 
ever since it was founded, the movement of the revolutionary Left 
(mir) had a class vision of the state as bourgeois, denounced the 
pro-imperialist character of the national bourgeoisies and therefore 
saw as impossible an institutional road to socialism. nonetheless, 
after Allende’s unexpected election in 1970, it had to decide what 
position to take.
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in line with its strategic orientation, immediately after Popular 
unity’s electoral victory the mir offered to provide personal protec-
tion for Allende, forming what was called the group of friends of the 
President (gAP). in this capacity, it sought to investigate the first act of 
destabilization carried out by those who would later stage the chilean 
coup — namely the kidnapping and murder of the then commander-in 
chief of the Armed forces, general rené schneider. he had christian 
Democratic tendencies and had been appointed by eduardo frei, the 
president who was still serving out his time in office. his killing had 
been immediately blamed on armed movements of the left, but the 
investigations discovered it was a plot by the right, seeking to provoke 
tension and spread fears that under Allende the armed groups would 
act openly. The objective was to prevent the chilean congress from 
ratifying the victory of Allende — who had won with just 36.3% of vote 
in the first round, and who therefore, according to the constitution, 
had to be confirmed by parliament.
The challenges faced by a government coming to power in cir-
cumstances like those in which salvador Allende was elected — with 
a radical, anti-capitalist programme, but without the support of even 
a simple majority of the population — were complex. Allende tried to 
carry out his political platform, but found himself smothered within 
the state apparatus, until he was eventually overthrown by a military 
coup. The mir fought for a strict and even more radical application of 
the socialist programme. on the one hand, they were convinced that 
the existing power structures would prevent the application of this 
programme, and therefore considered a military coup inevitable. on 
the other, they did their utmost to have the programme implemented 
as deeply as possible.
The mir succeeded in spreading the organization of the popu-
lar movement, especially in the countryside, in the shanty towns and 
among students; in alliance with more radical sections of the socialist 
Party, they proposed and began to build organs of popular power, as 
the structures of what might become an alternative national power. 
since they regarded a military coup is inevitable, they tried to prepare 
the mass movement and the party itself to confront this. They believed 
that, once the reformist strategy had had its opportunity and failed, 
then the time would come for a revolutionary strategy. 
The military coup did indeed happen, and it hit the whole of the 
left hard. it represented not just a failure for the reformist strategy, but 
a brutal change for the worse in the balance of forces. it also meant 
the beginning of strategy of annihilation against the entire left and the 
popular movement, whit the mir as its main target. A mistaken judg-
ment about what was possible at the time of Allende’s victory led them 
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to deepen the level of confrontation, without the left being in a posi-
tion to prevent the coup or successfully to resist it once it began. The 
course of events could have been different, if there had been a rethink-
ing of the relation between reforms and revolution and an attempt to 
carry out projects of urban and agrarian reform. even if these had 
not had a directly anti-capitalist nature, they would have represented 
a profound social and democratic advance, in the direction of anti-
capitalism. The mir’s slogan — ‘socialism is not a few factories and 
some land for the people, but all the factories and all the land’ — re-
flected this maximalism. This was the most important organization 
of the revolutionary left in chile, with an extraordinary membership 
that demonstrated tremendous political creativity and organizational 
ability. Yet it succumbed to this ultra-left logic.
The question below is posed as an updating of the relation be-
tween reform and revolution, and of the relations between radical, 
anti-capitalist movements and centre-left forces with a different orien-
tation. What position should a radical organization adopt in relation 
to governments like those of Lula, Tabaré Vásquez, cristina Kirchner, 
Daniel ortega, José Luis rodríguez Zapatero, and others of the kind? 
These are not governments of the right; in all these countries, there are 
indeed forces of the right, that act in opposition to these governments, 
even though they are not carrying out a clearly left-wing programme.
manichaeism is an all too familiar phenomenon in politics. in 
such situations, it pushes on the one hand towards a subordinate al-
liance, in an effort to occupy what space exists to the left, and on the 
other hand towards the creation of news spaces, in an effort to break 
this logic. manichaeism also entails the serious and permanent risk of 
concentrating one’s attacks on the governments — of the centre-left, 
now characterized as the ‘new right’ — and thereby promoting confu-
sion instead of strengthening the polarization between right and left.
The failure to recognize the left or centre-left character of the gov-
ernments mentioned tends to disorient the forces that seek to occupy 
the space to their left. By centring their opposition on these govern-
ments themselves, they end up benefiting the right. What they should 
do instead is take a position on specific policies, supporting those that 
have a left character and opposing the right-wing ones.
if a political approach loses sight of where the right is located 
and of the dangers it poses, when it confuses a moderate, contradic-
tory ally with the enemy, this shows it hasn’t grasped the reality of 
the existing political landscape. This is what happened to the german 
communist Party. When it characterized german social democracy 
at the beginning of the 1930s as a disguised form of fascism, an ally 
of fascism or as a part of the right, it was mistaking a vacillating ally 
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for the enemy. it couldn’t differentiate between the sides, wasted ener-
gies that should have been directed against the dangerous rise of the 
right, isolated itself and effectively assisted the victory of the enemy. 
The same thing happened in reverse, dramatically and tragically, with 
german social democracy. By characterizing the communist Party 
as a different version of nazi totalitarianism, the stalinist version, it 
completed the division that helped the nazis come to power and then 
repress both social democrats and communists without distinction.
if we take the case of the Lula government, its own contradictory 
character left it open to praise and criticism from both the right and 
the left, in spite of the great differences between them.
The left should be working to open up an area of political and 
ideological dispute in which the polarization between right and left 
is what predominates. This is not out of some fetish, but because 
one side represents the maintenance and reproduction of the system, 
while the left is seeking to create an anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist 
alternative. ideological and social struggle should be pursued with 
vigour, but they must be subordinate to the political struggle, which 
is key, and whose focus is opposition to the dominant power and the 
building of an alternative power.
The left experiences that have managed to develop sufficient 
strength to win the struggle for hegemony are those that have shown 
themselves able to develop mass struggles and the battle of ideas, 
while keeping the political dispute as their main reference. This 
means that the ideological battle must choose the decisive strategic 
themes that are capable of uniting all the popular forces at a given 
moment — which is at present that of anti-neoliberal and post-ne-
oliberal struggle. it is anti-neoliberal in the sense of combating all 
forms of submission to the market; it is post-neoliberal in the sense 
that it promotes alternatives centred on the public sphere, because 
in the neoliberal era conflict is based on a polarization between the 
market sphere and the public sphere.
Doctrinaire logic subordinates everything to the ideological strug-
gle, and sets itself up as the guardian of marxist principles and their 
theoretical purity. As a result, it not only remains isolated but also 
creates even bigger divisions within the left, over interpretations of 
theory – Trotskyism, for example. it also tends to decry all new revo-
lutionary experiences which, since they are always heterodox, ‘against 
Capital’, have to be rejected and condemned. This is what happened 
with all the victorious revolutionary processes, in russia, china, 
cuba, Vietnam, nicaragua, and it is happening today with Venezuela, 
Bolivia and ecuador. it is similar to what happened in france in 1968, 
when sartre wrote of the difficulties the communists had in recogniz-
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ing the new forms of the class struggle – what he called their ‘fear of 
revolution’ as it actually existed, which was inevitably different from 
the Bolsheviks’ assault on the Winter Palace.
The russian revolution, for example, could not represent a 
break with capitalism, because that would contradict marx’s predic-
tion that socialism would arise in the countries of the capitalist heart-
land. The chinese revolution should confine itself to expelling the 
invaders and developing a national capitalism. The cuban revolution 
was explicitly condemned for using methods considered ‘adventurist’ 
and ‘provocative’, when the conditions supposedly did not exist for 
the kind of rupture that was being proposed. in none of them, includ-
ing the Venezuelan and Bolivian processes, did the working class play 
a leading part, nor did the economic circumstances make it possible 
to speak of anti-capitalism.
however, the truth is concrete: it is born out of the concrete anal-
ysis of concrete reality. Principles are principles: they do not move out 
of books into reality, but are concretely reborn out of daily struggles 
when they demonstrate their usefulness. Theoretical mistakes cost 
dear in practice; but theoretical zeal cannot confine the rich experi-
ence of concrete historical processes in narrow, dogmatic bands.
Álvaro garcía Linera’s analysis of the way the traditional left in 
Bolivia regarded the indigenous population is an excellent contempo-
rary example of how concrete reality rebels against dogma. The Bo-
livian left always sought to develop a workers and peasants´ alliance 
along the lines of the Bolshevik revolution. There was concrete sup-
port for this in the existence of a mining proletariat, located in a key 
sector of the Bolivian economy, which could exert a kind of veto pow-
er over the country´s economic activity, because paralysing the mines 
meant shutting down the entire economy. however the isolation of 
such an enclave, not least physically, made it difficult to develop an 
alternative hegemonic project led by the miners.
The role of the miners in the 1952 revolution, with the nation-
alization of the tin mines, the development of workers’ councils, even 
the replacement of the Armed forces by self-defense brigades, gave 
the impression that the miners did have such a strategic capacity. The 
agrarian reform, in turn, seemed to suggest the peasantry could be 
a strategic ally for the mining proletariat, in classic style. it was an 
attempt to apply to a specific, concrete reality, a theoretical scheme 
derived from another reality — the soviet one.
The rural population was viewed in terms of its labour, and the 
forms of reproduction of its conditions of existence. since they lived 
on the land, they were classified as peasants, regardless of whether 
they were indigenous or not. They were to forget their ancient ori-
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gins and play the part of the peasants, subordinate allies of the mine 
workers — and up to a point vacillating allies too, since they were not 
proletarianized but still tied to their smallholdings. The economic de-
termination was seen as direct and mechanical, reducing indigenous 
peoples to peasants. 
it was the specific, concrete reconstruction of Bolivian history, 
beginning in the pre-colonial period, that allowed garcía Linera to 
grasp the decisive elements of the native peoples’ identity, of their in-
digenous condition — more specifically their condition as Aymara, 
Quechua or guaraní. it was this kind of analysis that made it possible 
to grasp the identity of the indigenous peoples as a whole, that al-
lowed them to assume this identity politically and elect evo morales 
as president, as well as to build a party — the mAs — as a vehicle to 
establish their hegemony over Bolivian society as a whole.
one case where a victorious strategy was apparently repeated was 
that of the sandinista revolution in relation to the cuban revolution. 
it was an exceptional situation, but it deserves to be noted. There were, 
it is true, differences in the way these guerrilla wars were conducted, 
and in the much broader way in which the nicaraguan experience in-
corporated women, christians, children and old people into the clan-
destine mass struggle. But in essence, the similarities between these 
two processes, occurring in the same historical period, are greater than 
those between any other revolutionary experiences. if the element of 
surprise was decisive in cuba, in nicaragua it was a combination of the 
us defeat in Vietnam, the struggles against the war and for civil rights 
at home, the Watergate crisis and richard nixon’s resignation, that 
led to Jimmy carter’s efforts to restore us prestige abroad. Through 
a policy of human rights, he sought to distance Washington from the 
dictatorships it had previously supported in the continent. 
guerrilla movements in guatemala and el salvador were, how-
ever, unable to repeat the experience. one decisive factor prevented 
this and pushed the guerrillas back into political forms of struggle: the 
international balance of forces had changed and made it impossible 
for armed struggle to prevail. Whatever the criticisms of the left’s cur-
rent experiences, that alternative is no longer available. it means that 
the left has to settle accounts with the existing power structures, re-
working the radical critique which would allow it to go beyond these 
structures while passing through them.
The shift to the current historical period has created new param-
eters for struggle. The strategy of reforms leading to a violent break 
through armed struggle is no longer an option. This should make it 
easier to once more develop rich and concrete combinations between 
reform and revolution.
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ThE REfoRMIST LoGIC
The reformist logic underestimates or abandons both the ideological 
struggle and the mass struggle. it seeks the lines of least resistance, to 
advance where it can, in an attempt to gradually change the balance 
of forces without touching on the central question of the relations of 
power. undoubtedly it achieved significant advances in Latin America 
— especially under the nationalist governments in Argentina, mexico 
and Brazil — when the industrial bourgeoisie’s plans for economic 
development coincided with those of the trade union movement and 
sectors of the middle classes. These were the decades of rapid growth, 
with income distribution and upward social mobility, which came 
to an end when the long expansive wave of international and Latin 
American capital went into decline.
in theory, the reformist project seeks a profound overhaul of the 
existing economic, social and political structures. it obeys a logic of 
spontaneous, progressive change, of successive shifts in the power 
relations, won through economic and social demands that gradually 
strengthen the popular camp and undermine the enemy pole.
This has been and remains the prevailing logic in the immense 
majority of historical situations. The conditions required for a revo-
lutionary process to emerge are much more unusual, and have to be 
combined in very particular ways to make a revolution — that special 
historical moment — possible.
The spontaneous ideology and practice of social, economic and 
political struggles are those of gradually winning improvements in the 
situation of the mass of the people, through gradual changes in exist-
ing legislation and through gradually conquering greater space in the 
existing political institutions.
Although reformism has been responsible for most of the econom-
ic and social gains won over the decades, it has failed as a strategy to 
transform, little by little, the relations of power. its attempt to turn 
partial victories into qualitative changes in the relations of power, and 
thereby to introduce a new political system, never bore fruit. indeed, 
the reforms were neither a substitute for revolution, nor did they lead 
to revolution; all too often they did not even succeed in toning down 
the reaction of the ruling classes to such moderate, gradualist propos-
als from the left. This failure was mainly a result of not making the 
question of power the central concern, and therefore not working to 
develop alternative forms of power. This deficiency is decisive, and fa-
tal for any political force aiming at structural transformation. it is an 
issue that often goes unnoticed, only to return with much greater force 
and take unawares those who propose changes to the prevailing power 
relations — and the less prepared they are, the harder it hits them.
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The coup against salvador Allende is a case in point. As president 
he won the support of the chilean congress for the nationalization of 
the copper mines, controlled by us companies. But this consensus 
could not obviate the heavy blow to the us government. As a result, the 
administration of richard nixon — with none other than henry Kiss-
inger as secretary of state — accelerated the plans for a coup against Al-
lende. for his part, the socialist president, trusting in chile’s traditions 
of parliamentary democracy and the Armed forces’ respect for the rule 
of law, did not prepare to confront the right’s offensive with strategies 
for an alternative power. As a result, when the end came, he found him-
self surrounded inside the presidential palace, defending alone a legal-
ity that the right had long since decided to throw overboard.
The gains that were won by the various reform projects were 
achieved because they fitted into a long historical period — from the 
1930s to the 1970s — when the hegemonic project on both a world 
and a regional scale was one of progressive, Keynesian regulation and 
social welfare. The winds were blowing in favour of reform, allowing 
a certain convergence between the interests of the popular camp and 
those of a part of the hegemonic bloc.
When the period changed, and regressive projects prevailed — neo-
liberal ones of deregulation and privatization — the right appropriated 
the very notion of reform. This came to mean, in the dominant par-
lance, the dismantling of the state’s regulatory role, economic liberali-
zation, open markets and the elimination of employment guarantees.
The very same elite that had dismantled the mechanisms of state 
regulation, destroyed the public patrimony and left the public purse 
with impossible debts, now claimed that the key dilemma was the po-
larization between public and private, or more directly, between state 
and market.
in this framework, what could a reform project mean? As long as 
it doesn’t challenge the neoliberal model, it will remain just a variant of 
the same thing. This is what happened with the so-called ‘third way’ that 
claimed to be ‘the human face of neoliberalism’. it is also the risk that 
is run by governments that develop important social policies — like the 
Kirchner, Tabaré Vázquez and Lula administrations and their respective 
successors, cristina fernández in Argentina, Pepe mujica in uruguay 
and Dilma rousseff in Brazil; they altered the balance of forces in the so-
cial field by extending access to basic goods to much wider sectors of the 
population, but left untouched the hegemony of finance capital, the dic-
tatorship of the private media, and the immense influence of agribusi-
ness, to mention just some of the most important centres of power that 
dominate our societies. This is the limit of reform today, in the frame-
work of neoliberalism’s global hegemony and its consequences in each 
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country. unless these problems are addressed and solved democratically, 
these governments could lose the capacity to act that they demonstrated 
at an earlier stage. That in turn could put a brake on the process of 
income redistribution and favour a possible return of right-wing gov-
ernments that take on board some of these policies, strip them of their 
progressive content and co-opt the beneficiaries.
This is why processes like those in Bolivia, Venezuela and ecua-
dor — at the same time as they try to implement an anti-neoliberal 
economic model — seek to combine this with a refounding of the state 
and the public sphere, so as to allow the emergence of a new bloc of 
forces in power and a resolution of the crisis of hegemony in a post-
neoliberal direction. it is still a process of reforms, but one that leads 
towards a substantial transformation of the relations of power that 
underpin the neoliberal state. Without this, it would be difficult to at-
tack the hegemony of finance capital and impose controls on capital 
movements and foreign exchange, or subordinate the central Banks 
to policies of economic and social development.
returning to the question of reform and revolution, there is no 
necessary or fundamental contradiction between the two. it depends 
on the kind of reform, the way and extent to which it affects the key 
relations of power, as well as on the ability to develop an alternative 
bloc of forces in which the state — its economic, social and political 
nature — plays an essential role.
superficial reforms which do not affect the overall balance of 
power between the main social forces, between opposing political 
camps, obstruct the processes of profound change in society; they oc-
cupy this space and waste social and political energies on mere read-
justments — which at present still means readjustments of the hegem-
onic neoliberal model — instead of helping to build support for the 
replacement of this model and of the bloc of forces that promotes it.
The defeat of neoliberalism, and the triumph of post-neoliberal 
projects, depends on this combination between deep reforms and the 
revolutionary transformation of the old structures inherited by progres-
sive governments in the region. This is where the new mole has unex-
pectedly and forcefully re-surfaced at the beginning of this new century.
ThE ThREE STRATEGIES of ThE LATIn AMERICAn LEfT
1. ThE STRATEGy of dEMoCRATIC REfoRMS
The first strategy developed by the left was based around major struc-
tural reforms that would unblock the path to economic development, 
embodied in the project for import-substitution industrialization. An 
alliance that subordinated the working class and the left to large-scale, 
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national business, set as its aim the promotion of economic moderni-
zation, agrarian reform and national independence. it was a strategy 
implemented by nationalist forces — getúlio Vargas in Brazil, Lázaro 
cárdenas in mexico, Juan Perón in Argentina, among others — as well 
as by forces of the left or centre-left — as in the cases of the Popular 
front, led by Pedro Aguirre cerda (1938), and Popular unity, led by 
salvador Allende (1970), both in chile.
The fullest expression of this strategy coincided with a long cycle 
of growth in international capitalism and, in Latin America, with pro-
cesses of industrial development, under the overarching dominance 
of export-oriented agricultural and mining interests. Alongside the 
urban middle classes, the working class grew, helping to expand the 
domestic consumer market and extend social rights — a process that 
continued for almost five decades, beginning in the 1930s.
This first main strategy of the left saw its political objective as a 
transition to national, democratic, industrial societies, in an alliance 
between the industrial bourgeoisie, the working class and urban mid-
dle layers, as a stage prior to the building of socialism. There were 
two main variants of this kind of project: one led by nationalist forces 
— examples of which include the chilean Popular front, the mexi-
can Pri, the Bolivian mnr, Peronism, and the Vargas governments in 
Brazil; the other led directly by a left coalition — whose main example 
was the government of salvador Allende. 
its programmes were centred on economic and social demands, 
for development and income distribution. it saw the main enemies as 
big landholdings and imperialism. The premise of the strategy was 
the existence of a national bourgeoisie with distinct interests from 
those other two, which would lead a bloc that the left and the workers’ 
movement should join in order to remove the obstacles to national 
development and democracy.
it was these governments that repeatedly occupied the politi-
cal space of the left, whether or not they were supported by social-
ists and communists. The alliance between the latter two forces 
participated actively in the political struggle until, with Popular 
unity’s victory in chile, for the first time the class forces of the left 
exercised hegemony themselves. here the strategy took on its most 
radical form — for this was the only time in the international his-
tory of the left that an attempt was made to implement a peaceful 
transition to socialism.
it was a strategy of institutional transition, without violent 
breaks, which aimed to incorporate the existing democratic struc-
tures, strengthening them and widening them. it sought to democra-
tize economic and social relations, increasing the regulatory role of 
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the state by nationalizing basic industries and controlling the remis-
sion of profits abroad.
Popular unity’s programme represented a break with the earlier, 
stageist strategy (according to which socialism would be preceded 
by a stage of reforms that would modernize capitalism); it proposed 
expropriating big capital by nationalizing the 150 largest companies, 
both foreign and chilean, thereby giving the state control over the 
central nervous system of the economy. These nationalized companies 
would be socialized by setting up councils in which the workers would 
decide the course of the economy and of each enterprise. Politically, 
the most important proposal was to unify the Lower house and the 
senate in a single chamber.
These proposals were incompatible with existing state structures: 
the plan was to change these qualitatively, from within. The Allende 
government had occupied the heart of the state apparatus, that is, 
its executive branch — albeit with only minority electoral support, of 
36.3% in 1970 and 41% in 1973 — but it found itself asphyxiated by 
these structures. it did not call for a refounding of the state, because 
it trusted in its democratic character; nor did it call for the building 
of new power structures, what was called ‘popular power’, outside the 
state. The military coup, when it came, marked the demise of this 
strategy in the most dramatic and complete way possible.
The nationalist governments were either toppled — as happened 
with Perón and Vargas — or co-opted and reabsorbed, losing their 
initial momentum — as in the cases of the mexican and Bolivian revo-
lutions. getúlio Vargas’s suicide in 1954, and the coup against Peron 
in 1955, coincided with the end of a long parenthesis in world history 
that began with the 1929 crisis and stretched through the end of the 
second World War to the war in Korea. They marked, simultaneously, 
a change in the nature of the nationalist project of import-substitution 
— a result of the return of foreign investments on a massive scale 
(symbolized most clearly by the arrival of the car industry in the re-
gion), and at the same time a new phase of the subordination of Latin 
American capital to processes of inter-nationalization.
This first strategy went into decline, therefore, in parallel with 
the model of industrialization, when the internationalization of Latin 
American economies pushed the business class of each country into 
solid alliances with international capital — a process that would later 
lead into neoliberalism. Before that, this change made possible the 
military dictatorships in the southern cone, and showed just how 
ready the dominant bloc was to liquidate the popular movement in 
order to adhere to economic policies based on exports, the domestic 
consumption of the rich, and the super-exploitation of labour.
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The cycle of southern cone military coups — heralded by the 
overthrow of Perón and getúlio Vargas’s suicide a year earlier; and 
later carried through by coups in Brazil, in 1964, in Bolivia, in 1971, in 
chile and uruguay in 1973, and again in Argentina in 1976 — formal-
ized the end of that period, ideologically and politically, and the adher-
ence of the region’s national bourgeoisies to a dictatorial, repressive, 
pro-us posture, that went hand in hand with the internationalization 
of capitalism in the continent.
The two coups that consolidated this spread of dictatorship across 
the south of the continent, those in chile and uruguay, occurred the 
same year that is generally held to mark the end of the long wave of 
growth for capitalism — the longest in its history, described by eric 
hobsbawm as ‘the golden Age of capitalism’. marked by the oil crisis, 
it turned the page on a period of history, and with it on one of the 
strategies of the Latin American left.
2. ThE STRATEGy of GUERRILLA WARfARE
following the triumph of the cuban revolution in 1959, insurrection 
combined with guerrilla warfare as a strategy of the Latin American 
left to take power. guerrilla war had been a characteristic of the chi-
nese and Vietnamese revolutions, and now made the ‘possibility of 
revolution’ a reality in Latin America, through the offices of the 26 
July movement18 and the cuban rebel army. 
insurrectional movements had played a part in the wars of in-
dependence at the start of the nineteenth century. in the last century, 
first the mexican revolution, later the rebellions of sandino in nica-
ragua and farabundo martí in el salvador, in the 1930s, and then the 
Bolivian revolution of 1952, revived the insurrectionary tradition in 
the continent, with various forms of struggle. But it was the cuban 
revolution that posited armed struggle — in the form of guerrilla war-
fare — as the second main strategy of the Latin American left.
As had happened before with the russian and chinese revolu-
tions, the victorious strategy applied in cuba exerted an important 
influence and encouraged numerous imitations, with minor modifica-
tions, in various countries. in colombia, the guerrilla movement had 
already begun to develop in the 1950s with the fArc. in nicaragua, 
the struggle of the sandinistas had existed for some time before the 
sandinista national Liberation front was formally created in 1961. 
18 The 26 July movement was the revolutionary organization planned and led by 
fidel castro that in 1959 overthrew the government of fulgencio Batista in cuba. 
it took its name from the date of castro’s failed attack on the moncada Barracks in 
santiago in 1953 (Translator´s note).
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But in countries like guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, 
Brazil, uruguay, mexico, the Dominican republic and el salvador, 
it was the impetus of the cuban victory that was mainly responsible 
for spreading this strategy. in a Latin America that was much more 
homogeneous than europe at the time of the russian revolution — 
in spite of the obvious national differences — the cuban influence 
spread rapidly, from the cities of Argentina and uruguay to the rural 
areas of guatemala or Peru.
The new strategy was based on the sharp contradictions in the 
Latin American countryside, the result of the dominance of big land-
holdings, foreign companies and the primary-export model, which 
blocked agrarian reform and made this the weakest link of capitalist 
domination in the continent. in cuba the guerrillas took advantage of 
this, along with their mobility, the peasantry’s experience of previous 
victories, the existence of a us-supported dictatorship, and the ele-
ment of surprise, to achieve victory and open a new strategic path for 
the Latin American left — one that confronted the end of the cycle of 
import substitution and liberal democracy, and the proliferation of 
dictatorships.
There were three different cycles of guerrilla struggle during the 
four decades after 1959. After that, the conditions that had allowed 
it to appear as the principal form of struggle for the left in the con-
tinent no longer existed. The first cycle developed as an immediate 
effect of the cuban victory, in Venezuela, guatemala and Peru. These 
last two were, like cuba, mainly agricultural economies, but with a 
decisive indigenous presence — although these ethnic groups were 
seen by the guerrilla movements, in a reductionist way, as peasants. 
Venezuela, on the other hand, was an oil economy, with only a sparse 
rural population. 
This first cycle could not benefit from the element of surprise, 
which had made an important contribution to the cuban revolution-
ary movement, and for that reason couldn’t work after that. on the 
contrary, the united states, once it got over the surprise, stepped up 
its cold War mechanisms, labelling any democratic and popular force 
as subversive and drawing up a policy to encourage land reform as a 
condition for inter-governmental aid. With this it sought to reduce the 
acute level of conflict in the countryside, seen as an essential condi-
tion for the emergence of guerrilla movements — which could then 
swim like fish in this sea. The aim was to isolate these movements 
from their support base. it was a preventive mechanism similar to the 
agrarian reforms imposed in Japan and south Korea under us occu-
pation, in order to prevent any repetition of the chinese revolution, 
which had fed off peasant discontent.
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on the other hand, in some of these countries the governments 
still enjoyed a degree of political legitimacy, because they had come 
to power in non-dictatorial electoral processes, unlike the government 
of fulgencio Batista in cuba. guatemala was the country most simi-
lar to the cuban case. The version of the victorious cuban strategy 
that circulated most widely was a reductionist interpretation — that 
of régis Debray in Revolution in the Revolution19. This favoured vol-
untarism and militarism, underestimating the mass support enjoyed 
by the 26 July movement in cuba. it gave the impression that the 
‘small motor’ — the initial guerrilla nucleus of twelve fighters — was 
alone able to create the conditions for the emergence of the ‘big mo-
tor’ — that is, the mass movement. The image of the heroic gesture 
of those twelve guerrillas who survived the landing of the boat, the 
granma, and went on to create the conditions for the revolutionary 
victory, spread widely. it encouraged groups with no mass roots, in 
countries whose governments enjoyed some institutional legitimacy, 
to launch guerrilla struggles which made no headway, because of their 
social and political isolation.
This first cycle suffered its sharpest defeat in Peru — where it 
had taken various forms, including the revolutionary Left movement 
(mir) of guillermo Lobatón and Luis de la Puente uceda; the na-
tional Liberation Army of héctor Béjar, and an armed self-defence 
movement organized by hugo Blanco — and in Venezuela, both with 
the mir of moisés moleiro and with the Armed forces of national 
Liberation (fALn) of Douglas Bravo. The strategy would re-emerge in 
guatemala, however, with the movements led by Yon sosa and Luis 
Turcios Lima, because there the conditions more closely resembled 
those that had existed in cuba.
This cycle represented the extension of guerrilla warfare as a 
means of struggle and would mark a new period of left struggle. its 
novel aspect, which aimed to lend the struggle a continental dimen-
sion, came from che’s plan to organize a guerrilla group in Bolivia, 
not just as a local revolutionary force, but mainly as a co-ordinating 
axis for the existing guerrilla movements, and those that were begin-
ning to organize, in Argentina, uruguay and Brazil.
che’s death and the defeat of his project was in fact the first big 
defeat for the guerrilla movement in the continent. it closed the first 
cycle of armed struggle. A second, however, was already gestating, this 
time centred in the cities of the three countries already mentioned. 
This development altered key factors, basic principles, of the guerrilla 
struggle as it had been practised and theorized in cuba. countries 
19 Debray, régis 1967 Revolution in the Revolution (new York: octagon Books).
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with largely urban populations, like Argentina and uruguay, or in the 
process of rapid urbanization, like Brazil, changed the original rural 
scenario; the struggle moved closer to its support bases, but it became 
more difficult to grow from small guerrilla nuclei into the regular, for-
mal structures of an army, because of the very conditions of operat-
ing in a dense, urban environment, and the capacity of the repressive 
forces to operate in that milieu.
on the one hand, the urban context has the advantage of closeness 
to the nerve centres of power. on the other, it makes it much harder to 
create liberated zones, which in turn affects the guerrilla forces’ ability 
to grow and leaves them more vulnerable in terms of security. This is 
what led to the setbacks for the urban guerrilla movement in Argen-
tina, with the montoneros and the People’s revolutionary Army (erP), 
in uruguay with the Tupamaros, and in Brazil, including all the armed 
organizations, but especially the most important — the national Liber-
ation Alliance (ALn) and the Popular revolutionary Vanguard (VPr).
in Argentina and uruguay, because the development of both pop-
ular support and military capability had been greater, the scale of the 
defeats was also greater. Little remained but the traces of the victims 
and the destruction of the organized left. given the radical changes in 
both the national and international balance of forces that occurred in 
the years immediately following, these experiences today seem even 
more distant possibilities, lost in the mists of the past.
The defeats inflicted on the popular camp did not spare any area 
of opposition, from trade unions to political parties, from universities 
to civil servants, from social movements to the opposition press, pub-
lishers and parliament. They brought a deep, regressive shift in the bal-
ance of forces between the fundamental classes, which would prepare 
the ground for the hegemony of the neoliberal model. The defeat of 
the popular movement and its organizations, savaged by repression, 
would also establish the military superiority of the dominant forces.
in the meantime, the old mole of guerrilla struggle would head 
back to where it started, back to its original habitat in both social 
and geographical terms, to countries with a mainly rural character. it 
travelled to central America and began there the continent’s third and 
last cycle of guerrilla struggles. The sandinista movement managed 
to reorganize and reunite the forces it had built up in previous years, 
and to relaunch the struggle, after somoza himself helped to open up 
a space for them by having the main leader of the liberal opposition, 
Joaquín chamorro, assassinated.
As mentioned before, nicaragua reproduced several of the fac-
tors that had made victory possible in cuba. These, together with the 
breadth of the sandinistas’ international alliances, ended working in 
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favour of a new guerrilla victory in Latin America, twenty years after 
the triumph of the cuban revolution.
Applying similar strategies, the guerrillas in guatemala and el 
salvador relaunched their struggles. Like the nicaraguans, they man-
aged to unite all the military organizations in each country. however, 
as had also happened immediately after the cuban victory, the ele-
ment of surprise was no longer with them. it should be recalled that 
the sandinista victory happened in the same year as the us suffered 
setbacks in iran and grenada.
The effects on the us domestic scene were not long in coming: 
the Democrats were defeated, the republicans returned to power with 
ronald reagan and the ‘second cold War’ began. nicaragua was a 
privileged target of the us counter-attack, so much so that reagan 
declared it to be the ‘southern flank of the united states’. nicaragua’s 
frontiers were militarized, especially the northern one with honduras, 
which itself became a military rearguard for the united states, just as 
Laos and cambodia had done in indochina.
The united states was intent on preventing the domino effect that 
had happened in southeast Asia. To this end, it put all its military 
might at the service of the guatemalan and salvadoran governments, 
clearly signalling to the guerrilla movements and the international 
community that Washington would not permit another victory of a 
hostile movement in the region.
A series of strategic offensives by the guerrilla fronts in both 
countries were repulsed by government forces, closely supported by 
the us. This continued until an external factor of unexpected and de-
cisive magnitude fell upon the third cycle of Latin America’s guerrilla 
struggles: as a consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the col-
lapse of the soviet union and the socialist camp, the world returned 
to a unipolar system, under the hegemony of the very superpower that 
was confronting the nicaraguan government and the guerrilla move-
ments in guatemala and el salvador. The fall of the sandinista gov-
ernment — following the invasion of grenada and, a few years before, 
the capitulation of the government in surinam — only accentuated 
the radical shift in the international correlation of forces.
The sandinista government had called presidential elections, 
which were held under conditions of barely concealed bribery by the 
united states. holding a sword over the heads of the nicaraguan peo-
ple, Washington sent a clear message: vote for opposition candidate 
Violeta chamorro, who was linked to the us, and the war will end; 
vote to keep the sandinistas in government, and the war will con-
tinue. it was at this same time that the guatemalan and salvadoran 
guerrillas realized they could not achieve a military victory, and be-
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gan to return to institutional, political channels, leaving the armed 
struggle behind.
Thus concluded the third cycle of guerrilla struggle, and with this 
a period of the Latin American left in which armed struggle remained 
the main form of struggle for approximately three decades. At the 
same time, the defeat of guerrilla movements in countries under mili-
tary dictatorship, like Argentina, Brazil, uruguay, Bolivia and chile 
(which had brief experiences of guerrilla groups with the mir and the 
manuel rodríguez Patriotic front), opened the way for liberal-demo-
cratic forces to seize the initiative, take the lead of the opposition and 
displace the armed groups within the left.
guerrilla groups continued to exist in countries like colombia 
and mexico, but in a very different national and international con-
text. The fArc, the oldest guerrilla movement in the continent, and 
the national Liberation Army (eLn) — following the disappearance 
of the urban guerrilla group, m-19 — continued their trajectory in 
colombia, but with much more difficulty than before, as did the lo-
cal guerrilla groups in mexico. The Zapatista Army, for its part, is 
a special case, which emerged as an armed rebellion but does not 
consider itself a guerrilla movement, nor does it seek victory through 
armed struggle.
As the colombian case brutally demonstrates, the balance of 
military forces turned utterly against the guerrilla movements, and 
in favour of the armed forces of the various countries, now direct-
ly supported by Washington. This was one decisive reason why the 
current social and political movements in the region, including the 
most representative and radical ones, like the Landless rural Workers’ 
movement (msT) in Brazil, the Zapatista national Liberation Army in 
mexico, the indigenous movements in Bolivia and ecuador, have not 
sought to militarize their conflicts. To do so, as they know, means they 
would inevitably be decimated by the crushing military superiority of 
the regular forces, both inside their countries and beyond.
3. ThE ThIRd STRATEGy of ThE LATIn AMERICAn LEfT
neoliberal hegemony reshaped the overall framework of political 
and ideological struggle in Latin America. The radical change in the 
balance of forces imposed over previous decades — which for some 
countries meant military dictatorships — was consolidated by the 
new hegemonic model. The resistance struggles against neoliberalism 
constituted a new strategy for developing an alternative model. This 
sought to go beyond the two previous strategies, incorporating and 
dialectically negating both of them, while shaping itself in the new 
conditions of neoliberal hegemony.
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one of the first features of this new strategy was determined by 
the nature of neoliberal hegemony itself — in particular, by the crea-
tion of a consensus among the elites in favour of profound, liberal-
izing (counter-) reforms. This consensus was strongly supported and 
nurtured by the private media which counted on the support of the 
traditional parties. The social movements were put on the defensive, 
and resisted, drawing on potentially very widespread popular support, 
but hampered by this political and media offensive, as well as by the 
difficulties of their own objective situation (unemployment, precari-
ous jobs, social fragmentation).
A second feature was determined by the adherence of left par-
ties, both social democratic and nationalist, to the neoliberal agenda, 
leaving the social movements practically alone in their resistance to 
government policies. The Zapatistas, the msT, the Bolivian and ecua-
dorean indigenous movements, all played a prominent part in these 
struggles of resistance. They were struggles to defend rights under 
threat, but they adopted militant methods, ranging from the land oc-
cupations and marches of the Landless movement, through the re-
bellion in chiapas, to the popular uprisings of indigenous peoples in 
Bolivia and ecuador.
As neoliberalism rolled back the state, privatized public enterpris-
es and eliminated rights stretching from formal employment to public 
education and healthcare, the social movements did what they could to 
resist. opposition to the north American free Trade Agreement (nAf-
TA) was central for the launch of the Zapatista movement in 1994. The 
struggle against privatizations was essential to the mobilizations of the 
Landless in Brazil. resistance to the privatization of water in Bolivia 
was the starting point for a whole new stage of the left in that country. 
something similar happened in ecuador, with the power of veto exer-
cised by the social movements over the neoliberal governments and 
over the signing of a free trade treaty with the united states.
As the neoliberal model began to show its limitations and run 
out of steam, the carefully manufactured consensus began to break 
down. splits emerged between traditional parties, various presidents 
had to depart without completing their terms in office, or even when 
they had barely begun them, due to mobilizations launched by the 
social movements. This was particularly the case in ecuador, Bolivia 
and Argentina. in this context, the question of alternatives came to be 
posed quite concretely for the forces resisting neoliberalism — of how 
to move from the defensive to the offensive, from struggles of resist-
ance to the dispute for a new hegemony.
There was a shift from the phase of resistance to one where the 
capacity to veto a government’s actions was demonstrated, rendering 
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that government inoperative, but this still did not go as far as devel-
oping alternatives. The best example was in ecuador, whose social 
movements were able to overthrow three presidents in a row and then 
block the signing of the free Trade Treaty with the united states. Lu-
cio gutiérrez, the third of these presidents, had been elected with the 
support of these social movements, which took part in his government 
through the confederation of indigenous nationalities of ecuador 
(conAie) and Pachakutik, a political movement set up by conAie 
and other social movements.
such mobilizations combined forms of struggle ranging from ter-
ritorial uprisings to hunger strikes, road blockades, mass rallies and 
armed resistance to repression, among others. from this point on, 
differences began to surface among the anti-neoliberal forces. some 
wanted to remain as social movements, justifying themselves with the-
oretical arguments about the ‘autonomy of social movements’. others 
sought new forms of articulation with the political sphere, with the 
aim of being in a position to dispute the unfolding crisis of hegemony. 
The Bolivian, ecuadorean and Paraguayan cases clearly fit into this 
second category; the mexican and Argentinean into the first.
The argument about ‘the autonomy of social movements’ found 
its fullest theoretical expression in the work of john holloway, who 
sought to explain the strategy of the Zapatistas, summed up in the ti-
tle of his book, Change the World without Taking Power20. This implied 
changes in the social sphere at a local level, as illustrated by the Zapa-
tistas’ actions in chiapas. it is an approach that also emphasizes the 
importance of the grass roots and of building new social structures 
from the bottom up. 
it is understandable that social movements should be critical of 
the traditional parties and the traditional way of doing politics, given 
the many frustrations they have experienced. The mistake is to give 
up on politics altogether, believing that an alternative, even one built 
from the bottom up, could simply avoid disputing the political sphere.
The presence of ngos (which by definition distance themselves 
from politics and with which many social movements work closely) 
strengthens this tendency. The emergence of the World social forum, 
whose ‘charter of Principles’ crystallized the separation between social 
struggle and political sphere, froze the strategy of the popular move-
ments in the phase of resistance, from which it could not escape unless 
it managed to reconnect these two areas. As long as the social move-
ments limited themselves to the social sphere, they remained on the 
20 holloway, John 2002 Change the World without Taking Power: The Meaning of 
Revolution Today (London: Pluto Press).
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defensive, unable to create the instruments needed to fight for political 
hegemony. The ‘other possible world’ could not be created merely out 
of grass-roots resistance, but only with new structures of power.
The argument in favour of the ‘autonomy of social movements’ 
suffers from two main ambiguities. firstly, there is a blurring of the 
differences with neoliberal discourse, in so far as the social movements 
also choose the state, politics, parties and government as the targets of 
their attacks. These are positions that are also defended by neoliber-
als, leading to confusions over what exactly the ngos and some of the 
social movements stand for. secondly, one of the key characteristics 
of neoliberalism is its wholesale confiscation of rights. To redress this 
and restore such rights, along with their respective guarantees, can 
only be done through government policies. similarly, the regulation of 
capital movements and financial markets — another central concern 
of the Wsfs — can only be achieved by deliberate state action. 
eight years after the first Wse that ‘other possible world’ is be-
ginning to be built in Latin America. in arenas like the Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Peoples of our America (ALBA), one of the initial 
proposals of the Wse for ‘fair trade’, is being put into practice, along 
with other post-neoliberal initiatives like operation miracle, the Latin 
American school of medicine (eLAm), literacy campaigns and the 
Bank of the south.
The political battles to develop post-neoliberal governments came 
after the anti-neoliberal forces had suffered several failures. The Za-
patistas had retreated into isolation in the south of mexico, unable to 
turn their struggle into a national political alternative; the piqueteros 
in Argentina had lost their initial momentum because they had no 
political expression for their struggles; while ecuador’s indigenous 
movements had delegated their political representation to a candidate 
outside their ranks21, who then betrayed them even before he took of-
fice. Yet while all this was going on, other social and political forces 
were beginning to outline a new strategy for the left.
This new strategy has had its main developments in Bolivia, Ven-
ezuela and ecuador. The combination of popular uprisings and mass 
demonstrations gave rise to political-electoral alternatives, distinct 
from the earlier strategies of insurrectional struggle. however, these 
new alternatives are also different from the traditional reformist pro-
jects, because they propose to implement a programme of economic, 
social, political and cultural changes, not through the existing power 
structures but through a refounding of these states. To this end they 
21 Lucio gutiérrez, a former army officer, was elected president in 2002 in alliance 
with the mainly indigenous party, Pachakutik.
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have united elements from both the reformist strategy and the insur-
rectionary one, seeking to combine different forms of struggle and to 
reconnect the social struggle with the political one.
Bolivia is the clearest example of this new strategy. There, the 
social movements first paralysed the neoliberal governments, then 
founded their own party, the movement to socialism (mAs), in order 
to establish indigenous hegemony in the political sphere by getting 
evo morales elected as president. The strategy of the Bolivian new 
left was based on a critique of the traditional left’s economism, which 
had defined the indigenous people as peasants — because they worked 
the land — and characterized them as small landowners. According 
to this scheme, they became subordinate allies of the working class, 
which was concentrated in the tin mines.
This economism robbed the Aymara, Quechua and guaraní of 
their profound and ancient identity as indigenous peoples. it was this 
critique, elaborated by Álvaro garcía Linera, the current vice-presi-
dent of Bolivia, that made it possible to develop a new political subject 
capable of reconnecting the political sphere with the strength of the 
mass movement built up since the year 2000, and thereby of fighting 
for hegemony in the country as a whole. The path that led national-
ist officers to power in Venezuela, and that which got rafael correa 
elected and led to the approval of a new constitution in ecuador, both 
followed this new strategy of the Latin American left.
These processes, which are regenerating the Latin American left, 
did not happen in countries where the left was traditionally strongest 
and where, as a result, the repression had been most severe — coun-
tries like chile, uruguay, Argentina and Brazil. nor were they led by 
traditional parties or movements of the left, like communists, social-
ists or old-style nationalists. And they are not happening in Brazil, 
where, until recently, there seemed to be some of the most important 
political and social organizations of the left, like the PT, the cuT, the 
msT or the Wsf, as well as the experiences of participatory budgets.
Venezuela, after the guerrilla movements of the 1960s, saw the 
creation of a new party, the movement to socialism (mAs), which 
came out of a split in the communist Party following denunciations 
of the soviet invasion of czechoslovakia. At first its positions were 
close to those of the italian communist Party (Pci), with its theses on 
eurocommunism. however, it later followed the collapse of european 
social democracy into neoliberalism. As such, it took part in the gov-
ernment of rafael caldera in the 1990s, with its main leader, Teodoro 
Petkoff, serving as economy minister. Another movement, the causa 
r, also emerged, but subsequently lost popular support and failed to 
regenerate the Venezuelan left. 
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it was, however, a movement of nationalist — Bolivarian — sol-
diers that expressed the popular discontent at carlos Andrés Pérez’s 
1989 package of neoliberal measures. coming just after he had been 
elected on a platform for development, it was met by a massive mobi-
lization against his government, called the Caracazo, whose repression 
resulted in several hundred deaths. something similar happened in 
Argentina the same year; when carlos menem promised a ‘strong dose 
of production’ only to assume immediately a neoliberal programme 
— this time without much popular reaction. Also that year, fernando 
collor de mello won the presidential elections in Brazil on a neoliberal 
programme, making 1989 a key year in the implantation of the neolib-
eral programme in the region. it was of course the same year that the 
Berlin Wall fell, and the transition to a new period began across the 
world. Before the year was out, cuba entered its ‘special period’, and 
the following year the sandinista government fell in nicaragua.
The military uprising led by hugo chávez in 1992, along with the 
cry of the Zapatistas in 1994, came as the first expressions of resist-
ance to neoliberalism — symptoms of the new kind of force to lead 
this resistance, in a new and sharper way, encompassing indigenous 
movements and nationalist military officers. As chávez himself tells it, 
the soldiers who rebelled called on the rest of the left to support their 
movement, but remained isolated and were defeated. nonetheless his 
movement had an impact on the political scene, similar to that of the 
attack on the moncada barracks in cuba four decades earlier, or the 
sandinistas’ first offensive in 1987. They were all military defeats, but 
political victories.
After the military uprising, the Bolivarian movement was able to 
recycle itself for political-institutional struggle, with chávez standing 
for president of the republic in 1998. The failure of both the social-
democratic governments of Democratic Action (AD), which ended in 
the impeachment and imprisonment of carlos Andrés Pérez, and the 
christian Democrat government of the other main party, coPei, with 
rafael caldera as president, signalled the collapse of the two-party 
system that had characterized Venezuelan politics for three decades.
As a result, in the presidential campaign of 1998, the two favour-
ites were both ‘outsiders’: irene sáez, an ex-miss universe who had 
been mayor of chacao, a rich neighbourhood of caracas, and was 
backed and financed by Venezuelan bankers who had taken refuge in 
miami after the banking crisis and subsequent nationalization carried 
out by caldera; and hugo chávez, who overtook her in the final stage 
of the campaign and won the election. chávez immediately called 
a constituent Assembly with the idea of refounding the Venezuelan 
state, thus inaugurating this new strategy of the left.
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The anti-neoliberal content, of protest against the neoliberal 
package and government of carlos Andrés Pérez, was thus present 
in the origins of the Bolivarian movement. The anti-imperialist con-
tent would come with the oil policy of the new government, when it 
worked to put fresh life into the organization of Petroleum exporting 
countries (oPec) and intensified trade with cuba, thereby clashing 
with both the local private media and the Bush administration. This 
polarization with Washington only accelerated the process.
in 2000, the second year of the chávez government, as if to cel-
ebrate the new century, indigenous revolts broke out in Bolivia and 
ecuador. The Bolivian indigenous movement led the Water War, 
which prevented the privatization of the water distribution system in 
the city of cochabamba and its sale to a north American company 
(the Bechtel corporation). This began an impressive cycle of struggles 
that would topple two presidents — sánchez de Lozada and his vice-
president — and lead, five years later, to the election of evo morales, 
the first indigenous person to be elected president of Bolivia.
The rebellions of the ecuadorean social movements — at first in-
digenous but later led by urban movements — led to the overthrow of 
three successive elected presidents who had maintained the neoliberal 
model. The third of these, Lucio gutiérrez, had been supported by the 
indigenous movements, but went back on his programme. This led to 
a division in the movement. some sectors stayed in the government, 
while others broke with it, but were weakened by the defeat and un-
dermined by the fact they had supported the president. 
At the same time, other social movements confronted similar 
challenges: how to bring the strength developed in resistance to neo-
liberalism to bear at the political level of the dispute over alternatives. 
To reject the political sphere wholesale because of criticisms of partic-
ular political practices was only to ‘throw out the baby with the bath-
water’ and marginalize oneself from the national political dispute.
This is what happened to the Zapatistas, who isolated them-
selves from the national political struggle. The piqueteros, for their 
part, after the biggest crisis of the Argentinean state, with the fall 
of three presidents in one week, adopted the slogan ‘que se vayan 
todos’22 in the presidential elections. however, without the strength 
to overthrow ‘them all’, they left the field open for carlos menem to 
win the first round by promising to dollarize the economy — with all 
the consequences that would have had for Latin American integra-
22 The slogan ‘out with the lot of them` emerged during the mass mobilizations 
that swept Argentina from December 2001 through much of the following year 
(Translator's note).
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tion. in the second round, Kirchner occupied the space vacated by 
the social movements and was elected president, avoiding the worst. 
continuing to defend the ‘autonomy of social movements’ and failing 
to understand the need to build alternative hegemonic projects, the 
piqueteros isolated themselves and saw their enormous capacity for 
mobilization evaporate, just a few years after they had so spectacu-
larly burst onto the scene.
for these currents, the ‘autonomy of social movements’ ended up 
being not a means of regrouping mass forces in order to organize new 
kinds of political action, nor a way to build alternative forms of power, 
but simply a refusal to face up to the question of power, a rejection of 
the battle for hegemony. it represented a retreat to pre-marxist posi-
tions, because the marxist critique of this kind of autonomism em-
phasizes the concept of power as a synthesis of economic, social and 
ideological relations, putting power back in command, as the funda-
mental strategic objective. To abandon the political sphere is to aban-
don the struggle for power. it serves to protect the supposed ‘purity’ 
of the social sphere, directly representing the ‘grass roots’ against the 
leadership, which is itself automatically regarded as an illegitimate 
form of political representation. it means falling back into corporative 
and fragmented perspectives, an inevitable outcome when the social is 
split from the political.
The most developed versions of this approach come in the works 
of Toni negri, on the one hand, and John holloway on the other. Both 
explicitly abandon the struggle for power and hegemony which are 
seen as corrupting everything with their forms of representing the 
popular will. for negri, the state is a conservative body in relation to 
globalization. Both theorize existing situations, dealt with in purely 
descriptive terms; they fail to develop anti-neoliberal strategies and 
become trapped in the inertia that results from insisting on the au-
tonomy of the social sphere.
Both end up prisoners of a theoretical framework produced by 
neoliberalism itself — the opposition between public and private, state 
and civil society, which is a central tenet of neoliberalism. however, 
this polarization conceals the core axis of neoliberalism, the principle 
that drives our age. for behind the category of the private, or of civil 
society, are hidden very different, indeed counterposed phenomena. 
Within civil society there coexist trade unions, banks, social move-
ments, drug traffickers and many others. it is not the private sphere 
that characterizes the neoliberal project. This does not set out to strip 
power and resources from the state in order to transfer them to in-
dividuals, in their privacy, but to throw them into the market. When 
a company is privatized, it is not the workers who acquire it, but the 
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market which takes control, transferring it to whichever of the com-
peting conglomerates has most financial power. 
so what really drives the neoliberal scheme is ‘mercantilization’ 
or ‘commodification’, the turning of everything into commodities, with 
a price in the marketplace, where everything is bought and everything 
is sold. neoliberalism is the most advanced expression of capitalism’s 
historical project, that ‘immense accumulation of commodities’ with 
which marx opens Capital23. it is a project that began with the end of 
servitude, making the labour force free — ‘naked’ in marx’s words — 
because separated from its realization, which requires the means of 
production, and turning the land into a commodity too. in this its most 
recent phase, following the interregnum of the welfare state, things 
that had been thought of as rights (education, health, etc.) become 
commodities and are traded in the marketplace. even goods like water 
become commodities. Thus the hegemonic sphere in neoliberalism is 
the sphere of the market. on the other hand, the opposite pole is not 
really the state — because this could be a socialist state, a welfare state, 
a fascist, liberal or neoliberal one. There is, precisely, a dispute over 
what kind of state. for neoliberalism, it should be a market-oriented, 
‘financialized’ state, which gathers resources from the sphere of pro-
duction and transfers a large part of them to finance capital through 
debt payments. But it could also be a state that has been refounded by 
governments that seek to break out of neoliberalism, developing new 
structures of power. The state is, therefore, a space in dispute.
The opposite pole to the market sphere is in fact the public 
sphere, that which revolves around rights and their universalization, 
and which demands a profound and extensive process of de-commod-
ifying social relations. Democratizing means de-commodifying. it 
means removing from the marketplace and transferring to the public 
sphere, rights that are essential to citizenship. it means replacing the 
consumer with the citizen. in other words, overcoming neoliberalism 
requires a refounding of the state around the public sphere, incor-
porating aspects such as participatory budgets, which mean handing 
fundamental decisions over to organized citizens.
in the neoliberal era, therefore, the theoretical framework is 
shaped around this opposition between the public sphere and the 
market sphere, with the state as an area in dispute between the two. 
on the outcome of this dispute depends the nature of the state and the 
kind of society that exists.
23 This phrase in the first sentence of Capital, Volume 1, is itself a quote from marx’s 
own earlier work, marx, Karl 1859 ‘Zur Kritik der Politischen oekonomie’ (Berlin: 
franz Duncker Verlag) p. 3.
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All the more reason, therefore, for the presence of the state in 
the fight against neoliberalism, in order to guarantee rights, regulate 
capital movements and create the spaces for direct participation by 
citizens in politics and the structures of power. Post-neoliberalism re-
quires a state that has been refounded around the public sphere, and 
not a polarization against the state in the name of some supposed civil 
society or private sphere.
To such positions can be added those of the ultra-left. These in-
clude intellectual positions that confine their analyses to the level of 
criticism and denunciations of betrayal, without ever proposing alter-
natives, and those of doctrinaire groups who merely repeat maximal-
ist demands — abstract calls for the building of socialism — with no 
grasp of concrete reality, but intent on preserving theoretical princi-
ples from the realities that always contaminate them. They do not 
realize that no revolutionary process ever started from theoretical 
principles, but rather arrived at these on the basis of demands deeply 
rooted in the immediate reality — like the russian revolution’s de-
mands for ‘peace, bread and land’. Dogmatic positions like those of 
the ultra-left have never triumphed anywhere. 
in ecuador, the indigenous movements were slow to recover from 
their setbacks. in the meantime, from the beginning of 2006, rafael 
correa channelled the strength developed in the anti-neoliberal strug-
gle and occupied the political space they had left free. By the time the 
indigenous movements launched their main leader, Luis macas, as can-
didate, the political landscape had already been defined. correa won a 
resounding victory in the second round of the presidential election in 
november 2006, which allowed him to command the process of build-
ing a post-neoliberal order in ecuador; he called the constituent Assem-
bly and got the new constitution approved in a referendum in septem-
ber 2008, along with a series of other measures in line with his assertion 
that ‘the long night of neoliberalism was ending in ecuador’, which was 
experiencing ‘not a period of change, but a change of period`. 
At about the same time, in 2006 in Paraguay, fernando Lugo 
emerged as the main anti-colorado leader, at the head of a popular 
movement to stop the re-election of the then president, nicanor Du-
arte. The social movements were slow to take the elections scheduled 
for April 2008 seriously, and to mobilize for them. When they did, they 
allowed their differences to prevail and ran separately. Thus weak-
ened, they only got two candidates elected to the national parliament, 
when their joint vote should have enabled them to elect five times 
that number. As a result, Lugo didn’t win a majority in parliament 
and had to make alliances with other sectors in order to be able to 
govern, in addition to deepening his dependence on the Liberal Party. 
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if the social movements had understood better the shift from a phase 
of resistance to one of hegemonic dispute, and combined politically, 
they would have strengthened their own position and favoured a post-
neoliberal project in Paraguay.
The Bolivian, ecuadorean and Venezuelan experiences have thus 
converged on a similar strategy. The aim is to overcome neoliberalism 
and develop processes of regional integration that strengthen the resist-
ance to imperial hegemony, so as to begin to develop post-neoliberal 
models. This is the third strategy in the history of the Latin American left.
The big advances made in Latin America in the first years of this 
century have come about precisely because of the democratization 
obtained through de-commodification. The economic exchanges be-
tween cuba and Venezuela are a model of what the Wsf called fair 
trade — a trade based on solidarity and complementary capacities, 
rather than market prices as preached by the World Trade organiza-
tion. Venezuela supplies cuba with the oil it needs, at subsidized pric-
es financed over the long term, while cuba gives Venezuela practition-
ers of the best community health care in the world, as well as sports 
technicians and literacy experts; the latter helped to make Venezuela 
the second country in the Americas, after cuba itself, to eradicate il-
literacy, according to unesco.
These principles were later extended, via ALBA, to exchanges with 
countries that have far greater needs and much less ability to contrib-
ute to others — countries like nicaragua, Bolivia, honduras and Domi-
nica, as well as ecuador and haiti24. it is a system of exchange in which 
each country gives what it has and receives what it needs, according to 
the capacities and necessities of each participant. it is the only example 
of this kind of commerce in the world and is quite different from the 
market-based criteria of the WTo. it was these principles that gave rise 
to the eLAm (Latin American school of medicine) with its original 
centre in cuba and another one in Venezuela. This institution, which 
is training the first generation of poor doctors in the continent, already 
has several thousand graduates. once selected from among the social 
movements and other popular organizations, including some north 
American ones, these young people are trained and then return to their 
own countries to practice health care in the community.
24  ALBA was set up by Venezuela and cuba in December 2004. Bolivia joined in 
2006, nicaragua in 2007, honduras and Dominica in 2008. ecuador, st Vincent & 
the grenadines and Antigua formally joined in 2009, after participating in ALBA 
as observers for some time. grenada, haiti, Paraguay, uruguay and syria have 
all attended as observers. The new administration installed in honduras after the 
coup of June 2009 was not recognized by most Latin American governments and 
immediately cut its ties with ALBA.
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operation miracle was set up in similar fashion. Through this, 
more than a million Latin Americans have received free eye surgery 
to restore their sight, in cuban, Venezuelan and Bolivian hospitals. 
campaigns against illiteracy have also spread; Venezuela has already 
completed the process and Bolivia, nicaragua and Paraguay have all 
set deadlines for eradicating illiteracy. 
All these are examples of de-commodification, as a way of mak-
ing rights universal. They can only come about through a break with 
the central axiom of the neoliberal model, that is, with the primacy of 
market criteria. They are therefore a step towards the development of 
a post-neoliberal model.
The development of such a post-neoliberal model, however, de-
mands a prolonged battle for hegemony between the new social-po-
litical bloc and the old structures of power. Álvaro garcía Linera sees 
this progressing through five different stages.
a. The crisis of the state is revealed when there emerges ‘a politi-
cally dissident social bloc whose ability to mobilize and expand 
territorially has become permanent`.
b. next, if this dissident bloc manages to consolidate itself as a na-
tional, political project that cannot be co-opted by the dominant 
system, there begins what garcía Linera calls a catastrophic 
stand-off — which means that this oppositional force shows it-
self able to develop ‘a proposal for power (including programme, 
leadership and organization, all aimed at assuming state power), 
and also able to split society’s collective imagination between 
two, different and opposing, political-state structures’.
c. Then comes the formation of a new, governmental, political 
bloc ‘dedicated to using government office to convert opposi-
tion demands into acts of state’.
d. There follows the use of the state to build an ‘economic-polit-
ical-cultural power [...] bloc combining the ideas of mobilized 
society with material resources provided by or via the state’.
e. finally, there is the ‘turning point or historical-political fact after 
which the crisis of the state’ is resolved ‘through a series of con-
frontations which either consolidate the new or reconstitute the 
old’ — and this involves not only the political system but also the 
dominant bloc in power and the symbolic order of state power25.
25 garcía Linera, Álvaro 2008 La potencia plebeya (Buenos Aires: cLAcso/muela del 
Diablo) p. 394.
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garcía Linera gives as an example the state crisis in Bolivia that 
emerged in 2000 with the Water War and which simultaneously re-
versed the state policy of privatizing public resources and permitted 
‘the creation of the territorial nuclei of a new, national-popular bloc’. 
The catastrophic stand-off developed in 2003, when the social move-
ments took the lead in developing a programme of structural changes 
and thereby embodied ‘a mobilized will to assume state power’. When 
evo morales became president, the old governmental elites were dis-
placed, beginning the development of a ‘new economic power bloc 
and a new redistribution of resources’ which continues to the pre-
sent. The turning point therefore came with the approval of a new 
constitutional text by the constituent Assembly, and really took form 
when this was approved by referendum in August 2008 — although it 
remains impossible ‘to establish with precision the precise moment 
when this will reach completion’26.
This rich classification of the different stages of the battle for 
hegemony makes it possible to see how the process unfolds and the 
balance of forces shifts, how the capacity to take the initiative and 
develop one’s own strength changes, and by what means power shifts 
between the two main blocs in contention.
in the course of this ‘state transition’, there was a ‘modification 
of the social classes and their ethnic- cultural identities; these classes 
assumed, first, control of the government and then, gradually, the 
modification of political power, control over the economic surplus 
and over the structure of the state’. This new, emerging, power bloc 
is based economically on urban and agrarian petty-commodity pro-
duction, especially that of indigenous peasants and small urban pro-
ducers, as well as a new urban and indigenous intelligentsia, well-
known cultural figures, precariously employed workers and a section 
of the traditional business class, part of it linked to the domestic 
market. in addition this bloc incorporates a new state bureaucracy, 
originating in the public universities, which also includes members 
of trade union networks.
This whole process of state transition, as characterized by garcía 
Linera, ‘appears as a flux of movements, flexible and interdependent, 
going backwards and forwards’27, which affect the structures of power 
and the balance of both political and symbolic forces.
in this third strategy of the Latin American left, there is no subor-
dinate alliance with bourgeois sectors — as there was in the reformist 
one — nor are the dominant classes annihilated — as in the insur-
26 garcía Linera (2008: 395).
27 garcía Linera (2008: 409).
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rectionary strategy. rather, there is a prolonged battle for hegemony, 
or war of position, in the gramscian sense. The way the constituent 
Assembly was called in Bolivia reflected this dispute. The government 
could have done it through the direct, proportional representation of 
the indigenous peoples, for this is what the mAs proposed as a fair 
way of electing the representatives of the majority of the nation. such 
a criterion, however, would have given the government a massive po-
litical-electoral victory, resulting in a disconnection between the new 
political structure and the real relation of economic forces; the elites 
in the opposition states would certainly have boycotted the new As-
sembly. This would have created a very difficult situation for the gov-
ernment. neoliberal policies had greatly weakened the Bolivian state, 
and a boycott by the wealthiest sectors would have dealt a grave blow 
to the new administration.
in Venezuela, by contrast, after the government regained control 
of the state oil company, PDVsA, the state became very strong and 
big private business, relatively weak. When the latter boycotted the 
parliamentary elections in 2004, they undermined themselves and re-
inforced the government. in Bolivia, the state was much weaker. The 
call for the constituent Assembly came when the process of renation-
alizing the country’s gas resources was just beginning, and state struc-
tures were still badly damaged by neoliberal policies.
The government revised its initial method, mainly because it did 
not have the means to implement a new constitution without the par-
ticipation of any of the forces representing big private capital. The 
election of the Assembly confirmed a majority for the mAs, but with-
out the two-thirds majority needed to approve the most hotly con-
tested articles. The opposition took part but tried to obstruct the work 
of the constituent Assembly, in an effort to recover from their defeat 
in the presidential election.
The dispute continued in the national and state referenda on au-
tonomy. here the opposition sought to interpret decentralization in an 
institutional sense, concentrating solely on the state governments. in 
a country where state governors had been nominated up until the elec-
tions in December 2005, the liberals wanted to confine the democratic 
debate to the decentralization of regional state administrations; for its 
part, the government, reflecting the historic demand of the indigenous 
peoples, proposed a form of decentralization centred on these peo-
ples. With its almost complete monopoly of the private media, the op-
position succeeded in imposing its terms and managed, in the states 
it led, to win support for the referendums. What they really wanted, 
with their demands for autonomy, was to prevent the agrarian reform 
already begun by the government from affecting the material basis of 
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their power, namely their monopoly over the land. They also wanted 
to get their hands on a significant part of the income obtained from 
the tax on gas. This had gone up from 18% under previous govern-
ments to 82% under President morales, making it a vital resource for 
the recomposition of the Bolivian state and the implementation of the 
government’s important social policies.
The government again reworked its original proposal, to in-
corporate aspects of autonomy for regional states. in the end the 
national referendum strengthened the government. however, the 
opposition knows that the new constitution — even after all its com-
promises — includes basic rights that limit its own power and open 
the way to multi-ethnic initiatives and institutions that were until 
recently non-existent.
other governments were also elected on the strength of oppo-
sition to neoliberalism, like those of Lula, néstor Kirchner, Tabaré 
Vazquez, Daniel ortega and fernando Lugo. none of these, however, 
took clear steps to break with the model they had inherited, although 
they did make adjustments and produce significant differences. This 
was especially true in the first three cases, particularly Brazil, and less 
so in Paraguay, where fernando Lugo had great difficulty introducing 
the changes he wanted because of his lack of a majority in parliament. 
This aspect makes these countries different from the group mentioned 
earlier — which includes Venezuela, ecuador and Bolivia — where 
the governments have broken with the neoliberal model — apart from 
cuba, which of course never experienced neoliberalism.
on the other hand, these governments do prioritize regional in-
tegration — although nicaragua is a special case — above the free 
trade treaties proposed by the united states. Thus they take part 
in mercosur, the union of south American nations (unAsur), the 
south American Defence council, the Bank of the south, the g20, 
the continental gas pipeline, and other similar initiatives. in this way, 
alongside the other governments mentioned above, they contribute 
not only to strengthening the international space occupied by the 
south, but also to the development of a multi-polar world. These gov-
ernments are allies for those that have gone further in breaking with 
the model and developing more advanced forms of integration, such 
as ALBA or Petrocaribe. 
however, they are also contradictory governments, split between 
economic policies inherited from past neoliberal governments and 
foreign policies of regional integration. They are certainly different 
from their predecessors, while conserving many of the latter’s key 
characteristics, like the primary fiscal surplus and independent cen-
tral Banks, etcetera. 
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What puts them in the progressive camp is their form of interna-
tional insertion, which prioritizes integration — unlike the governments 
of mexico, Peru, chile, costa rica and others, which have signed free 
trade agreements with the united states and have thereby mortgaged 
their future and forfeited any ability to regulate their economies. The lat-
ter have joined those vast, free trade-oriented zones where capital moves 
unimpeded, privatizations abound and the market rules unchecked.
The fundamental dividing line in Latin America, therefore, is not 
between a good left and a bad left, as some on the right suggest — 
Jorge castañeda, for example, whose aim is to divide the left, co-opt-
ing the moderate sectors and isolating the more radical ones28. This is 
a position that favours the right.
The fundamental dividing line is between those countries that 
have signed free trade treaties with the united states, and those that 
prioritize processes of regional integration. This is the decisive crite-
rion for judging these governments. Among these, of course, as we 
have said, there are some that advance firmly on the path of a break 
with neoliberalism and towards the development of a model that we 
can describe as post-neoliberal; others simply apply the model more 
loosely, developing more social programmes and taking part in re-
gional integration projects. Taken together, these countries are cre-
ating various kinds of mutual interdependence for the future, while 
those that signed free trade treaties are completely tied to the united 
states and its policies.
Any sharpening of the differences between, for example, the gov-
ernments of Venezuela and Brazil — which diverge in important re-
spects — would favour the right, isolate the Venezuelan government 
and possibly push the Brazilian government closer to the united states 
and its allies in the region. The alliance between moderate govern-
ments and more radical ones in the process of integration strengthens 
both, and the progressive camp as a whole.
At the same time, the new form taken by the battle for hegemony, 
in an unfavourable international context, means that even in those 
countries where the governments are advancing in a post-neoliberal 
direction, the character of the process is not directly anti-capitalist. 
We call them post-neoliberal in so far as they are directly counter-
posed to the processes of commodification dictated by neoliberalism; 
but they continue to exist alongside big concentrations of private capi-
tal — including international and finance capital — while they carry 
on the battle for a new hegemony, on the domestic market, in parlia-
ment, and through a hard-fought struggle to win hearts and minds.
28 see castañeda, Jorge 2006 ‘Latin America Left Turn’ in Foreign Affairs, may-June.
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The further they are able to take the aspects of de-commodifica-
tion, of socialization within the nationalized industries, of building 
popular power, of building a consensus in favour of socialization, of 
restoring the importance of labour and fighting against alienation, the 
greater will be their chances of moving beyond post-neoliberalism to-
wards anti-capitalism and socialism.
To declare that only socialism can put an end to neoliberalism is 
to fail to grasp the extent of the historic retreat implied by the shift 
from the previous period of history to the present one. it was a retreat 
not only for socialism as a general objective, but also for the distinct 
forms of anti-capitalist consciousness, for the centrality of the world 
of labour and for the different kinds of popular organization. What is 
needed is not just an act of will, but the rebuilding, in new ways, of the 
objective and subjective conditions for anti-capitalist struggle. And one 
of these new ways, the most important in the current period, is the an-
ti-neoliberal struggle and the building of post-neoliberal alternatives.
An affirmation like this fails to take account of the balance of forc-
es that really exists in the region and in the world, which has to be our 
starting point. The left, and especially the ultra-left, has great difficulty 
accepting the setbacks suffered. it prefers to reiterate general theoreti-
cal theses, principles and dogmas, as if these operated directly in his-
tory as they do in books, without the concrete conditions of class con-
frontation getting in the way. it has difficulty accepting what Lenin and 
gramsci understood so clearly, namely, that ‘the truth is concrete’. it is 
therefore incapable of comprehending the dynamics of new, concrete 
experiences like those in Venezuela, Bolivia and cuba, and as a result 
misses the most important thread of what is going on in the region.
no revolutionary process ever developed as a result of attempts 
to impose general, abstract theses on a complex and always heterodox 
reality. in russia, as noted earlier, the goal was to obtain ‘peace, bread 
and land’; in china, to expel the invaders and carry out an agrarian 
revolution: in cuba, to oust Batista; in Vietnam, to expel the invad-
ers and win national independence; in nicaragua, to overthrow the 
somoza dictatorship.
These objectives cleared the way for achieving other, more pro-
found ones — anti-capitalist in some cases, anti-imperialist in oth-
ers — because the revolutionary leaderships proved able to develop 
this dynamic out of those initial, concrete objectives. in russia at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, that meant going beyond the win-
ning of peace by breaking international alliances with the imperialist 
powers; turning the demand for bread into the nationalization and 
socialization of large-scale industries; or developing the need for land 
into the agrarian revolution. something similar happened in other 
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revolutionary processes, through the transitional dynamic of con-
crete demands that were deeply felt by broad layers of the people, 
and which also served to establish alliances, build the new hegemonic 
social bloc and isolate the dominant regime.
Any strategic proposal has to the anchored, first and foremost, in 
concrete reality, in the specific dynamic of the great confrontations of 
the time. it has to take account of the fact that all processes of trans-
formation involve aspects that are new and heterodox, which need 
to be understood, rather than reduced to theoretical axioms which 
never seem to have been verified in any specific situation. fidel castro 
said that all revolutionary processes should be radical, in the marxian 
sense: that they should go to the root of things. But they should never 
be extremist, in the sense of taking one aspect of reality and giving it 
extreme importance, without understanding the significance of each 
historical process as a whole.
The term post-neoliberal is descriptive. it refers to new processes, 
that arise in response to the deep and repressive changes effected by 
neoliberalism, but have not yet acquired a permanent form. This is 
what we see in Venezuela, Bolivia and ecuador. They do not constitute 
a specific, historical phase, distinct from capitalism and socialism, but 
rather a rearrangement of the power relations between social classes, 
one that encourages the emergence of a new social bloc at the head 
of particular, sui generis historical processes, in circumstances that 
are much more favourable to the popular forces. Their destiny will be 
decided by the concrete experience of building post-neoliberal states.
ThE fUTURE of LATIn AMERICA
PhASES of ThE AnTI-nEoLIbERAL STRUGGLE
The struggle against neoliberalism already has a history. it has been 
through several phases — from resistance to development of alterna-
tives — and now faces a new situation, that of a counteroffensive from 
the right, and the respective responses from the left. 
it was in 1994, the same year as the north American free Trade 
Agreement (nAfTA) came into effect, that the Zapatistas began resist-
ance to the new hegemony. in 1997, ignacio ramonet, in an editorial 
in Le Monde Diplomatique, called for struggle against the ‘single or-
thodoxy’ and the Washington consensus. The World social forum in 
2001 invited people to build ‘another possible world’. The demonstra-
tions against the World Trade organization (WTo), which had begun 
in seattle in 1999, showed the extent of the disconnection between the 
new hegemonic model and the popular potential for struggles against 
it. This was a phase of resistance to the negative turn, of gigantic his-
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torical proportions, which resulted from the move from a bipolar to a 
unipolar world, and from the regulatory model to the neoliberal one.
At government level, the consolidation of the neoliberal model 
came with the shift from the initial right-wing leadership (Pinochet, 
reagan and Thatcher) to a second generation, called by some the 
‘third way’ (clinton, Blair, fernando henrique cardoso), thus occu-
pying the entire political spectrum. The dominance of this force first 
began to be checked with the election of hugo chávez as president of 
Venezuela in 1998, a process which from then on was concentrated in 
Latin America. When the model principal protagonist suffered suc-
cessive electoral defeats (cardoso, menem, fujimori, carlos Andrés 
Pérez and the Pri), its failure became evident.
nonetheless, the popular reaction against neoliberalism reflected 
in the electoral victories that followed that of chavez — Lula (2002), 
néstor Kirchner (2003) and Tabaré Vazquez (2004) — did not unfold 
in quite the way expected. Although these governments won election 
against hard-line, neoliberal predecessors, they did not move to break 
with the neoliberal model as such. on the contrary, they maintained 
it, applying it with varying degrees of flexibility, mainly depending on 
the relative weight they gave to social policies.
Brought together by their shared support for regional integration 
— first and foremost through mercosur — and the defeat of the fTAA, 
to which they actively contributed, these new governments showed 
significant differences from their predecessors. They helped create an 
unprecedented situation in the region, with the simultaneous exist-
ence of an assortment of different kinds of government, all opposed 
to the free trade policies preached by the united states, as well as its 
policy of ‘unending war’ — which colombia was the only country in 
the region to support.
The victories of evo morales (2005) and rafael correa (2006), 
along with the creation of ALBA, the Bank of the south, the conti-
nental gas pipeline and the entrance of Venezuela and Bolivia into 
mercosur, broadened and strengthened an axis of governments that 
not only supported regional integration but were also beginning to 
develop post-neoliberal models. fernando Lugo’s election in Paraguay 
(2008) and mauricio funes’s in el salvador (2009) further extended 
the camp of progressive governments in the continent.
nonetheless, from 2007, after being rather taken by surprise by 
the spread of progressive governments across the region, the right 
recovered its ability to take the initiative. The progressive govern-
ments had managed to take electoral advantage of the social discon-
tent at neoliberal policies — thus exploiting the weakest link in the 
neoliberal chain.
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in order to retake the initiative, the right — both the old, oligar-
chic right and the social-democratic currents that adhered to neoliber-
alism — resorted to the two areas where its hegemony and its strength 
remained intact: the economy and the media, both of which it con-
trolled. its counteroffensive took slightly different forms in different 
countries, but the elements were the same. criticism was levelled at 
the state and its regulatory functions, at tax policies and at regional 
and south-south integration initiatives. Attention was directed to is-
sues like corruption (always in relation to government and the state), 
supply shortages, the autonomy of regional governments against state 
centralization, and supposed ‘threats’ to ‘press freedom’ (always iden-
tified with the private media). 
in Brazil, there were campaigns of denunciation against the Lula 
government. in Venezuela, after the attempted coup in 2002, the right 
began to campaign in defence of the private monopolies in the me-
dia, and to denounce corruption and food shortages. in Bolivia, the 
attacks were directed at land reform, the new constitution and the 
introduction of new taxes on gas exports to finance social policies car-
ried out by the government. in Argentina, the target was price regula-
tion and supply problems, while in ecuador it was the new constitu-
tion and new forms of state regulation. in addition to these, the right 
could count on the two main right-wing governments in the region 
— mexico and colombia. 
The right also went back on the offensive in the economic do-
main, having been on the defensive during the years of international 
economic growth, when the income from foreign trade could easily 
be used to finance social policies. now it began again to warn of the 
danger of rising inflation and the need for fresh adjustments, with 
higher interest rates, giving priority to monetary stability at the ex-
pense of economic growth. The Economist magazine expressed the 
hope that, with the change in the international situation, the right 
might return to the fore, drawing on two issues dear to conservative 
thinking: inflation and law and order. The Latin American examples 
of this are significant.
This new phase, from 2008, was marked by renewed confronta-
tion between progressive governments and the right-wing opposition, 
both politically and ideologically. The attempts to discredit the role 
of the state became the central axis of debate between right and left. 
Today in Latin America there are a number of countries that follow 
the prescriptions of the ‘minimum state’. mexico began a process of 
privatizing the state oil company, Pemex, putting itself at the forefront 
of neoliberalism’s fresh push for privatization. Peru (which joined the 
ranks later), chile and costa rica remain the success stories of this 
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current — although they have had to repair gaping holes in their pri-
vate pension systems, once models for the region.
on the other hand, there are a number of countries that seek to 
rebuild their states on post-neoliberal or post-liberal foundations. 
That means they seek new forms of political representation, that go 
beyond liberal formalisms, as in the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia and 
ecuador — the latter two seeking to found pluri-national, multi-eth-
nic, multicultural states.
Between these two groups, several countries — like Brazil, Ar-
gentina, uruguay and Paraguay — have implemented certain levels 
of state regulation, without going back to the sort of state that existed 
before neoliberalism. They have slowed down the earlier processes 
of privatization, encouraged the growth of formal employment, and 
regenerated public administration and services.
evo morales’s victory in the August 2008 referendum, by an am-
ple margin, showed that mass support was still there. so did the levels 
of popular backing for rafael correa and Lula. The elections of fer-
nando Lugo in Paraguay, mauricio funes in el salvador and then Dil-
ma rousseff to succeed Lula in Brazil showed that the consolidation 
and expansion of progressive governments in Latin America had not 
come to an end, in spite of the offensives of the right. Dilma rousseff’s 
victory in Brazil was the result of enormous popular support for the 
Lula government, in which she had played the role of central coordi-
nator; her success means that by the end of her mandate, the PT will 
have ruled Brazil for twelve years.
The future of neoliberalism in the continent is not yet decided.
The model remains hegemonic. mexico, Peru, colombia and 
chile continue to practise it in orthodox form, while it survives in vari-
ous different forms in countries like Brazil, Argentina and uruguay. in 
the end its destiny will depend on the capacity of the first two of these 
to move beyond it. Brazil in particular, because of the strength of its 
economy, rising prestige and the possibility that its current govern-
ment will continue and deepen the course set by its predecessor, could 
play a key role in the regional balance of forces between neoliberal 
hegemony and the projects that promise an alternative.
The consolidation and expansion of ALBA is another strategic 
element for the future of the continent, and even for the future of a 
post-neoliberal order on a world scale. At first this initiative advanced 
at the points of least resistance, where neoliberalism had never ex-
isted — like cuba — or where it had failed before it could really take 
hold, like Venezuela, Bolivia and ecuador, whose neoliberal govern-
ments were toppled by popular movements. other countries joined, 
attracted by the more favourable terms of trade, which began to dem-
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onstrate the superiority of principles like solidarity and complemen-
tarity over those of free trade. Petrocaribe further reinforces this ar-
gument, and makes it possible to imagine a future favourable to the 
expansion of ALBA.
one limit to such expansion results from the high degree of in-
ternationalization of the region’s economies, especially the most de-
veloped among them, chiefly mexico, Brazil and Argentina. in the 
case of the latter two, this could also limit the extension of merco-
sur. While the regional integration projects partly overlap with the 
interests of big international companies and internationalized, lo-
cal companies, these might prefer free trade treaties, which allow 
them to increase their integration with the international marker and 
with the central capitalist powers. however, when these slow down 
in comparison with intra-regional trade and with the big economies 
of the south, especially china and india, that encourages these big 
companies to take a closer interest in some aspects of the integration 
process, especially those that give them access to bigger markets and 
promise fresh investments.
some initiatives, like the Bank of the south, the continental gas 
pipeline, unAsur, the south American Defence council and even 
mercosur, are areas of dispute over the future shape of south Ameri-
can integration, which still does not have any clear statement of where 
it is going or how it should proceed.
foR A PoST-nEoLIbERAL LATIn AMERICA
how far can this new push for change in Latin America develop and 
deepen its anti-neoliberal models in a world still dominated by free 
trade, the WTo, the World Bank and by mainly conservative powers, 
of which europe is one example and the united states another?
soviet socialism was the first big driving force for change in the 
last century, but it failed because it never managed to break out of its 
initial isolation. When it did, this was not in the direction of devel-
oped europe, of the centre of capitalism, of the countries where the 
forces of production were most highly developed, but in the opposite 
direction, towards backward Asia and Latin America, and one of the 
less developed countries of this continent, cuba. What is the potential 
of the anti-neoliberal struggle in Latin America? is it limited to anti-
neoliberal reactions within a capitalist framework, or does it have the 
potential for much deeper change?
Although recent, the anti-neoliberal struggle already has a history 
and has gone through several stages. it began with the Caracazo, the 
popular resistance against President carlos Andres Pérez’s neoliberal 
package in 1989, continued with the Zapatista rebellion in 1994 and 
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developed further with the mobilizations of landless peasants in Bra-
zil, with the indigenous struggles in ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, and 
with the struggles of the unemployed or piqueteros and the factory 
occupations in Argentina.
The election of hugo chávez in 1998, combined with the crises in 
Brazil (1999) and Argentina (2001-2002), functioned as a moment of 
transition to a second phase. This resulted from a crisis of hegemony 
and involved a political battle for government and for the implementa-
tion of alternative policies. if the social movements played a leading 
role in the first phase, the shift to the second phase presented the anti-
neoliberal forces with a challenge: how to win back the political arena 
through either traditional or novel ways of combining the social and 
the political spheres.
The phase that followed was marked by a striking series of elec-
toral victories based on popular rejection of neoliberalism. These in-
volved the election or re-election of governments that, in one way or 
another, came to form a bloc of progressive forces in Latin America 
and open up an alternative to the governments that had occupied vir-
tually the entire political landscape of the continent during the previ-
ous decade.
These forces advanced along neoliberalism’s lines of least resist-
ance — especially in areas of social policy, devastated by neoliberal-
ism, and of regional integration, given the failure of free trade policies 
in the region. They also made some progress in restoring the capacity 
of the state — which had been rolled back by neoliberalism — to im-
plement regulations and guarantee and extend social rights.
This was the period that brought the most sweeping progressive 
changes ever experienced on the Latin American political and ideo-
logical scene — only comparable to the cycle of independence wars, 
two centuries earlier. neoliberalism was caught unprepared to face 
challenges in the political arena, while the united states was bogged 
down in its policy of ‘unending war’. As a result, in the few years be-
tween 1998 and 2008, governments of this kind came to office in eight 
Latin American countries, with important defeats in just four (mexi-
co, Peru, colombia and costa rica).
After this period of extension of these new kinds of government, 
there began to be signs of a reaction, of a counteroffensive by the 
right. The two phases overlap in time. While fernando Lugo’s elec-
tion was putting an end to more than six decades of colorado rule in 
Paraguay, and mauricio funes was leading the fmLn to victory in the 
march 2009 presidential elections in el salvador, the right-wing offen-
sives continued to gather steam, taking advantage of contradictions 
besetting many of these governments.
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This reaction began with the attacks by the Venezuelan right — 
and the attempted coup of April 2002 — soon followed by the denun-
ciations of corruption against Lula in 2005. Both cases heralded the 
new line-up of the right bloc, with ideological and political leadership 
in the hands of the big, private media, and the parties of the right act-
ing as their agents. The Bolivian right took advantage of the constitu-
ent Assembly to regroup, with its base in the economically dynamic 
eastern part of the country.
The right regained the initiative against Lula with denunciations 
of corruption — supported by its tight monopoly of the private media 
and by the bloc of right-wing parties — which looked like they might 
lead to impeachment. however, the support obtained through his so-
cial policies allowed the president to survive the crisis and use those 
same social policies to consolidate his position. he won re-election 
and by the end of his second term enjoyed popularity ratings of 87%, 
with a rejection rate of just 4%.
hugo chávez faced a right-wing opposition that had swung be-
tween boycott and electoral participation. When it put its trust in the 
latter, institutional path, it was able to reunite and strengthen itself, to 
the point of defeating the government in the referendum on constitu-
tional reform in December 2007.
When cristina fernández succeeded her husband, néstor Kirch-
ner, as president of Argentina, she suffered strong opposition attacks 
for her proposal to raise levies on agricultural exports. The death of 
nestor Kirchner rather than lessening the possibilities for cristina 
Kirchner’s continuation in office, strengthened her candidacy for a 
second term.
After managing to win approval for his proposal for a new con-
stitution, evo morales suffered the most violent opposition attacks, 
which for a time undermined his support. Yet by 2009 he was again 
able to win large majorities, in the constitutional referendum in Jan-
uary and the presidential re-election in December.
up until now, the opposition blocs have displayed a clearly resto-
rationist response to the advances secured, in greater or lesser degree, 
by the progressive governments. Their positions advocate a return 
to the ‘minimum’ state, lower taxes, renewed privatizations, reduced 
public spending, more open markets and more precarious conditions 
of employment. it is a packet of measures that does not add up to 
a programme, but merely serves to rally the discontented and those 
displaced from power.
What will happen to Latin America in the future? how far are the 
changes irreversible? What kind of regression could the region suffer, 
if the current political processes are not consolidated?
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one possibility is the continuation of the present governments 
and, as a result, the consolidation of the processes of integration, lead-
ing to a single regional currency, coordinated central Banks and the 
development of the Latin American Parliament29, along with advances 
in each country’s economic model and increased possibilities of a rup-
ture leading to the development of alternative models. internationally, 
Latin America would make an important contribution to the develop-
ment of a multipolar world, based on stronger regional integration.
it has to be remembered that anti-neoliberal strategies — the only 
ones possible, given the current national and international balance 
of forces — entail a prolonged battle for hegemony. That means they 
involve neither a subordinate alliance with leading fractions of the 
bourgeoisie — as the traditional reformist strategy did — nor the an-
nihilation of the adversary, as the armed struggle strategy did. This 
encourages the recomposition of anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist 
social subjects, and at a more advanced stage, once the state has been 
refounded, it crystallizes a new balance of forces and of power be-
tween the major social blocs.
some regional integration projects present serious problems and 
could be abandoned, depending on how far the current governments 
advance. This is the case with the continental gas pipeline, the Bank 
of the south and the south American Defence council, among others. 
There is popular support on a level never before experienced by the 
left in the region, above all thanks to the social policies carried out by 
the progressive governments, which sets them apart from the neolib-
eral governments.
it is this support which confronts the economic and media power 
of the right, and means that elections across the region occur in very 
similar circumstances. The candidates may be more or less radical, 
but the scenario is always the same. on one side, there is a neoliberal 
bloc supported by the powerful, private monopoly of the media; on 
the other, the social policies of the governments. The media monop-
oly ‘manufactures’ public opinion — in the sense that chomsky gives 
the term in Manufacturing Consent30 — and defines day after day the 
themes that are most important for the country, passing off its inter-
29 The Latin American Parliament (Parlatino) was formally created in 1964, and 
actually established in 1987. most of its members are elected by the legislatures of 
the different member countries, and it has few powers. however, some countries, 
like Venezuela, have sought to strengthen the body and elect their representatives 
directly, alongside the members of their own national assembly.
30 chomsky, noam & herman, edward s. 2002 Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media (new York: Pantheon).
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pretation as if it were the general interest; yet when the electors have 
their say, it is defeated. As one Brazilian journalist put it after he and 
the paper he worked for had been defeated in the 2006 presidential 
elections: ‘The people have defeated public opinion’.
given their importance, what happens to the processes in Ven-
ezuela, Bolivia and ecuador is vital to the political and ideological 
future of the region. nonetheless, because of their size, in the last 
analysis this depends on what will happen to the current governments 
in Brazil and Argentina, and on the fate of mexico. either way, it is 
clear that the future shape of Latin America in the twenty-first century 
depends on what happens to the progressive governments that cur-
rently exist in the region.
Yet what bearing could Latin America have on the situation of 
neoliberalism and capitalism in the world? how far does the region’s 
reduced economic weight — a result of neoliberal policies — take im-
portance away from everything else that is going on here, in terms of 
its impact on the overall destiny of the world in the decades to come?
We could say, to summarize the essential aspects, that the world 
today is dominated by three main axes, three great monopolies of 
power: the power of arms, the power of money and the power of the 
word. Latin America may contribute, in some respects, towards over-
coming these power structures, even if, by itself, it does not have suf-
ficient weight to alter them substantially. nonetheless, through alli-
ances with india, china, south Africa, russia or iran, and with the 
intensification of south-south exchange, the continent may acquire 
a new weight through a new kind of presence on the world stage — a 
world stage that will itself have changed. To a certain extent this is 
already the case, as has been shown by the region’s relative ability to 
withstand the latest economic crisis. it has obviously been affected, 
but in a much milder way than in earlier crises.
The struggle against the power of arms means releasing the world 
from us hegemony. Latin America’s contribution here has been to 
oppose the empire’s policies of ‘unending war’. This was shown very 
clearly when the united states failed to persuade even its close allies 
in the region, chile and mexico, to back its plans for an invasion of 
iraq in the un security council. colombia, the epicentre of ‘unend-
ing war’ in Latin America, finds itself isolated — as was shown af-
ter its aggression against ecuador, when it won the support only of 
Washington and was condemned by the other countries, as well as 
by the oAs (organization of American states). Latin America is the 
only region of the world to carry out processes of integration that are 
relatively autonomous from the us and to develop alternatives to the 
free trade treaties proposed by Washington and the WTo. it also has 
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some of the few governments in the world which frontally oppose 
and challenge north American imperial hegemony: cuba, Venezuela, 
Bolivia and ecuador.
however, this is not enough to develop a political and military 
counterweight to the united states. At most, it is an example of re-
sistance, building an integrated area in a region with little weight in 
the new world economic order. The creation of unAsur, a project of 
integration for the whole of south America, and of a south American 
Defence council, both without the participation of the united states, 
as well as the first sessions of the mercosur Parliament, point towards 
broader forms of integration with fresh potential.
The importance of the region as a whole comes from its energy 
resources (especially oil, but also gas) and its agribusiness (with soya 
exports leading the way, but with production for the domestic mar-
ket also growing constantly), alongside these integration processes 
that boost its political influence in international negotiations. But it 
is the processes of rupture with the neoliberal model and the alter-
native forms of trade, like ALBA, that make the region a reference 
point for debates about alternatives to neoliberalism, such as those 
developed in the World social forum and in its regional and thematic 
forums. Leaders with different kinds of influence in different milieus, 
like hugo chávez and Lula, along with the Bolivian and ecuadorean 
processes, indicate the political dimension of Latin America’s growing 
importance in the world.
All the same, there are weaknesses in Latin America’s post-ne-
oliberal processes, and one of these weaknesses is their relative iso-
lation in the world. in the absence of strategic allies, the continent 
is obliged to link up with countries that have some kind of conflict 
with the united states, like russia, iran, china, and Belarus. What is 
more, the countries that have taken concrete steps to break with the 
neoliberal model are not the relatively most developed ones in Latin 
America, although they can count on Venezuela’s oil as an important 
economic factor in their favour.
ideologically, Latin America can throw up proposals for debate, 
like the pluri-national and multi-ethnic state, socialism of the twenty-
first century and integration through solidarity, exemplified by ALBA. 
however, the means to disseminate such ideas in a way that is ad-
equate to the needs of the political moment simply do not exist, even 
within each of these countries. They have difficulty competing with 
the single orthodoxy and its basic propositions, which are repeated 
over and over again by the monopoly media.
Latin American critical thought, which has a long tradition of im-
pressive interpretations and theoretical and political proposals, now 
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faces new challenges, with old themes reappearing in new forms: the 
new nationalism and processes of regional integration; indigenous 
peoples and the new model of accumulation; processes of socializa-
tion and de-commodification the new forms to be assumed by the 
state and the nature and functions of the public sphere; the political 
future of the continent.
in some countries, the most significant of which is Bolivia, there 
is a rich and renewed process of theoretical reflection and elabora-
tion on the processes that are unfolding. in others, the most extreme 
case being Venezuela, there is an enormous gulf between the academ-
ic intelligentsia and the process lived by the country. in others still, 
like Brazil, Argentina and mexico, in spite of their strong academic 
systems and the high quality of their intellectual production, a large 
part of this work has no connection with the main political and social 
struggles these countries are experiencing. The theoretical potential 
that exists in the region could make an important contribution to the 
development of post-neoliberal alternatives, if only it can find new 
ways of engaging with these contemporary historical experiences.
At the beginning of this new century, Latin America is living through 
a crisis of hegemony of enormous proportions. The old is struggling to 
survive, while the new has difficulty in replacing it. The objective condi-
tions for the end of neoliberalism already exist. Yet countries like Bra-
zil, Argentina and uruguay have retained the model, applying it more 
loosely, continuing the financial policies but not the economic ones. in 
the process, they have managed to return their economies to cycles of 
growth, something the preceding governments had been unable to do, 
for all their orthodox application of the model. mexico, which stills fol-
lows the orthodox path, has not managed to advance economically, and 
even chile — a model of how to apply the neoliberal approach — has 
seen the cycle of concertación governments come to an end.
The difficulties encountered in developing social and political 
subjects able to break with neoliberalism are largely the result of the 
real obstacles faced by any attempt to leave neoliberalism behind. 
When steps were taken to develop new kinds of political and ideologi-
cal leadership for the anti-neoliberal struggle, real progress was made 
in this direction. The outcome of the crisis of hegemony will push the 
future of the continent in the direction that the social, political and 
ideological struggles decide.
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SPEECh In CoMMEMoRATIon of 
fLACSo’S 50Th AnnIVERSARy**
ceLeBrATing The 50Th AnniVersArY of an institution like the 
facultad Latinoamericana de ciencias sociales (fLAcso, Latin Amer-
ican faculty of social sciences) calls for a retrospective evaluation of 
social sciences and their impact on our times and on the historical 
processes of ecuador and of Latin America.
it is worth remembering that the men and women who found-
ed fLAcso were deeply committed to the integration of our Latin 
America and were notably dedicated to research and teaching aimed 
at developing our societies. 
fLAcso was born from an idea developed at the unesco gen-
eral conference in 1957 and was quickly taken up by a number of 
countries that understood what was meant by this action. The first to 
join were Brazil and chile, and then Argentina, Bolivia, costa rica, 
cuba, ecuador, honduras, guatemala, mexico, nicaragua, Panama, 
 * President of ecuador since 2007. PhD in economics at university of illinois at 
urbana-champaign.
** opening speech at the congreso Latinoamericano y caribeño de ciencias so-
ciales (Latin American and caribbean conference on social sciences) in com-
memoration of fLAcso’s 50th Anniversary, 29 to 31 october 2007, Quito, ecua-
dor. Text extracted from: Crítica y Emancipación (Buenos Aires: cLAcso), Year 
1, n° 1, 2008. Translated by shana Yael shubs and ruth felder. Also available in 
spanish at <http://www.presidencia.gov.ec/secciones.asp?seid=238>.
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Paraguay, uruguay, Peru, Dominican republic and suriname.
The idea was to build a social science institution that would gen-
erate a space for reflection and analysis that did not yet exist, and that 
would drive the development of Latin American thought tied to the 
specific needs and problems of our region.
fLAcso’s objective was considered to be key at that time: to in-
crease the capacity for countries to collaborate in the field of social 
sciences through regional institutions of high academic standard, 
which would cooperate with national governments and universities 
by preparing human resources for social change.
We also have to remember that fLAcso was formed in the global 
context of the cold War and in the regional context of social and polit-
ical unrest as a consequence of the influence of the cuban revolution, 
the appearance of guerrilla movements and the spread of Liberation 
Theology. it was a time in which capitalism and socialism seemed to 
define the battlefield of the options for social change. This was sup-
plemented in our region with a marked interest in the development 
perspectives put forward, in large part, by the economic thought of 
ecLAc.
Thus, fLAcso, or, more accurately, the sites that were starting to 
work at that time, engaged in academic inquiry tied to a number of 
lines of research. for example, development. Theses about national 
strategies of regional development, economic concentration and de-
velopment took shape, as did modes of alternative development, etc. 
research that, it is worth remembering, in many cases linked the eco-
nomic, the social, the cultural and the political, not dissociating them 
as if they were separate spheres without any type of relation.
in the field of development, education was not left out either. eco-
nomic development was thought about in a comprehensive way. The 
theory of human capital, which was later and for good reasons widely 
criticised, suggested important connections between the training of 
human resources and economic growth.
interest in thinking about the different paths to revolution in the 
region was also significant, as was interest in the impediments to con-
solidating the democratic regime.
issues related to agrarian sociology and agrarian reform also 
became important. issues related to the country, to rural space, and 
to the peasant and indigenous actors became inescapable, but, once 
again it is worth saying, in the context of processes of social change.
similarly, historical analyses were important. Phenomena, their 
significance and their productivity were explored in the context of 
their concrete historical development. in those times, history took on 
a key relevance in Latin American studies: it was about discovering 
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the Latin American specificity as well as the underlying processes and 
relationships that were constituting it. 
in sum, there was a marked interest in constructing research ob-
jects that addressed Latin American issues and, in particular, those 
that were relevant for each country and even sub-region. for example, 
in the case of fLAcso-ecuador, interest in Andean and indigenous 
issues was concentrated in this institution.
so now, after fifty years, if we had to do an assessment, we could say 
that fLAcso, to a large degree, still reflects these original expectations.
currently, this institution has become a key reference point in 
the academic and political world of our region. nobody can deny that 
its research, seminars, books, journals and even the informed opin-
ion of its professors and researchers are widely respected, not only in 
the world of social sciences, but also in public space and in decision-
making spheres.
fLAcso also continues to participate in the creation of highly-
trained human resources that make up much of the teaching staff in 
public and private universities in the region, as well as occupying sen-
ior posts in different institutions in the governmental and non-govern-
mental administration of our countries.
Through its diverse academic activities, fLAcso continues to 
collaborate in the consolidation of social disciplines; although — as 
we will see shortly — in many cases it does so under the ideological 
dominance of certain theoretical and methodological perspectives. 
similarly, fLAcso contributes, through its systems of scholar-
ships, to the ability of many students from the region to carry out their 
studies, especially in countries other than their own. By having sites 
in different countries, student exchanges and the exchange of learn-
ing experiences, fLAcso has made its contribution to the pursuit of 
Latin American integration. 
finally, the Latin American nature of fLAcso is currently 
strengthened, not only by the origins of its students but also by its 
academic staff.
Though we could organize a seminar to examine the role fLAcso 
has had in the social sciences, i would like to reflect on the challenges 
that i can see, in the spirit of constructive criticism.
i will mainly try to focus on a critical reflection on what i think 
is one of Latin American academia’s main problems and from which 
fLAcso is not immune: the crisis of Latin American thought.
A key question that all social scientists have at one point asked 
themselves revolves around the meaning of scientific-social inquiry: 
What really justifies the existence and development of the social sci-
ences? What is the mission of a social scientist in the face of the dy-
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namic, contradictory and in many respects painful reality of the con-
temporary world? 
Though multiple answers are possible, in general terms we could 
say that as academics we seek to contribute to increasing our under-
standing of the phenomena of the social world in order to increase as 
well our ability to build a better society from which all can benefit. es-
pecially in the social sciences, a theory that does not have clear politi-
cal implications that can improve reality is essentially a useless theory.
nonetheless, several questions emerge that this general answer 
conceals. When we say ‘our understanding of phenomena’, to whom 
are we referring with our understanding? And when we speak about a 
better society, how are we understanding the word better? 
With respect to the first question, we have to note that there are 
differences between understanding in academia and understanding 
that occurs in other spaces of knowledge. The type of explanations 
that academic discourse constructs, in contrast with others such as 
those of common sense, of a sophist or even of a politician, is based 
on a specific process that produces arguments and verifies them. This 
is not to underestimate or to not seek forms of dialogue between dif-
ferent types of knowledge and experience, nor to imply that there 
are hierarchies between them. The scientific-social argument is not 
justified through intuition, belief or desire, but rather through a re-
flexive process that recognises errors, the mechanisms that produce 
them, and the ways to overcome them while leaving the capacity for 
discovery intact. As Pierre Bourdieu would say, it is not just about an 
abstract methodology that works like a manual — like a set of rules 
that can be applied to all cases — and as an unequivocal guarantee 
of scientificity. Precisely because the unconditional obedience to an 
organon of logical rules tends to prematurely shut down the condi-
tions for discovery.
it is, instead, about an attitude of epistemological vigilance in 
which not only is there an effort to understand the logic of the error 
but there is also an effort to construct a logic of discovery of the truth.
in this sense, we can say that the academic-researcher seeks 
the greatest degree of ‘objectivity’ possible. The ideal would be that, 
through methodological transparency (of the procedures carried out 
and the justifications offered for each decision) and through the de-
mocratisation of information, anyone could reproduce the results and 
the conclusions. in this way, through dialectic exchange, the quality of 
our understanding of reality can be continuously improved.
With respect to the second point, that is, what do we understand 
to be a better world, we encounter one of the most serious dangers 
that lurk in academic discourse: trying to equate objectivity with neu-
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trality, and therefore, free oneself of the inevitably political nature in-
herent to any teaching or research task, especially in the social scienc-
es. following Boaventura de sousa santos, i think that it is essential 
to distinguish between objectivity and neutrality. We must strive to be 
objective social scientists but not neutral ones, and this means using 
the best methodologies that the social sciences offer us and doing so 
with the greatest possible rigour, impartiality and autonomy.
But, at the same time, we have to be clear about what side we 
are on; that is, how we construct our research problems, our research 
objects, how we formulate our working hypotheses, how we choose 
our methodological strategy and even our research techniques. such 
non-neutrality (inevitable in our profession) unquestionably leads us 
to the political, social, cultural and other positions that we necessar-
ily embody and about which we must remain constantly vigilant. But 
careful, to be vigilant is not the same as to deny. 
example: my home country.
once we are clear about these differences, we can ask ourselves, 
for example: Where do the research topics in current social sciences 
come from? from what perspective are the research questions formu-
lated? What is the political economy of the dominant theories in social 
sciences? Which brings us to ask: What is the form of knowledge pro-
duction that seems to work in Latin American academia?
These questions locate us in a space for reflection about what has 
occurred over the last decades in Latin American academia and about 
what fLAcso, i believe, has not been able to escape from. As men-
tioned previously: the crisis in Latin American thought.
An example of the greatest expression of this crisis: the Washing-
ton consensus.
Without fear of being mistaken, i believe that academic spaces 
are spaces for ideological struggle with the objective of building the 
hegemony of some interests over others, of some world views over 
others. it is about imposing meanings on what we call ‘reality’ and 
thereby constructing it, and what ultimately each of us understands 
by a better world.
in this sense, Latin American academic space was practically 
colonized by a set of methodological theories and prescriptions that 
arose in the central countries.
for example, this can be seen in the predominance of the posi-
tivist economy which was uncritically and uncontrollably applied in 
the field of social sciences. This gave way to a kind of very profound 
homogenisation of research and teaching work, and certain pockets 
were only marginally able to resist and dispute what has become a 
type of common sense in academia.
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The argument brandished was that such theories and processes 
were the only ones that could guarantee ‘relevant’ issues for study, 
‘objective’ analytical perspectives (confusing this concept with neu-
trality) and ‘scientific’ methodologies. The rest was just left over. it 
was residual.
continuing with our example we can think about rational choice1 
applied to political science, and in some cases, even political sociology. 
This has implied a return to the dominance of an extremely posi-
tivist methodology that only values what can be ‘observed’ (meaning 
preferences) and therefore ‘measured’, and that dismisses anything 
that in this context is considered ‘subjective’.
useless theory.
(Between parentheses we could say that this has reinforced the 
idea of academia as the only valid site of knowledge and a contempt 
for dialogue with other types of knowledge. Thus, along with other is-
sues that were left out, those theoretical and methodological perspec-
tives that emphasised the participation of the subjects being studied, 
because they were considered to be the principal beneficiaries of such 
studies, were rejected).
This also involved the generation of one-dimensional explanations 
that tended to account for social phenomena with a single, similar 
argument: the selfish, atomised, maximizing human being, etcetera.
in this context, the definition of the ‘better world’ that social 
sciences must seek was reduced to the individual maximizing op-
timization of utilities, principally understood to be the preferences 
expressed in any market (political, cultural, economic, family, commu-
nity) through consumption (also of any product: votes, goods, money, 
love, cultural consumption, etcetera).
in addition to being a largely useless theory, terribly reductionist, 
it presented the social sciences as being independent of value judg-
ments. example: market theory, rational actors, voluntary exchanges 
and ‘a girl lost in the desert’. 
A review of the curriculums of political science, sociology and 
economics programs in many fLAcso sites reveals to what extent 
this dominance has also permeated an institution that aimed to gen-
erate independent and specifically Latin American thought. not to 
mention the programs that goes under the name of government and 
Public Affairs or Administration and Public Policies.
We have to realise that these theories and their associated ana-
lytical categories, that have co-opted ideological space, prevent us 
from seeing other ways of constructing the research problems and 
1 original in english (Translators’ note).
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objects that are relevant for the plans for change that we believe 
in. They also make the intellectual inheritance of Latin American 
academia invisible, that academia that until a few decades ago was 
proud of its accomplishments and of its commitment to Latin Ameri-
can emancipation.
it is not about an uncritical return to the past, but rather about 
a more accurate recovery of a legacy that has not been sufficiently 
appreciated. With this dominance, disciplines and entire research 
lines have disappeared, such as for example history, agrarian sociol-
ogy, studies of social structure, of economic concentration, of social 
inequality, and others.
it is true that other extremely important issues have been taken 
up that are related to types of social exclusion. for example, the 
treatment of groups determined by characteristics related to age, 
such as youth; to gender, such as women; to ethnic origin, such as 
the indigenous; to mobility, such as immigrants, etc. Academia has 
been particularly sensitive to these issues and to the human groups 
that have historically been denied their voices. This can be seen in 
the number of projects that have been developed, for example, in the 
different sites of fLAcso and above all in the research theses that 
these sites stimulate.
As Todd gitlin asserts, though the profusion of social actors has 
occurred throughout society, think about the visibility achieved by 
minorities and social movements in recent years; nowhere has there 
been such a vigorous result as in the academic world. There, in many 
programs of study, each movement experienced the joy of an identity 
based on the group. The problem lies in that the expansion of what 
has been called ‘identity politics’ was inseparable from the political 
fragmentation of what had initially been shared.
The university and academic world has taken up these new is-
sues from a largely uncritical position, as in many cases such research 
lines imply abandoning the concern for what it is that human beings 
and groups share. The study of ‘identity’ becomes the study of a type 
of inescapable destiny, in a world made up of intrinsic and essential-
ist identities that prevent connecting with the other. The voice of the 
voiceless can thus end up constituting a new silence, functional to the 
dominant paradigm, and academia has not been immune to this.
so, based to a large extent on what Boaventura de sousa santos 
suggests, perhaps a debt and an outstanding challenge for fLAcso 
over the next fifty years would be to decide to invest time, money and 
human resources in offering contributions toward a notable episte-
mological and theoretical overhaul of current social sciences. An over-
haul from a Latin American perspective; that is, from the south.
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similarly, the understanding of the world enabled by the social 
sciences in many cases denies social experience and denies the social 
changes that are taking place. example, the end of history. A set of 
experiences are thus neglected, unrecognised, robbed of their cred-
ibility by hegemonic perspectives. What is thus presented as the thesis 
is at most the dominant theory. our challenge must be to take on this 
neglect of social experience. This can be achieved to the extent that 
we engage in a discussion not only about the objective conditions for 
the transformation of society, but about those conditions that speak 
about a will for change. Perhaps we have to think about how to create 
a rebellious subjectivity, not a paralysing objectivity.
in this sense, what i am trying to say is that we cannot escape 
this quagmire with the social sciences, because they are part of the 
problem. first, we have to epistemologically work through the social 
sciences. our forms of rationality come from the periphery and we 
have to keep this in mind in order to bring about a change in our 
frameworks of thought, as edgar morin would say.
To a great extent, this will happen, as santos holds, if we think 
about ‘absences’ from a different place. Let me explain. much of what 
does not exist in society is produced as non-existent, which ends up 
reducing ‘reality’ (always constructed) to what exists. A look from 
the absences is a rebellious method for showing what does not exist, 
but with a different, clear objective: trying to attain it. it also entails 
seeing what does not yet exist but is emerging, showing signs of life. 
for example, contributing to the symbolic extension of a social or 
citizens’ movement. free of romanticisms, we must make this devel-
opment credible.
Also, questioning those concepts that speak to us of a time that 
is not ours and from a pre-defined point of arrival. Thus, in Andean 
and indigenous time, the ancestral is not part of the past, as we are 
told, but of the daily present; and the very ideas of ‘developed’ coun-
tries, ‘progress’, ‘modernisation’ and even ‘globalisation’ tell us of a 
time and a destination that are foreign to us, although we have inter-
nalised them as necessary goals. A first step towards this is to rethink 
the idea of development. not from a modernising perspective or one 
based only on growth. i think that this is already included in our na-
tional Plan, which articulates, beyond economicist views, the human 
relationship with nature, the relationship between people and the way 
to perpetuate Latin American cultures indefinitely.
moreover, we have to rethink the mode of knowledge production. 
Let us not forget once again that what is at stake is the construc-
tion of hegemony. We do not need alternatives, but rather ‘alternative 
thinking about alternatives’. This does not mean that we have to deny 
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the knowledge from the north, but rather that we have to understand 
it in order to discover its ways of constructing knowledge, those that 
make it hegemonic.
We also have to reflect on the conditions in which Latin American 
academia carries out its work.
first, it is necessary to think about and relate funding and re-
search. frequently, research projects and education programs are 
conditioned by the source of funding, since it not only defines how 
much can be spent but also on what and in what ways. in many cases, 
academic programs first arise out of a need for funds rather than as a 
result of an academic need.
This type of funding has promoted short-term research, linked 
to specific conjunctural projects, while research into structural and 
far-reaching problems is precluded. This all ends up reproducing the 
predominance of a logic of consulting work and technical assistance 
more tied to ngos than to academia. in the best of cases, long-term 
research agendas are personal projects and not institutional ones. 
This has led to the disappearance of the idea of research programs or 
lines. The only things that seem to be of relevance are individualities 
that become islands or archipelagos of status.
for these same reasons, what prevails is not research of an em-
pirical nature. in most cases, it consists of compilations of second-
ary sources, states of art, bibliographic research or interpretations not 
supported by field work. 
This has also been accompanied by an important change with 
respect to the profile of the social scientist. The double role or utility 
of the social sciences as both technical tools and a space for intellec-
tual productivity has lost its balance with the growing participation of 
these human resources in the processes of transformation of the state 
furthered by neoliberal policies. The importance that sociologists, po-
litical scientists, anthropologists and others acquire in studying the 
design, evaluation and theoretical and methodological justification of 
public policies in recent years has not been sufficiently appreciated in 
terms of its effects on the autonomy of the field and the political role 
of these resources.
To address this problem, it is first necessary to recover the auton-
omy of research production and agendas with respect to funding, and 
the sovereignty of the availability of academic programs as a function 
of academic criteria and social needs.
one of the messages i would like to make clear is that part of 
the crisis of thought is due to the discrediting of politics that has oc-
curred over the last decades. Academia has destroyed itself by try-
ing to gain visibility as something separate from politics, in the name 
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of an objectivity confused with neutrality. under the predominance 
of the technical discourse of the 1990s, the political became entirely 
tainted as negative. i think we must rethink what we understand to be 
the political in academia. it is not about justifying political interests 
with research or teaching, but about recognising the political nature 
of the understandings of reality that we construct in academia. This is 
a responsibility that cannot be evaded.
i invite you, then, to build an academia that is committed to the 
needs of Latin America and mindful of the processes of change that 
we are living through today. And these are significant; perhaps we do 
not clearly perceive it right now, we do not see a revolution taking 
place, but that does not mean that we are not in its midst. There are 
already signs that we are living not only in a period of change, but also 
a change of period. Let’s help it be born from the place in which we 
find ourselves in this historic time.
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 * Degree in sociology, Politics and Public Administration at ufmg. master in 
Politic science at unB. PhD in economics at ufmg and fluminense federal 
university. 2009 Doctor Honoris Causa at uBA, Argentina, and unmsm and 
r. Palma, Peru. President of the Advisory council of international relations of 
the state of rio de Janeiro. President of the ‘global economy and sustainable 
Development’ programme and network course of the united nations university-
unesco. consultant at sistema econômico Latino-Americano (seLA); univer-
sity for Peace, un; united nations university-unesco; iLDes, friedrich ebert 
foundation; cnPQ. Director of studies at the  École des hautes Études en sci-
ences sociales, france; lecturer at the Latin America institute of the Academy of 
sciences, urss. Associate Professor at Paris Viii and ritsumeikan-Kyoto uni-
versities. emeritus Professor at fluminense federal university. he has published 
numerous books and papers, including: O Conceito de Classes Sociais (Petrópo-
lis/santiago de chile: Vozes/PLA, 1970); Dependency & Latin American Devel-
opment (helsinki, 1977); Forças Produtivas e Relações de Produção (Petrópolis: 
Vozes, 1985); La Teoría de la Dependencia: Balance y Perspectivas (méxico: Plaza 
& Janés, 2002); Do Terror à Esperança: Auge e Declínio do Neoliberalismo (Apare-
cida/caracas/Beijing: ideias & Letras/monte Ávila/social sciences Academy, 
2004; 2007); Economía Mundial, Integración Regional y Desarrollo Sustentable: 
Las Nuevas Tendencias y la Integración Latinoamericana (Lima: infodem, 2010) 
e-mail: <theotoni@nitnet.com.br>.
LAtIN AMErICAN CrItICAL tHOuGHt: tHEOry AND PrACtICE
220
had been facing enormous difficulties,  the economies were in crisis, 
the political regimes were in dismantlement and the ideological sys-
tem were in disarray. civil wars, political instability, mass unemploy-
ment and poverty presented a gloomy reality to these former soviet or 
pro soviet countries.
meanwhile, the eurocentrism is in definite crisis. The Anglo-Amer-
ican capitalism, as the ideal model for global social-economic develop-
ment and for modern democracy, is gradually losing ground along with 
the decline of the us economic and political supremacy. The emergence 
of newly industrializing countries (nics) of Asia and Latin America 
challenged the us / europe and Japan absolute hegemony, the revival of 
islamic fundamentalism, the Latin American integration and the sub-
sequent mercosur directly defied the us domination.  These facts draw 
a new world, more complex and more difficult to be administered. The 
us supremacy will certainly continue for a period of time, but its he-
gemony has to be shared with the european union, Japan and russia, 
as well as the nics such as china, Brazil, india, and etcetera.   
The cold War ended and with it all the justification for military 
aggressiveness. As the pretended unquestionable winner of the cold 
War, the united states also found it unbearable to maintain its hegem-
ony, faced with budget pressure and power limits.  Thus, the decade of 
90s witnessed the end of the us absolute hegemony and beginning of 
a new world system: the shared global leaderships. in the first decade 
of twenty-first century we assist the intent of the W. Bush administra-
tion to re-install an undisputed unilateral hegemony of united states 
over the World. This phase is ending now during the world financial 
crisis, started 2007, that is being transformed in 2008 in a general 
economic crisis.  
meanwhile, the humanity entered into a new historical phase: 
the age of accelerated globalization, which would ultimately lead to 
a planetary civilization based on the synthesis of various civilizations 
that form the contemporary world. The human beings must follow 
the path of peace and understanding, correcting the great inequali-
ties of the world and concentrating on more global policies and goals. 
But this new world will be not possible without strong national states 
capable to assure the transference of its sovereignty to a world order. 
The united nations’ conference on environment and Develop-
ment (rio de Janeiro, 1992) was an expression of the increasing con-
sciousness of the necessity to unite the complex humanity — plural 
and lacerated by her economic and social contradictions — to ad-
dress global issues such as environment preservation and the struggle 
against poverty which are crucial for the improvement of the present 
situation and for a better world for future generations.
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in the next years several summits on population, social issues, 
women, and other crucial questions prepare the basis for the ‘Decla-
ration o the millennium’ in 2002. All the national states of the world 
subscribe a set of compromises that represents concrete goals for the 
human development of humanity. 
in this new world system, the humanity shall go through a pro-
cess of profound reflection, adjustments, and cooperation in order to 
adjust its great contradiction of interests between the few ultra-devel-
oped and the huge masses of unemployed, under-employed, excluded, 
and marginalized that seem to be the inevitable by-product of a tech-
nological modernization — based in the scientific and technological 
revolution — in the limits of the capitalist mode of production, ori-
ented toward the profit and the private appropriation of the mankind 
wealth. humanity will be obliged also to confront the malaise that is 
and will be, undoubtedly, the social, cultural and spiritual correspond-
ence for this unacceptable situation.
Thus, the humanity is facing the needs to elevate its manage-
ment or governance system of world economy. global solutions — 
produced from global negotiations — will need to substitute the so-
called ‘invisible hand’ of the market, the idea of an automatic and 
mechanical adjustment of the various disputing interests, and the 
illusion of a law of comparative advantages presiding world com-
merce.  The risks continue to exist: the deteriorating global envi-
ronment, the threat of war and nuclear explosion, the menace of 
extermination of the non-renewable energy sources, and the destruc-
tion of environment and biodiversity in general. The principles of 
conscious and democratic planning will prevail over the idea of a self 
regulation of the market. The complexity of the new world system 
set the need for a global political and economic coordination aiming 
to a world where peace and sustainable and human development 
should win over all the nations.
ThE ExISTInG STUdIES on WoRLd EConoMy  
And WoRLd SySTEM 
The study of the world economy in the context of world system is 
relatively recent.  since its beginning, it was limited mainly to the 
study on international commerce, which was dominated by the clas-
sical and neoclassic economics theories. it was the same case with 
the work of marx.  his unfinished book Capital had limited system-
atic study on the matter. By the end of the nineteenth century and 
the beginning of the twentieth century, some sporadic attention was 
given to the study on the global development of the capitalism. During 
the 1920s, the League of nations published an empirical study about 
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world economy. Later on, Keynes produced expressive ideas on the 
economic conditions for the world peace which joined with other vari-
ous efforts to understand the causes and the consequences of the war. 
it was until the beginning of the twentieth century that the study 
on world economy gained global force when the concept of imperial-
ism had been developed on the basis of marxist-Leninist analysis of 
economic concentration and the formation of the international mo-
nopolies. The success of russian revolution and the economic crisis 
of 1929 conduced to an ideological revolution on the interpretation of 
world economy. The ideological struggle assumed extremely radicals 
forms in the post-war years, until the end of the cold War.
The revolution was initiated when the analysis of the interna-
tional conjuncture was introduced in 1921 in the congress of the in-
ternational communist, so as to give tactical and strategic proposals 
for communist struggles. in the 30s, in the urss the institute of in-
ternational relations and World economy (imemo) was created and 
directed by eugenio Varga. The studies about the imperialism and the 
world economy increased considerably in the 20s and in the 30s, more 
and more based on institutionalist approach.
At the side of marxism, but very influenced by him, it developed 
an institutionalist perspective that had in hobson, at the end of nine-
teenth century and beginnings of twentieth century one of its most 
interesting expression. Werner sombart was another impressive re-
searcher of the formation of modern capitalism.
in the 40s, the work of Karl Polanyi about the great transforma-
tion was the most ambitious intent to understand contemporary capi-
talism as a historical phenomenon unifying economic, social, political 
and cultural approaches to the social reality. The development of an 
economic anthropology treated in a more holistic approach the role 
of culture and civilization in the great transformation that installed 
capitalism as a historical reality   
During the 70s, the concept of world economy found its best ex-
pression in the work of immanuel Wallerstein on world system.  fer-
nand Braudel’s researches have also contributed to establish a theoreti-
cal framework for the study of these concepts.  During the 80s and early 
90s, the concept of globalization has been developed in order to analyze 
the new trend the world system, and its accompanying phenomena.
since the 70s much literature has been produced. The interna-
tional institutions started a methodical analysis of the world economy, 
especially the creation, in 1978 of the annual publication of the World 
Bank named ‘World Development report’. in the 70s, various econo-
metrics models of the world economy were created by international 
organizations like un and oecD, the World Bank, fmi, etc. in 1973, 
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The State of the World was produced by the us president’s office, which 
has started the national emphasis on the world conjuncture. The Bu-
reau of economic Planning of Japan also publishes the ‘White Papers 
on the World economy’.
The centre of the united nations for the Transnational corpo-
rations was created in the beginning of the 70s and published four 
general reports with substantial empirical information about the mul-
tinationals corporations and the world development. in 1991, started 
the annual publication of the ‘World investment report’.
The discussion about the new economic order proceeded with the 
proposal of President Luis echeverría of mexico on ‘Declaration of the 
economic rights and Duties of the nations’ which was voted in the 
united nations in 1973.  Afterwards, in 1975, Boumediene created the 
term ‘new world order’ in the meeting of the non-Alliance movement 
in Algeria.  Because of the crisis of oil, the nations of the Third World 
advanced considerably in the international level that gave consistence 
to the ‘Development Decade’ created by the Assembly of the united 
nations in 1969.  in this period the uncTAD was created; the non-
Alliance movement and the north-south dialogue had been fortified. 
A wide literature was produced about the ‘new World economic or-
der’, mainly a set of international reports, which started a new treat-
ment for the world conjuncture and a new conscience of the running 
process of globalization.
World reports was elaborated by various research institutes, such 
as the club of rome, the institute of Bariloche, the Dag hammarskjold 
report of the united nations, as well as by the ad hoc commissions like 
the rio report (the Leontief report of the united nations), the Willy 
Brandt commission, the Willy Brandt and michael manley report, the 
olof Palme commission, the interfutures of oecD, the south com-
mission, etc. some were elaborated by national governments, such as 
the global 2000 report of the president of the united states and the 
World economic and social crisis of the President fidel castro.
from the 70s to our days the new global reality gave origin to 
several permanent publications on the world economy and global is-
sues in general:
 - since 1978, as mentioned above, the World Bank started an an-
nual publication named ‘World Development report’, besides 
the analysis of one or two major matters, published its ‘World 
Development indicators’.
 - since 1980 the international monetary fund published its 
‘World economic outlook’ annually until 1984 and afterwards 
became half yearly.
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 - since 1986 the united nations publishes the ‘report on the 
World economy’, based on regional reports prepared by its re-
gional commissions and special organizations located in eu-
rope, Latin America, Asia and Africa.  Besides, the united na-
tions publish ‘statistical Yearbook’.
 - in 1991 the unDP started the publication of the ‘human De-
velopment report’.
 - The uncTAD publishes annually the ‘Trade and Development 
report’, besides the ‘handbook of international Trade and De-
velopment statistics’.
 - The uniDo publishes each two years its ‘industry and Devel-
opment - global report’ since 1989-90.
 - The unesco publishes for many years its ‘statistical Year-
book’, although it doesn’t contain any specific analysis on world 
economy, it was one of the main data sources.
 - since its foundation in 1961, the oecD studies the world econ-
omy and publishes the ‘economic outlook’, with the exclusive 
distribution to its member nations.
 - The WALrAs, like the LinK, represents another model to 
study the world economy by means of quantifying the interna-
tional economy.
 - A great number of reports by non-government organizations 
(ngos) were also prepared to analyze the situation of world 
economy, such as, ‘L’etat du monde’ published since 1981 by 
La Découvert, Paris; ‘rAmsÉs - rapport Annuel mondial sur 
le système Économique et les stratégies’ published since 1981 
by the ifri - institut français des relations internationales; 
‘The state of the World’, by the Worldwatch institute, pub-
lished since 1984 on the human progress to create a sustain-
able society.
 - During the 90s and the new century the studies of Angus madi-
son create a statistical basis for the study of development in the 
perspective of a longue durée. 
During these years, the studies about peace expanded a lot.  They con-
tributed greatly to a holistic vision to the process of globalization. The 
international Peace research Association (iPrA) was the ‘locus’ of 
these studies, and has its influence in the creation of the university for 
Peace in costa rica. in the70s, however, a great step was made when 
the university of the united nations was set up, with headquarters in 
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Japan. The unu created the World institute on Developing economic 
research (WiDer)  to study the issues of development joined this 
wave of global studies. The university has elaborated a program of 
studies about the global transformations that was developed through 
new theoretical and conceptual landmarks.
The most significant conceptual change related to the world econ-
omy during this period is due to the formation of a new theoretical 
framework in the end of the 70s, and mainly in the 80s, that links 
the concept of world system to the long waves of Kondratiev, to the 
technological-scientific revolution and to the study on transnational 
corporations.  Based on these changes, the concepts of world system 
and globalization were developed.
since the 70s, the debate about the development and the world 
economy reached new levels because of the introduction of the envi-
ronment issue.  starting from the stockholm conference on the envi-
ronment and Development in 1972, this relation had been elaborated. 
The critique made by the ecologists and the ‘green peace’ extended 
to the political field and started to question the proper concept of de-
velopment. under the influence of neo-malthusians ideologies, some 
authors proposed a limit for the economic growth.
The oil’s crisis in 1973 showed that the limits of growth were 
more serious than the developmental optimism would accept.  This 
discussion continued until the 80s, in the Bruntland report, about 
‘our common Destiny’, that introduced the concept of sustainable 
development and called the attention to the global dimension of the 
ecological threat. The conference in rio de Janeiro (eco-rio), in 1992, 
represented a definitive step in this direction when it introduced 21 
points and some global basic agreements about the climate, the ocean 
and the biodiversity.
When these conceptual and political advances were taking place, 
the success of economic growth in southeast Asia was taking place 
too. At the same time, Latin American newly industrialized nations, 
eastern europe and the indian subcontinent limited its growth be-
cause of the payment of high interests for its huge external debts. The 
African continent, which was newly freed from the colonialism, had a 
great number of debts, while the prices of the basic products that they 
export were falling.
During this period, the model of structural adjustment proposed 
by the World Bank and the fmi was the basic mechanism to make 
possible the payment of the international interests. high exportations, 
low importations, depreciated currencies formed a set of Draconian 
measures to create export surplus in order to pay for the debt services, 
by sacrificing the public expenditure and the governability of these 
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countries. resultantly, these adjustment measures produced higher 
income concentration, dramatic amplification of the misery and so-
cial exclusion.
in spite of these harsh realities, the structural adjustments still con-
tinues from the 80s up to the 90s with the so called Washington consen-
sus, and at the present we suffer with even stronger consequences. in all 
countries, the adjustments failed to achieve equilibrium between mac-
roeconomic policies and social policies, which shows the limits of eco-
nomic theory in relation to the economic, political and social realities. 
After 30 years of imposition of a neo-liberal conception of the world 
economy we have the stronger disequilibrium that humanity had in his 
all history. instead of the fiscal, exchange, and monetary equilibrium 
that is the base of neoliberal economic doctrine, the deregulation and 
the privatization, promoted by neoliberal governs, produced a fantastic 
disequilibrium of the world economy characterized by gigantic deficits 
from one side and surplus from the other side. This deficits / surplus 
produced enormous debts from one side and incredible liquidity from 
the other side opening a new stage in the development of financial capi-
tal, with growing capacity to create fictional values. 
ThE dEPEndEnCE ThEoRy of LATIn AMERICAn
Latin American views on world economy were developed only after 
the second World War. in 1948, the continental sessions of the so-
cial council of the united nations started the annual analysis of its 
regional economies, and established the economic commission for 
the Latin America (ecLA), raúl Prebisch, in that time executive sec-
retary of ecLA, proposed a theoretical and analytical framework to 
analyze the world economy in terms of centre / periphery relation.  he 
initiated the Latin American tradition of underdevelopment analysis 
and the development theories that became fundamental in the Latin 
American contemporary social and economic sciences. 
The main characteristic of this tradition is its vision of the un-
derdevelopment as the absence of development.  The ‘delay’ of the 
underdeveloped countries is explained by the obstacles put in front of 
them, which retard its modernization.  in the beginning of the 1960s, 
however, these theories lost its relevance. Latin American countries, 
who had achieved political independence in the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, were restricted by the depth of its economic and po-
litical dependence of the international economic system maintained 
after the World War ii.  its economic increase seemed destined to ac-
cumulate misery, illiteracy and unequal income distribution.
The dependence theory, which appeared in Latin America in the 
60s, tries to explain the new characteristics of this dependent develop-
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ment that had been oriented in the direction of an industrialization 
based on the international capital, whose centre were the multina-
tionals companies created in the 50s and in the 60s.  This new point 
of view rejected the idea of that the underdevelopment meant the lack 
of development, but it was understood as the historical result of the 
development of the capitalism as a world system that produced devel-
opment and under-development.   
in the 70s, there had been extensive international debates about 
the matter that appeared in articles, books and in various conferences 
and seminars. Besides, the theory of dependence also exerted influ-
ence in many important political processes, like the Peruvian revolu-
tion; the chilean Popular unit; the manley government in Jamaica; 
the socialist government in Tanzania; and etc.  in the mid-70s, the 
critiques about the dependence theory became stronger and were ex-
tended by the 80s. These critiques came from the scholars of Latin 
American countries and from all parts of the world.  They accused 
the authors of this theory for overrating the external factors and for 
abandoning the internal analysis, especially the social classes.  others 
criticized that this theory diluted the struggle of local classes and de-
nied the importance of the concepts of ‘imperialism’ and ‘dependence’. 
The recent critique that has a very widespread diffusion and re-
percussion came from francis fukuyama in his book The End of His-
tory and the Last Man, published in 1992.  in his point of view, Depend-
ence Theory is the last bastion of resistance to the ‘end of history’, and 
it would have been belied by the successful Asia experiences.
Thus, in Latin America, this extensive and animated debate led 
to discussion on development under the context of the world system. 
These theoretical advances  corresponds to the new Latin American 
social, economic and political realities. 
A LATIn AMERICAn PERSPECTIVES of GLobALIzATIon
The Latin American nations after the War ii had undergone a rapid 
process of capitalist internationalization, which would be accelerated 
and amplified, known as globalization in the 90s. The internationali-
zation of capital in Latin America (especially Brazil) forced the Latin 
American social thinkers to study the new reality. starting from raúl 
Prebisch with his famous 1950 manifesto (‘The economic Develop-
ment of Latin America and its Principal Problems’), proclaimed a 
powerful role for government in avoiding the deflationary policies of 
the interwar years, a greater commitment to government microeco-
nomic intervention, more controls, subsidies and protection, a greater 
emphasis on ‘planning’, and a greater distrust of market features of 
postwar development.
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The post-war years witnessed Latin American’s dependent inte-
gration to the world economy. These countries (and Brazil in particu-
lar) were incarcerated in a vicious cycle since the debt crises of the 80s 
provoked the derangement of the local financial markets, deteriorating 
the public finances and the monetary politics, placing these countries 
in three digits hyperinflation. The consequent economic adjustment 
to ensure the payment of the debt services inflicted unbearable social 
cost on these nations. Domestic and foreign investment had shrunk, 
interest rates were high, wages and salaries were drastically reduced. 
The economic development was adversely affected, gravely impover-
ished these economies. 
During the 80s, Latin American countries saw the creation of a 
new type of  urban marginality, and consequent deterioration of social 
order caused by the increase of the criminality and the increase of  il-
legal activities, like the drugs trafficking, the smuggling,  prostitution, 
the kidnapping, and etcetera.
in the 90s, the international interest rates dropped and there is 
a relief of the pressure for the payment of the international debts. 
however, because of the pressure of the united states’ necessity to 
equilibrate its payment balance, these dependent countries that were 
previously supply-oriented, implanted a policy of commercial deficit. 
This conservative policy was based on the pegging of local currencies 
(the famous foreign exchange anchorage), on the indiscriminate in-
crease of the interest rates of the public debts, as well as the sale of 
the public enterprises known as the ‘privatization’ of the economy. 
consequently, the exports diminished and imports increased, produc-
ing the commercial ‘deficits’, that are compensated by the entrance 
of short term capital searching for the high interests and the stock 
market speculation. 
Thus, Latin American social scientists have drawn experiences 
from imbalanced industrialization in the 50-70s; the military authori-
tarianism from the 60-80s; the debt crises of the 80s; the structural 
adjustment and subsequent domination of neoliberalism in the 80-90s; 
etc.  it is necessary to emphasize the fact that, Latin America in gen-
eral, and Brazil in particular, has developed an original thought about 
the world economy and politics that needs to be continued. With their 
own experiences, Latin American social scientists have been able to es-
tablish ‘Dependence Theory’, as a plausible theoretical formation con-
solidated in many years and contributed by many scholars of the Latin 
American region who have been following the model of raúl Prebisch. 
As the reality tends to bypass national boundaries and to create 
units of production and circulation, more and more local and sub-
regional economies are being developed, thus, arise the concepts of 
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regionalization as the base of globalization. These new economies 
change drastically the pictures of regional development.  Therefore, 
the knowledge of the world economic system is more and more a con-
dition of comprehension of the specific social-economic formations. 
This fact must be considered in the theoretical research and teaching, 
in the strategic formulation and governmental policy-making. 
GLobALIzATIon, dEVELoPMEnT And SoCIo-EConoMIC JUSTICE
The process of globalization of world economy and politics is based 
in the scientific-technological revolution that began in the 40s and 
changed radically the relation among science, technology and the 
productive process. This revolution changes tremendously the scale 
of the production by automation through the robotics and the in-
formatics. it produced structural changes by extending the role of 
the services as well as the activities related to the knowledge, plan-
ning and design of the products. it creates new sectors, industries and 
economic activities and changes the relations between the economic 
sectors and causing a third industrial revolution.  it integrates the 
planet in instantaneous process of communication and reduces the 
distances among the various regions of the globe. finally, it breaks 
the traditional ecological balance at global level and threats the hu-
manity’s survival because of the environmental deterioration and the 
threat of nuclear explosion.
in this context of rapid changes, the world’s regions that don’t 
participate of the development of the new forms of industrial and 
post-industrial production and circulation are more and more dis-
tant from the centres of world power. This process of globalization 
enlarged the technological gaps between the developed and the under-
developed countries.
The technologically backward regions were penalized by a per-
verse double movement.  on the one hand, the advance of new tech-
nologies and productive systems has wiped out subsistence sectors 
and the non-monetized sectors, such as, the peasants, tribal produc-
tion, handicrafts, the barter trade, etc.), it  conducts an ‘exodus’ of 
the rural population to the urban regions.  on the other hand, the 
is a striking absence of a global development schemes to allow for a 
balanced industrialization,  an extensive education system and a well-
coordinated service sector to sustain the advancement of new technol-
ogies and new productive system. The result was an explosive urbani-
zation without a good social-economic structure, the deterioration of 
environment and increased marginalization and social exclusion. All 
these tendencies are recognized by the iLo, unDP and other interna-
tional organizations which are dedicated to the study of the matter.
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The unregulated and unplanned world economy is leading hu-
manity to the increased poverty, except the case of china, to serious 
problems of social disintegration, social exclusion and to increased 
open unemployment. This situation posed a serious question to the 
humanity: are social justice and economic progress incompatible al-
ternatives? or, to put it in a better way:  can the humanity survive 
based in the seemingly uncontrollable competitive capitalist eco-
nomic relations?
The un social summit conference that has been held in copen-
hagen in march 1995 was a new attempt to take control on the sav-
age forms of capitalist competition and social and international rela-
tions. it continued a set of international initiatives that had already 
been proposed in other un conferences, the most important being the 
earth summit of 1992, in rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The copenhagen so-
cial summit demonstrates the universal will to control the economic 
forces by means of regulation and state intervention, by popular par-
ticipation in the control of enterprises and by civilized forms of social 
and international relations.
The social summit has discussed three basic issues: fight against 
poverty; the social integration; and the creation of employment.
To address these issues, first of all, the international community 
needs to recognize the structural nature of poverty, social disintegra-
tion, inequality, unemployment and under-employment. Pure liberal 
mainstream economic theories can never lead our humanity to social 
justice. global negotiation and social intervention are urgently need-
ed.  A ‘world social contract’ as it is being proposed by unDP, should 
replace the liberal economic calculations. The chart of economic 
rights of Peoples and nations, voted in 1974 by the un Assembly, has 
to be respected.
if the humanity is to develop a more just and manageable world, 
the social thoughts of the underdeveloped countries should be re-
spected, and the developed countries should not simply impose its 
‘conventional wisdom’ and its eurocentric paradigms on the south.
To listen to the south means also to accept the social forces that 
represent old civilizations and strong cultural particularities in Asia, 
in America, in oceanic and in Africa. And it means also to accept the 
strength of regional plural dynamism. if you cannot eliminate some 
part of the human race, as had been done on the Jewish people during 
the nazi regime and the second World War, you must accept to live in 
a world where Asian, African and Latin American people are major-
ity. moreover, Asia is showing that this majority can be educated and 
well developed in one or two generations. in the 50s, myrdall wrote 
the Asian Drama, and in the 80s, we are talking about the Asian he-
231
Theotonio dos Santos
gemony; in the 80s, Latin America was living the ‘lost decade’, now, a 
part of it is being perceived as important ‘emerging’ economies.
secondly, we need to reformulate the institutional framework 
of international relations. The present world institutions do not suf-
ficiently allow the participation of the non-Western countries. The 
g7 prefers canada, england or italy to china, india or even Brazil, 
and they hardly accept russia as the eighth participant. The security 
council of un does not include Brazil, india or mexico, let alone Ja-
pan and germany. The general Assembly of un is not being respected 
anymore. And what about islamic countries? Where they can express 
their voice in the world institutional framework?
Third, we need to restructure the present international aid pro-
grams. The majority of international technical aid is used to pay for 
northern ‘experts’ to help economies, societies and ecological realities 
unknown to them. Why not to use technicians and scientists from de-
veloping countries to give technical assistance to the south? We have 
much better scientific expertise on tropical ecological environments 
than you do. But you still think that we need your expensive techno-
crats from the World Bank, the imf, and other international institu-
tions to teach us your disastrous policies of development!    
international aid should be based on local development priorities 
formulated democratically by the local communities. The local hu-
man resources and technicians from the south should be used. Local 
experiences of social development should be studied, for example, the 
indian expertise on humid tropical development, and the bio-mass 
technology in Brazil (the sugarcane alcohol combustible program), 
and so on, must be the basis of international technical and social 
aid. This policy will reinforce local scientific and technological devel-
opment, will fix the professionals in their countries, that otherwise 
would be part of the ‘brain drain’ that may impoverish our countries.
fourth, we need to develop common strategies of development at 
world levels, unifying common interests. for example: Trade unions 
of developed countries supported, in the 70s and in the 80s, democrat-
ic movements in the south, to eliminate dictatorships, that protected 
low salaries and opened their countries to multinational investment.
now, many developing countries in the south have established 
democratic governments, but they are still based on a controlled me-
dia system that maintains low salaries and economic dependency.  
here lies a common interest between trade unions and popular move-
ments of the south and the north: to maintain in the north and to 
improve in the south social legislation; defend labour market; pick 
up children from the streets and put them in schools; to defend la-
bour safety, to develop workers’ training and education; protect our 
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labour force from over-exploitation, etc. These common areas of co-
operation between the north and south should be implemented by 
the labour organizations.
fifth, we have another common problem: the increase of world fi-
nancial speculation, which is based in more and more modern means 
of communication. But this international financial system is based in 
very high rates of interest paid by government that expand each time 
their public debt and pay more and more interest to support a terrible 
exploitative financial structure. These high rates of interest subtracted 
the state resources of north and south countries, what diminishes the 
capacity of the state to attend basic needs of the population and to 
give possible foreign aid. 
The people are paying more and more taxes only to pay interests 
of the public debt. for example, the public debt of germany admin-
istrations used to be 18.6% of the gnP in 1973. it’s now 65.9% after 
years of neoliberal policy. how can a liberal policy conduce to so high 
debts? german government used to pay 2.7% of annual interest in 
1980. now it is paying 6.1%. Big banks used to be against fiscal debt. 
now they live on it. The us and european fiscal debts are the basis of 
international financial market. 
globalization in the financial sector is driving terrible amount 
of resources from the south to the north. This leads to growing con-
centration of income and inequality at world scale. so, we cannot 
think in terms of social justice, equal opportunities or even econom-
ic equilibrium at international level without reforming our present 
financial system.  
in resume, an agenda for social Justice would be based in a new 
scientific framework really built at world level. it will be based in the 
points below:
1. A new World social contract to countervail market tenden-
cies to concentration and inequality, to reduce labour time 
and assure more employment in education, research, com-
munication, leisure, culture and so on. We need a more 
equilibrate international order and participation of the 
south in the formulation and execution of international eco-
nomic cooperation.
2. Democracy and citizenship are the basis of a world order 
with social justice. Alliance among social forces punished by 
present economic development must be built to create a new 
world order. society must control media power and assure 
free speech and free information to a well informed social 
movement and citizenship.
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3. Public debt must be reduced not by cutting social welfare and 
forcing aid, but by cutting high rates of interest supported by 
tax payers of the entire world. financial system must be de-
flated and reduced to its really necessary dimension.
ConCLUdInG REMARkS
summing up, there is an enormous research work to be done in fu-
ture. Together with the north, the south should also analyze the pro-
cess of globalization of world economy and the role of the process of 
regionalization in the formation of an integrated world system.  The 
south should recognize the danger of globalization in the destruc-
tion of the regional, national and local markets, and confront with the 
disintegration of social sectors and institutions that have extremely 
negative effects in short and long term.  it should also utilize the re-
gional blocs, such as nAfTA, mercosur, APec, and etc., as a mecha-
nism of negotiation and balance of power. All in all, the south should 
also adopt some lines of socio-economic and political strategies, and 
scientific-technological and industrial policies to effectively deal with 
the process of regional integration and globalization. 
Though many researches have been done on globalization, and 
the issues of global development and the new world system, i think 
the future research efforts of the south should pay special attention 
to the following:
I. MAJoR fACTS And hyPoThESES
a. The scientific-technological revolution makes possible the 
global scales of production, links the production to the pure 
science and the frontier research, diversifies the markets in 
terms of  quality and quantity,  local condition of demand and 
supply,  joins intimately with the accumulation of capital, the 
economic, social and political development. To be simpler, 
technological factor plays a central role in world system.
b. The action of the long waves (Kondratiev’s cycles) is located at 
this moment in the end of the negative curve of the world econ-
omy, that began in 1967, and reached its lowest point in 1993 
and began since 1994, a new long term of economic growth. 
in this new period of positive increase, the national economies 
will be able to assimilate a great number of scientific and tech-
nologic advances prepared during the long years of recession 
such as robotization and the flexible production, modern com-
munications, biotechnologies, etc. it will create a new period of 
globalization and integration of the world economy.
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c. This new period of increase, as related in the theory of the long 
waves, would be relatively stable for a long time.  neverthe-
less, it begins with a big problem of structural unemployment, 
as a consequence of the huge advance of the robotization of 
the productive process and the automation of great part of the 
service activities.  The issues of this period will be: diminu-
tion of labour time; change the management system of micro 
and macroeconomic policies; restructuring of the corporations 
and  public administrations; the reduction of social exclusion 
and criminal violence, consumption of drugs; the preservation 
of environment and etc., which are the legacies of  unequal, 
imbalanced, and exhaustive economic growth.
d. The tendencies of monopolization and oligopolization of the 
local, national, regional and global markets, with the forma-
tion of the regional blocks, the increase of the intra-firm trade, 
the crescent cooperation among  multinational corporations 
and the formation of networks and mechanisms of manage-
ment through advanced  telecommunications.
e. The question of the governability arises from these realities at 
the global, regional and national levels will lead to the global 
institutional reconstruction that affects particularly the united 
nations and other international organizations, and a rebuild-
ing of industrial and economic policies at these levels.
f. The definition of a global project of sustainable development, ca-
pable of guaranteeing the preservation and the betterment of the 
environment and the elimination of the poverty and the misery.
II. ThE PERSPECTIVES of ThE SoUTh
The developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America should 
strengthen the capacity of their own international research systems 
and academic institutions to:
a. establish a conceptual bases that permit to describe this pro-
cess of globalization in three dimensions:
1. new Technologies vs. capitalist Productive system/relations
2. Domestic Political relations vs. geopolitical strategies
3. cultural Traditions, pluralism and globalization
b. Analyze their situation and to diagnose the problems and de-
termine their respective national objectives;
c. Determine and draw politics of regional integration and of sus-
tainable development capable to overcome these serious struc-
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tural limits and to put itself in a level of civilization compatible 
with the scientific and technological revolution.
Last but not the least, the social scientists of the south should join the 
social forces and the political movements so as to produce an effective 
response to the global changes; they should unite the local, regional 
and global efforts in order to fight for sustainable development and 
global socio-economic justice.
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The new world social issues make an intellectual dialogue with 
chinese sociology possible, building up a productive agenda for the 
future of the contemporary sociology. 
The distinctive features of the sociological knowledge in Latin 
America have been the following: internationalism, hybridism, critical 
approach to processes and conflicts of the Latin American societies, 
and social commitment on the part of the sociologist (germani, 1959; 
castaneda, 2004; chacon, 1977; ianni, 1993; marini & millán, 1994). 
We may identify six periods in Latin American and caribbean 
sociology: 
1. The intellectual inheritance of sociology (from the nineteenth 
century to the early twentieth century). 
2. The sociology of the chair (1850-1950). 
3. The ‘scientific sociology’ and the configuration of ‘critical soci-
ology’ (1950- 1973). 
4. The institutional crisis, the consolidation of ‘critical sociology’, 
and the diversification (1973-1983). 
5. The sociology of authoritarianism, democracy, and exclusion 
(1983-2000).
6. The institutional consolidation and the worldization of Latin 
American sociology (since 2000). 
To analyze this internationalization of sociology, it seems interesting 
to formulate three hypotheses: 
1. The Latin American sociology forms, from the years 1930, an 
intellectual approach marked by the internationalism and by 
sociological innovation. 
2. it is not possible to understand the contemporary sociology 
without considering the work of Latin American sociologists.
3. The legacy of the critical approach on sociology could be an 
intellectual method to design a dialogue with others sociologi-
cal traditions, as for instance, with the new chinese sociology.
The outlines of the sociological knowledge in Latin America must be 
remembered: the internationalism, the hybridism, the diversity and 
the critical analyses of the social process, the social conflicts and the 
public commitment of sociologists. Latin American sociology is insert-
ed in the global space of the sociological knowledge: it has scientific le-
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gitimacy, and has being recognized by the civil society and by the state 
as a critical conscience of the social reality. The critical thought needs 
the construction of a new paradigm, in order to be able to imagine po-
litical alternatives, working with the dialectic between the sciences of 
the complexity and the experiences of the classes, the nations and the 
citizenship (gonzález casanova, 2004; mejía navarrete, 2009).
 
PRoSPECTS foR CRITICAL SoCIoLoGy fRoM LATIn AMERICA 
The twenty-first century expresses long transformations of the contem-
porary societies, with new forms of the social agents, others social forces, 
emerging new social movements and a set of social representations very 
diverse. The present period is marked by the post modernity as a cultural 
form, by the intensive use of the scientific knowledge in new technologies, 
by the expansion of the industrial production but with precarious labour, 
by the advance of the financial capital but also a global social crisis (hob-
sbawm, 1996; 2000; ianni, 1992, 1996; Jameson, 1996; Arrighi, 2007). 
The Late modernity means also the worldization of social con-
flicts and the new transnational social issues, which are analyzed by 
an international sociology. indeed, a revolution within the informa-
tion technology is reframing the material base of the society (cas-
tells, 1996) but the purposes of science, technology and innovation 
are mostly determined by the market’s demands (Baumgarten, 2008). 
The new social questions are more complex: the question of social 
inclusion / exclusion; the relation of man with nature, indicating the 
ecological issue; the transformations of urban and agrarian spaces; 
the fragmentation of the cities; the question of the multiculturalism 
and transculturalism; the dilemmas of the university, science and the 
technology; the changes through the new technologies; the forms of 
violence; the ambivalent lines of the civilizing process and the alter-
natives of development for the contemporary societies (castel, 1998; 
castells, 1996; ianni, 2004; Wieviorka, 2004). 
There is a deep process of social exclusion — the unemployed, 
the migrants, the underclass, the landless peasants, those with hun-
ger and ‘without work’, and people experiencing the digital divide (De 
sousa santos, 2000). The social bonds have been broken, by means 
of social fragmentation processes, a mass society but with individual 
values (ianni, 1996). Among the new social questions, even crime ac-
quires new contours and the multiplicity of violence produces a pro-
cess of lacerating citizenship (Tavares dos santos, 2009). 
We live, from the beginning of the twenty-first century, in the sixth 
period of this long intellectual history: the institutional consolidation 
and the internationalization of the Latin American sociology. so, it is 
possible to enunciate a set of questions: 
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1. Which is the significance of the Latin American sociology in 
the age of worldization of social conflicts? 
2. how to develop a cosmopolite dialogue with others nationals 
sociologies, from the north to the south, from the West to the 
east? 
3. how to express the Latin American social diversity in the spec-
trum of the new worldwide social questions? 
4. how to construct the recognition of the Latin American socio-
logical thought in an international sociology? 
I. ThE InTELLECTUAL InhERITAnCE of SoCIoLoGy (fRoM  
ThE nInETEEnTh CEnTURy To ThE EARLy TWEnTIETh CEnTURy)
The intellectual inheritance of sociology in Latin America was out-
lined by authors who were concerned with a general interpretation of 
the society in which they lived. We may name them ‘social thinkers.’ 
The period of the social thinkers corresponds historically to the period 
that spans from the struggles for independence in Latin American na-
tions until the beginning of the twentieth century During this period, 
social theory was developed mostly by thinkers who were under the 
influence of socio-philosophical ideas developed in europe and in the 
usA, such as the french illuminism, comte’s positivism, and spen-
cer’s evolutionism (Liedke filho, 2003). 
in Brazil, the intellectual milieu was marked by the modernist 
revolution (1922), a blossom of ideas that grew in with missions of for-
eign scholars from both the usA and france. it dates back to the 1930s 
the publication of some admirable works: Casa Grande e Senzala, by 
gilberto freyre (1933); Evolução Política do Brasil, by caio Prado Jun-
ior (1933); and Raízes do Brasil, by sérgio Buarque de holanda (1936). 
in other Latin American countries, the social thinkers’ contribu-
tions were equally important. in chile, José Vitorino Lastarria (1817), 
O Positivismo; Valentin Letelier (1852-1919); enrique molina, O 
Ensaio Moderno (Brunner, 1988). in Peru, we could list José carlos 
mariátegui (1895-1930) and Victor raúl haya de ia Torre (1895), EI 
Imperialismo y el APRA; and José miguel Arguedas. in cuba, ramiro 
guerra wrote Azúcar y población en Ias Antillas (sosa, 1994; in ma-
rina & millán, 1994). in Venezuela, Vallenilla Lanz wrote Cesarismo 
democrático, estudio sobre Ias bases sociológicas de Ia Constitución 
efectiva de Venezuela (1919); José rafael mendoza, Ideológica y moral 
(1938), and rafael caldeira, Idea de una sociología venezolana (1954) 
(romero salazar, 2001: 21). in mexico, the following books had been 
published: Los Grandes Problemas Nacionales, by José Vasconcelos and 
Andrés molina henríquez; Las clases sociales, by mariano otero, and 
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Evolución Política del Pueblo Mexicano, by Justo sierra. in Argentina, 
as early as in the nineteenth century, Facundo o civilización y barbarie, 
by sarmiento (1811-1888), published in 1845, (sarmiento, 1994). 
The major result of social thinkers contribution was the gain of le-
gitimacy of a certain discourse on society, one that defined the intellec-
tual as an interpreter of the meaning of the national society construction 
(Brunner, 1988: 37). in other words, the formation of the Latin American 
thought can be seen as the history of the idea of a Latin America, i.e., the 
‘national question’ was its basic issue and this question refers to how a na-
tion is formed and transformed (ianni, 1993: 32). 
II. ThE ‘SoCIoLoGy of ThE ChAIR’ (1890-1950) 
The academic institutionalization of sociology took place in terms of 
the so-called ‘The sociology of the chair’, a period which began, in 
the Latin American countries, towards the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, when the disciplines of sociology were introduced in the schools 
of Philosophy, Law, and economy or, as in Brazil, in the secondary 
schools for Teachers (Liedke filho, 2003: 226). This phase was char-
acterized by the publication of handbooks for the teaching of sociol-
ogy, and it was through them that one could learn about the ideas 
of renowned european and American sociologists, as well as about 
sociological ideas on social problems such as urbanization, immigra-
tion, illiteracy, and poverty. 
in Brazil, in the 1930s, some schools were founded in the higher 
education system: escola Livre de sociologia e Política (1933) and fac-
uldade de filosofia, ciências e Letras of the university of são Paulo 
(1934), both in the state of são Paulo (Barreira, 2009). in the city of rio 
de Janeiro, the university of the Distrito federal was founded in 1935, 
afterwards becoming the university of Brazil, when then its faculdade 
nacional de filosofia was founded in 1939 (Lippi, 1995: 242). An author 
of paramount importance in that period was fernando de Azevedo. 
in Argentina, the institute of sociology of the school of Philoso-
phy and Languages of the university of Buenos Aires was created in 
1940. Alfredo Poviña was the intellectual leader in that period, not-
withstanding the fact that sergio Bagú’s work, Economía de ia socie-
dad colonial (1949), was a milestone in the interpretation of the Latin 
American history. 
in méxico, mendieta y nuñez encourages the organization of the 
instituto de investigaciones sociales and starts editing the mexican 
Journal of sociology. in uruguay, the discipline of sociology is created 
in 1951 at the facultad de Derecho y ciencias sociales, universidad 
de ia república; and another discipline of sociology is created in 1952 
at the facultad de Arquitectura. Among the most outstanding sociolo-
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gists are isaac ganon (Estructura social deI Uruguay, 1966) and Aldo 
solari (rural sociology). The instituto de ciencias sociales is creat-
ed in 1958, and the centro Latinoamericano de economia humana 
(cLAeh) is founded (universidad de la república, 2000; filgueira, 
1979; Pinheiro, 1988). in chile, the facultad de filosofia y educación 
of the university of chile was organized in 1931, and Astolfo Taipa 
moore was one of the most important chilean sociologists from that 
period. in Venezuela, the first academic disciplines in sociology were 
created in the central university, in 1902, and, later on, at the univer-
sity of Los Andes; the Department of sociology and Anthropology of 
the central university of Venezuela was created in 1953. 
The Latin American sociology Association (ALAs) was founded 
during the first World congress of sociology, organized by the interna-
tional sociological Association (isA), in Zurich, in 1950. The ALAs 1st 
congress was held in Buenos Aires, in 1951. Alfredo Poviña was elected 
President. The ALAs 2nd congress was held in rio de Janeiro, in 1953, 
and manuel Diegues Júnior was then elected President. Two years later, 
in Quito, the 3rd ALAs congress was concerned with outlining ‘a com-
mon basic program for the Latin American universities which would 
address the following division and organization of academic disciplines: 
history of sociology, Logics of sociology, general sociology, special 
sociologies, and Latin American sociology’ (Brunner, 1988: 149). 
from the very first congress on, the opponents of the ‘chair so-
ciologists’ were already present in these international meetings, and 
would eventually become the ‘scientific sociologists’, people as, for in-
stance, gino germani, which presented papers in rio de Janeiro in 
1953, in Quito in 1955, and in montevideo in 1959 (germani, 1971: 
13; germani, 2004: 133). 
in 1957, in santiago, chile, where the 4th ALAs congress took 
place, the sociologist Astolfo Taipa moore was elected President. in 
1959, during the 5th congress, in montevideo, it was isaac ganon’s 
turn to be elected President. 
one may assert that the phase of ‘chair sociologists’ made possi-
ble the institutionalization of the sociological discourse and the foun-
dation of schools of higher education in sociology or else social sci-
ences (Brunner, 1988: 347). 
III. ThE ‘SCIEnTIfIC SoCIoLoGy’ PERIod And ThE ConfIGURATIon  
of A ‘CRITICAL SoCIoLoGy’ (1950-1973) 
The ‘scientific sociology’ period was characterized by academic insti-
tutionalization and theoretical disputes linked to empirical investiga-
tion, from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s. in Argentina, the institute 
of sociology of the university of Buenos Aires was organized, and 
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their ‘scientific sociology’ was defined by the presence of gino ger-
mani, Jorge graciarena, and Torcuato Di Tella; later on, sergio Bagú 
and Tulio halperin Dongui joined the faculty. 
in mexico, the national school of Political and social scienc-
es was founded in the Autonomous national university of mexico 
(unAm) in 1951, and the centre for Latin American studies was 
founded in 1961. 
in Brazil, in the 1950s, the school of sociology of the university of 
são Paulo was finally consolidated, led by Antonio candido, florestan 
fernandes, octavio ianni, and fernando henrique cardoso. This faculty 
would guide Brazilian sociology for decades to come. The sociological 
work of florestan fernandes (1920-1995) is the major expression of soci-
ology in Latin America, mainly being concerned with ‘sociology in an era 
of social revolution’ (candido, 2001; garcía, 2002; Liedke filho, 2003b; 
martins, 1998). in rio de Janeiro, at the same time, sociology was thriv-
ing in the universities: the state of rio de Janeiro, in the 1950s, has among 
its exponents in social sciences hélio Jaguaribe, nelson Werneck sodré, 
and guerreiro ramos (ramos, 1965; Lippi oliveira, 1995). in the other 
states of the Brazilian federation, the university courses of social sci-
ences are being structured, especially in Bahia, Pernambuco. rio grande 
do sul and minas gerais, with professors who had had their education in 
Law or economy, as well as having graduated from medical school, as it 
was the case of Thales de Azevedo, from Bahia (Barreira, 2009). 
The creation of the economic commission for Latin America (ce-
PAL) by the united nations in 1948 gave rise to an important diagno-
sis of the Latin American economies, based on raúl Prebisch, with a 
structural heterogeneity’: the centre/periphery concept developed from 
acknowledging the existence of an international division of labour, ac-
cording to which the Latin American countries are assigned a subordi-
nate role and specialize in producing and exporting raw materials and 
different kinds of food (estay reino; in marini & millán, 1994: 28) . As to 
the Latin American agrarian question, cePAL points out two elements: 
‘(a] an extremely slow growth associated to certain agrarian structures, 
and (b) the structures of property and possession of land’ (giarracca, 
in Pineiro, 2000: 78). cePAL congregated notorious economists from 
Latin America — celso furtado, Aníbal Pinto, oswaldo sunkel, among 
others — and gave rise to the creation of the Latin American institute of 
economic and social Planning (iLPes) in 1962, which aimed at taking 
a path to planning through theories on development. 
in chile, in 1951, the institute for sociological research of the school 
of Philosophy and education of the university of chile was created. in 
1958, the school of sociology was organized, and in the same year, the 
school of sociology of the catholic university opened its doors. in both in-
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stitutions, a renowned generation of sociologists developed their academic 
work, and among them we find eduardo hamuy, hernán godoy, guill-
ermo Briones, rafael Baraona, enzo faletto, Danilo salcedo, edmundo 
fuenzalida, orlando sepúlveda, manuel Antonio garretón, and roger 
Vekemans. one might say that the influence of functionalism is evident in 
the theoretical concepts, and emphasis is put on quantitative techniques as 
a methodological option (godoy urzúa, in camacho, 1979: 519). 
unesco’s support to the development of social sciences in Lat-
in America materialized, at that time, in two projects: the first un-
esco project resulted in the foundation of a Latin America center for 
research in social sciences, in rio de Janeiro, in 1957. many Latin 
American sociologists took part in seminars at the institution, such 
as Luiz A. costa Pinto, gino germani, rodolfo stavenhagen, Torcu-
ato Di Tella and Jorge graciarena (chor maio, 1999: 35). The cen-
tre published the journal America Latina from 1959 to 1976. most 
articles discussed topics on development in Latin America. or else 
they were topics concerning each of the different countries. The main 
bibliographical production referred to developmental sociology, from 
modernization to ‘dual societies’. its end, in 1976, was dramatic, aban-
doned by the military government (Lippi, 1995; 2005). 
The second unesco project resulted in the foundation of the 
Latin American school of social sciences (fLAcso), in 1957. lt first 
director was José medina echevarría (Aspectos sociales del desarrollo 
económico, 1959). fLAcso expanded throughout eleven countries in 
the following decades, and it was responsible for institutionalizing so-
cial sciences in Latin America during the difficult years of the military 
regimes which would scar the continent from the 1960s on. 
in colombia, a group formed around orlando fals Borda starts 
writing sociological analyses: their landmark is the publication of 
La Violencia en colombia, followed by Las revoluciones inconclusas 
en America Latina (fals Borda, 1971 and 1976). in Venezuela, silva-
michelena and orlando Albornoz start writing. in guatemala, severo 
martínez Peláez publishes, in 1970, La Patria deI Criollo, ensayo de 
interpretación de Ia realidad colonial guatemalteca, an indispensable 
reference book when the subject is the central American societies. 
in mexico, Pablo gonzález casanova publishes, in 1965, La de-
mocracia en México, a remarkable work in the sociological approach 
guided by a structural viewpoint, analyzing the shaping of the nation-
al state with the notion of an internal colonialism (gonzález casa-
nova, 1967). in uruguay, the institute of social sciences is founded, in 
the universidad de ia república, in 1958. 
The period from 1950 to 1973 corresponds to the phase of the 
populist democracies: Vargas in Brazil (1950-54); Peron (1945-55), 
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and frondizi (1958-62) in Argentina; ibanez, in chile (1952-58), fol-
lowed by Allessandris liberalism (1958-64), and by eduardo frei’s 
christian democracy (1964-70). There were a few experiences with 
socialist governments: Arbenz, in guatemala (1948-54); the mobiliza-
tion in the Dominican republic (1966); the cuban revolution (1959); 
and in chile, Allende’s government (1970-73). 
This phase of the ‘scientific sociology’ attempted to institutional-
ize both the teaching of and the research in sociology — based on the 
structural-functionalist paradigm — in a way that were analogous to 
that of the sociological centres of the hegemonic countries. According 
to this approach, the concept of development was expressed in the 
theory of modernization and in the analysis of the process of transi-
tion from a traditional to a modern society. The theory of moderniza-
tion perceived the process of development as a transition from a tra-
ditional rural society to a modern industrial society (germani, 1971). 
At that period, the ALAs congresses were held each time in a differ-
ent country; for instance, in Venezuela, in 1967 — the elected President 
of the 6th congress was the sociologist rafael caldeira, and the main 
themes discussed were: ‘possibilities and limitations of the sociologi-
cal research in Latin America; political parties and electoral sociology; 
and the social changes in Latin America’. in 1963, the 7th congress took 
place in colombia; in 1967, the 8th congress was held in ei salvador. 
By the end of that period, the configuration of the ‘critical soci-
ology’ was undergoing, with an analysis that disputed both the as-
sumptions of the ‘sociology of modernization’ and the development 
of an approach based on a ‘multiple interlocution’ (ianni, 1993), with 
nonconformist authors from the united states (such as W. mills and 
horowitz), or from the french heterodox marxism (as incorporated 
by henri Lefebvre and Jean-Paul sartre), and from the uK (the first 
works by historians from Birbeck college, London, who were follow-
ers of eric hobsbawm (hobsbawm, 2002). 
one of the most prominent sociologists from that period is the 
Brazilian Luiz Aguiar de costa Pinto, director of the Latin American 
center for social sciences from 1957 to 1961, and editor of the journal 
Revista América Latina, having been Vice-president of the internation-
al sociological Association (isA) from 1956 to 1959. The contribution 
of costa Pinto to sociology derives from his concept of sociological 
study as a critical analysis of society: he devoted himself to interpret-
ing the racial relations and the transitions that characterized societies 
at his time (chor maio & Villas Bôas, 1999; costa Pinto, 1970). 
in other words, the institutionalization of sociology in that period 
that ends in 1964, in the case of Brazil, ‘revealed to the intellectuals 
another interpretive perspective in the horizon, one that was based on 
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the social and economic inequalities inherent to the Brazilian society’ 
(Villas Bôas; in Bomeny and Birman, 1991: 37). in Argentina, as early 
as 1967, Jorge graciarena was already outlining a framework for the 
‘sociology of conflict’ (gracierena, 1971: 178). 
A critical approach to the ‘sociology of modernization’ was emerg-
ing; its exponents were miguel murrnis, Juan carlos Portantiero, and 
the followers of José Aricó — editor of the periodical Cuadernos de 
Pasado y Presente that came to define a renewal in the sociological 
thought in Latin America (murmis & Portantiero, 1974). 
The Latin American rural sociological Association (ALAsru) 
was created in 1969, in Buenos Aires, with the purpose to ‘encourage 
the circulation and refinement of rural sociology’ (nino Velásquez; 
in Pinheiro, 2000: 212). Their 1st congress was held in 1983, in the 
Dominican republic, and their 6th congress, in 2003, in Porto Alegre. 
The last one was organized in recife, Brazil, 2011.
The phase of institutionalizing social sciences in Latin America 
had come to its end, with a brilliant generation of intellectuals having 
been devastated by the military coups which succeeded each other 
in the south cone, starting with Brazil (1964) and Argentina (1966) 
(Brunner, 1988: 351-56). 
nonetheless, an intellectual process was noticeable: eliseo Verón 
revealed the beginning of the scientific sociology crisis. on the one 
hand, a certain ideological diversification is produced, with the marx-
ist thinking with paramount importance, but also the structural an-
thropology, the communication theory), and the critical us academic 
sociologist, such as goffman, garfinkel, Becker (Verón, 1974: 45). 
finally, in many Latin American countries, at this moment, soci-
ology would experience a sort of rebirth, and would even present itself 
as ‘critical sociology,’ often within that one space of freedom which 
was provided by the ALAs congresses. 
IV. ThE InSTITUTIonAL CRISIS, ThE ConSoLIdATIon of ThE ‘CRITICAL 
SoCIoLoGy’, And ThE dIVERSIfICATIon of SoCIoLoGy (1973-1983) 
The Diaspora of sociologists from Brazil, Argentina, and uruguay had 
begun. in 1969, the 9th ALAs congress was held in mexico, with Pa-
blo gonzález casanova being elected President. The generosity of the 
mexican people contributed to the creation of institutions that wel-
comed many of the exiled intellectuals: this country was converted in 
the 1970s, into a sort of cultural-ideological crossroads. in 1971 the 
center for sociological studies is created, and in 1973, the Doctorate 
Program in sociology of colégio do méxico — not to mention that 
unAm was still going strong as an institution of reference, with Pablo 
gonzález casanova’s guidance. 
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in 1972, while Allende’s government was effervescent, guillermo 
Briones was elected President of the 10th ALAs congress That period, 
from 1964 to 1983, refers to the period of the military governments, 
with traces of authoritarianism and ‘state violence against their op-
ponents and against many sociologists’ (Brazil, 1964-1985; Argentina, 
1966-1983; uruguay, 1973-1985; chile, 1973-1989). 
Within the context of the military coups, in the 1960s, there was the 
‘period of crisis and diversification in the Latin American sociology,’ the 
consolidation of the ‘critical sociology,’ and the emergence of the theory of 
dependence, while at the same time a double movement was taking place. 
if, on the one hand, in some countries (particularly in Argentina, 
chile and uruguay) an institutional crisis in sociology was brought 
about, in other countries, on the other hand, an institutional consoli-
dation took place (as in the case of Brazil, in the 1980s, and mexico), 
with the generalization of the theories of dependence, of marxism, 
and of critical sociology (olivier, 1996: 80). 
During this period, in the 1970s, in many countries, centres for re-
search were organized, thus giving rise to a process of overture to new 
institutional possibilities for sociological work: in Brazil, ceBrAP; ce-
Dec; in uruguay, the ciesu; in chile, fLAcso and the group of Agrar-
ian investigators (giA, 1991); in Peru, the center for Peruvian studies 
(ceP); and in Argentina, the institute Di Tella, cicso and ceur. 
As a consequence, the Latin American council on social sciences 
(cLAcso) was founded in 1967, and it was their function to coordi-
nate efforts, to be a representative organ before unesco, and to be 
an agent in raising funds from international organizations for the pro-
jects to be developed at the centres for research in the various Latin 
American countries, thus being able to provide opportunities in social 
sciences, something which would secure the continuity of critical so-
ciology in Latin America (theirs executive secretaries had been Aldo 
ferrer; francisco Delich; fernando calderón; márcia rivera; Atilio 
Borón and, since 2007, emir sader). 
The consolidation of ‘critical sociology’ may be well character-
ized by its basic dimensions: an integrated analysis perspective; the 
historical-structural or dialectic method; the historicity of the object 
of knowledge; the analysis of complex phenomena of an international 
nature; a radical criticism of structuralism-functionalism; an inter-
est in marxism as an all encompassing theory that could explain any 
regional reality; the themes of development and of social and political 
change (franco; in camacho, 1979: 271-84). 
The most important authors are florestan fernandes, octavio ian-
ni, orlando fals Borda, Aníbal Quijano, Pablo gonzález casanova, fer-
nando henrique cardoso, enzo faletto, miguel murmis, among others. 
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one must add, to the above iist, the vast expansion of a critical 
sociology of the agrarian social processes in Latin America (Delich, 
1970; giA, 1991; giarracca, 1998; 1999; Pereira de Queiroz, 1973; Pin-
ero, 1998; 2000; Brunner and Tavares dos santos, in Pinero, 2000; 
souza martins, 1981; Tavares dos santos, 1991). 
Also, a landmark was heleieth saffioti’s book, The Woman in Class 
Society, published in 1969, about how gender operates in class soci-
eties (saffioti, 1969). her study suggests that the ‘explanation of the 
women’s situation in the capitalistic society can be found via the analy-
sis of the relations between the factor gender and the essential deter-
minations of the capitalistic mode of production’ (saffioti, 1969: 387). 
There was an intense dispute as to the variants of marxism, from 
the historicist marxism of the university of são Paulo to the Althus-
serian marxism. it was also a period when the theory of dependence 
became internationality pervasive. moreover, one should not forget 
to mention the indigenous marxism, the neo-gramscian scholars, 
and the neo-developmentalists (mariátegui, 1973; marini and millán, 
1995; Briceno-León, 1990). 
other authors from the second generation of the school of soci-
ology of the university of são Paulo had their first books published 
in the 1980s. Among then, we have marialice foracchi, José césar 
gnacarini, Luiz Pereira, José de souza martins, gabriel cohn, and 
sedi hirano. 
in the case of chile, the production of ngos may be best char-
acterized by their ‘critical texts’, due to a questioning attitude geared 
directly against the military government. The most important institu-
tion was fLAcso-chile (Brunner, 1988). norbert Lechner reflection 
belongs to that phase as well, for the main theme of his work is ‘to 
explore the subjective dimension of politics’ (Lechner, 1988: 13). 
however, during the military regimes in the south cone, there 
were brutal repression and exile of sociologists, at first in chile, then 
in méxico, central America and the caribbean islands. The Diaspora 
in Latin American sociology paradoxically produced an unprecedent-
ed process of academic exchanges and dialogue, and the ALAs con-
gresses moved to the Andean America and central America. 
in 1974, the 11th ALAs congress was held in san José, costa rica, 
and Daniel camacho was elected President. The main debate took 
place between two distinct approaches to Latin America: ‘a debate 
between those authors who advocate an approach that focuses on the 
concept of imperialism and those who choose to make use of the cat-
egory of dependence’ (camacho, 1979: 12). The 12th congress took 
place in Quito, with Agustín cueva as President. in 1979, at Panama 
city, marco A. gandásegui presided over the 13th ALAs congress Two 
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years later, the 14th congress, held in san Juan, Porto rico, elected 
Denis maldonado to chair the meeting. The 15th ALAs congress was 
organized in 1983, in managua, while the sandinista revolution 
(1979-1990) was raging. 
The atmosphere in that managua congress revealed hope in the 
overcoming of the central America dictatorships. The authoritarian 
forms of government — somoza family in nicaragua (1937-1979); 
the permanence of the Army in the government of ei salvador (1931- 
1979), and the military governments after Arbenzs fails from power in 
guatemala (1954-1982) (Torres-rivas, 1993: 17) — were followed by 
political agreements and peace treaties which left great hopes of change 
in central America (figueroa ibarra; in Torres-rivas, 1993: chapter 2). 
That was the period of crisis and diversification in Latin Ameri-
can sociology (1973- 1983), characterized by the institutional and 
professional crisis in sociology under the cultural-political repression 
of the authoritarian regimes and, at the same time, by a deep paradig-
matic crisis, i.e., by a crisis of the hegemony of the ‘scientific’ sociol-
ogy, given the emergence of theoretical options, such as the national 
sociology, the theory of dependence, and the theory of the ‘new au-
thoritarianism’ (Liedke filho, 2005: 400) 
rodolfo stavenhagen work (Siete tesis equivocadas sobre América 
Latina: sociología y subdesarrollo), published in mexico in 1973, repre-
sented a landmark in this critical rupture with the developmentalists 
and modernizing theories (stavenhagen; in Durand, 1974). several au-
thors — Theotonio dos santos, Vania Bambirria, Andre gunder frank 
and enzo faleto, start asking themselves whether it was possible that 
the socioeconomic development could be frustrated if it attempted to 
reproduce the processes experienced by the ‘metropolitan’ hegemonic 
countries. Basically, they start thinking that underdevelopment has its 
historical specificity of dependence mean. According to florestan fer-
nandes, this was the ‘phase of reflecting on the bourgeois revolution 
in Brazil (1967-1986)’, described in his book A Revolução Burguesa no 
Brasil, followed by another phase (1986-1995), that of the ‘citizenship 
militancy’ (Liedke filho, 2003b). 
fernando henrique cardoso and enzo faletto’s book (published 
first in chile and mexico, and then in Brazil in 1970) was the socio-
logical work from the region that had the most repercussion abroad. 
Their purpose was ‘to explain some controversial aspects about the 
conditions, possibilities, and forms of economic development in coun-
tries that, while keeping relations of dependence with the hegemonic 
poles of the capitalist system have managed to organize themselves 
into becoming nations — and, just like any other state, aspire to sov-
ereignty (cardoso & faletto, 1973: 7). 
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in Latin America, there were disagreements in the relationship 
between the military governments and the academic, scientific, and 
technological development. even military authoritarian governments 
could be extremely different one from each other: in the cases of Ar-
gentina, chile, and uruguay, on the one hand; and the case of Brazil, 
on the other, they affected the higher-education institutions (Brunner 
& Barrios, 1987: 42). 
in the Brazilian case, after professors, researchers and university 
teachers were expelled from various institutions, both in 1964 and in 
1968; scientific and technological development were incorporated to 
the model of development and geopolitics that had been adopted, es-
pecially after 1975, in a phase called ‘gradual transition’. 
in Argentina (1966-1983), chile (1973-1989), and uruguay (1973-
1985), a repressive and destructive authoritarianism prevailed in the 
universities in the area of social sciences (garretón, 1983; 1984). 
V. AUThoRITARIAnISM, dEMoCRACy And SoCIAL ExCLUSIon (1983-2000)
After the Argentinean example in 1983, the processes of re-democra-
tization in the other countries (Brazil in 1985; chile in 1989) outline 
new social processes, and in sociology the principal debate tackles 
authoritarianism and social exclusion (garretón, 1995; 2000). 
it was then possible to scatter the ALAs congresses throughout 
Latin America and the caribbean islands. in 1985, the 16th congress 
was held in rio de Janeiro, under the supervision of Theotonio dos 
santos. in 1987, it was montevideo’s turn to host the ALAs congress 
in its 17th edition, when geronimo de sierra was elected President. in 
1991, the 18th congress was held in cuba (salazar, 1992: 13). 
Among the various debates, the question of the state in Latin Amer-
ica was summarized in three aspects. The first question relates to the 
modes of society participation in the structures and in exercising de-
mocracy. The second one relates to the ability this society will have to de-
velop policies for its own interests. The third and last question is based 
on our prospects for the future of Latin America (salazar, 1992: 177).
The following congress was held in caracas, in 1993 (sonntag 
& Briceno-León, 1998). The more outstanding debates discussed the 
following subjects: the viability of democracy in Latin America in the 
1990s; models for alternative development and for social policies; cul-
ture, modernity, and cultural tradition; and democracy and citizenship. 
During that period, it was noteworthy the density in the theoreti-
cal and interpretive contribution of sociologists, in different countries 
from Latin America. in Peru, for instance, there was José matos mar, 
Aníbal Quijano, and Julio cotler (Clases, Estado y Nación en el Perú, 
1978). And we have already mentioned the sociological production 
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in chile, with enzo faletto, José Brunner, norbert Lechner, sérgio 
gómez, and so many others. in Brazil florestan fernandes, octavio 
ianni, fernando henrique cardoso, José de sousa martins, gabriel 
cohn, and a new generation of young sociologists (who obtained their 
PhD at the university of são Paulo, at iuPerJ of rio de Janeiro, and 
at universities abroad — france, uK, germany, usA, mexico) in the 
1980s and the 1990s. 
much work was carried out in the field of agrarian studies, they 
overcame theoretically the concept of modernization; they interpreted 
the changes in the social classes in the agrarian milieu, they acknowl-
edged the political presence of the peasants in the Latin American 
societies, and they evaluated the social changes in the agrarian milieu 
(gómez & echenique, 1988; gonzález casanova, 1984, 1985; roger 
Bartra, 1974; 1981, 1982; martins, 1981). The presence of the peas-
antry as a social force in Latin America was once again a topic in 
sociological studies, and these include the socio-historical studies by 
Arturo Warman, Jacques chonchol, and José Bengoa. At the same 
time, there was a boom of studies on the ‘new ruralism’ and the social 
conflicts (giarracca, 2001; gómez, 2002; Pérez correa, 2001). 
The changes in contemporary societies imposed new challeng-
es to sociology in Latin America after the global crisis on the 1990s 
that conclude the short twentieth century (hobsbawm, 1994). These 
new challenges were especially acute in the beginning of the twenty-
first century: the worldization of social conflicts, the globalization of 
economy, the neo-fordism mode of production and the cultural post-
modernity. 
VI. ThE InSTITUTIonAL ConSoLIdATIon And ThE WoRLdIzATIon  
of LATIn AMERICAn SoCIoLoGy (AfTER ThE yEAR 2000) 
in the process of worldization of Latin American sociology, the so-
cial dilemmas take on new configurations. This is the period when 
political democracy was steadily constructed in Latin America, with 
specific processes of re-democratization. The increasing claims for 
human rights, social rights, and the right to difference aspired to an 
extended social democracy and citizenship. This is a time for theoreti-
cal debate involving different notions of state, social classes, and new 
social movements (Larangelra, 1990; medeiros, 1989; scherer-Warren 
& Krischke, 1987), completed with discussions on modernity, post-
modernity, and the future of Latin American societies (Domingos, 
1999; ianni, 1996, 2000). 
The ALAs congresses in the 1990s manifested this concern. in 
1995, the 20th ALAs congress was held in mexico, and raquel sosa 
was elected President. The congress’s theme was ‘Latin America and 
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the caribbean islands: prospects for their reconstruction’ (sosa, 1996). 
so, the contemporary challenges to the Latin American sociology are: 
globalization, the integration of Latin America into the new world 
scenery, the question of migrations and frontiers, the demographic 
transition, problems of the transition to democracy, political culture 
and the media, political violence, the agrarian urban crisis, the pros-
pects for recovery of the environment and the design of a program for 
sustainable development, the problems of gender and autonomy for 
the different ethnic groups (olivier, 1996: 5). 
The production of new knowledge after the social struggles and 
movements, in circumstances where we have criticism against the ne-
oliberal hegemony — e.g., as in the Zapatista movement — was taking 
place (sosa, 1996: 24). The question of the prospects for democracy 
in Latin America was the big issue at that moment, mainly to social 
participation in the fundamental issues of society (salinas, 1999: 10). 
The following ALAs congress, the 21st, was held in 1997, at the 
university of são Paulo, in the city of são Paulo, and emir sader was 
elected President. The final Declaration of the 21st congress establishes: 
There are representative-democratic regimes in most of our countries 
today. on the one hand, an option is presented which favours an in-
creasing concentration of both political and economic power, exclusion 
of the majority, and the existence of programs that reinforce social con-
trol, secure governability, and limit people’s participation in public life. 
on the other hand, democracy has in fact expanded the presence of the 
collectivities, the creation of horizontal networks not only of cultural 
and political organizations but also of social movements; democracy 
has also encouraged (and ma de deeper) the changes in both forms and 
means of the public activity, the establishment of new relations and 
means of alternative communication, the establishment of principles 
for a participative process and for a democratic culture (sader, 1988). 
At this moment, Latin American sociologist analyses globalism as a 
totality that is not only geo-historical, but also socially, economically, 
politically and culturally comprehensive. it actually means a totality, 
but heterogeneous, uneven, contradictory, and fragmentary (ianni, 
1992; 1996). 
We were living a neoliberalism, the generator of a process of eco-
nomic globalization, of increasing social inequalities, of a ‘world of 
poverty’ in ‘violent times’ (Borón, gambina & minsburg, 1999). in 
1999, the 22nd ALAs congress took place in concepción, chile. The 
final Declaration stated the following: ‘from our point of view, the 
alternative should be based on the value of the democracies at the 
national level, of the alliances between and of solidarity among all the 
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countries in the continent and those countries in the periphery of the 
planet, excluded as they are from the mega-markets of the rich coun-
tries. in the first place, one should be aware that, while experiencing 
the crisis of the neoliberal models, it is a must that alternatives that 
contemplate a sustainable development be designed, and such alter-
natives must articulate productivity and social equity. 
in 2001, the 1st regional conference of lsA, hosted by the Ven-
ezuelan sociology Association, made manifest the worldization in so-
ciology in Latin America, pointed the Latin American sociology main 
features: its empiricism, its eclecticism, and its social commitment 
(romero salazar, 2001: 54; sonntag & Briceno-León, 1998: 24). 
Also in 2001, the 23th ALAs congress took place in Antigua, gua-
temala. The final document affirms: 
We reiterate our commitment to a humanistic and critical thinking 
that engages in justice and peace, fights the various forms of oppres-
sion that crush our peoples today, pursues the consolidation of a Latin 
American identity, aims at restoring integrity and dignity, aims at the 
economic, social and cultural integration of our peoples, and seeks an 
active participation in the construction of a better and peaceful world. 
The 24th ALAs congress was held in Arequipa, Peru, in 2003, and Jor-
dan rosas Valdivia was elected President (Zeballo, salinas & Tavares 
dos santos, 2005). its central theme revealed the moment the conti-
nent was experiencing: ‘civil society: actors and organizations’. The 
final Declaration stated: 
As social scientists from this region of the world, permanently commit-
ted to its obtainment, we can contribute with vocation, creativity and 
initiative in this and in the next period, so that these new possibilities for 
development may become sound and solid to the benefit of society as a 
whole. some heartening experiences start to blossom - albeit extremely 
difficult and painful - in terms of a reconstruction of sociability’s, in terms 
of social struggles and movements, in terms of demonstrations and po-
litical participation. one can perceive, then, that the excluded are, in fact, 
including them. Alternatives can be foreseen: the renewal of forms to 
generate income, the reconfiguration of the social capital through soli-
darity networks, the processes that allow for the emergence of collective 
actions which apparently are strong enough to inspire hope in those ex-
cluded by the hegemonic model of globalization (Díaz & cattani, 2004). 
once again, critical knowledge had to face the challenges of inter-
preting the world social changes and their social and epistemologi-
cal effects on Latin American sociology (Barreira, 2009; Delich, 2004; 
Lander, 2003; sánchez & sosa, 2004). 
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The 25th congress of the Latin American sociology Association 
(ALAs, hold in Porto Alegre in 2005, followed the theme ‘Develop-
ment. crisis, Democracy — participation, social movements and so-
ciological theory’. The central topics where: (1) the dilemmas and the 
possibilities of democracy in Latin America, central America, and the 
caribbean islands — political violence vs. ethics; and (2) the theoreti-
cal challenges, both classical and contemporary, for sociology in Latin 
America (Tavares dos santos, 2009b, 2009c). 
VII. ThE AGE of WoRLd ConfLICTIVEnESS
Assuming the analysis developed by hobsbawm about the twentieth 
century, the Age of Extremes, one may define the twenty-first century 
(which has begun in 1991) as the period of the process of globalization 
of social conflicts, characterized by a worldization of the capitalistic 
activities, global crisis and hybrid cultures in Latin America. 
During this 10-year period, we arrived at a worldization of analy-
ses, discussions and debates on some of the new global social issues, 
mainly through conferences sponsored by international organizations 
like the united nations, from 1989. in the mid-1990s, a new wave of 
protests is set off against the effects of the globalization process — a 
process that molds social forms marked by the effects of exclusion 
derived from the neoliberal policies, thus giving rise to new social con-
flicts, sometimes establishing limits to the consolidation of democracy 
in the countries that are peripheral to the capitalistic world.
examples are many, from the Zapatista movement (1994) to the 
demonstrations against the meetings of the international financial or-
ganizations. in other words: ‘We have tried to demonstrate how the 
neoliberal doctrine was imposed upon the contemporary world, and 
how the economic policies derived from it have produced terrible in-
equalities in the world economy’. Against such discomfort of the con-
temporary civilization, a world process has been developed of debates 
on ‘another world possible’, something which has been taking place 
since the first World social forum in Porto Alegre, in 2001 (Dos san-
tos, 2004; cattani, 2001; seoane & Taddei, 2001). 
The social questions, focusing on work issues since the ninetieth 
century (castel, 1998), now become complex and worldwide ques-
tions, for many are the dimensions of social issues that are now ques-
tioned — among them the question of social bond (Tavares dos san-
tos, 2009). The changes in the working world, given the technological 
transformations that bring about scantier and more uncertain work 
opportunities, provoke a crisis to the labour unions, unemployment, 
and a process of social selection / exclusion (cardoso, 2003; sierra, 
2001; sobral fonseca & grossi Porto, 2001; mejía navarrete, 2009b). 
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Among the current social conflicts, the phenomena of diffuse vi-
olence have increased. They have acquired new characteristics, and 
now are pervasive in the entire society (Pinheiro, 1982, 1983, 1998; 
Preciado, 2004; Delito y sociedad, 1992-2012). one finds multiple forms 
of violence in the contemporary societies — ecological violence, social 
exclusion, violence between the genders, racism, violence in school 
—, and this comes to a process of citizenship laceration (Tavares dos 
santos, 1999). in other words, we face contemporary forms of social 
control that are characteristic of a repressive state plus a crisis in the 
welfare state (strasser, 2000: 14). There is a visibility and a notion 
of the importance the social struggles have against the worldization 
of injustice: we find new agents of resistance; we face the denial of 
centralized state power acting on the social space-time. Then, within 
the picture of crisis in the Latin American cities, it would be possible 
to consider the construction of a transnational world citizenship, one 
that would be marked by the conceiving of social, juridical, and sym-
bolic practices that were innovative and global (Joseph, 2005; ribeiro 
Torres, 2004; Tavares- dos-santos, 2009). 
Processes of social exclusion are unleashed: the landless, the 
social-classless, the computer divide, the homeless, the foodless, the 
workless; and the young people crisis (Balardini, 2000; Tavares dos 
santos, 2009). A new world social space of conflicts is delineating 
itself in the spaces and times of the ‘era of globalism’ (Beccaria & 
López, 1996; ianni, 1996; mazzei, 2002, minuin, 1995; souza martins, 
2002). Being against a normative and programmed society (resulting 
from a power technology centred in life itself) and against a state 
guided towards social penal control, social forces of resistance have 
emerged in this still very young twenty-first century; examples range 
from the protests to the social movements, all of them seeking alter-
natives to ‘imperialism’ (Almeyra, 2004; Borón, 2002; cels, 2003; gia-
rracca, 2001; scribano, 2003; seoane, 2003). 
The 26th congress of the Latin American Association of sociology 
took place in guadalajara, mexico, August 2007, oriented by the sub-
ject ‘Latin America in and from the World. social sociology and sci-
ences in the change of Time: Legitimacies in Debate’. The proposition 
expresses the internationalization of critical sociology: 
a) The worldwide debates: the influence that they have in Latin Amer-
ican and caribbean sociology, and simultaneously to emphasize the 
originality and the contribution from the Latin American thought to 
the worldwide social sciences debate; b) the best understanding of the 
original moment by which they cross our societies in his worlds of life, 
their local, regions and countries or even in his processes of integra-
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tion and conformation of supranational identities; c) the analysis of 
the recent social transformations, in terms of the debate on democ-
racy, social participation, citizenship, government, justice, public se-
curity, and the alternatives that are generated from the new left, and 
from other critics to the neoliberals; d) the subjective construction of 
the public ethics, like values of coexistence in the fairness and justice. 
in accordance with this outlook, we can find a synthesis of the Latin 
American social sciences’ contributions to reinterpretations of socio-
logical knowledge, as it presented itself in the second half of the twen-
tieth century, in these concepts: (1) Political independence; (2) order; 
(3) Progress and development; (4) Liberty; (5) revolution; (6) margin-
alization; (7) centre/periphery and their relations; (8) Dependence; (9) 
internal colonialism; (10) socialist revolution and moral revolution; 
(11) Political systems and systems of power; (12) informal society and 
authoritarian formalism, and the neoliberal society; (13) exploitation; 
(14) the pedagogy of the oppressed and collective pedagogy; (15) Lib-
eration theology; (16) Democracy; (17) radical post-modernism and 
constructing the world. it is centred on the concept of ‘Democracy 
for all’ including social groups of the various ethnic origins and the 
civil society (gonzález casanova; in: Tavares dos santos 2009b; mejia 
navarrete, 2009). 
VIII. ThE dIALoGUE bETWEEn LATIn AMERICA 
And ChInESE SoCIoLoGy 
To explain the societies of the twenty-first century, from the point of 
view of a critical sociology, some intellectual problems are decisive: 
1. What role can sociology play in Latin America in the age of the 
worldization of social conflicts? 
2. how to develop the multiple interlocutions in the world space, 
dialoguing with the diverse sociologies of the north and the 
south, and how to explain the homologies of the new world-
wide social issues, in its national and regional contexts? 
3. how to construct the intellectual recognition of the intellectual 
dialogue between Latin American and chinese sociologies? 
Perhaps, a starting point could be the study of the social transforma-
tions (Li Peilin, guo Yuhua & Liu shiding; in roulleau-Berger et al., 
2008), and also the concept of a ‘sociology of transition’ could help us 
in this dialogue (sun Liping; in roulleau-Berger et al., 2008). 
still, we needed to take a step forward to organize a contemporary 
agenda to construct an international sociology, by a comparative ap-
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proach with an international dialogue of theoretical concepts, subjects 
of research, comparative methodologies and an interchange of socio-
logical interpretations (chen Yingying; in roulleau-Berger et al., 2008). 
for the sociological agenda, we may choose some sociological 
dimensions that could be shared for comparatives studies in contem-
porary society: 
1. The agrarian social conflicts and the rural-urban migrations. 
A dialogue with the researches of Liu shiding, Li Youmei, guo 
Yuhua, Tang un (roulleau-Berger et al., 2008) could be quite 
interesting. 
2. The transformations of the work, the effects of the technologies 
and the ‘fragmented cities’. it will be worthwhile comparing 
Latin American studies with the researches of Li chunling, Ton 
Xin, Li Peilin (roulleau-Berger et al., 2008).
3. The diffuse social violence and the ways of violence social 
prevention. 
4. The systems of criminal justice and the model of social con-
trol. for instance, the work of Zhang Jing (roulleau-Berger et 
al., 2008). 
5. The perspectives of construction of a society with respect to the 
citizenship, and the social diversity, in a different level of the 
civilizing process. This point is analyzed by shen Yuan (roul-
leau-Berger et al., 2008). 
in the procedures of contemporary sociology, the dissemination of the 
habitus of the search resides marked by diverse elements: methodical 
doubt, creativity, methods and hypothesis of the scientific work; use 
of the computer methodologies, in order to surpass the antinomies 
of qualitative and quantitative procedures; flexible organization of 
the work in research groups; ethical responsibility and the use of the 
sociological imagination. These elements of the sociological thought 
define sociology as a critical and constructivist knowledge of social 
self-conscience of the reality. 
By this made of intellectual practice, it would be possible to con-
struct sociology for the twenty-first century, oriented by the perspective 
of the transition or transformation, both of society and knowledge. A 
sociology of the transformation, in which the quality of scientific work 
of the sociologist is made up by an imperative of social responsibility, 
with respect to the human dignity and by an academic conduct ori-
ented by the social justice. 
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ConCLUSIon
The recent period of an intellectual history consolidate the interna-
tionalization of the Latin America sociology. 
The 26th congress of ALAs, located in guadalajara, méxico, in 
2007, proposed the following general subjects: ‘The worldwide de-
bates: the influence that they have in Latin American and caribbean 
sociology, and simultaneously to emphasize the originality and the 
contribution from the Latin American thought to the worldwide social 
sciences debate. The analysis of the recent social transformations, in 
terms of the debate on democracy, social participation, citizenship, 
government, justice, public security, and the alternatives that are 
generated from the new left, or from other critics to the neoliberals’. 
Almost the same issues have been discussed at the 27th congress of 
ALAs, in Buenos Aires, 2009: ‘We are determined to consolidate the 
Latin American intellectual movement in social sciences and to for-
tify the diverse participation about: natural resources degradation and 
the ecological conflict; citizenship and participative democracy; the 
new productive areas; and the construction of critical knowledge’. 
consequently, two key questions arise. first, if ‘modernity is a dis-
appointment’, it means that another space-time perspective defies us, 
because the euro centrism, the Western world vision of the modern 
civilization, has a serious challenge (Wallerstein, 1998). The multiplic-
ity of social times requires what we reconstruct our theories and our 
methodologies, minding on historicity (Touraine, 2007; sztompka; in 
Barreira et al., 2006). 
secondly, there is worldization of the social conflicts that changes 
norms, values and produces transnational social movements, like femi-
nism, ecological mobilizations or migrations to the big cities (Wieworka, 
2008). By the way, a blossom of ideas has been produced, as it shows 
the World social forum: (‘open meeting place for reflective thinking, 
democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of 
experiences, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed 
to neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form 
of imperialism, and are committed to building a society centred on the 
human person’), located in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2005, 2010, 2012; in mumbai in 2004; in caracas and Bamako in 2006, 
and in nairobi in 2007; and the regional meetings in 2008 and 2009. 
from Latin America, it could be possible to synthesize the social 
questions and the sociological problems in an emergent agenda for 
sociology: 
1. The development of sociology: concepts, methodologies, insti-
tutions of education and research and associations. 
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2. Development and crisis of the rural society.
3. The big cities: immigration, housing deficit, slums, unemploy-
ment.
4. crisis of the institutions of socialization: family, childhood, 
youth and school. 
5. new organization of work relations, precarious work, vulner-
ability and social exclusion. 
6. The environment issues and sustainability. 
7. sociology of the differences: gender relations, ethnical rela-
tions, and cultural diversity. 
8. social state and Policies: governmentally and social policies.
9. models of social control: violence, the administration of jus-
tice and the human rights. 
10. social movements, civil society and social protests. 
11. internationalization of the knowledge by networks. 
12. Alternatives of a democratic development. 
13. The mode of culture: hybrid cultures, political culture, mass 
media, digital inclusion, the religions and the social imaginary. 
in the Age of Late modernity, the social transformations present this 
complexity of social problems, the ‘mobilization and the activism of 
the masses’, in a global proportion with a dynamic temporality which 
affects millions of ‘common people’ (sztompka; in Barreira et al., 
2006: 13). in order to answer these challenges, we observe, on the 
one hand, the perspective of multidisciplinary or Trans disciplinar ap-
proach (sztompka; in Barreira et al., 2006: 16). 
A global sociology leaves ‘of the global variability, the global con-
nectivity and the global intercommunication’ (Therborn; in Barreira 
et al., 2006: 83). The author proposes five departure points: 1) The 
systems could only be understood if we recognize that its systematic 
is highly variable; 2) the world is divided, ‘with many borders — cul-
tural, social and political’. nevertheless, it is more related and interde-
pendent, it is also a world of real time, a world constantly connected; 
3) the national and the global could be overlapping to each other; 4) 
the increasing regionalization of some economic flows, particularly 
of commerce; 5) the persistent importance of the emergent countries 
(Therborn; in Barreira et al., 2006, p. 93; Therborn, 2006). 
At this moment of paradigmatic transition, the possibility that we 
construct a late-modern critical theory could come if we recognize the 
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relation between knowledge and emancipation, or a ‘decent knowl-
edge for a prudent life’ (De sousa santos, 2000). Because it would be 
the possibility that we enunciate a new common sense, a participa-
tive and re-enchanted common sense (De sousa santos, 2000: 107; De 
sousa santos, 1995). 
The sociologists have an imperative of social responsibility, of re-
spect to the human dignity and academic conduct founded on social 
justice and solidarity, oriented by the scientific merit but even more 
by the social relevance of his work. This pattern of intellectual work 
defines the challenges of the international sociology.
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